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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis was twofold. Firstly, the impact of the following 
independence (accountability) factors on stakeholder perception of auditor 
independence and willingness to appoint the incumbent audit tinn to provide non-audit 
services (NAS) was examined experimentally: (i) the financial threat to auditor 
independence from recurring NAS; and (ii) the structural strength of the board of 
directors. 
Secondly, an analysis of the nature and source of the efficiencies that may accrue from 
appointing the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS was undertaken in the process of 
laying the groundwt)rk for the foregoing experimental study. Qualitative evidence of 
issues of efficiency and accountability impacting stakeholder willingness-to-appoint 
was also obtained prior to conducting the experiment. The evidence was obtained in a 
preliminary study using protocol analysis as the method of inquiry. 
The results of the experimental study arc as follows. 
The financial threat from recurring NAS adversely affected participant perceptions of 
auditor independence and their choice of the audit fim1 to provide NAS, but not the 
third response variable, strength of preference for the audit finn. All three response 
variables were adversely affected where the monitoring strength of the board was weak. 
Further, participant perceptions of auditor independence were more likely to be affected 
by recurring NAS, when the monitoring strength of the board of directors was weak 
than when it was strong. The interaction did not. however, hold for the remaining two 
response variables. 
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1.0 CHAPTER CONTENT 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Chapter is to lay the foundation for the thesis. The Chapter deals with 
four issues. beginning with the background to the study. The background represents a 
distillation of issues expanded upon in Chapters 2 and 4 that fonn an integral part of the 
thesis. The issues include the audit - non-audit services (N:\S) debate, the Australian 
regulatory response to the debate. <!nd the theory of independence risk. Secondly, the three 
broad research questions addressed by the study arc identified. Thirdly, the motivation for 
and importance of the research is described. The chapter concludes by identifying the 
contributions of the research. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
This thesis examines issues of accountability and efficiency impacting the decision of 
whether to hire the incumbent external audit finn to provide non-audit services (NAS), 
wh1.:re the dei:-ision maker (client) is a listed public corporation. "Accountability" refers to 
independence factors impacting the decision and "efficiency" the capacity of an audit firm 
to add value vis-a-vis competitors. accountability aside. Whilst accountability is ultimately 
concerned with capital markets efficiency. a distinction is maintained between the tenns 
accountability and efficiency for the purposes of the study, for ease of discussion and 
analysis. The study falls within the ambit of the body of research that is concerned with 
examining the relationship betv,cen audit quality and independence in appearance, and the 
user-based perception-ufintlepcndence literature in particular. 
Auditors have always been involved in providing clients with NAS (Reed, 1999). The 
provision of NAS predates the audit (A1'bott. 1988). Concern over the implications that the 
provision of NAS may hold for auditor independence was expressed in the United States as 
early as the 1950s. However, it was not until the miti 1970s onwards that the issue began 
to gain a life of its own as a result of significant changes impacting the market for audit 
services. The changes involved the deregulation of the audit market and the advent of the 
global economy. Dr-regulation heightened competition in the market for the audit resulting 
in reduced profit margins. The advent of the global economy resulted in an increase in 
corporate demand for NAS, generally, and an expansion in the range of professional 
scrvi\:es sought. The auditing profession, for reasons identified in Chapter 2, played a 
major role in meeting that demand. 
The decline in audit profit margins and the expansion in the scope of NAS combined to 
result in a significant increase in the relative economic importance of NAS vis-a-vis the 
audit, to pubfic accounting firms, including the market for the joint services, during the 
1980s and 1990s. Further, by the mid 1990s the nature of the NAS provided included 
services traditionally held to be the function of management. The provision of the NAS 
challenged the principle of separation of duties traditionally held to be a necessary 
condition of independence. the hallmark of the profession. 
The foregoing i:hanges represented heightened incentives for the auditor to assume !:,'Teater 
independence risk in the conduct of the audit, i.e., to compromise his/her public interest 
role. The threat from the scope-of-services issue was compounded by an increasing 
network of financial, employment and business relationships between audit firms and 
public corporate clients (Walker, 1999). 
Concern over the threat to auditor independence from the provision of NAS, per se, was 
brought to a head m the United States (US) in 2000. In June of that year, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed regulating audit independence by placing severe 
limitations cr-i the NAS that US accounting finns could ofier to audit clients. The SEC 
proposal served to fuel the debate, worldwide, over the audit-NAS strategy and the related 
issue of government intervention in the regulation of the profession. The audit-NAS debate 
is underpinned by issues of economic (allocative) efficiency (cost - benefit analysis) and 
ultimately the appropriate mechanisms for regulating/safeguarding auditor independence. 
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Those same issues are at the heart of the decision of whether to hire the incumbent audit 
finn to provide NAS that is the subject of this thesis. 
The role of government in the regulation of the audit-NAS strategy has also been brought 
to a head in the last four years as a result of a spate of international corporate financial 
scandals. The scandals were led by the collapse of the US energy giant, Enron and with it 
the premier audit finn, Arthur Andersen, in 2002; and, locally, the prominent insurer, HIH, 
in 2001. The series of events precipitated significant changes in the audit-NAS market and 
in the regulation of corporate governance, generally, worldwide. 
The Australian regulatory response to the audit-NAS strategy, which was instituted in 
response to the foregoing developments, is of immediate interest to this study. The 
regulation consists of a combination of best practice codes and law. From the supply side 
of the market for the joint services, the regulation of the provision of NAS to corporate 
audit clients, vests with the profession. 1 The regulation is contained in Professional 
Statement (PF) I, which fonns an integral part of the profession's Joint Code (?( Conduct 
that deals with independence. The Code is underpinned by Auditing Standards (AUS) 108, 
which deals with independence. The profession has rejected a rules-based approach to the 
regulation of independence, including assurance independence, in favour of a principles­
based approach contained in a three-stage conceptual framework. 
The principles-based approach provides that an audit finn (assurance provider) may 
provide a client with NAS, subject to any threat to auditor independence being reduced to 
an acceptable level. Implementing the standard involves identifying threats, assessing their 
significance, and where a threat is deemed to be significant, applying appropriate 
safeguards to either eliminate or reduce the threat to an acceptable level. The responsibility 
for giving effect to the principles-based approach vests with the assurance provider and 
relies on professional judgement. To that extent, the approach involves self-regulation at 
the level of the assurance provider. However. the professional code plays a significant role 
1 The profession is represented here by CPA Australia (CPA) and the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Australia (CA I 
3 
in establishing minimum standards of accountability at the operational level, through the 
application of the concepts and implementation principles to speci fie situations. 
The principles-based approach compels the auditor ( assurance provider) to take an 
introspective perspective in assessing the capacity of relationships and activities to 
compromise his/her independence: and to assess how the relationships and activities would 
appear to (reasonable and infonncd) others. The latter assessment is concerned with the 
appearance of independence. Independence in appearance fonns an integral part of the 
a�1ditor independence debate and is of immediate interest to this study. 
The profossional code. and. theretiJrc. the principles-based approach, as it relates to auditor 
independence, is underpinned hy statute, on hoth the supply and demand sides of the 
market li.)r the joint services, on the hasis of five key amendments to the Corporations Act 
(200 I) which took eftcct from July I. 2004. The amendments provide for the following: 
(i) a general standard of auditor independence; 
(ii) an obligation on the part of an auditor to declare. annually. to the 
hoard of directors. in writing. that he/she has met the 
independence requirements of the Act and applicable codes of 
conduct; 
(iii) legal status for the Auditing Standards (AUS) and. therefore, those 
dealing with indcpcndence:2 
where the audit client is a listed company. the annual directors' report must 
inciude 
(iv) disclosure of the foe paid to the audit tinn for all NAS. and a 
description of the services: and 
(v) a statement by the directors whether they arc satisfied that the 
provision of NAS docs nol compromise the auditor's 
independence. and their reasons for believing that lo be the case. 
2 There will be a two year holding off period to enable thc standards setter to re-issue the standards in a 
fom1 suitable for legal enforcement. 
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Item (v) is consistent with a board's overriding responsibility for the integrity of the 
financial statements, under the Corporations Act (200 I). Further, in effect, the provision 
renders the board of directors (i) the key statutory regulatory safeguard of auditor 
independence with respect to the threat from the provision of NAS; and (ii) ultimately 
responsible for corporate pnlicy with respett to hiring the incumbent audit firm to provide 
NAS. The professional code also recognises directors as an important mechanism for 
safeguarding auditor i?1dependence. The safeguarding role of the board is of primary 
interest to this study, where the threat from the provision of NAS is wealth based -
specifically, the continuity of fees associated with recurring NAS. 
Corporate best-practice, emanating, for example, from the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) and related empirical corporate governance research (e.g., DeZoort, Hermanson, 
Archambeault & Reed, 2002) suggests that the effectiveness of a board in fulfilling its 
financial reporting safeguarding function relies on it possessing certain structural attributes. 
The safeguarding role of the board of directors is examin�d here from the perspective of 
the strength of those attributes. The threat - safeguarding variables are investigated using 
an experimental approach. Evidence of the effect of the independence factors on 
stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence and willingness to hire the incumbent 
audit finn to provide NAS is sought. The rationale for the choice of the independence 
variables is discussed in section 1.3 below, which deals with the motivation and importance 
of the study. 
The foregoing scenario leads to the research questions of interest to this study, which 
follow. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study attempts to address three broad research questions in the context of the decision 
of whether the incumbent audit fim1 should be hired to provide given NAS. The first two 
questions are empirical and are distinguished on the basis of the dependent variables 
involved. The third research question is descriptive. 
s 
The first empirical question 1s concerned with independence (accountability) factors 
affecting stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence risk. The independence factors, 
as mentioned earlier, involve the financial threat to auditor independence from recurring 
NAS and the structural (monitoring) strength of the board of directors as a safeguard of 
auditor independence. Accordingly, the first research question is as follows: 
RQl Docs financial 1hreat to auditor independence from recurring NAS 
and the structural strength of the board of directors affect 
stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence? 
The second empirical research question concerns independence (accountability) factors 
impacting stakeholder willingness to appoint the incumbent audit firm to provide NAS. 
Again, the independence factors involve the financial threat to auditor independence from 
recu�ng N AS and the structural strength of the board of directors as a safeguard of auditor 
independence. Accordingly, the second research question is as follows: 
RQ2 Does financial threat to auditor independence from recurring ��AS 
and the structural strength of the board of directors affect 
stakeholder willingness to appoint the incumbent audit firm to 
provide NAS? 
The foregoing research questions will be addressed using an experimental approach, 
wherein a listed (public) corporation has chosen to outsource NAS and the incumbent 
external audit firm is one of two likely contenders. The alternative choice is a specialist 
NAS provider. Stakeholder willingness-to-appoint the incumbent audit firm to provide 
NAS is examined by asking participants to indicate whom they would choose to provide 
the NAS; and the strength of their preference for the alternative providers. 
Examining willingness-to-appoint invokes issues of efficiency as well as accountability. 
The potential NAS providers in this study differ in relation to the following criteria, which 
hold implications for the capacity of the respective parties to add value: 
(i) audit technology as a capability; 
{ii) incumbency vis-a-vis the client; 
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(iii) a multi-disciplinary organisational structure; and 
(iv) formal professional status. 
The existing audit literature centres on the efficiencies of the audit-NAS strategy on the 
supply side of the market and their implication for independence in appearance. The 
efficiencies accrue to the audit fim1 from technological advantages (e.g., Beck, Frecka & 
Solomon, 1988a) and knowledge spillovers (e.g., Simunic, 1984 ). The foundation of the 
resom .::es is incumbency and incumbency as a multi-discipline provider to the client, 
respectively. The resources represent client specific investment, and give rise to ex-post 
advantage. The opportunity for the audit client to participate in the efficiencies relies on 
competitive pricing and/or enhanced quality of service emanating from the provider. 
However, the decision of whether to hire the incumbent audit firm to provide NAS that is 
central to this study is, of course, concerned with the demand side of the equation. Further, \ 
the decision choice arises in the initial market for NAS. The process of choosing between 
competing service providers in the initial market for NAS begins with firm specific 
resources held by the providers, and, may or may not be impacted by client specific assets. 
Firm specific assets arc the subject of a literature dedicated to identifying the demand 
determinants of quality professional services, including the audit (e.g., Beattie & Feamley, 
1995; Carcello, Hennanson & McGrath, 1992; Eichenseher & Shields, 1983). However, 
the nature and role of the resources as a source of efficiency in the market for joint audit­
NAS has largely been overlooked in the accounting literature to date. This study will 
attempt to redress that deficiency. 
A unified approach to identifying the nature and source of the efficiencies impacting the 
decision of whether to hire the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS - one that is inclusive 
of firm and client specific assets - is adopted. Such an approach is considered essential in 
guiding the development of the case studies (data instruments) that will drive stakeholders' 
decision choice in the context of the present study. The four fundamental factors that 
differentiate the incumbent audit firm rrom the specialist provider in terms of their capacity 
to add value are expressed through finn specific and client specific resources. 
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Accordingly, the third research question is as follows. 
RQ 3 What are the nature and sources of the efficiencies that may 
accrue from appointing the incumbent audit firm to provide 
NAS? 
The foregoing question will be examined in the first instance at a general theoretical level 
and, therein, with specific reference to the present study. Further, qualitative evidence of 
efficiencies impacting stakeh�lder willingness to appoint the incumbent audit firm to 
provide NAS will also be sought in a preliminary empirical study using protocol analysis as 
the method of inquiry. 
1.3 MOTi VA TION AND IMPORTANCE 
The motivation for this research denves from the opportunity to examine issues that are 
central to the current Australian co-regulatory principles-based approach to the audit-NAS 
strategy, which enables a balance to be struck between the issues of accountability and 
efficiency impacting the strategy; and at the same time extend the existing associated 
academic literature. 
The Australian government considers that wealth incentives.- the fees for NAS - to be the 
most significant threat to auditor independence arising out of the audit-NAS strategy 
(Commonwealth Law and Economic refonn Program (CLERP) 9 Report, 2002}. Further, 
analytical research suggests that the real threat to auditor independence from fees lies with 
recurring NAS ( e.g., Simunic, 1984; Beck ct al., 1988a). Recurring NAS signals the 
presence of client-specific investment, the value of which relies upon a future income 
stream of quasi-rents, i.e., a continued relationship with the client (e.g., Simunic, 1984}. 
From an agency theory perspective, the fees (relationship) provide a mechanism by which 
management may. exact auditor compliance in the domain of residual opportunism. 
However, the results of empirical studies that have sought to identify the relationship 
between the continuity of fees for recurring NAS and auditor independence, on both the 
supply and demand sides of the market for joint audit-NAS, are mixed (e.g., Beck, Frecka 
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& Solomon, 1988b: Parkash & Venables, 1993 ). The present study provides the 
opportunity to examine this important issue further, from a user-based perspective. 
As the foregoing discussion associated with the fees for NAS suggests, financial threat is 
not a sufficient condition .for an auditor to assume heightened independence risk, but relies 
for its effect on pressure from management. The relationship between financial threat from 
the provision of NAS and managerial opportunism has largely dominated prior audit 
quality studies dealing with auditor independence. However, more recent developments, 
for example, in the market for joint audit-NAS, the regulatory principles-based approach to 
auditor independence and empirical studies, beg the question of the relationship between 
non-financial threat and auditor independence, and the role of safeguards in ameliorating a 
threat, generally. The capacity to examine these issues has been advanced. by recent 
significant academic theoretical developments that model independence risk (e.g., 
Johnstone, Sutton & Warfield, 200 I; Mock, Srivastava & Turner, 2005). The models 
represent independence risk (JR) as a function of the following elements: incentives and 
opporlllnity, anc! depending upon the model, auditor integrity/attitude. 
The Johnstone et al. (200 I) and Mock et al. {2005) IR models provide an important means 
of examining the relationship between the threat - safeguarding independence factors of 
interest to this study. The models, together with the Australian regulatory conceptual 
approach to auditor independence, will be deployed to assert that the board of directors has 
a central role to play in safeguarding audit0r independence from the threat from the 
provision of NAS; and, at the same time striking a balance between accountability and 
efficiency. The user-based experimental component of the study provides the opportunity 
to examine the signalling quality of the structural attributes of the board of directors as a 
buffer to effectiveness in circumstances where IR opportunity is high and the threat to 
auditor independence is from wealth incentives. 
Johnstone ct al. (200 I, p. 15) identify examining the relationship between the determinants 
of independence risk as a key area for research. The authors a�sert that by identifying 
"factors and their relationships within the (independence risk) framework, the auditing 
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profession, auditing finns, regulators, and researchers should be better able to respond to 
the practice and policy implications of independence risk" (Johnstone et al., 200 I, p. 15). 
The present study also provides the opportunity to advance our understanding of the nature 
and role of efficiencies associated with firm specific assets in the context of the principles­
based appr'.)ach. 
Thus, in concluding this part, it is suggested that the overall importance of this study lies in 
its capacity to provide valuable evidence on key issues that are part of the current, 
worldwide debate surrounding the joint provision of the audit and NAS, including 
regulatory developments. The audit-NAS strategy is not dead in the water, at least in 
Australia. The code - statutory principles-based approach vests the use and responsibility 
for the strategy vis-a-vis its implications for the independence of the audit in the hands of 
the market players. Regulation serves to anchor responsibility for the strategy on the supply 
and demand sides of the market and at the same time establish and promote a framework of 
mechanisms for preserving independence. 
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The contributions of this research are fivefold. Firstly, examining user perceptions of the 
financial threat to auditor independence from recurring NAS represents an important 
extension of prior user-based perception studies. Prior user-based studies have centrl.!d on 
stakeholder perceptions of the relative magnitude of NAS fees to audit fees for auditor 
independence (e.g., Pany & Reckers, 1988; McKinley, Pany & Reckers, 1985). However, 
as the foregoing discussion suggests, stakeholder perceptions of the threat to auditor 
independence from the continuity of fees (recurring NAS) is central to the issue of financial 
incentives and auditor mdependence. 
Secondly, examining user perceptions of the mitigating strength of the board of directors as 
a safe!:,ruard of auditor independence also represents an important extension of prior user­
based perception studies. Prior user-based studies have centred on separation of duties as a 
safeguard of auditor independence (e.g., Swanger & Chewning, 200 I; Lowe, Geiger & 
Pany, 1999). Separation of duties trades off accountability for efficiency. The board of 
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directors, on the other hand, as the discussion in Chapters 2 and 4 reveals, represents an 
important mechanism for striking a balance between accountability and efficiency. The 
board is also at the pinnacle of the regulatory corporate governance strnctures that have 
been established to preserve the integrity of the auditor's public interest role in Australia 
and elsewhere. 
Thirdly, exammmg the effect of independence factors on stakeholder willingness to 
appoint the incumbent auditor to provide NAS also represents an extension of prior user­
based studies. The prior studies focus on issues of accountability impacting stakeholder 
perceptions of auditor independence, per se (e.g., McKinley et al., 1985; Swanger et al., 
200 I; Lowe et al., 1999). Examining willingness-to-appoint, invokes issues of efficiency 
impacting the decision choice and in that respect introduces additional context to the 
independence decision making process than that reflected in prior user-based studies. The 
ISB (2001 ), for example, acknowledges the impottance of cost - benefit analysis in 
independence decision making. Efficiencies foregone represent indirect costs of reduced 
independence risk and, therefore, safeguards. Context is also recognised as important in 
overcoming the demand effects of earlier user based studies (e.g., McKinley ct al., 1985; 
Pany & Reckers, 1987). 
Fourthly, the approach adopted in identifying the nature and sources of the efficiencies 
from firm specific assets impacting the audit-NAS strategy, represents an important 
theoretical extension of existing research. The approach draws on the resource based 
theory of competitive advantage described in the strategic management literature (e.g., 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). The approach is, at the descriptive level, compatible with 
the economics of audit quality literature dealing with client specific assets. Thus, it 
facilitates a unified approach to examining the fitm specific - client specific issue. The 
framework, which is described in detail in Chapter 5, provides a springboard for further 
research. 
Finally, protocol analysis is used to test a set of case studies designed· to examme 
stakeholder perception of the issues of accountability and efficiency, of int�rest to this 
study, impacting the decision of whether to hire the incumbent audit firm to provide NAS 
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(Study I). The results of the study form an integral role in the development of the set of 
case studies used in the experimental comj)onent of the thesis (Study 2). Protocol analysis 
has traditionally been used to trace human information processing directed at arriving at a 
decision choice, including the area of auditor judgement (e.g., Bedard, Mock, & Boritz, 
1992; Klersey & Mock 1989; Biggs & Mock, 1983). However, in the past 20 years, the 
verbal report technique has also been used to test and develop writter. communication, 
including data instruments (e.g., Midanik, Hines, Greenfield & Rogers, 1999; Flower, 
Hayes & Swart�. 1983; Benb� fich, 2001 ). The tneoretical basis for using the 
technique for 'hat purpose is grouud�d in contemporary communications theory and 
reading comprehension research. The 'think aloud' technique is recognised as the foremost 
method of correcting for response error attributable to impediments to comprehension 
inherent in written communication (e.g., Mantei & Teorey, 1989). Protocol analysis has not 
previously been used for that purpose in audit/accounting research, nor in the process of 
testing and developing case studies, generally. 
Examining willingness-to-appoint experimentally, gives rise to a multi-faceted study that 
invokes a broad ranging set of prior empirical research and extant regulatory corporate 
governance literature and is exploratory in nature. Protocol analysis i� recognised as an 
important method of inquiry in gaining preliminary evidence on issues impacting a 
decision choice under those circumstl!nces (Kuusella & Paul, 2000). The study also 
provides preliminary qualitative evidence of issues of accountability and efficiency 
impacting the decision of whether to appoint the incumbent audit firm to provide NAS. 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes the debate 
surrounding the joint provision of the external audit and non-audit services (NAS) to 
corporate audit clients, the Australian regulatory response to the issue, and the theory of 
independence risk (IR). The Australian regulation and the theory of JR provide the broad 
theoretical setting for the research. Chapter 3 reviews prior empirical research impacting 
the accountability variables of interest to the study. Chapter 4 provides the theoretical 
development of the empirical accountability hypotheses and the rationale for the 
descriptive research question dealing with efficiency. Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the 
nature and sources of efficiencies that may accrue from appointmg the incumbent audit 
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firm to provide NAS. The empirical component of the study is dealt with in Chapters 6 and 
7. Chapter 6 describes Study I, which involves the protocol analysis. Chapter 7 describes 
the research method. empirical results and conclusions of Study 2. Chapter 8 concludes the 
thesis by providing an overall summary and conclusion, including the limitations of the 
research and opportunities for further research. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE AUDIT-NAS DEBATE, 
THE AUSTRALIAN REGULA TORY RESPONSE TO THE DEBATE 
AND THE THEORY OF IR 
2� CHAPTERCONTENT 
The purpose of this Chapter is to lay the theoretical foundation for the thesis. The Chapter 
deals with three issues, beginning with the debate over the joint provision of the external 
audit and NAS to audit clients, which provides the background to the thesis. The discussion 
surrounding the debate addresses the economic arguments for and against the strategy, the 
altered economic circumstances that lead to its prominence, and the broad regulatory 
response to the strategy, emphasising the Australian position. Secondly, the contemporary 
Australian regulatory approach to the audit-NAS strategy will be described. Thirdly, the 
theory of independence risk (IR) is described. The discussion dealing with the Australian 
regulation and the theory of IR lays the groundwork for the theoretical framework of the 
thesis, beginning with the issue of accountability. The theoretical framework is extended in 
Chapter 4 in the process of developing the accountability hypotheses, and, subsequently, 
Chapter 5, which deals descriptively with the issue of efficiency. The chapter concludes by 
outlining market-based incentives to preserve auditor independence. 
2.1 THE AUDIT-NAS DEBATE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine issues of accountability and efficiency that are 
integral to the current worldwide debate surrounding the joint provision of the external 
audit and non-audit services (NAS) by public accounting firms to public, corporate audit 
clients. The implication of the provision of NAS for auditor independence is, inter a/ia, the 
subject of recent professional and statutory regulatory developments, worldwide. From an 
Australian professional regulatory perspective, the issue falls within the ambit of the 
regulation of independence and the provision of assurance services, generally. From a 
statutory perspective it falls within the ambit of the regulation of corporate financial 
reporting, impacting both the supply (external auditor) and demand (e.g., directors) for the 
joint provision of the services. The Australian professional and statutory response to the 
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debate, instituted over the past three years, has been precipitated by a series of related 
events including international regulatory developments, the "Enron factor" and the collapse 
of local high profile corporations at the beginning of the new millennium. The Australian 
regulation provides a balanced solution to the debate surrounding the joint provision of the 
audit and NAS. 
The argument against the audit-NAS strategy views independence as the raison d'etre of 
the profession and centres on the capacity of the incentives that NAS hold for auditors to 
assume heightened independence risk which adversely impacts investor perception of 
financial information risk, and, therefore, the cost of capital. The relationship between the 
perception of independence risk and the cost of capital is underpinned by agency theory. 
The separation of corporate ownership and control gives rise to an agency relationship 
between investors (principal) and management (agent) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Investors (shareholders or debt holders) delegate to management the authority to manage 
economic resources on their behalf. However, both parties are assumed to be self­
interested utility maximisers, which in the presence of imperfect contracting, results in a 
divergence of interests, investor wealth losses from managerial opportunism, and the 
agency problem. That is, the problem of aligning management's interest with that of 
investors i.e., minimising managerial opportunism. Control is provided, in part, by the 
independent external audit, which is intended to alter the opportunity for ex post 
managerial opportunism (Jensen et al. 1976). The external audit is intended to provide 
credibility to the financial representations of management, which may be lost in the process 
of management reporting on its own performance. Where investors perceive that the 
auditor has incentives to assume heightened independence risk, their perception of 
information risk may also rise and negatively impact the cost of capital and, therefore, 
capital market efficiency. Under those circumstances the ""value of the audit function 
itself might well be lost"" (United States v. Arthur Young & Co., cited in Briloff, 1996, p. 
3). 
The changing nature and growing economic importance of NAS to public practice, 
worldwide, during the 1980s and '90s raised concerns over the impact that the altered 
relationship with business (management) could have on auditor independence, in fact, and 
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on public perception of auditor independence, in particular. The threat to auditor 
independence posed or heightened by the provision of "full-service accounting/consulting" 
(Walker, 1999, p. 48) is grounded in circumstances where the auditor is perceived to have 
the incentives and opportunity to engage in high-risk behaviour. 
Antagonists of the audit-NAS strategy call for management consulting to be spun-off from 
the audit i.e., for the audit to stand alone, except to the extent that the services "would be 
required to be performed as an incident to fulfillment of the independent audit" (Briloff, 
1996, p. 9). 
The argument in favour of appointing the incumbent audit firm to provide NAS, on the 
other hand, centres on the economic efficiencies of the strategy, and the capacity of ex post 
safeguards to preserve auditor independence in the presence o+" :he strategy. Proponents of 
the audit - NAS strategy reject the one-size-fits-all/blanket prohibitionist stance of the 
antagonists on the basis that it may result in a cost greater than any benefit that may accrue 
from preserving the appearance of auditor independence. 
Concern over the impact of the scope of services on audit independence was expressed in 
the US, for example, as early as 1957 in a report of the United States (US) Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The issue gained momentum from the mid-1970s onwards, 
beginning with Congressional hearings into the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit 
industry, held in the US. Concerns were raised again in the 1980s and 1990s, evidenced, 
for example, by the Dingell enquiry (1985-1986) and the establishment by the Public 
Oversight Board (POB) in 1994, of the Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence, to look 
into "expressed concern for the independence and objectivity of the auditing profession" 
(POB, 1994, p. I). 
The foregoing events, from the mid- l 980s onwards, were paralleled by changes within the 
accounting industry worldwide that increased the industry's exposure to the market place. 
Three of the changes have had significant implications for auditor independence. Firstly, 
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the repeal of rules against competitive practice resulted in a significant increase in the 
competition for clients, including price competition. Price competition reduced profit 
margins for the external audit and, according to some (Walker, 1999, p. 46), the resources 
that are dedicated to the task. Further, according to Benston (cited in Briloff, 1996) the 
commodification of the audit-\ which he alleges has reduced the skill of the auditor, per se, 
to the auditee, also squeezed profits. 
The second major factor affecting the accounting industry was the rapid expansion in the 
provision of NAS that has resulted in the decline in the relative importance of the external 
audit as a source of revenue to the industry and increased profitability. In the US, the audit 
and accounting fees of the largest accounting firms as a percentage of their total revenue 
· "decreased significantly from 70% of total revenue in 1976 for the Big Eight to 34% of 
total revenue . . (merged into the Big Five) in 1998" (Turner, 2000, p. 4). In the UK, at 
the start of the 1980s the audit provided approximately 70% of the total fees generated by 
the then Big Six fim1s. By 1993, it had declined to slightly less than 40%. Similar patterns 
emerged across the European Community (EC) states over the course of the 1980s 
(Hanlon, 1996). 
The change in the macro-structure of the market was also reflected in the market for the 
joint services. The average non-audit (to audit) fee ratio in the US in the period 1979 to 
1981 ranged from 29.2 per cent to 30. 7 per cent (Glezen and Miller, 1985). However, by 
200 I the figure in relation to the US Fortune 1000 companies had risen to 269 per cent 
(Raghunandan. 2003). In terms of the Australian experience, according to Buffini (2001, p. 
24). a review of Australian corporate annual reports revealed that in 2000, 20% of 
Australia's largest companic'- paid to audit finns. on average, 250% more for consulting 
services ($104 million) than for audit work ($40.2 million). 
The decline in the relative econom 1c imptH tance of the audit within the market for the joint 
provision of the services held implications for auditor independence. That is, the significant 
increase in the relative economic importance of NAS could be construed as providing an 
J Commodification refers to situation where expertise is vested in technology rather than the individual. 
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audit finn with wealth incentives to nssume heightened independence risk. This issue was 
compounded in the US, for example, during the 1990s, by other factors that the SEC 
considered reflected an increasing network of business and financial relationships between 
audit finns and corporate clients. These included the presence of strategic business 
alliances with audit clients, the ownership by audit partners of satellite businesses 
established to perform services for audit clients that regulation prohibited audit firms, per 
se, from perfonning, and audit partners holding investments in clients (Walker, 1999). 
The increase in the demand for NAS, generally, is attributed to the advent of the global 
economy whose complexity increased corporate demand for professional expertise in such 
areas as taxation, infom1ation technology, finance, market studies and human resource 
management (Hanlon, 1996). Heightened competition in the global economy also 
prompted many corporations to outsource non-essential services to improve margins and 
allow management to concentrate on core competencies with a view to developing and 
maintaining a strategic edge. 
The rationale for the expansion in the provision of NAS, by the accounting profession, per 
se, is grounded in the foregoing changes. Walker ( 1999), for example. suggests that the 
declining profitability of the audit threatened the survival of the profession and drove the 
search for alternative more profitable markets. Arrunada ( 1999), on the other hand, views 
the provision of NAS as a natural consequence of modern auditing. He maintains that \Vith 
the advent of the global economy, audit finns needed to contract professional NAS experts 
to help them understand increasingly complex undertakings. Thus, they "found themselves 
in the position of being able to satisfy an increasingly wide range of demand in the field of 
advice, and, in general, the provision of many professional services" (Arrunada, 1999, p. 
73 ). Further, providing the experts with the Ppportunity to provide N AS services is also 
recognised as an important means of .ittracting, retaining and training such personnel, 
whose skills are, in turn, esscntinl to providing a quality audit - an argument in support of 
joint provision. 
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The third factor affecting the accounting industry was the change in the microstructure of 
the market i.e., the product mix offered by audit firms. In 1981, management (consulting) 
advisory services (MAS) for US audit firms represented approximately 15% of their total 
revenue, by 2000 MAS accounted for 40% of revenue (Turner, 2000). Further, by the mid­
l 990s the expansion in the provision of the services by public practice had "taken on new 
dimensions" (Sutton, 1997, p. 88) with respect to the nature of the NAS. The list of 
services included the following: investment banking and other equity-raising activities; 
strategic planning and operational consulting services; assistance in finding business 
partners or acquisition candidates and regulatory approval for major transactions; 
outsourcing services; and other traditional management activities (Sutton, 1997). 
The altered product mix, in the context of the market for audit and NAS, represented the 
capacity for the audit finn to lack independence from the subject matter of the audit and, 
similarly, management. The increased size and mobility of the modem professional 
workforce, which holds implications for employee relationships between the audit firm and 
clients, compounded the problem. 
The changes in the macro and micro structure of the market for audit firm services 
combined to suggest a shift in ethos in public practice from professionalism in the sense of 
serving the public interest, to one of commercialism. That is, the pursuit of profit and 
serving management (Hanlon, 1996) - a sentiment reflected, in part, in the following claim. 
"These firms no longer advertise themselves as auditing firms, but rather as one-stop 
financial service firms that offer a full range of services" (Turner, 2000, 4 ). 
Despite these developments, no solid evidence has been adduced to suggest a link between 
audit failures and impaired independence (e.g., Melancon, 2000). However, in the US, at 
the end the l 990's, the SEC expressed growing concern over the impact that the altered 
relationship between the audit fiff1 and client could have on investor perception of auditor 
independence at a time when the significance of the audit to the capital markets had 
increased. For example, in the period between 1970 and 1998 total capitalisation of the US 
security market grew 20fold from $651 billion to $13.3 trillion; whilst the number of direct 
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public shareholders increased 2.5fold from 32 million in 1973 to around 79 million in 2000 
(Turner, 2000, p. 2). In Australia the total capitalisation of the equiti.es market in the period 
betwee!1 1-992 and 2000 increased 2.6 fold from $389 billion to $1,005 billion (Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX), 2003); whilst the number of direct public shareholders increased 
20fold from 173.000 in 1991 to 3,500,00C in 2000 (ASX, 2000). Under these 
circumstances, independence in appearance is considered to assume particular significance 
(Turner, 2000). 
The foregoing developments also highlighted the fact that statutory provisions and the self­
regulatory structure of the profession, reflected in professional codes of conduct instituted 
in the 1970s, had not kept pace with the dramatic changes that had taken place in the 
industry since that time (Turner, 2000). That is, the rules and roles of the professional 
accountant in the modem era of multi-disciplinarity were ill defined. As a result the 
restructuring that took place in the market place during the 1980s and 90s has had its 
equivalent in the regulatory domain since the beginning of the new millennium. 
Major reviews of audit independence regulation globally were given prominence by the 
following events: 
(a) the release, in November 2000 by the US, Independence Standards Board (ISB) 
of an exposure draft on independence concepts that were to form the basis of a 
conceptual framework for auditor independence. (The ISB was disbanded prior 
to reviewing the comments received. However, the exposure draft was issued as 
a staf
f 
report in July 200 I.); 
(b) the release, in December 2000, by the European Commission, of a consultative 
paper on statutory auditor independence, designed to achieve greater uniformity 
in the requirements in force in the Member States of the European Community 
(EC); and 
(c) the release. in April 2001, by the accounting profession's peak international 
body, the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), of a re-exposure draft 
intended to update its ethical requirements on professional independence 
including the provision of assurance services, gencrally.4 
4 The document was a re-release of an exposure drafi. released in June 2000, which was re-written as a 
result of comments received. 
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The publications focus on the following four core factors that have traditionally been 
recognised by regulators, including the profession, to be of significance to auditor 
independence, and which were the subject of the altered circumstances within the 
accounting industry described earlier: 
(i) financial relationships; 
(ii) business relationships; 
(iii) employment relationships; and 
(iv) the provision of NAS. 
Threat to auditor independence may emanate in the context of the audit-NAS strategy from 
financial, business or employment relationships attaching to members of the assurance 
team. However, threat tu auditor independence emanating from the provision of NAS, per 
se, is of immediate relevance to this thesis. 
Whilst there is some variation in the detail of the foregoing publications, each adopts a 
principles-based as opposed to a rules-based approach to auditor independence and, 
therein, the provision of NAS. The rules-based approach to auditor independence is 
typically associated with the prohibition of certain relationships and activities between the 
audit firm and client, by a regulatory authority independent of the audit firm or profession. 
The approach reflects what Kinney ( 1999, p. 70) refers to as "The Constraint View" of 
auditor independence. The principles-based approach, on the other hand, involves a 
theoretical framework of concept� and principles and the use of professional judgement on 
the part of those vested with the responsibility of applying the theory in the process of 
defining/establishing the operating rules (!SB. 2000). The responsible parties represent 
independence decision-makers. The principles-based approach is more closely aligned with 
Kinney's ( 1999, p. 71) alternative view of auditor independence, "The Core Value View", 
which advocates self-regulation at the audit firm level. 
The principles-based approach to auditor independence holds immediate relevance for the 
Australian regulatory position. The IFAC (2001) publication was formally adopted by the 
profession in March 200� - forming part of its joint code of conduct, as Professional 
Statement F. l (PF I). The best-practice statement also has, in effect. the status of an 
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auditing standard by virtue of section .14 of Auditing Standard (AUS) I 08, which reads as 
follows: 
Professional accountants must ... observe the requirements of Professional 
Statement FI in the Code which includes a requirement to be independent 
when conducting an assurance engagement. 
The principles-based approach to professional independence, as it relates to audit 
assurance, was subsequently ratified by statutory developments, beginning with the 
Ramsay (2001) review. The review was established for the purpose of examining the 
adequacy of Australian, statutory and professional regulatory, auditor independence 
requirements. It was prompted by the foregoing professional regulatory developments and 
the collapse of high profile corporations, such as Onetel and HIH, in Australia in the first 
half of 2001. The review culminated in the publication of the Ramsay report in October 
2001. 
Ramsay's (200 I) approach to dealing with the four factors of significance to auditor 
independence, identified above, sought to preserve the prevailing (then as now) Australian 
co-regulatory position, involving statutory, professional and other best-practice regulatory 
authorities. Firstly, the report sought to upgrade the existing statutory (Corporations Act, 
2001) rules-based provisions dealing with employment and financial relationships, 
identifying a non-exclusive list of such relationships "which, if they exist, mean that the 
auditor is not independent" (Ramsay, 200 I, p. 7). The regulation of business relationships 
and the provision of NAS, on the other hand, were to remain with the profession, with 
supporting statutory recommendations. The recommendations included an inaugural 
general standard of auditor independence, and provided for increased market transparency 
and independent regulatory oversight of the audit. The recommendations associated with 
NAS, per se, called for the provision of the services to be dealt with by the following 
means: 
(a) revised and updated professional ethical rules; 
(b) mandatory disclosure of non-audit services and the fees paid for th(e) services; 
(c) mandatory declaration by the auditor to the directors of his/her independence; 
(d) strengthening the role of the audit committees (board of directors): 
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(e) mandatory disclosure by the board of directors of whether the provision of NAS 
is compatible with maintaining auditor independence; and 
(f) the establishment of an Auditor Independence Supervisory Board (AISB) 
which would have among its functions, the task of monitoring the adequacy 
of disclosure of non-audit services. (Ramsay, 200 I, p. I 0) 
Ramsay (200 I, p. 80) recommended that the responsibility for mandating and defining the 
structure of audit committees vest with the ASX, to be incorporated in the ASX Listing 
Rules. The review also called for the AISB to be constituted outside the control of the 
profession. 
The recommendations contained in the Ramsay (200 I) report were followed by the release 
in September 2002, by the Australian Commonwealth Treasury, of its report titled 
C01 porate disclosure: S1re11gt/ze11i11g the fi11a11cial reporting framework. The report 
represented stage 9 of tht: Government's Commonwealth Law and Economic Reform 
program (CLERP 9) which commenced in the early 1990s. The report is referred to here as 
the CLERP 9 Report (2002). The CLERP 9 Report (2002) embraced the Ramsay (200 I) 
recommendations. Although, it contained an overriding proposal to replace the regulatory 
oversight of the audit (and, similarly the development of auditing standards) within the 
existing statutory framework, headed by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), rather 
than establishing the AISB. Further, whilst the Ramsay (2001) report dealt solely with the 
issue of auditor independence, the CLERP 9 Report (2002) extended to the proposed 
refom, of other areas impacting the strength of corporate financial reporting. They included 
issues of auditor liability, the adoption of international accounting standards, financial 
analyst independence and advice, continuous disclosure, enforcement of accounting and 
auditing requirements, and shareholder participation and infonnation. The latter 
developments reflected the Commonwealth legislature's response to what was described 
worldwide as a crisis in corporate governance, revealed by a spate of international financial 
scandals, beginning with the collapse of the US energy giant, Enron, and with it the 
premier audit finn, Arthur Andersen, in 2002. 
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The CLERP 9 Report (2002) proposals having statutory import were re-released in the 
fonn of an exposure draft, titled the CLERP (Audit Re.form and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 
(CLERP 9 Bill), in October 2003. The provisions provided for a rules-based approach to 
the regulation of auditor independence with respect to financial and employment 
relationships. However, notwithstanding a succession of prominent overseas financial 
scandals post Enron, the CLERP 9 Bill (2003), unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the 
US, did not adopt a rules-based, prohibitive approach to the provision of NAS to audit 
clients. Instead, it sought to strengthen the professional principles-based approach to the 
audit-NAS strategy, embodied in the profession's code of conduct, on both the supply and 
demand sides of the market for the joint services, in line with Ramsay (2001) and the 
CLERP 9 Report (2002) 
The CLERP 9 Bill (2003) passed into law by an Act of the Commonwealth Parliament on 
24 June 2004 - the C01porate Law Economic ReJorm Program (Audit Reform and 
C01porate Disclosure) Act 2004. The Act is referred to here as the Audit Reform and 
C01porate Disclosure Act (2004). The Act amends the Corporations Act 2001 and the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001. The amendments take into 
consideration recommendation 391 of the report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of 
Public Accounts and Audit, and the recommendations of the HIH Royal Commission 
report, released m April, 2003. 
The Australian regulatory, professional code - statute principles-based approach to auditor 
independence and the provision of NAS to audit clients underpins the theoretical setting for 
the research questions of interest to this study. However, before considering the nature of 
the underlying framework, it is important to note the changes in the market place that took 
place in relation to the audit-NAS strategy in line with the foregoing corporate and 
regulatory developments. 
Firstly, with respect lo the relative economic importance of NAS vis-a-vis the audit, in 
Australia non-audit fees as a proportion of total fees paid by the top I 00 companies to their 
auditors cased from around 70% in 2000, to 54% by 2002 (Gettler, 2002, p. 38). Audit fees 
increased, on average, in the same period by 27% (Gcttler, 2002). Secondly, major 
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changes to the accounting and non-audit services framework, per se, included the sale or 
spin-off of the consulting arms of each of the Big 4 audit fin:is. A summary of the major 
changes in the framework, which took place at the tum of the new millennium. is provided 
in Figure I. 
Figure 1: Major changes to the accounting and non-audit sen•ices framework in 
Australia 
KPMG 
• Instituted voluntary internal independence structures: Ethics & Conflicts 
Committee (majority KPMG management); external academic review of 
independence, conflict resolution and quality control pro1.edures - available to 
clients only. 
• Spun off its consulting ann as KPMG Consulting in October 200 I, containing 
business and technology consulting, systems design, applications implementation 
and system integration. 
• KPMG retained assurance, tax, legal, corporate recovery, corporate finance, 
transaction services and forensic accounting. 
• Listed in US on NASDAQ. 
Deloitte Touchc Tohmatsu 
• Spun off consulting services as a private company (Braxton) by the end of 2002. 
• No longer offers internal audit outsourcing services. 
• Retained security, actuarial, corporate finance, and tax services. 
Ernst & Young 
• Sold its consulting arm to Cap Gemini in May 2000. 
• Retained assurance, corporate finance, tax, legal, and advisory businesses. 
• 75 per cent of Arthur Andersen accounting and audit in Australia merged with 
Ernst & Young. 
PriccwaterhouseCoopcrs 
• Sold IT consulting ann to IBM Global Services (July 2002), and withdrew plans 
to spin off and list. 
• Established Audit Standards Oversight Board in May 2002 to examine quality 
control and processes for ensuring audit independence. 
• Spun off valuation consulting and HR outsourcing businesses in 2001. 
Arthur Andersen 
• Spun off Accenture in August 2000. 
• Subsequently built a business consulting division that has since joined with 
KPMG Consulting (75 per cent) and William Buck (25 per cent). 
• Ceased operation in A.ugust 2002. 
Many second tier accounting finns experience business growth through non-audit 
services and the acquisition of non-audit service providers. 
Source: adapted from CLERP 9 Report (2002, p. 31-32) 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing market changes, regulatory support for a principles-based as 
opposed to a rules-based approach to the provision of NAS to audit clients is viewed by 
some commentators as falling short of what is required ( e.g., Citron, 2003; Briloff, 2002). 
The rationale for the principles-based approach, however, is provided in the following 
statement. 
New developments in business, the evolution of financial markets, rapid 
changes in information technology, and the consequences for management 
and control, make it impossible to draw up an all inclusive list of all 
situations when providing non-assurance services to an assurance client 
might create threats to independence and of the different safeguards that 
might reduce these threats to an acceptable level (IFAC, cited in Ramsay, 
2001,p.193). 
The statement a�knowledges the inevitability o� the audit-NAS strategy and that the 
principles-based approach is necessary to accommpdate (i) the external forces, referred to 
earlier, by which the brave new world has been shaped; and (ii) "innovation in organisation 
and service delivery" (CLERP 9 Report, 2002, p. 39). Further, "audit firm projections show 
(NAS) are the engine for their business growth" (CLERP 9 Report, 2002, p. 29). 
The principle-based approach is intended to strike a balance between the partisans and 
antagonists of the NAS strategy, and relies for its success in that respect on the 
effectiveness of the framework of safeguards that have been established to preserve the 
integrity of the audit. 
2.2 THE AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY APPROACH TO THE JOINT 
PROVISION OF THE AUDIT AND NAS 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, PF I supported by AUS I 08, and the Corporations 
Act (200 I ), as amended, reflect the professional and statutory positions associated with the 
regulation of auditor independence in Australia. The aspects of the respective sets of 
regulation that provide the groundwork for the theoretical framework for this study will 
now be considered - beginning with PF I. The speci fie variables of immediate interest to 
the study will be identified in the process of the discussion. 
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2.2.1 Professional regulation - PF 1 
Professional regulation of the joint provision of the audit and NAS strategy falls within the 
ambit of the regulation of independence and the provision of assurance services generally. 
An assurance engagement is defined as one that is conducted to "enhance (he credibility of 
infonnation about a subject matter" to "provide either a high or a moderate level of 
assurance" (PF I, 1.2). 
The provision of services to assurance clients is founded on the following general rule: 
... a firm may provide services beyond the assurance engagement 
provided any threats to independence have been reduced to an 
acceptable level (PF I, 2. 71 ). 
Reducing "threats to independence ... to an acceptable level" reflects the professional 
principles-based approach to independence. The latter approach is described in PF I as 
"tak(ing) into account threats to independence, accepted safeguards and the public interest" 
( PF I, 1.8). Thus, the key concepts involved in the process are fourfold: 
(i) independence, 
(ii) threats, 
(iii) safeguards, and 
(iv) the public interest. 
Formal definition of the concepts is confined to the notion of independence. The 
interpretation of the remaining three variables is a matter of professional judgement on the 
part of the assurance provider, given the circumstances of each case. However, a 
substantial amount of guidance on the nature of the three concepts is provided in PF I. 
Constraints or limitations imposed on the application of the principles-based approach, and, 
therefore, the general rule. are evident, in the foregoing reference to "accepted" safeguards, 
and the related issue of an "acceptable level" of threat. 
The assurance provider is vested with the responsibility of giving effect to the principles­
based approach (PF I, 0. 16 ). The assurance provider includes one or more of the assurance 
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team, finn or network finn, depending upon the nature of the assurance service - all three 
in the case of audit assurance ( PF I, 1.13 ). The implementation process is founded on 
three key principles. 
The nature of the four independence concepts and the �hree procedural principles will now 
be considered in detail. 
2.2.1.1 Underlying concepts 
The concepts underpinning the general rule guiding the provision of NAS to an assurance 
client are, again, independence, threats, safeguards and public interest. 
2.2.1.1.1 Independence 
The profession's definition of independence, per se, provides two separate perspectives of 
the concept. The first prescribes the attitude or state of mind that the assurance provider 
must maintain in the condu.ct of the audit, and is referred to as "independence of mind". 
The second perspective, "independence in appearance", is concerned with the state of mind 
of the observer i.e., third-party stakeholders. The assurance client and assurance provider 
represent the first and second parties. 
The profession's definition of independence reads as follows: 
lndepe11de11ce is: 
(a)Independence of mind - the state of mind that pennits the provision of an 
opinion without being affected by influences that compromise professional 
jud!:_,rment. allowing an individual to act with integrity, and exercise objectivity 
and professional scepticism; and 
(b) Independence in appearance - the avoidance of facts and circumstances 
that are so significant a reasonable and infonned third party, having 
knowledge of all relevant infonnation, including any safeguards applied, 
would reasonably conclude a firm's, or a member of the firm's, integrity, 
objectivity or professional scepticism had been compromised. (PF 1, 0.14 ). 
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Independence m appearance, as it relates to external audit assurance, is of immediate 
relevance to this thesis. The "facts and circumstances" to which the definition of 
independence m appearance refers, include threats to and safeguards of auditor 
independence. 
2.2.1.1.2 Threats 
Threats to independence represent circumstances that provide the assurance provider with 
incentives to assume heightened independence risk in the conduct of an assurance service, 
in fact and appearance. The threats essentially derive from the relationships and activities 
impacted by the altered professional environment identified earlier: financial, bu. _,.ess and 
employment relationships and the provision of NAS. PF I provides the following, non­
exclusive classification of the threats: selt:interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and 
intimidation. The description and examples of each of the threats provided in PF I are 
identified in Table I. 
The specific fonn of threat that may ensue from the provision of NAS is reflected in the 
following examples of self-interest, self-review and advocacy, drawn from Table I. 
Threat 
Sci f-intcrest 0 
0 
Self-review . 0 
l.� • Advocacy • 
• 
Examples 
undue dependence on total fees from an assurance client; 
concern about the possibility of losing the engagement. 
performing services for an assurance client that directly affect 
the subject matter of an assurance engagement; 
preparation of original data used to generate financial 
statements or preparation of other records that are the subject 
matter of an assurance engagement. 
dealing in-. or being a promoter ot: shares or other securities in 
an assurance client; and 
acting as an advocate on behalf of an assurance 
litigation or in resolving disputes with third earties. 
client in 
The threat associated with the fees for recurring NAS that is of interest to this study, falls 
within the ambit of se(f:interest; and with -respect to the foregoing examples, in effect, 
"concern about the possibility of losing the engagement". 
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TABLE l: THREATS TO AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE IDENTIFIED IN PROFESSIONAL STATEMENT PF. I 
Tiircat Description Examples 
Self-interest Occurs when a finn or a mcmher of the assurance team could benefit from a a direct financial interest or motcrial indirect financial interest in an assurance 
financial interest in or other sclf-intcrL-st conllict with an assurance client. client or a related entity: 
a loan to or from an assurance client or any din.'Ctor. otlicer or controlling 
owm.-r of an assurance client: 
concern ahout the possibility of losing the cngagL'lllent; 
undue dL'J)endcncc on total fees from an assurance client: 
having a close business relationship with an assurance client: 
potential employment with an assurance client: and 
contingent fees relating to assurance eng,,gements. 
Scll�revicw Occurs when (I) any product or judgment of a previous assurance engagement or a member of the assumnce ter.m being. or having recently hccn. a director or 
non-assurance cngagL'lncnt needs to he re-evaluated in reaching conclusions on the otliccr of the assurance client: 
assurance engagement or ( 2) when a member of the assurance team was previously a mcmhcr of the assurance team being, or having recently been. an employee 
a director or otlicer of the assurance client or was an employee in a position to of the assurance client in a position to atlcct the a subject matter of an 
n!lcct the subject ma lier of the assurance engagement. assurance engagement: 
perfonning services for an assurance client 1hat directly atlcct the subject 
matter of an assurance engagement: and 
preparation of original data used to generate fin.mdal statements or preparation 
of other records that nre the subiL'CI matter of an assurance engagement. 
Advocacy O.:curs wh,m a !inn. nr a member of the assurance team. hecomes .in advocate for dealing in. nr being a promoter of, shares or other securities in an assurance 
or against an nssurance client's position or opinion to the point that objectivity is. client: nnd 
or is perceived to he impnired. ncting as an advocate on behalf of an assumnce client in litigation or in 
rL-solving disputes with third nartiL-s. 
Familiarity Occurs when. hy \'irtuc of a close relationship with ;m assurance client. its a member of the assurance tcum having an immediate family member or close 
directors. otlicers or employees. a firm or a member of the assurance team family member who is n director or otlicer of ,m assurance client: 
becomes too sympathetic to the client's interests. a member of the nssurnnce team having an immcdinte family member or ch1se 
family member who, as an employee of an assurance client, is in a position to 
affect the subject matter of an assurance engagement: 
a fonncr partner of the finn occupying n policy mnking position with the 
nssurance client: 
long association of a senior member of the assurance team with the assurance 
client: and 
acceptance of gifts or hospitality, unless the vnluc is clearly insignificant. from 
an assurance client, its directors, otlicer or emnloyees. 
lntimidntion Occurs when a member of the assurance warn muy be deterred from acting threat of replacement over a disagreement with the application of an 
ohjectively ond exercising professional scepticism hy threats. actual or perceived, accounting principle; and 
from the dirL-ctors, otlicer or cmplowes of on assurance client. nressure to reduce the extent of work nerfonncd in ordL-r to reduce fees. 
Source: PF I, 1.22 - 1.26. 
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PF I provides that the si1:,,nificance of threats to independence depends upon the 
"characteristics of the individual engagement" (PF I, 1.10) taking into account "qualitative 
as well as quantitative factors" (PF I, 1.16). The "factors" include the nature of the threat 
and assurance engagement, and the scope of public interest in the assurance client. The 
implications of the factors for the significance of the threats to independence are identified 
in the ensuing discussion and in section 2.3 dealing with the theory of IR. 
2.2.1.1.3 Safeguards 
Safeguards represent mechanisms designed to insulate the auditor from threat(s) to 
independence, where a threat is significant. Professional regulation identifies the source of 
safeguards as threefold: 
(a) safeguards created by the profession, legislation or regulation; 
(b) safeguards within the assurance client; and 
(c) safeguards within the firm's own systems and procedures (PF I, 1.29). 
Examples of the form that the safeguards may take at each level are identified in Table 2, 
which is constructed from Appendix I of PF I. The safeguards have either general 
application in promoting and preserving independence, or are assurance cngagement­
specific. 
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TABLE 2: SOURCES AND EXAMPLES OF SAFEGUARDS IDENTIFIED IN PF 1 
Source of safeguards 
The audit firm 
The audit client 
Professional, legislative 
or Other regulatory 
environment 
Examples of safeguards 
Virm-witlc saf�unrds: 
(al linn lcadL-rship lhal sln:sscs lhc 1mp,,rtancc of imkpc,1dL'IICC and th,• cxpL-Clalion lhal member, 
,,r .L�surar,cc IL'.lms will acl in 1hr: public 111tcrcst 
(bi policie� and pmcedurL-s lo 1mmi1or and implement 4uali1y control ofassumnce cngagcmenL,; 
le) dncumemcd indL-pLi dcncc fK'licics regarding the 1dcntilica1ion nflhrL':lL� lo indL-pL'1<lL'1Cc. lhc 
::valuation nf llw significance of 1hcse 1hrca1s and 1he id1?ntitical1on and applicalmn of 
s:tfcguards lo reduce the thr,:-Jls. olher 1ha11 tlwsc that arc clearly insignilicant. 10 an acceptable 
level; 
(di inl,:mal policies and prt>CL-durc-s to mnnitDr compliance with linn pohcics and 1miccdures as 
they rclale lo indc-pc'lldL'IJCe; 
(e) r<•licics and procedures thal will ci able the 1,kntification of interests or rclationsh1p, b, ,WL'L'll 
the tinn or member, of the a.,sumnce team and assurnnce clients; 
{f) policies and pn>CL-dun:s lo monitor and. if O<Xe,sary. manage the reliance on revLi ue receivL-d 
lh1111 a single tL'5Urnnce client; 
(gl using diffcr,i l panncrs and tc-J1ns with scparntc rL-poning lines for the rrov,sion of non­
assur.mcc sL'fVices to an assurance chent; 
(h) fK>licies and proc<.-dun:s I(' pmhihil indi"iduals who arc not member.< of the assurance team 
from mflm,"l1cing the outcome oflhe a.,sur.mce engagement; 
Ii) limdy rnmmunica11on of a linn·s policies and procedurc'S. anJ any changes thc'fcln, 10 all 
pannL. ,,, and professional staff. including appropriate !mining and ,-duca1ion 1hcrL"<m; 
tj I designating a mcmbL'f or senior management as r..-sponsible for ov1.-r.;L"Cing lhe adequate 
functioning of lhc safeguarding system; 
( k) nlL'.lns or advising pannL..,,, and proressional staf
f 
"f those assurnncc dicnls and related L'fllities 
from which they mus I be dc-pcnd,i t 
Ill a disciplinary mc-chanism lo promote compliance with pohcics and pr<>ec-durcs; and 
( ml policies and procedures lo empower staff In communicate. to s,i im levels within the linn. 
any issue nf indL-pL'lldL'IICe and ohiL-cl1vi1y 1ha1 concern, them; thi, mcludcs infom1ing staff of 
the prc>eedurL-s open to them 
Engagcmcnl specific safcgu:irds: 
(a) 
lb) 
le) 
(di 
l,:) 
( I) 
l:il 
lh) 
It) 
;a) 
(b) 
{C) 
(d) 
(c) 
in, nlving an additional profi .. �smnal accuuntmll lo carry out reviews of the work done or 
lltherwisc ad,ise a.s llL-,:essary. llus imhvidual could be sumeunc frnm oulside lhc tinn nr 
nctw,,rk linn, or sol11L'Onc within the linn or network tinn, who w.is not otherwise associated 
with the :�,sumncc IL-am; 
consulting a third pany. such a., a co11111111tec of mdcpc11d1.i11 din.-clor.;. a prnrcssional 
regulatory body or anolhL'f prnf..-ssional accountunl; 
rotalion of sLi ior pL"TSnnnd; 
disclosing to the audit cnmminee or other, chargL-<l w11h govi:rnance. !he nalurc of the sc-rvices 
prcwidc-d and exlcnl of fec-s charge,!; 
disdosmg 1<1 the audit committee. or 1>lhc'fs charged w11h governance. the nature of services 
pro"itled and extent or foes charged; 
policies and procedures to L11sure mcmb,-rs uf the assurJncc team d" not make. (1r assume 
rcsponsibil ity for. management d,-cision, for the assurJncc cl1cnt; an 
involving anothc'f linn In pc'ffom1 or r,·-perforn1 pan nf the assurJnec engagement; 
in"olving anolhL'f tim, lo rc-1,erlimn the non-a.,surJncc SL'fV1ce In the exlcnl nL-c<.-ssary to 
L�,ablc it lo take r..-SfKlllSibility for that SL'fVICe; and 
removing an individual from lhc assumnce leam. where that individual's financial mlercsL, or 
rclalionstuns create a lhrL"al In indL'llL11dcncc 
whc"ll the a.ssurJncc client" s managemem appoints the tinn. per.;nns nlhL'f than managctnL'fll lo 
rntify or appnwc the appointment; 
the assurJncc dici l ha., c,,mpctenl cmploycL-s to make managerial dc"Cisions; 
poiic1e, and procedures lhal emphasise lhc assur.111ce client's commi1men1 In fair financial 
1CfKlr1111[!; 
inh:mal proccdure-i that LTl�urc l'hJct.:t1vc choices m commic;.smnm£, non-assurance 
eng.ag.cm.:nts: amt 
a corpnrJtc gov ... ·nrnncc: structure. such as an audit Clltnnuttcc. lhat provides nppropriak-s 
ovc�iJ.?ht and ,mnmunlcallons rc)!ardinJ.? a linn·s scn.,u.:c�. 
(HJ L"tiucational. trJllllllg und experience n:qu1n.:mcnl" for cnlry inln lhc prnfc..-ssmn. 
th, nmt1nuing L-<lucatinn n .. '11utrcmcnL,;;.. 
le) pn>fcssional standards and monitoring and disciplinary pniceSSL-S; 
id) external rc\'t�w ofa finn·s quality c,,ntml system. and 
k) lel!i,lation govern in I! !he indL'f)endL,ice rc'(luircmc'!llS of the• finn. 
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Safeguarding independence involves the following two broad strategies: 
(i) eliminating threat; or 
(ii) reducing the significance of threat to an "'acceptable level" (PF I, 1.28). 
The two strategics fom1 the foundation of the taxonomy of safeguards depicted in Figure 
2. The taxonomy, drawn from an analysis of PF I, provides order to the ensuing 
discussion and facilitates the analysis of safeguards, generally. The taxonomy includes the 
following: 
• the principles upon which the foregoing strategies are founded -
separation of duties. materiality and governance; 
• whether the principles involve ex ante or ex post incentive ali&>nment - see 
the legend in Figure 2; 
11 where scp_aration of duties is involved, the organisational level at which 
the principle may be implemented; and 
• a non-exhaustive list of the fonn that governance mechanisms may take. 
The nature of the two broad strategics will now be considered. 
Strategy I: Elimi11atio11 
Elimination involves separating the provision of the assurance service from the source of 
the threat and, therefore, the principle of separation of duties. The organisational level at· 
which the safeguard may be implemented differs according to the significance of the threat 
involved. Elimination may be achieved by trading-off the relationship or activity (NAS) 
for the assurance service, or vice versa, at the finn or network levels. Separation in that 
sense is absolute, and is invoked in circumstances where the threat "could not be reduced 
to an acceptable level" by the application of any (other) safeguard (PF I, 2.72). Such 
degree of signi ficancc is the basis for regulatory prohibition of relationships or activities. 
With respect to the provision of N AS, PF I prohibits the following list of activities: 
• authorizing, erecuting or consummating a transaction, or otherwise 
exercising authority on behalf of the assurance client, or having the 
authority to do so; 
• detennining which recommendation of the (audit) firm should be 
implemented; 
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FIGURE 2: Taxonomy of Safeguards of Auditor lndcpcndcncc 
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• reporting. in a management role. to those charged with governance; and 
• any other activity barred by legislation (for example, acting as a liquidator, 
provisional liquidator, controller, scheme manager, official manager or 
administrator of the assurance client within the previous two years). (PF I, 
2.68) 
However, separation of duties may also be used in circumstances where a threat is not 
"so significant" as to result in an absolute trade-off of the relationship or activity (NAS) 
for the assurance service at the firm (network) levei. This may involve, for example, the 
separation of the provision of NAS and external audit service intra-firm (PF I, 2.72), 
i.e., at the assurance team level. Such an approach gives rise to the notion of Chinese 
walls or.firewalls, between separate service teams/divisions, within a firm. 
Strategy 2: Reducing threat to an acceptable level 
Whilst elimination involves removing the source of a threat, reducing a threat to an 
acceptable level involves the following two options: 
(i) reducing the threshold of a threat; or 
(ii) deploying mechanisms for altering the opportunity for a threat to 
take effect, i.e., in the presence of a threat. 
The former strategy is concerned with the principle of materiality. Reducing the 
threshold (materiality) of threats. and elimination operate at the level of the threat itself. 
Thus, they achieve ex ame incentive alignment between the auditor and the public 
(invcstJrs) and are identified here as ex ante safeguards of auditor independence. 
Altering the opportunity for a threat to auditor independence to take effect, on the other 
hand, involves ex post as opposed to ex ante safeguards. The determinants of 
opportunity arc dealt with in detail in the discussion dealing with the theory of IR 
below (section 2.3 ). Suffice it to say at this point, that opportunity is !,'founded in the 
power of discretionary decision making on the part of management, which holds 
implications fo( payoffs to claimholders. That discrrtionary power is the basis of the 
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demand for the independent (external) audit, hoth of which have their origin in the 
separation of ownership an<l control. The role of the auditor is to monitor 
management's discretionary decision making on behalf of investors. Fulfilling that role 
also calls for discretionary decision-making on the part of the auditor. Independence in 
the exercise of the auditor's disc1etionary power is the currency of the profession. Thus, 
safeguarding auditor independence excludes the notion of reducing the foregoing 
antecedents of opportunity, and, therefore, e.r ante incentive alignment in that respect. 
The ex post category of sateguard involves the principle of governance. Governance 
mechanisms represent strategies for mediating equitable exchange (Bowen & Jones, 
1986); in this instance between the auditor and investors (the public). That is, ensuring 
auditor inteb>rity in the conduct of his/her public interest role, notwithstanding the 
presence and significance of the relationship or activity (NAS) that is the basis of the 
threat. 
Examples of the fonn that governance may take are evident in Table 2 {page 32) and 
Figure 2 (page 34). Whilst numerous, the underlying mechanisms include the following: 
• an ethos of ethical accounting behaviour, supported by 
leadership and fonnal standards, policies and procedures 
designed to promote and monitor such a spirit;5 
• disciplinary mechanisms; 
• independent third-party roles involving oversight and 
communication, brokerage and verification; and 
• accountability. 
The ex post approach to safeguarding auditor independence, specifically independent 
third-party oversight and communication, is of empirical interest to this study. 
5 It is acknowledged that an ethical culture may, from the perspective of independence in appearance at 
least. include ex a/lie safeguards, such as prohibition. 
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The use of safeguards, as mentioned earlier. is conditional under the regulatory 
principles-based approach to the extent that they must be "acceptable" (PFl: 1.27). The 
regulatory examples of the safeguards identified in Table 2, and their application to 
specific circumstances contained in Appendix 2 to PF I, provide the foundation for 
what is acceptable to the profession. However, the acceptability, and in that sense 
ctlcctiveness. or otherwise, of the mechanism to other stakeholders is integral to the 
issue of independence in appearance. This is reflected, for example, in the "reasonable 
and informed third party" test included in the definition of _independence in appearance 
identified on page 28. 
Further, section 1.28 of PF I directs the assurance provider to take into consid�ration 
"what a reasonable and informed third party ... would reasonably conclude to be 
unacceptable", and, the following when assessing the appropriateness of safeguards: 
the significance of the threat, the nature of the assurance engagement, the 
intended users of the assurance report and the structure of the firm. 
Third-party perceptions of the appropriateness of safeguard· - a measure of the 
effectiveness of safeguards - is of immediate interest to this thesis. The particular 
safeguard concerns the board of directors. Australian corporate law (the Corporations 
Act, 2001, Part 2M.3, Division I) holds the board of directors ultimately responsible for 
the integrity of the financial statements of a corporation. As a result it is the ultimate 
internal governance mechanism for facilitating (ensuring) auditor independence. This 
issue is pursued in greater detail in the discussion dealing with the theory of IR (e.g., 
Johnstone et al., 200 I; Mock et al.. 2005) in section 2.3. below; and again in Chapter 4 
(see 4.2.2). 
2.2.1.1.4 Public i11terest 
Public interest is concerned with the scope of stakeholder interest in the assurance 
client, which is assessed with respect to a client's "business, ... size or ... corporate 
status" (PF I. 1.20). Public interest in the assurance client is identified in PF 1 as an 
integral part of assessing the significance of any threat to independence. This issue is 
pursued in greater detail in the ensuing discussion. 
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2.2.1.2 Implementation principles 
The three key principles to be followed by the assurance provider in giving effect to the 
principles-based approach to independence are as follows: 
(a) identifying the threats to independence; 
(h) evaluating whether the threats are clearly insi!:,'llificant; and 
(c) in cases, when the threats are not clearly insignificant, identifying and 
applying appropriate safeguards to eliminate or reduce the threats to 
an acceptable level (PF I, 1.17). 
Thus, again, safeguards are invoked in circumstances where threat is significant. 
The foregoing concepts and implementation principles apply to all assurance 
engagements. However, PF I also stipulates that the significance of threats and, 
therefore, the applicability of safeguards will differ according to whether the assurance 
engagement is an audit engagement or otherwise (PF I, I. I 0) and, as mentioned earlier, 
the level of public interest in the assurance client. The document provides that the 
scope of public interest and, therefore, independence in appearance, assume particular 
significance in evaluating the significance of threats and the appropriateness of 
safeguards where the assurance engagement is the audit and the audit client is a listed 
entity (PF I, 1.20). A listed entity is defined as follows: 
An entity whose shares, stock or debt are quoted or listed on a recognized 
stock exchange, or are marketed under the regulations of a recO!:,'llized stock 
exchange or other equivalent body (PF I, 0.14). 
The interface between threats and safeguards within the audit assurance-NAS setting, 
involving a listed company, provides the focus of this study. The audit assurance -
listed company scenario, as the foregoing discussion suggests, heightens the 
significance of threat to independence from NAS. The theoretical basis for that 
proposition is identified in the context of the discussion dealing with the theory of IR 
(section 2.3). 
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The professional, regulatory principles-based approach strikes a balance between the 
antagonists and protagonists of the audit - NAS strategy. To that end PF 1 identifies a 
non-exclusive list of nine NAS the provision of which to a listed audit client "may 
create threats . . so significant that no safeguard could eliminate or reduce the threat to 
an acceptable level" (PF 1, 2.75). The NAS are as follows: 
• Preparing accounting records ! • 
and financial reports • 
Litigation support services 
Legal services 
• 
• 
Valuation services I •• 
Internal audit services 
Recruitment of senior management 
Corporate finance and similar activities 
• Provision of IT services 
• 
The nature of the NAS reflects regulatory concern for the audit firm occupying a 
position of conflict of interest vis-a-vis its r,ublic interest role, which is concerned with 
the governance (control) of manager.tent. However, unlike the US Sarbanes-Oxley 
(2002) Act, which prohibits an audit firm from providing the foregoing list of services 
outright, PF I provides that a firm may provide the services subject to certain 
safeguards. The alternative positions reflect the rules-based versus principles-based 
approaches, respectively. 
From a professional perspective - prohibition accepted - the general rule relating to the 
provision of services to assurance clients, identified on page 2"i, and iterated below, 
appli..:s. 
. a firm may provide services beyond the assurance engagement 
provided any threats to independence have been reduced to an acceptable 
level (PF I, 2. 7 ! ). 
Thus, with respect to the audit-NAS strategy, the principles-based approach to 
independence provides the opportunity for economic efficiencies to prevail in the 
market for NAS, subject to external audit accountability being met in the market for 
equity. The principles-based approach to independence, embodied in PF 1, is 
considered, for the purposes of this thesis, to provide the professional ground rules for 
39 
meeting accountability in the market for joint audit and NAS. From that perspective, 
· accountability is met where the following conditions prevail: 
I. any threat to auditor independence from NAS is insignificant at the 
outset: or 
2. the threat to auditor independence from NAS is sif,rnificant but 
safeguards have the effect of reducing the threat to an acceptable 
level. 
•· 
Thert:fore, from the perspective of this thesis, the professional general principle relating 
to the provision of NAS to audit clients, identified above, might also read as follows: 
... a firm may provide NAS beyond the audit engagement provided 
accountability is met. 
However, the question remains as t? the implications that statutory regulation of the 
external audit and the demand side of the market for the joint services, holds for the 
professional principles-based approach to auditor independence. This issue will now be 
dealt with. 
2.2.2 Statutory regulation of auditor independence and the audit-NAS strategy 
The changes to Australian legislation impacting the principles-based approach to auditor 
independence and, therefore, the provision uf NAS to audit clients, including the 
demand side of the market for the joint services, are evident in the A11dit Reform and 
Co,porate Disc/os11res Act (2004 ), which amends the Corporations Act 200 l. The 
Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosures Act (2004 ), as with us predecess,xs, the 
Ramsay review (2001) and the CLERP 9 Report (2002) and Bill (2003), supports a co­
regulatory approach to auditor independence, and is designed to strengthen professional 
regulation. The document deals specifically with the issues of financial and employment 
relationships between the auditor and the auditee, including their significance for the 
provision of NAS. The regulation of business relationships and the provision of NAS, 
on the other hand, remain with the professi<.,n. The latter position was initially 
confim1t!d by reform provision 6 of the CLE�P 9 Report (2002, p. 3), which called for 
the "immediate application" of PF I. 
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However. the foregoing vesture and status of the PF I requirements are underpinned, 
legislatively, on both the supply and demands sides of the market for joint audit-NAS. 
Supp(i• side 
Amendment 307C ( I to 3) of the Corporations Act (200 I) calls for the annual audit 
report to be accompanied by a declaration to directors that the auditor (individual or 
lead auditor in the case of an audit fillll or company) has not contravened the following: 
S307C (I) (i) the auditor independence requirements of th(e) (Corporations) 
Act; and 
(ii) any applicable codes of professional conduct in relation to 
the audit. 
Subsection (I) (ii) embraces the requirements of PF I. Further, with resped to 
subsection (i), professional auditing standards including those impacting auditor 
independence, will fonn part of the requirements of the Corporations Act (2001 ), in 
2006. The auditor independence requirements of the Corporations Act (2001) referred to 
in S307C (I) (i) above also include a general standard of auditor independence. The 
standard 1s grounded in the notion of the auditor not being in a "conflict of interest 
situation" vis-a-vis the auditee (amendment S324CA (I) (b)). 
A conflict of interest situation is defined in amendment S324CD (I) as existing in 
circumstances where because of circumstances that exist at the time: 
(a) the auditor. or a professional member of the audit team, is not 
capable of exercising objective and impartial jud!:,'ITlent in 
relation to the conduct of an audit of the audited body: or 
(b) a reasonable person. with full knowledge of all the relevant facts 
and circumstances. would conclude that the auditor, or a 
professional member of the audit team, is not capable of 
exercising objective and impartial judgment in relation to the 
conduct of an audit of the audited body. 
The standard establishes tht: appearance of independence as a necessary condition of 
independence. Further. the concepts identified in the standard. including the notion of "a 
reasonable person. with full knowledge of all the relevant facts and circumstances" are 
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important in defining the legal, and, therefore public expectations of auditors. Overall. 
the provisions underpin the role of independence in relation to "audit business risk" - an 
important safeguard of auditor independence emanating from the audit firm that 
includes the related risks of litigation and loss of reputation (e.g., Huss, Jacobs & 
Patterson, 1993 ). 
Demand side 
Amendments to the Corporations Act (200 I) also serve to strengthen the professional 
principles-based approach to the provision of NAS to audit clients on the demand side 
of the market via increased market transparency and oversight of the audit-NAS 
strategy. Amendment 300 (11 B) provides that the directors' annual report for listed 
companies must include the following statements under the heading "Non-audit 
services": 
(118) (a) details of the amount paid or payable to the auditor for non-audit 
services provided. during the year, by the auditor (or another 
person or firm on the auditor's behalf); 
(b) a statement whether the directoFs are satisfied that the provision 
of non-audit services, during the year, by the auditor . . . is 
compatible with the general standard of independence for 
auditors imposed by (the) Act; 
(c) a statement of the directors' reasons for heing satisfied that the 
provision of those non-audit services, during the year, by the 
auditor . . . did not comprise the -auditor independence 
requirements of (the) Act. 
The foregoing two statements must be made in accordance with advice provided by the 
company's audit committee or a resolution of the direl.'.tors in the absence of an audit 
committee (Section 300 ( 11 D) of the Act, 200 I ).6 
r 
I 
I 
Suh-sections (b) and (c) of S300 ( 11 B) above have the eftcct of rendering directors 
independence decision-makers and ultimately responsible to the public on the issue of 
auditor independence and the provision of NAS. The capacity to fulfil that 
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responsibility would rely on directors ensuring that appropriate systems are in place to 
screen for the selection of the audit finn in the market for NAS, an ex ante perspective, 
and "<ltegrnrd audit independence in the presence of NAS, an ex post (governance) 
perspective. 
Directors occupy an interesting position in relation to the ex ante/screening role. A 
board could serve to safeguard auditor independence by instituting a policy of rejecting 
the auditor as a provider of NAS - a prohibitionist stance. However, such an approach 
may result in "destroying value for shareholders and introducing costs much higher than 
the benefits" (Long, cited in Buftmi and Tingle, 2002, p. 4). The benefits to which Long 
(2002) refers are those efficiencies that accrue from reduced independence risk. For 
auditees the benefits may include, for example, reduced cost of capital and litigation; for 
auditors, reduced litigation and enhanced reputation; and for investors, improved 
resource-allocation decisions (ISB, 200 I). The benefits are at the heart of the argument 
against joint provision of the external audit and NAS referred to earlier. Notably. the 
benefits underpin the fact that a major objective of accountability is capital market 
etftciency. However, as stated earlier, the issue of capitcll market etliciency is referred 
to in terms of accountability in this thesis, for ease of discussion. 
The costs to which Long (2002) refers. on the other hand, at the audit client level, 
include the loss of economic efficiencies from not appointing the incumbent audit firm 
to provide NAS. That is, circumstances where the audit firm offers maximum value for 
shareholders vis-a-vis competing NAS providers, taking into consideration 
accountability. Net benefits may accrue from enhanced quality of service in relation to 
the audit and/or NAS; and/or savings in transaction costs. Thus, the provision of NAS 
by the incumbent audit firm may represent both a source of efiiciency and a threat to 
accountability. 
6 Audit commillccs arc mandatory for companies included in the S & P All Ordinaries Index at the 
beginning of the financial year under the ASX Usrin� Rl'q11ircme111s. section 12. 7. 
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Therefore, the decision of whether the incumbent auditor should be chosen to provide 
NAS represents a double-edged sword where issues of efficiency and accountability 
prevail. However. in circumstances where the threat to auditor independence is 
significant, rules-based regulation (prohibition) aside, the decision need not result in a 
trade-off cf efficiency for accountability or vice-versa. The capacity to take advantage 
of efficiencies where the NAS also hold incentives to assume downside independence 
risk lies with safeguards that alter the opportunity for the incentives to take effect and/or 
preserve auditor integrity. This issue is highlighted in the discussion on the theory of IR 
in the following section of the Chapter (2.3 ). 
Prohibition trades-off efficiency for accountability. The costs alluded to by Long (2002) 
are attributable to the exercise of the safeguard of prohibition. The issue of the costs of 
safeguards (reduced independence risk) is recognised by the ISB (200 I) as a basic tenet 
to be considered by independence decision makers in the analysis of auditor 
independence: 
Independence decision makers should conclude that the benefits of 
reduced independence risk from applying safeguards exceed their costs 
(ISB, 2001, section 31 ). 
The costs to which the ISB (2001) refers include the loss of economic efficiencies in 
circumstances where the audit firm represents the best choice for the job, which are of 
the nature of indirect costs, and the direct costs associated with the safeguards, per se. 
Such costs are at the heart of the argument in favour of joint provision. The direct costs 
of safe!:,>uards represent a third facet of the issue of economic efficiency that underpins 
the decision of whether the incumbent audit fim1 should be chosen to provide NAS. In 
circumstances where the audit finn represents the most efficient choice of provider for a 
given NAS, optimal efficiency would appear to lie with those safeguards of auditor 
independence for which indirect and direct costs are minimal. An analysis of the nature 
anu sources of the indirect costs of redu(:ed independence risk are provided in this study 
(sec Chapter 5). However, the issue of the direct costs of safe1�uards falls outside the 
scope of the study. 
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The foregoing ISB (200 I) principle is directed at regulators - the document from which 
it is drawn represents a staff report. However, it is no less applicable to other 
independence decision-makers. For example, in Australia, decision-making by directors, 
generally, is impacted by a best-practices principle that provides that they are 
responsible for maximising efficiency subject to meeting accountability (e.g., Bosch, 
1995; Hilmer, 1993). 
Further, prohibition holds particular significance in Australia where "with only four 
major firms, there's a scarcity of sk1lled advisers and ruling out auditors dimirnshes 
supply significantly" (John Hall, the president of the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors (AICD), cited in Butftni et al. 2002, p. 4). Notably, as mentioned earlier, 
unlike the US Sarbanes- Oxley Act, the Corporations Act (2001), as amended, does not 
directly and unconditionally prohibit an audit firm from providing the list of nine 
prohibited NAS identified earlier. In effect, it defers to the requirements of the 
profession (PF I) in that respect. 
Thus. as the foregoing discussion suggests, the application of the principles-based 
approach to auditor independence and the provision of NAS, raises important empirical 
questions on both the supply and demand sides of the market for the joint services. 
Questions, for example, concerning perceptions of the threats to auditor independence; 
the acceptability and, therefore, signaling quality, of the safeguards of audit 
independence; what constitutes an "acceptable level" of independence risk; and the 
nature and relative benefits and costs of reduced independence risk. 
The issues of accountability and efficiency converge in this study by exammmg, 
empirically, circumstances where stakeholders face the decision of whether the 
incumbent audit fim1 should be chosen to provide NAS, in circumstances where the 
potential NAS providers are hcterogenous. The decision choice is referred to in tenns of 
stakeholder willingness-to-appoint, a phrase coined by I kin (200 I) in the context of 
modeling the detenninants of the demand for NAS, from an economics of audit quality 
perspective. 
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2.3 THEORY OF INDEPENDENCE RISK 
The capacity to examine the complexities of the principles-based approach to auditor 
independence has been facilitated by recent significant academic, theoretical 
developments in the area that model the principles-based approach to independence 
from the perspective of the notion of independence risk. The developments are twofold. 
Firstly, the Johnstone et al. (200 I) auditor independence risk framework depicted in 
Figure 3; and secondly, the Mock et al. (2005) model of the risk of impaired 
independence, depicted in Figure 4. 
The Johnstone et al. {2001) and Mock et al. (2005) IR monels, together with the 
professional principles-based approach to addressing the inherent conflict of providing 
both audit and NAS to a client, provide fundamental tools of analysis for examining 
how the variables of interest to this study relate. 
Johnstone et al. (200 I, p. I) define independence risk (IR) as "the risk that an auditors' 
independence may be compromised or may be perceived to be compromised". 
Johnstone et al. {200 I) frame IR as a function of two elements: firstly, incentives and 
secondly, opportunity. The two clements are the basis of independence in appearance. 
Independence of mind (in fact) is unobservable. Independence in appearance is 
concerned with inferring independence of mind on the basis of "facts and 
circumstances" (PF I, 0.14), i.e., evidence. The facts and circumstances represent the 
contextual independence factors that define IR incentives and opportunity. The factors 
are either antecedent to the elements, i.e. are a necessary condition for the elements to 
exist; or of the nature of safeguards, which serve to mitigate independence risk. 
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FIGURE 3: A Framewurk for Understanding the Antecedents and Consequences of Independence Risk 
Neces•,ary 
Eri ...-ironmental 
Conditions 
:\litigating Factors 
Stakeholder 
Analysis 
Suggested Actions 
Direct incentives 
Direct invcslmcnts 
Contingent fees 
Po1e111ial employmc111 
Fin.111<:ial dcpcnclcm:c 
\Vhat incentives create independence risk? 
Indirect Incentives 
lntcrpcrsonal relationships 
Auditing work l'f sclf or !inn 
What judgement-based decisions allow independence risk to affect audit quality'? 
Pressure on ditlicuh Pressure on Pressure on audit 
Accounting issues Matcriality judgements Scope and conduct 
What factors may mitigate independence-related environmental conditions? 
Corporate Go\'ernance 
Mechanisms 
Boards of directors 
Audit committees 
Auditing Firm Policies 
Concurring partner reviews 
Peer reviews 
I \\"ahm-lirm consultations i Audiwr competence programs 
L Compensation plans 
Regulaton· Oversight 
Standard setting 
Enforcement 
Auditing Firm Culture and 
Individual Auditor 
Characteristics 
Auditing firm emphasis on 
its public duty 
Auditors' ethical and moral 
characteristics 
How arc stakeholders affected if mitigating factors fail? 
Auditccs Shareholders and creditors Individual auditors 
Auditin_g_p_rofession 
+ 
Regulators 
\\'hat actions should he taken by the auditing profession, auditing firms, regulators, researchers? 
Source: Johnstone ct al.,. 200 I. p 4. 
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FIGllRE 4: Model of Risk of Impaired Auditor Independence with Examples 
Risk of Impaired 
Independence 
• Safeguards 
• Safeguards created by the profession. 
legislation or regulation 
• Safeguards within the assurance client 
• Safeguards within the firm ·s own 
systems and procedures 
Incentive 
Opportunity 
Safeguards* 
........_ 
Threat 
Safeguards* 
Self-interest 
threats 
Intimidation 
threats 
Advocacy 
threats 
Familiarity 
threats 
Self-review 
threats 
Threat due to auditor 
characteristics 
Threat due to auditec 
characteristics 
Threat due to audit 
program judgments 
• Financial interests in client 
• Loan to or from client 
• Undue dependence on fee 
• Concern over losing engagement 
• Close business relationships 
• Potential employment 
• Contingent fees 
• Actual or threatened litigation 
• Threat of replacement 
• Pressure to reduce work 
performed to reduce fees 
• Promoting securities of client 
• Client advocate in litigation or 
disputes with third parties 
• Family and personal relationships 
• Long association of senior audit 
personnel with assurance clients 
• Gifts/hospitality from clients 
• Reviewing auditors own work 
previously done for client 
• Auditor previously director. officer. or 
innuential employee of client 
• Inability to resist intimidation threats or other 
demands of dominating client personnel 
• Willingness to ignore or inappropriately 
interpret laws and regulations 
• Cultural differences in moral codes 
• Existence of errors or fraud 
• Accounting issues requiring judgment 
• Selection of audit procedures 
• Interpretation of evidence 
• Materiality choice 
Source Moel. ct al . :!005. p 41 
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2.3.1 Incentives 
Incentives represent factors that provide an auditor with a motive(s) to breach 
independence i.e., his/her integrity, objectivity and/or scepticism. They 'ire a source of 
pressure for the auditor to assume heightened independence risk. Incent1. �s may be 
classified as (i) direct: wealth and career prospects; and (ii) indirect: interpersonal 
relationships and conflict of interest (Johnstone et al., 200 l ). 
Incentives may be viewed as the obverse side of a coin whose reverse side comprises 
the conceptual threats to auditor independence, which arise in circumstances where: 
• the auditor has a mutual or conflicting interest with the audit client; 
• audits his or her own firm's work; 
• functions as management or an employee of the audit client; or 
• acts as an advocate for the audit client (Ramsay, 2001, p. 27). 
The foregoing circumstances are the foundation of the non-exclusive list of five 
subclasses of threat to auditor independence generally: self-interest, self-review, 
advocacy, familiarity, and intimidation identified in Table 1 (page 30). That is, the 
analogy of IR incentives in the context of the regulatory principles-based approach to 
independence is the threats to independence. The incentives (threats) are invoked 
through financial. business or employment relationships between the audit firm and 
client and/or activities involving the provision of NAS. The relationship between 
incentives (threats) and the antecedents of the concept is depicted in Figure 5. The 
aspects of the diagram that are of immediate relevance to this study are highlighted in 
green. The source of the threat that is of interest to this study is, of course, the provision 
of NAS. The particular threat is se(/:i,11erest. emanating from the fees from recurring 
NAS, which result in the audit firm having a mutual interest with the audit client as bi­
lateral traders. The incentive, being wealth based, is direct as opposed to indirect in 
nature. 
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FIGURE 5: Antecedents of incentives (threats) 
INCENTIVES 
Threats 
Sc·ll'-1nten:,1 
Self-review 
Advocacy 
Familiarity 
Intimidation 
Antecedents 
• Financial relationships 
• Business relationships 
• Employment relationships 
• Pro\ i�ion of t\:\S. 
The mitigation of IR incentives. per se. would involve eliminating or reducing the 
materiality of the threat (relationship and/or activity) that is the source of incentives. 
i.e .. ex ante incentive alignment. 
2.3.2 Opportunity 
The IR element opportunity. as the name suggests. refers to the presence of 
circumstances that allow incentives to assume heightened independence risk to take 
effect. The element plays a critical role in detennining the significance of incentives. in 
that respect. and provides the bridge between incentives and audit quality. De Angelo 
( 1981 a) defines audit quality as the probability of detecting errors (a matter of auditor 
competence): and the probability of reporting errors (a matter of auditor independence). 
Johnstone et al. (2001) identify auditor judgement-based ( discretionary) decision­
making arising in the context of a client-resolution process as the antecedent of 
opportunity. Auditor judgement-based decision making originates in the context of the 
knowledge base that defines the boundaries of the profession. and its application to 
circumstances peculiar to the audit client (e.g .. Abbott. 1988). The power of discretion 
is exercised with respect to issues involving accounting policy choice: materiality: and 
the scope and conduct of the audit (Johnstone et al. 200 I). 
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A client-resolution process is characterised by managerial opportunism (e.g., Gibbins, 
Salterio and Webb. 200 I). Managerial opportunism has its origins in the separation of 
ownership and control. which gives rise to an agency relationship between shareholders 
and managers, and the underlying assumption that all individuals are self-interested 
wealth maximisers (Jensen et al.. 1976). The movement out of profits alters 
management's preferences for non-pecuniary benefits and, in the presence of 
incomplete contracting. provides the opportunity for self-seeking behaviour in the 
exercise of discretionary decision-making impacting (pecuniary) payoffs to 
claimholdcrs. The purpose of the independent external audit, as mentioned earlier, is to 
alter the opportunity for such behaviour (Jensen et al. 1976). Under those 
circumstances, management must secure the co-operation of the monitoring agent to 
give effect to self-seeking behaviour (Jensen et al., 1976). 
Thus, the Johnstone et al. (200 I) reference to client-resnlution invokes the notion of 
auditor judgement-based decision-making under pressure from management; and with it 
a separate accounting literature dealing with audit-client negotiation of a client's 
financial representations ( e.g., Magee & Tzeng, 1990; Gibbins et al., 2001 ). Magee et 
al. ( 1990, p. 315) recognise circumstances where "auditors . . . disa!:,rree among 
themselves as to the appropriateness of the reporting policy desired by the client" as 
antecedent to judgement-based decision-making, and pressure from the client. The 
fom1er condition is "largely defined by the presence or absence of clear standards" 
(Gibbins et al., 2001, p. 539). Thus, the client resolution process originates with the 
knowledge base that characterises the accounting (auditing) profession, and specifically 
within the domain of discretionary decision making. 
Gibbins et al. (2001) model the client-resolution process in the context of a three­
clement audit-client negotiation inodel comprising, in order: an accounting issue, 
auditor-client process and an accounting outcome. Further, the researchers define 
negotiation as "any context in which two or more parties with differing preferences 
jointly make decisions that affect the welfare of both (all) parties" (Gibbins et al., 2001, 
p. 538). Gibbins ct al. (2001, p. 538) also portray the negotiators as "self-interested, 
rational agents". Thus, the judgement-based/discretionary decisions made as part of the 
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negotiation process hold implications for payoffs to claim-holders, and the .. flow of 
accounting infonnation to investors and other infonnation users" (Gibbins et al., 2001, 
p. 536), i.e., audit quality. Under these circumstances, where public interest is high, the 
independence (integrity, objectivity and scepticism) of the auditor is paramount to 
investors and others. The circumstances are, in tum, the essence of the role of the 
external audit - an ex post mechanism for altering the opportunity for managerial self­
seeking behaviour (Jensen et al., 1976). However, where NAS involvement provides the 
auditor with incentives to be dependent, he/she may be perceived, as a self-interested 
negotiator, to err on the side of management, i.e., to succumb to pressure. The catalyst 
for seeking auditor co-operation, in fact and appearance, is the IR element incentives. 
However, whilst Johnstone et al. (200 l) identify the client resolution process as the 
antecedent of opportunity, it is suggested here that in certain circumstances the pressure 
for the auditor to compromise audit quality does not rely on that context. This is 
evident, for example, in the Johnstone et al. (200 l ,  p. 5) discussion of the threat of self­
rcvicw, which follows: 
Self-review might create a situation in which the auditor is unable to critically 
evaluate his or her own work. It might also create a situation in which the 
auditor is unwilling to impair a relationship with other members of the 
auditing finn or the client, thus reducing the auditor's ability to evaluate audit 
evidence objectively. 
Under those circumstances the pressure on the auditor to impair his/her independence in 
exercising the power of discretion would derive from the subject matter of the audit, not 
managerial opportunism, i.e., ultimately, the NAS per se. Th.e inability to "critically 
evaluate his or her own work" and/or an unwillingness to "impair a relationship", in fact 
or appearance, would impair objectivity and/or skepticism in the exercise of t11e 
auditor's discretion with respect to the scope and conduct of the audit. The 
circumstances underpin Craswell 's ( 1999, p. 32) suggestion that "auditor independence 
depends upon an auditor's incentive ... to find errors" as well as "to report them". 
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However. the significance of the foregoing indirect incentives for auditor independence 
would depend upon the demand for a quality (competent and independent) audit. i.e., 
the scope for managerial opportunism. Thus. it is suggested here that it is the scope for 
managerial opportunism rather than the client-resolution process, per se. that, together 
with auditor professional discretion. represent the antecedent of IR opportunity. Support 
for this proposition is reflected in PF I with respect to the role of the public interest 
factor in determining the significance of threats to independence, and overriding 
regulatory concern (best-practice and statute) for the provision of NAS to public listed 
entities. 
Thus. the antecedents of IR opportunity are identified here as threefold, and, as shown 
in Figure 6. as follows: 
(i) managerial discretionary decision making; 
(ii) managerial propensity to act self-interestedly in the exercise of that 
discretion - referred to here as mana�erial opportunism; and 
(iii) auditor discretionary decision making. 
FIGURE 6: The antecedents of opportunity 
Antecedents 
(i) Managerial discretionary decision-
OPPORTUNITY � making. 
(ii) Managerial opportunism. 
( iii) Auditor discretionary decision-
making. 
The source of items (i) and (ii) originate with structure of the audit client. specifically 
the separation of ownership and control. Item (iii) originates with the knowledge base of 
the auditing profession and. as stated earlier. its application to the circumstances 
peculiar to the client. Thus. the structure of the audit client and the knowledge base of 
the profession may combine to provide significant scope for discretionary decision­
making on the part of management and/or the auditor for a given audit engagement. The 
impact of the audit client" organisational structure in that respect arises in the context of 
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the external audit of listed, public corporate entities, i.e., circumstances that invoke the 
public interest role of the auditor. Under those circumstances, safeguarding auditor 
independence from any threat to auditor independence via IR opportunity would rely on 
ex post (governance) mechanisms preserving the integrity of managerial discretionary 
decision-making, i.e., managerial opportunism. The safeguards may emanate from one 
or more of the audit finn, the audit client or regulation (professional, legislative or best 
practice). The board of directors, as the safeguard of interest to this study, is embedded 
in the governance of the audit client. The monitoring qualities of the board are the 
subject of best practice. 
2.3.3 Auditor integrity 
Johnstone et al. (2001) define contextual factors that have an ameliorating effect on IR 
as mitigating factors. The mitigating factors include a determinant of independence of 
mind - auditor integrity (Johnstone et al., 2001). The nature and mitigating effect of the 
latter factor on IR is formally addressed by Mock et al. (2005). 
Mock et al. (2005) recognise auditor intebJ ity as a third, fundamental element of IR. 
The researchers define the element, in an earlier stage in the development of the theory, 
as the "propensity . . . to engage in inappropriate activity" (Turner, Mock and 
Srivastava, 2002, p. 3). However, the concept of auditor integrity has more recently 
been subsumed by the researchers into the construct attitude (Mock et al., 2005). The 
definition provides the basis for the notion of managerial opportumsm, identified earlier 
as an antecedent of opportunity. 
The Mock ct al., (2005) IR model is grounded in evidential theory and the notion of 
inferential problem solving. The model is underpinned by the following equation: 
JR = f (incentives, attitude, opportunity). 
The paradigm that forms the basis of the mathematical analyses is the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of belief functions (Mock et al., 2005). 
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Thc synthesis of the resean.:hers' model of IR is depicted in Figure 7. The diagram is 
structurcd around thc following arguments which are identified in Figure 7 by the use of 
bold and light print respectively: 
(i) the structurc of the researchers' analytical argument i.e., the relationship 
between the construct risk of impaired i11depe11de11ce ( IR) and the three IR 
clements: the evidence (antecedents and safeguards) and the clements: and 
the clements, per se: and 
(ii) the mathematical arguments that fonn the bases for the analyses. 7 
The detailed mathematical arguments arc not described in this thesis. However, the 
structure of the researchers' analytical argument is fundamental to the theoretical 
development of the hypotheses of interest to the current study. Thus, consideration will 
now be given to identifying the nature of the relationships that define the structure. 
The argument between IR and the three clements accepted, the directional relationships 
arc. essentially, twofold. Firstly, there is a unilateral rLlationship, moving fn.,m left to 
right, between the evidence and the three elements. This argument holds that all three 
clements arc to be present for IR to exist. That is, IR "implies non-zero" values for "'all 
three components of the independence risk triangle" (Mock et al., 2005, p. 11 ). 
IR attitude has its analogy in independence in fact. However, independence, as a state of 
mind. is unobservable. Further. given the public interest (social) role of the external • 
audit, the regulation of auditor independence is as much concerned with ensuring that 
the external audit should be seen to be independent as it is within fact. Australian 
regulation, professional and statute, renders independence in appearance a necessary 
condition of independence. St?'.:cholder perceptions of an auditor's propensity to act 
inappropriately (dependently) is. again, ·inferred from the IR clement incentives, IR 
oppo1iunity accepted. The inferential problem of assessing independence in appearance 
7 The contrasting density of the print represents a modification to the presentation of the Mock ct al. 
( 2004) dia1,.rram. The modification is deployed here to facilitate the current analysis. 
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(the perception of IR) is represented in the Mock, Srivastava and Turner (2004) diagram 
(Figure 7) by the bi-directional broken lines coded by the authors as propositions R1•3• 
Proposition I (R 1 ) recogmses a bi-directional relationship between attitude and 
incentives; proposition 2 (R2). between attitude and opportunity; and proposition 3 (R3), 
between opportunity and incentives. 
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FIGURE 7: Evidential Diagram for Independence Risk 
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Source: Mock ct al.. 2004. p. 52. 
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Each of the bi-directional relationships is separated here into the associated unilateral 
directional influences between the clements. The pairs of uni-lateral propositions are 
referred to as R 11 --a·· and ··b'" respectively. and are depicted in Figure 8. The basis for the 
coding is as follows: 
o The direction coded ··a'" represents in the case of the auditor, pressure 
from incentives and opportunity to impair auditor independence; and in 
the case of management the means of securing auditor co-operation. 
• The direction coded ··b··. on the other hand. captures the aspect of the 
Mock et al. (2005) model that is concerned with intent. That is, 
··knowledgeable actions .. leading to .. intentional impairment" (Turner et 
al. 2002. p_. I) on the part of the auditor or management, whichever 
applies. 
The sub-clas::,i fication has been undertaken to facilitate the analysis of the relationships 
and. ultimately. the fit between the Mock et al. (2005) model and the variables of 
interest to this thesis. 
F !G URE 8: Unilateral relationshins that comnrisc nronositions R,. 
incentives 
attitude 
opportunity 
Source: adapted from Mock el al.. 2005. p. 3. 
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The nature of' th� resulting six sub-propositions is as follows. R la recognises the 
proposition that an auditor·s propensity to act inappropriately is a function of the 
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strength of incentives. The relationship depicted by R2i, "recognizes that an auditor with 
an inappropriate attitude may seek to create or increase existing incentives" (Mock ct 
al., 2004, p. 19). 
R2a recognises the proposition that an auditor's propensity to act inappropriately is a 
function of the scope for opportunities. R21, recognises that "an auditor with an 
inappropriate attitude may seek to create or increase existing opportunities" (Mock ct al. 
2004, p. 20). 
R3a recognises the proposition that managements' propensity to act self-interestedly 
(opportunism) is a function of the strength of incentives as a means of securing the 
auditor's co-operation. R.11, recognises that management may take actions to create or 
increase existing opportunities, for that reason. 
The common denominator in the foregoing relationships 1s human ochaviour. 
specifically the propensity for individuals to act in their o,vn self-interest. Thus. the 
Mock et al. (2005) model holds the key to understanding how safeguards proviJc the 
means of maintaining a balance between etliciency and accountability, direct costs of 
safeguards aside. in relation to the audit-NAS strategy. The issue of efficiency and 
threat arc inextricably linked to the IR clement incentives. Thus. the balance lies with 
mechanisms that serve to mitigate IR attitude and managerial opportunism as a 
detenninant of IR opportunity. 
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2.4 MARKET INCENTIVES TO PRESERVE INDEPENDENCF 
The discussion of safeguards of independence has to this point been confined to 
regulatory mechanisms. However, safeguards that serve to mitigate IR also extend to 
market (economic) incentives. 
The major market incentive for auditor's to preserve independence is attributable to 
reputation assets, for example, brand name, which includes the reputation for 
competence and independence. The mitigating effect of the assets in the market for 
NAS is considered in detail in Chapter 5, which describes the nature and source of the 
efficiencies that may accrue from appointing the incumbent audit firm. Suffice it to say 
at this point that reputation assets attract a premium that would not be forthcoming in 
the absence of the asset. Under those circumstances, it is expected that auditors will 
seek to "maintain and improve independence reputations . .. to enhance their wealth" 
(Kinney, 1999, p. 70). Thus, reputation assets operate at the level of the Mock et al. 
(2005) IR dement attitude, ex post. 
The existence of reputation assets as a source of competitive advantage in the audit 
market is well established (e.g., Palmrose, 1988: Teoh & Wong, 1993; Balvers, 
McDonald & M1 ler, 1988: and Beatty, 1989). However, the question remains as to 
whether an audit firm's audit independence reputation adds value in the market for NAS 
(Kinney, 1999). 
Reputation assets remain the foundation of the argument for self-regulation at the audit 
finn level with respect to auditor independence (e.g., Kinney, 1999), notwithstanding 
the altered, contemporary professional environment. However, market incentives to 
preserve independence arc grounded in the assumption that individuals behave 
rationally. Regulation of the joint provision of the audit and NAS and the notion of 
independence in appearance, on the other hand, recognise that auditors may not act 
rationally in auditing their clients. Further. as the discussion to date indicates, the extant 
regulatory environment continues to become increasingly more sophisticated, 
worldwide, with the advent of recent significant developments. The developments 
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include the US Sarbancs-Oxlcy Act (2002) and in Australia, PF I and, more recently, 
the Audit Reform and C01porate Disclosure Act (2004 ) . 
. ,__�<?a'fcguard ·of interest to this study, as mentioned earlier, is that of the 
directors. from an ex post perspective. In Australia, the board of directors is vested with 
the ··ultimate responsibility ... to ensure the integrity of the company's financial 
reporting" (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003, p. 29). The board represents the 
ultimate internal authoritative governance structure for mediating the actions of 
management and the internal and external auditors. From the perspective of the Mock et 
al. (2005) JR model, directors have the capacity to promote the integrity of discretionary 
decision-making on the part of management (mitigate IR opportunity) and the auditor 
(mitigate IR attitude). However, best practice regulation (e.g., the ASX Principles of 
Good Corporate Govema11ce and Best Practice Recomme11datio11s, 2003) and 
supporting empirical research (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2002) suggests that the effectiveness 
of the board relies on key structural attributes. Those attributes centre on the audit 
committee with respect to a board's responsibility for the integrity of financial 
statements in the case of a listed corporate entity, which is the business unit of interest 
to this study. However, the safeguard b constructed and referred to here in terms of the 
structural strength of the board of directors. These issues arc pursued in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER3 
PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
3.0 CHAPTER CONTENT 
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a review of prior empirical research impacting the 
development of the emp!rical hypotheses relating to accountability, undertaken in Chapter 
4. The hypotheses address the relationship between the fees for recurrent NAS and the 
structural strength of the board of directors on stakeholder perception of auditor 
independence and willingness-to-appoint. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The prior research falls into the following three categories: 
(i) user-based perception (experimental) studies that examine the 
relationship between auditor independence and the threat of self-interest, 
and separation of duties as a safeguard of independence in the face of 
threat from self-review and/or self-interest emanating from the provision 
of NAS by the incumbent; 
(ii) economics of audit quality studies that examine the differential effect of 
recurring and non-recurring NAS on the audit-client relationship; and 
(iii) corporate governance studies dealing with board (audit committee) 
effectiveness and the structural attributes of the board. 
The three categories also provide the structure for the ensuing discus5,on. The review of 
the individual studies in each category is provided in table fvrma .. preceded by an 
introductory overview of the research. A description of individual studies is, however, 
undertaken in the theoretical development of the empirical hypotheses with which they are 
associated, in Chapter 4 (see 4.2). 
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3.2 USER-BASED PERCEPTION STUDIES 
The results of user-based perception studies that have examined, inter a/ia, the affect of the 
provision of NAS on the perception of auditor independence are mixed. Earlier studies by 
Schulte ( 1965) and Hartley and Ross ( 1972) found that the provision of NAS had a positive 
effect on the perception of auditor independence. Studies by, for example, Titard ( 1971 ), 
Shockley ( 1981 ). Knapp ( 1985), Gui ( 1991) and, more recently, Beattie, Brandt and 
Feamley ( 1995). on the other hand, found that the joint provision of the audit and NAS, 
inter alia. adversely impacted user perception of auditor independence. However, all of the 
foregoing studies are open to the criticism that the results may have been sil,rnificantly 
influenced by demand effects associated with the use of surveys and/or repeated measure 
designs (McKinley et al. 1985; Pany et al. 1987). 
Other studies, beginning with McKinley et al. ( 1985 ), have sought to overcome the 
limitatior,s of the method inherent in the foregoing studies by using the between-subjects 
experimental design and providing context to the decision process involved. The review of 
the user-based studies here is confined to the latter set of studies. The studies are sub­
classified into two !:,>roups according to the independent variable involved. The first group 
involves the threat of self-interest emanating from the magnitude of the fees for NAS. The 
second group concerns the use of separation of duties as a safeguard of auditor 
independence from the threat of set f-review and/or sci f-interest. 
3.2.1 Threat of self interest emanating from the magnitude of the fees for NAS 
The studies that examine the relationship between auditor independence and the threat of 
self-interest emanating from the magnitude of the fees for NAS are twofold: Pany et al. 
{ 1988) and McKinley et al. ( 1985). The threat of se11:.interest is operationalised in both 
sturiies via the magnitude of the fees for NAS as a percentage of the audit fee. The 
participants involved in the Pany et al. ( 1988) study were bank Joan officers and financial 
analysts (investors). The experimental task required the parties to make a loan (investment) 
decision; and evaluate the reliability of the financial statements and auditor independence. 
The participants' perception of reliability and independence was measured by asking the 
participants to rate their confidence in the issues involved. The case materials cenfred on 
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historic and forecast financial data relating to the corporate loan applicant (investment 
target). an evaluation of management and background infonnation on the corporation. 
The McKinley et al. ( 1985) study involved bank loan officers only. The task was similar to 
that used in the Pany et al. ( 1988) study vis-a-vis the corporate loan applicant. 
The results of the studies suggest a lack of stakeholder concern for the associated threat of 
self-interest. A review of the studies is provided in Table 3. The table is structured around 
the following dimensions of the studies: 
.. 
Researcher(s) 
& vcar 
Participants Threat NAS Dependent 
type variables 
Independent Results 
variables 
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TABLE 3: User-based studies and wealth incentives 
( ' 
Researchers Participants Threat NAS Dependent 
Independent 
Results 
& year type variables variable 
Pany ct al. 192 loan Self-interest: Internal Loan decision. NAS fees. With respect to the loan officers·. the only dependent measure affected 
( 1988) officers magnitude control Financial Levels: 0%, was the loan decision (approve (not approve). The group at the 25% 
ofNAS fees design statement 25%. 60%and level of audit fee approved the loan at a much higher rate (71 %) than the 
to audit fee. reliability. 90% of audit fee groups at the zero. 60% and 90'Vo levels. 
Auditor 
independence. 
104 Investment With respect to the financial analysts. the only item affected was the 
investors as above as above decision. As above safety of the investment ( one of live questions associated with the 
( financial Financial investment decision) over an ensuing 12 month period. which was 
analy�ts). statement significantly lower at the 90% level. then for the other three levels of 
reliability. NAS. 
Auditor 
independence. 
McKinley et 261 bank Self-interest: Internal Loan decision. NAS fees. The NAS variable did not significantly affect the loan decision or the 
al. ( 1985) loan officers magnitude control Financial Levels: 0% and perception of auditor independence. The variable was significant with 
ofNAS fees design statement 30% of audit fee respect to reliability. but lead to increased confidence that the financial 
to audit fee. reliability. statements were free of fraud. rather than the expected opposite direction. 
Auditor The researchers suggested that the respondents may have perceived that 
independence. the NAS lead to improved internal control. 
I 
(The study also examined the affect of audit firm type and size on the 
dependent variables.) 
,,. 
65 
3.2.2 Separation of duties as a safeguard of auditor independence 
The studies that examine separation of duties as a safeguard of independence emanating 
from the provision of NAS are threefold: Geiger, Lowe & Pany (2002); Swanger et al. 
(200 I); and Lowe et al. ( 1999). The studies are concerned with examining the affect of the 
outsourcing of the internal audit function (!AF) on stakeholder loan decisions and 
perception of financial statement reliability and auditor independence (Geiger et al. 2002; 
Lowe et al. 1999); and stakeholder perception of auditor independence and the investing 
public view of auditor independence (Swanger et al. 200 I). 
The Geiger et al. (2002) and Lowe et al. ( 1999) studies examine separation of duties as a 
safeguard of the threat to auditor independence from the perspective of the threat of sclf­
review. However. Swanger et al. (200 I) examine the safeguard from the perspective of the 
threat from self-interest (wealth incentives) and self-review. The participants involved in 
the Geiger et al. (2002) and Lowe et al. ( 1999) studies were bank loan officers. The 
participants in the Swanger et al. (200 I) study, on the other hand, were financial analysts. 
Further, the Swanger et al. (200 l) study, unlike the remaining two studies, involved a two­
phase as opposed to a single-phase undertaking. 
The results of the studies suggest that separating the provision of the IAF from the audit 
impacts favourably on independence-related perceptions. A review of the studies is 
provided in Table 4. The Table is structured around the following dimensions of the 
studies: 
Rescarchcr(s) Participants Threat 
& vcar 
NAS Dependent Independent Results 
type variables variables 
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TABLE 4: User-based studies and separation of duties 
STUDY 
Geiger ct al. 
(2002} 
I 
Participants 
145 Loan 
officers 
Threat 
Self review. 
I NAS 
type 
Internal 
audit 
ft .ction. 
Dependent 
variables 
Loan approval. 
Financial 
statement 
reliability. 
Auditor 
independence. 
Independent variable 
Outsourcing (OS). 
Levels: 
I. No OS. 
2. OS to the 
incumbent auditor. 
without staff 
separation and 
where the 
provision of the 
NAS included the 
perfonnance of 
management 
functions. 
3. OS to the 
incumbent audit 
finn - without 
staff separation. 
4. OS to the 
incumbent audit 
finn - with staff 
separation. 
Results 
Participant perception of auditor independence and financial 
statement reliability, and loan acceptability were negatively 
affected where the auditor assumed management functions in 
perfonning the !AF. 
Separation of duties had a pos1t1ve effect on participant 
perception of auditor independence and financial statement 
reliability and loan acceptability. 
The perception of auditor independence was significantly 
different across the three types of outsourcing arrangement. 
Continued ... 
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Table 4 continued: User-based studies and separation of duties 
Researcher I 
& year: Participants Threat NAS Dependent 
Swanger et al. t)'pe variables 
(200 I) 
Phase I 153 financi:il Self Internal C(lnfidence in 
analysts. interest. audit auditor 
function independence. 
(IAF). 
Confidence in the 
appearance 0r 
independence to 
the investing 
public. 
Phase 2 117 financial Self Confidence in 
analysts. interest. auditor 
independence. 
Confidence in the 
appearance of 
inJependence to 
investing public. 
Independent variable 
Outsourcing (OS). 
Levels: 
I. NoOS. 
2. OS to another 
external audit !inn. 
3. OS to incumbent 
audit !inn -
without staf
f 
separation. 
Outsourcing (OS). 
Levels: 
I. Full OS to 
incumbent audit 
finn - with staff 
separation. 
2. Full OS to 
incumbent audit 
finn - without staff 
separation. 
3. Partial outsourcing 
- with staff 
separation. 
4. Partial outsourcing 
- without staff 
separation. 
--
Results 
Analysts' perceptions of auditor independence were greater · ,\'hen 
<!rent 
om1s 
the auditee docs not outsource the !AF or outsourced to a diff 
external audit finn than when the incumbent audit finn pcrf 
the IAF. 
Analystf' perceptions of auditor independence arc higher 
the internal audit services were provided by a different divisi 
the in..:urnbent audit firm compared to the no-staff sepru 
treatmen:. Perceptions did not differ between full and p 
outsourcing treatments. 
,vhen 
on of 
ation 
artial 
Continued ... 
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Ill 
---- ---- ---�---·-· ---, 
Tahle 4 continued: llser-hased studies and separation of duties .. ·-·--·-··- -. ---- ----- c� - - ---- � . . , , 
I Rmmhec(s) ! Pactidpant, I That �AS D,p,"deot l"dep,nd,"t •'- I t,·pc ,·•1r·1al>ln• . bl ( l Results �,. ,·cur . ·  • �., \'arm c s • I 
1 (l\\'C _cl al. l 177 hank 
I 
Self lntt·rnal Ll1an appro\'aL Outsc,urcing (OS). Auditor pcrfonnancc of manage1111:n1 tunct1ons had a sigmlicantly 
( 1999) h1an otliccrs re,·iew. audit Financial Lc\'t:ls: negative impact on users· percep1i11n of' amhtor independence and 
� 
l 
function. statement I. No OS. financial statement reliability and loan approvals. However. the 
rdiability. 2. OS to another separation of audit firm staf
f 
pcrforn1ing the outsourced IAF from 
I 
Auditor external audit firm. those performing the external audit had a signiticantl:1 positive 
independence. 3. OS to incumbent impact on financial statement users· perceptions and loan 
audit linn - without approvals. 
staff separation and 
the provision of the 
NAS included the 
perfonnance of 
management 
functions. 
-t. OS to incumbent 
audit firm 
without staff 
separation. 
5. OS to incumbent 
audit fim1 - with 
staff separation. 
... 
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3.3 ECONOMICS OF AUDIT QUALITY AND RECURRING NAS 
The economics of audit quality studies of immediate interest to this study arc those that 
examine the differential effect of recurring and non-recurring NAS on the audit-client 
relationship. The empirical studies otmsidcrcd here arc threefold: Beck ct al. I 988b� 
DeBcrg. Kaplan and Pany ( 1991) and Parkash ct al. ( 1993 ). The motivation for the studies 
originates with the Beck ct al. ( 1988a, p. 51) analytical model which demonstrates that the 
strength of the economic bond between auditor and client depends on "whether or not the 
(NAS) engagement is recurring". 
The variables used as a measure of auditor independence differ between the studies. 
Recurring NAS represent a measure of the presence of client specific investment. Client 
specific investment is synonymous with incumbency as a multi-discipline provider to the 
audit client. The value of the investment relics upon the future income stream i.e., a 
continued relationship between the parties. The Beck ct al. ( 1988b) and DeBerg et al. 
( 1991) studies arc based on the expectation of a significant positive relation between the 
provision of recurring NAS and auditor tenure and auditor switching, respectively. Such an 
outcome would ,suggest the presence of a strong economic bond between auditor and client, 
which may bold implications for auditor independence in fact and/or appearance. The 
results of thc'Studics provide limited support for the respective researchers' expectation. 
The Parkash ct al.( 1993) study is grounded in agency theory and evidence of audit client 
sensitivity to the adverse implications that the joint provision of the audit and NAS may 
hold for auditor independence and. therefore. agency costs. The study was conducted on 
the expectation of a positive relationship between agency costs and the demand for 
recurring NAS. The results of the study support the expectation. 
A review of the studies is provided m Table 5. The table 1s structured around the 
fi.)llowing dimensions of the studies: 
1 Rc�carchl•r(s) :\kthod Companies/ 
\'.iriablcs useJ a� a 
Results 
i--
--] I & ,·ear subjects measure of auditor l _ _· ______ _ _ J_ __ _ __ �---- ----- _ �- __ _ i_m _  l�_·p __ e_n_df_•n_c_e __ _,__ ___ ____. 
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r-· -----·----�- -··-·- -
! TABLE 5: Economics of audit quality studies and recurring NAS 
' -
' 
i Rescarcher(s) & year 
I lkck cl al. ( J 9R8h) i 
I 
I 
DeBerg ct al. ( 1991) 
Parkash ct al. ( 1993) 
'.\let hod 
I Arc hi,·al 
Archival 
Arc hi ml 
Companies/su hj ects 
50 US li,1ed companies 
in 1978 and 1979. 
All listed companies 
that changed auditors 
hetween September 
1978 and February l 9R� 
( tn:ntment group J and 
similar companies that 
did not switch auditors 
in that time frame 
( control group). 
250 Fortune 500 listed 
companies for J 97R. 
1979 and l 9RO. 
Variables used as a 
measure of auditor 
independence 
Auditor tenure. 
Auditor switches. 
Agency theory 
measures: management 
ownership. outside 
investment 
concentration and 
leverage. 
. . l 
Results 
Limited support was l<.1und for mcrcased bonding decreased 
independence in the case of some of thL· recurring NAS categories 
u1 the 1978 suh-sampk. l lowewr. the results were not replicated 
in the 1979 suh-sample. The dilTcrcncc in the means of audit 
tenure in the high NAS groups ,·aricd only slightly in ahsolute 
tcnns with that of the low groups although the differences were 
significant. No significant results were found in relation to non­
recurring NAS. 
The results did not find any significant differences in the lewis of 
total NAS. recurring NAS and non-recun·ing NAS between the 
treatment and control groups. 
In an extension to the principal research question. the researchers 
I investigated whether the decision to change audiwrs was related to 
changes in the purchase of NAS. Levels of NAS before and alier 
the auditor switches wen: examined. The results indicated that 
lower levels of total NAS and recurring NAS were purchased from 
the successor auditor vis-a-vis the predecessor and also w the no­
change group of companies. 
The findings indicated that variables related to expected agency 
costs ( management ownership. outside investment concentration 
and leverage) significantly explamed cross-sectional differences in 
the demand for recurring NAS. Overall agency costs did not 
explain the level of non-recurring NAS purchased from the auditor. 
The data also indicated that auditees purchased higher levels of 
recurring NAS from the inr.umbent au
0
dit firm when they were an 
._ I I I I industry specialist of the largest provider ofNAS. 
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3.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The present study examines the affect of the structural strength of the board of directors on 
stakeholder perception of auditor independence and willingness-to-appoint. The study in 
effect examines the signalling quality of structural strength as a measure of board 
effectiveness in discharging its financial reporting responsibility. The relationship between 
structural strength and the financial reporting effectiveness of the hoard has its analogy in 
audit committee effectiveness studies (ACE).x Thus, prior ACE studies are the subject of 
this discussion. 
DeZoort et al. (2002) provide a synthesis of empirical literature dealing with ACE. The 
synthesis is framed by a four-element taxonomy of the structural detenninants of ACE. 
The four elements and their dimensions are as follows: 
Elements 
• Composition 
• Authority 
• Resources 
• Diligence 
Dimensions 
- expertise, independence, integrity, objectivity 
- responsibilities, influence (derived from full of board 
of directors, federal law and exchange listing 
requirements) 
-adequate number of members: access to management, 
external auditors and internal auditors 
- incentive, motivation, perseverance 
(DeZoort et al. 2002, p. 42) 
The DeZoort ct al. (2002) article provides the basis for the summary of the review of the 
literature, updated by ACE studies published since that time. However, an alternative 
approach to classifying the studies is adopted here. The alternative approach is centred on 
identifying relationships between structural strength and measures of monitoring 
effectiveness that arc integral to the theoretical development of the board-of-directors 
safeguarding hypotheses. However, structural strength, per se. is ultimately defined in the 
thesis by the DeZoort ct al. (2002) clements composition, authority, resources and 
diligence. Thus, the alternative classification scheme includes the DeZoort ct al. (2002) 
taxonomy. 
'-n,c hasi, t,,r 1his prnposi1i11n is dcah with in Chapter 4 (sec 4.2.2). 
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The ACE studies arc grouped into five categories. The first two related categories are 
concerned with the relationship between structural strength and financial reporting 
reliability and audit quality, respectively and arc titled as follows: 
( i) 71,c structural strength of the audit cc,mmillee a11dfi11a11cial reporting 
rcliabilit_i ·. 
(ii) 711c structural strength <�/'the audit commillee and audit quality. 
The third category is concerned with the relationship between structural stren1:,rth and 
managerial discretionary decision making, and is titled as follows: 
(iii) 71u.: strnctural strength of tire audit committee and managerial 
discretionary decision making. 
The fourth category is concerned with the relationship between the structural strength and 
effectiveness of the audit committee and the structural strength of the board, and is titled as 
follows: 
(iv) 77ie strucwral stre11gth (e.f{ective11ess) of the audit committee a11d the 
structural strength of the board. 
The review of categories (i) to (iv) is provided in Tables 6 to 9, respectively. The Tables 
are structured around the following dimensions of the studies. 
Researcher(s) Method 
&year 
Companies/ 
sub"ects Comp Dilig 
Results 
The stu�ies identified in categories (i) to (iv) - Tables 6 to 9 - establish that all four 
structural clements ( composition, authority, resources, diligence) impact effectiveness. 
However, there is an emphasis on composition and dilige, �e, which is driven by the nature 
of the studies. 
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The fifth and final category of studies· docs not have a direct beating on the hypotheses 
dealing witr the safeguarding role of the board of directors. However, the studies hold 
implications for ACE generally and for that reason they are included in the process of 
rounding out the revkw of the literature. The category is titled as follows: 
(v) Other ACE studies. 
The review of the literature is provided m Table I 0, which ts structured ·around the 
following dimensions of the studies. 
�earchcr(s) Method 
Compani�s/ 
Domain Results 
I & year 
subjects 
Finally, with the exception of the first study (Krishnamoorthy, Wright & Cohen, 2002) the 
studies listed in Table IO were not reviewed by the researcher beyond the infonnation 
provided in the DeZoort et al. (2002) article. The studies are identified by an asterisk in 
Table I 0. and are not end-text referenced here. 
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TABLE 6: Audit committee structural strength and financial reporting reliability 
. 
Resenrcher(s) & year Method Companies/subjects Structural strength Results 
Comp Auth Res Dilil! 
Klein (2002a) Archival 692 firm-years on S&P Audit committee independence was negatively 
500 ./ associated with ahnornial accruals. and reductions 
in audit committee independence were associated 
with large increases in ahnornml accruals. 
McDaniel. Martin & Experimental 20 audit managers and 18 ./ When evaluating financial reponing quality. 
Maines (2002) cxecuti,e MBA financial experts tended to focus more on recurring. 
graduates less-prominent issues. while financial literates 
focused more on nonrecurring. prominent issues. 
Abbott. Park & Parker Archival 78 pairs of fraud and Companies with audit committees composed of 
(2000) non-fraud companies ./ ./ independent directors that met al least twice a year 
were less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC for 
fraudulent or misleading financial reporting. 
Bea�tey, Carccllo. Archival 66 fraud companies in Fraud companies in technology. hd!thcarc. and 
Hcnnanson & Lapid<:s three industry groups ./ ../ ./ financial services industries had less independent 
(2000) audit committees and internal audit support and 
held fewer audit committee meetings than the 
industry benchmarks. In addition. fraud companies 
had a lower percentage of audit committees 
composed of all outside directors than did non-
fraud rompanies. 
McMullen & Archival 51 companies with Companies with financial reporting problems were 
Raghunandan ( 1996) reporting problems ./ ../ less likely to have (i) audit committees composed 
entirely of outside directors; (ii) CPAs on the audit 
committee; and (iii) frequent audit committee 
meetings. 
Source: adapted from DeZoort ct al.. 2002, p.38-7 l .  
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TABLE 7: Audit committee structural strength and audit quality -
Researcher(s) & year Method Companies/subjects 
Structural strength 
Results Comp Auth ·Res Dilig 
Abbott & Parker (2000) Archival 500 NYSE. AMEX. or Companies with audit committees that did not 
NASDAQ companies ,I ,I include employee members and that met al least 
twice a year were more likely to use specialist 
auditors. 
Archambeault & Archival 30 companies with Companies that made suspicious auditor switches 
DcZoort (200 I) suspicious auditor ,I had a smaller percentage of independent audit 
switches committee members and fewer committee members 
with experience in accounting. auditing. or finance 
than matched non-switching counterparts. 
Raghunandan. Read & Survey 114 chief internal Audit committees with only independent directors 
Rama (2001) auditors (CIAs) ,I ,I and al least one member with an accounting or 
finance background were more likely to have longer 
meetings with CIAs. to provide private access to 
C!As. and to review internal audit proposals and 
results. 
Carccllo & Neal (2000) Archival 223 financially The greater the percentage of affiliated (inside or 
distressed companies ,I grey) directors on the audit committee. the lower the 
probability that a financially distressed firm will 
receive a going concern opinion from the auditor. 
Cohen & Hanno Experimental 96 external auditors Companies with audit committees that lacked 
(2000) ,I ,I resources and technical experience were m...9re likely 
to receive unfavourable audit planning judgments 
from auditors. 
DeZoort ( 1998) Experimental 87 AC members from Audit committee members with auditing and internal 
NYSE. AMEX and ,I control evaluation experience made internal rnntrol 
NASDAQ companies judgments more like experts than members who 
lacked such experience. 
Scarborough. Rama & Survey 72 CIAs from Canada Audit committees consisting solely of non-employee 
Raghunandan(l998) ,I ,I directors were more likely to ( 1) meet frequently with 
the CIA and (2) review internal audit programs and 
results of internal audits than were audit committees 
comprised of one or more insiders. -
Source: adapted from DcZoort ct al.. 2002. p. 38-71. 
; 
' 
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TABLE 8: Audit committee structural strength and managerial discretionary decision making 
Rcscarchcr(s) & �·car 
Ng & Tan (2003) 
DeZoort & Salterio 
(2001) 
I-­
Raghunandan & 
McHu�h ( 1994) 
t-:---K napp ( 1%'l) 
Method 
Experimental 
Survey 
Survey 
Experimental 
Companies/subjects 
IO I US audit managers 
6/l Canadian AC 
members 
426 chief internal 
auditors 
I 79 AC members 
Structural strength I R 1 I Comp I Auth I Re, I Dilig csu ts The results indicate that the availability of 
authoritative guidance (accounting standards) and 
independence of the audit committee from 
,/ 
,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ 
management interact to jointly affect auditors' 
propensity to concede to the client's preferred 
position. 
Independent director experience and audit 
knowledge were associated with audit commit
�
tee 
member support for an auditor who advocates a 
"substance over fonn" approach in a dispute wit! 
client management. 
Audit committees that were involved in cl� 
internal auditor hiring/firing decisions met more 
often with the CIA and were perceived to have 
greater ability to get management 10 act on auditing 
findings. 
Big 8 audit finn use was associated with increased 
support for the auditor in auditor-management 
disagreements. In addition. committee members 
who were practicing CO'l)orate manager Wf're more 
likely to support the auditor in a dispute with 
management. than committee members without a 
managerial background or retired executives. 
Further, audit committee members were more likely 
to support the auditor when the issue was the subject 
of objective professional standards and when the 
auditec was in a poor financial condition. 
Source: adapted from DeZoort et al.. 2002. p. 38-71. 
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TABLE 9: Audit committee structural strength and the structural strength of the board 
Researcher(s) & year Method Companies/subjectt, 
Structural strength Results 
Comp Auth Res Dilig 
Klein (2002b) Archival 803 !inn-years on S&P Audit committee independence was positively 
500 ,I associated with board size and board independence 
I and negatively associated with growth opportunities and fim1s with losses. 
Cohen. Krishnamoorthy. & Interview 42 US auditors The effectiveness of the audit committee is subject 
Wright (2002) ., ,• to independence from the CEO . 
Beasley & Salterio (200 I) Archival 627 publicly traded Voluntary increase in the number of outside audit 
Canadian companies ,I committee .members· collective financial reporting 
and audit committee knowledge and experience was 
I 
positively related to board size. the proportion of 
outsiders on the board. and separation of board chair 
and CEO/president. 
Collier and Gregory Survey and 141 UK companies Presence of insiders on the audit committee and a 
( 1999) Archival ,I dominant CEO was negallvcly related to the level of 
annual audit committee activity (number of rneitings 
and duration of meetings). 
Menon and Williams Archival 200 randomly selected As the proportion of outside directors on the board 
(1994) OTC companies ,I increases, fim1s are more likely to exclude insiders 
from the audit commiuee. Audit commillce 
independence is a proxy for the board's reliance on 
the audit -:ommittec. 
Kalbers & Fogarty ( 1993) Survey EAs. las. and CFOs Audit committee effectiveness included oversight of 
from 90 US companies ,I ,/ financial reporting. external auditors and internal 
control. Audit committee power within the 
organfr;ation came from a combination of written 
.... authority and the clear support of top managc'ment. 
Source: adapted from DeZoort ct al., 2002. p. 38-71. 
.. 
d= 78 
TABLE 10: Other audit committee effectiveness studies 
Researcher(s) & year Method Companies/subjects Domain Results -
Krishnamoorthy ct al. Interview 36 Australian auditors External auditing Auditors viewed corporate governance as ,�entrcd around 
(2002) management, rather than the board. Auditors v1t:wcd corporate 
governance cons
0
idcrations as particularly import:-mt in client 
acceptance decisions and in international settings. Fin.11ly, many of 
the auditors viewed audit committees as weak and inefkctive. 
Vafcas (200 I)• Archival 262 non-executive AC Audit committee New audit committee members generally had fewer years of 
members member selection service on the board, served on fewer board committees. and were 
more independent than the control group of other non-audit 
committee directors. Audit committee appointments \w:re not 
significantly related to stock ownership and the number or other 
directorships held. 
·-
DeZoort, Friedberg & Survey 18 internal audit Audit committee Internal audit directors suggested that structured communicat.10ns 
Reisch (2000)• directors member training programs between internal auditors and audit committees cmild 
improve the quality of corporate governance. 
Collier and Gregory Survey and 14 I UK companies Meeting activity Presence of insiders on the audit committee was negatively related 
( 1999)• Archival to the level of annual audit committee activity (number of meetings 
and duf?tion of meetings). 
Turpin & DeZoort ( 1998)• Archival 33 companies disclosing Audit committee report Results indicated significant positive associations between 
an AC report disclosure voluntary audit committee report disclosure in annual reports and 
company size, proportion of outside directors. le·,crage. and trade 
on a major stock exchange. 
DeZoon ( 1997)* Survey I 12 AC members from Audit commith:e Audit committee members recognised the importance of having 
NYSE, AMEX and responsibilities expe11ise in accounting, auditing and law with some members 
NASDAQ companies admitting they lacked sufficient expertise in these areas. Internal 
control evaluation was consistently ranked as the most important 
oversight responsibility . 
• 
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TABLE 10 continued: Other audit committee effectiveness studies continued 
Researchers & year Method Companies/subjects Domain Resull's 
Lee & Stone ( 1997)* Arciu\'al I 00 US multi-national Audit committee Results indicate a mismatch between stated audit committee 
companies responsibilities responsibilities and the lc\'cl nf audit committee member ··instrumental .. 
experience (related 10 accounting. auditing, and control issues). 
Coopers & Lybrand ( 1995)• Survey Members from 250 AC's Audit committee TI1e SC<,pe of ,1udit committee activity expanded considerably over the two 
responsihiliti1.'S decades prior to the study, and most of the sampled audit committees 
conducted a wide range of oversight duties. 
Vicknair, Hickman & Carnes Archivnl l!Jll NYSE companies Audit committee A significnnt presence of "grey·· directors wus noted on the audit 
(1993)" membership independence. committees of the s11111ple companies. Specifically, interlocking 
directorships and other related party transactions constituted the most 
prevalent sources of independence questions. 
Kalbers ( 1992)* Survey 50 cxtemal auditors and 52 Audit committee Extemal auditors had significantly lower opinions of audit committee 
AC members responsibilities. members· expc"lise in oversight areas than did audit committee members. 
Audit comnuttec members and auditors disagreed with the suggestion that 
the audit committee has very little authority. although audit commillt.'C 
mcmhers disagreed more than auditors. 
Rittenburg & Nair ( 1993)* Survey 62 AC members, 94 Audit committee Mnny members recognised that they needed to better understand their 
CPAs, and 42 IA characteristics. specific responsibilities. 
directors 
Abdolmohammadi & Levy Survey 69 AC members Audit committee Although audit committL'C members had varied perceptions of their 
( 1992)* responsibilities. responsibilities, several broad art.�s emerged. including oversight. 
relationships with external auditors, relationships with intcmal auditors. 
and financial disclosure. 
Haka & Chalos (1990)* Survey External auditors, Financial reporting. Management and audit committee chairs had significant differences in 
internal auditors. CEOs. perceptions about financial statement disclosure and accounting procedure 
and AC chairs from choice. 
Fortune 500 companies. 
Source: adapted from DcZoort ct al., 2002. p. 38-71. 
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The review of the corporate governance literature concludes this Chapter. 
Attention now turns to Chapter 4 and the development of the accountability hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER4 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNT ABILITY HYPOTHESES 
AND THE RA TIO NALE FOR THE 
EFFICIENCY RESEARCH QUESTION 
4.0 CHAPTER CONTENT 
The primary purpose of this Chapter is to provide the theoretical development of the 
hypotheses that proceed from the two empirical research questions identified in Chapter l. 
The research questions read as follows: 
RQl Does financial threat to auditor independence from recurring NAS 
and the structural strength of the board of directors affect 
stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence? 
RQ2 Does financial threat to auditor independence from recurring NAS 
and the structural strength of the board of directors af(ect 
stakeholder willingness to appoint the incumbent audit firm to 
provide NAS. 
The hypotheses are tested statistically in the experimental study (Study 2) described in 
Chapter 7. The Chapter concludes by providing the rationale for the third and final research 
question identified in Chapter l. The question, which is descriptive in nature, represents a 
natural progression from the fonnulation of the ac�ountability hypotheses and reads as 
follows: 
RQ 3 What are the nature and sources of the efficiencies that may 
accrue from appointing the incumbent auditor to provide NAS? 
Question 3 is examined conceptually in Chapter 5. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The experimental component of the thesis (Study 2) involves un experimental. user-based 
perception study. Thus. prior user-based studies provide the springboard for the 
development of the hypotheses. However, the theoretical framework involved is essentially 
drawn from el�ewhere. The development of the hypotheses dealing with recurring NAS 
de1ives from the economics of audit quality research dealing with auditor independence 
and the Mock ct al. (2005) IR model. The development of the hypotheses dealing with the 
safeguarding role of the board of directors draws on the conceptual framework of 
independence, the Mock ct al. (2005) lR model and corporate governance best-practice 
regulation, supported by findings from the corporate governance stream of audit research. 
The empirical accountability - descriptive efficiency dimensions of the decision of whether 
to hire the incumbent audit firm t0 provide NAS provide the structure for the ensuing 
discussion. 
4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses dealing with stakeholder pen:eptions of independence risk and willingncss­
to-appoint, concern the financial threat to auditor indcpenden�e from recurring NAS and 
the safeguarding role of the hoard of directors. 
4.2.1 Recurring N AS hypotheses 
The financial threat to auditor independence from recurring NAS falls within the ambit of 
the threat of sci f-intercst. 
According to PF I. the threat of self-interest occurs in the tl)llowing circumstances. 
when a Jinn or a member of the assurance team could benefit from a 
financial interest in or other self-interest conflict with an assurance client 
{PF I. I .22). 
X3 
Tlw reforer .... e to a "financial interest" refers to the threat to auditor independence from a 
financial relationship (as investor or borrower) with the audit client. Wealth incentives 
associated with the fees for NAS, on the other hand. fall within the ambit of "other self­
interest conflict" (PF I. 1.22). 
Prior user-based studies have opcration,iliscd the threat of self-interest via the relative 
magnitude of fees for NAS as a percentagl' of the audit fee. McKinley ct al. ( 1985) indicate 
that NAS equal to 30% of the audit fee did not significantly affect bank loan officer 
perceptions of auditor independence. the reliability of the financial statements or loan 
decisions. Pany et al. ( 1988) examined a situation in which NAS ranged from Oto 90% of 
average audit fees over a period of three consecutive years. The results gave no strong 
indication that users (bank loan officers and financial analysts) perceived an independence 
problem. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing results. there arc grounds fr)r further research on user 
perceptions of the threat of self-interest. They include the issue ,,f the heightened 
awareness of audit independence, generally, in the post-Enron era and the fact that 
financial dependence is not confined to the issue 0f relative magnitude. Johnstone ct al. 
(2001) identify wealth incentives associated with the provision of NAS as emanating not 
only from the magnitude of NAS fees, but also the source and continuity of fees, aud low­
bal\ing. This study is concerned with the issue of continuity of NAS fees, which is. in tum, 
grounded in the issue of client specific assets. 
Client specific assets are the basis of wealth incentives ti.1r the auditor to assume heightened 
independence risk. The assets arc the fr1cus of the economics of audit quality literature 
dealing with independence in appearance (e.g., Simunic, 1984; Beck et al. 1988a & b). 
Client specific resources arc identified in the accounting literature as specialised 
technological advantages (e.g., Beck ct al. 1988a) and knowledge spillovers (e.g., Simunic, 
1984). They accrue from incumbency and incumbency as a multi-discipline provider to the 
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client. respectively. Tcch11t1logical advantages derive from the presence of NAS start-up 
costs to the service provider and client switching costs associated with recurring NAS (e.g., 
Beck ct al. 1988a). 
Specialised knowledge spillovers. on the other hand. represent a by-product of the joint 
production of the audit and NAS peculiar to the client (e.g .. Simunic. 1984). The 
externalities may take the fonn of cost savings (economics of scope) or tacit knowledge 
(scope of knowledge). Scope of knowledge may or may not result in cost savings to the 
service provider (Simunic. 1984 ). This issue is addressed in Chapter 5. However. both sets 
of resources arc of the nature of a specialised investment and represent a source of 
competitive advanta!:,C to the incumbent. ex post. 
Beck ct al. ( 1988a) and Simunic ( 1984) demonstrate. analytically. that to the extent that 
both sets of resources arc enduring and the associated gains (cost savings) arc not passed 
on to the customer through competitive pricing. including low-balling at the initial contract 
stage. they represent a source of future quasi-rents. A quasi-rent represents the "excess of 
revenues over al'(Jidahlc costs including the opportunity ..:ost of (servicing) the next best 
alternative" ( De Angelo. 1981 b. p. 116 ). It is assumed fix the purposes of this thesis that 
competitive. not monopolistic tenns prevail. The alternative states hold ;mplications for 
whether rents arc quasi or monopolistic in nature ( De Angelo. 1981 b ). 
The value of the specialised investment tu the incumbent relic., on the future income stream 
from client specific quasi-rents and. therefore. a continued relationship with the client. The 
incumbent is able to protect the future income stream at the contract renewal stage through 
exercising limit pricing - the "value of incumbency"' (Magee ct al.. 1990, p. 315). The 
benefit to the client derives from the opportunity to share in the value (efficiencies). Fia 
competitive pricing. 
However. where an auditor is earning client specific eC0r.omic rents from the provision of 
NAS. he/she faces a "higher marginal expected loss from truthful reporting in .. . situations 
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involving conflicts between the auditor and client" (Simunic, 1984, p. 680). This, in tum. 
gives rise to a higher probability that the auditor will conceal ""bad news" from 
shareholders" (Simunic, 1984, p. 680). Simunic's ( 1984, p. 680) reference to "conflicts 
between the auditor and client"; and a "higher marginal expected loss from truthful 
reporting". brings into issue IR opportunity and IR incentives and attitude. 
The rclationship-speei tic, future rent stream represents a catalyst by which management 
may exact auditor compliance/elicit auditor co-operation, in the domain of IR opportunity, 
to give effect to self-seeki,1g behaviour. The presence of a future quasi-rent stream, upon 
which the value of the client specific investment relics. invokes the professional conceptual 
sci f-interest threat associated with ··concern about the possibility of losing the engagement" 
(PF L 1.22). The structure of the argument. from the evidence (antecedents) to IR 
incentives and subsequently from iner.:ntives to attitude and opportunity. using the Mock et 
al. (2005) evidential model. is shown in green in Figure 9. The antecedents of IR 
opportunity, as defined in this thesis, an.: also identified in green. 
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FIGURE 9: Evidential Diagram for lnclcpcnclcnce Risk (modified) 
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Recurring NAS may be viewed as a measure of the presence of enduring client specific 
investment/resources on the part of the audit !inn. and the foes fc.)r the NAS, as an annuity 
that approximates a future quasi-rent stream ( Parkash ct al.. 1993 ). Empirical evidence of 
the impact of the recurring/non-recurring issue on the supply/demand for NAS is confined 
to the economics of audit quality literature dealing with auditor independence (e.g .. Beck, 
et al.. 1988b: Dt:Berg ct al., 1991: Parkash \!t al.. 1993 ). The results of the studies arc 
mixed. 
Beck et al. ( 19�8h) tested the relationship between various levels of NAS fees (by 
recurring and non-recurring categories) and audit tenure on US listed companies in 1978 
and 1979. They selected 50 ;;ompanies in both years with high levels of different categories 
of NAS and compared them with a control sample of companies with low levels of NAS. 
Overall the results of the study arc mixed. Limited support was t«)und for increased 
bonding - decreased independence in the case of some of the recurring NAS categories in 
the 1978 sub-sample. However. the result was not replicated in the 1979 sub-sample. No 
significant results were fi.)Und in respect of i!1c non-recurring NAS. 
DcBcrg ct al. ( 1991) tested the assertion that companies with higher levels of recurring 
NAS would switch their auditors less ottcn than companies with lower levels of NAS. 
Using a matched pair research design. they compared levels of NAS for all listed US 
companies that changed auditors between September 1978 and February 1982 with levels 
of NAS fees reported hy similar companies that did not change auditors in that time period. 
The researchers did not find any significant differences in the levels of total NAS, recurring 
NAS and non-recurring NAS between the treatment and control groups. In an extension to 
their primary research question. De Berg ct al. ( 1991 ) investigated whether the decision to 
change auditors was related to changes in the purchase of N AS. Levels of NAS before and 
after the auditor switcl,�s were analysed. The results indicated lower levels of total NAS 
and recurring NAS were purchased from the successor auditor compared to the predecessor 
auditor and also the non-change company group. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing mixed results. agenc_1-rclatcd. audit quality literature 
suggests that audit clients arc sensitive to independence in appearance. Firstly, research 
confin11S that the demand for audit quality is a functil·n of the principal-agent conflict 
between management and shareholders (e.g .. DeFond, I :J92). Secondly. a set of studies 
dedicated to identifying the demand and/or supply drivers of NAS fees (e.g .. Parkash ct al., 
1993: Firth, 1997: Craswell. Guz and Francis. 2000) suggests that audit clients manage 
NAS according to variables related to expected agency cos:s. 
Specifically, the latter studies suggest the existence of an i11\'erse relationship between the 
quantity of NAS provided by the incumbent audit finr and expected agency costs. 
Expected agency costs refer to the increase in the cost of capital from perceived. impaired 
auditor independence. The expected agency costs are reprcs :nted in the studies by two or 
more of the following auditec characteristics. as a measure of the separation between 
ownership and control: managerial ownership. ownership diffusion and leverage (Parkash 
ct al.. 1993: Firth. 1997: Craswcll ct a .. '.WOO). The audit::c characteristics have their 
analogy ;n the IR element opportunity. specifically mana�erial discretionary decision 
making and managerial opportunism: the quantity of NAS. measured financially. IR 
(wealth) incentives. 
However. again the results of the fi.1regoing studies arc not def nitive with respect to the 
role of recurring versu:; non-recurring N AS in establishing the 1 •rescnce. or othcf\vise. of 
wealth incentives. Parkash et al. ( 1993) find a significant positive relation hctwecn the 
level of recurring NAS and lc\·cls of auditce charactcristit:s that proxy for agency costs (the 
cost of capital): and, conversely, that agcnt:y costs do not explain tl e level of non-recurring 
NAS. However. the Firth ( I 997) and Craswell ct al. (2000) stucies do not address the 
rernrring/non-rccurring nature of the NAS involved. 
The present study will exammc the recumng - non-recumng differential further. by 
exar.1111ing the impact of the 1.:ontinuity of fees on stakeholder pe1 ccptions of auditor 
independence and willingness-to-appoint, using an experimental approach. Willingness-to-
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appoint is measured by asking stakeholders to indicate whom they would chose to provide 
the NAS (audit tim1 or specialist tinn); a,1d the strength of their preference for the 
respective providers. 
The foregoing discussion gives rise to the following three hypotheses, which are expressed 
in the alternative fomrnt. The hypotheses are underpinned by propositions R 1a and R3a 
depicted in Figure 9 (page 8 7), which recognise a positive relationship between the strength 
of IR incentives and auditor and management propensity to act self-interestedly. 
H I Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence will be lower 
when the NAS is recurring than when it is non-recurring. 
H 2 Stakeholders will be less likely to choose the audit firm to provide 
the NAS when the NAS is recurring than when it is non-recurring. 
H-' Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit firm will be lower 
when the NAS is recurring than when it is non-recurring. 
4.2.2 Strength of the board of directors hypotheses 
From the perspective of the theory of IR. the foregoing studies centre on threat as the 
antecedent of the element incentives. However. the broader literature surrounding the joint 
provision of the audit and NAS begs the question of the mitigating effect of safeguarding 
mechanisms on independence risk. That literature includes the following: 
e the regulatory conceptual approach to auditor independence ( e.g., PF 1 ); 
o the theory of l R ( e.g., Johnstone ct al. 200 I: Mock ct al., 2005); and 
e economics of audit quality studies (e.g., !kin, 2001 ). 
Empirical evidence of the effect of safeguards on user-based perceptions of auditor 
independence is confined to a small set of user-based studies dealing with separation of 
duties as a mechanism for mitigating the threat of self-review (Geiger ct al., 2002; Swanger 
et al.. 200 I: and Lowe et al.. 1999). The threat was associated with the outsourcing of the 
internal audit function (!AF). 
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Lowe ct al. ( 1999) found that the separation of audit fim1 staff performing the IAF from 
those perfonning the external audit had a significant positive effect on user perceptions of 
independence and financial statement reliability and loan approvals. Swanger et al. (200 I) 
found that user perceptions of auditor independence were higher when a separate division 
of the incumbent audit firm, as opposed to where no staff separation was employed, 
performed the IAF. The Geiger et al. (2002) study was similar to the Lowe ct al. ( 1999) 
study in relation to the method and outcomes. The results indicated that the users perceived 
auditor independence. financial t;tatement reliability and loan acceptability more positively 
where separate personnel from those performing the external audit perfonned the IAF. 
The present study extends the foregoing studies by examining the effect of the 
safeguarding role of the board of directors on stakeholder perceptions of auditor 
independence and willingness to appoint the incumbent auditor to petiorm NAS. 
Separating the provision of the NAS from the audit mitigates the threat to audit 
independence - the antecedence of IR incentives. Thus. separation of duties represents an 
ex ante means of incentive alignment. However. the benefits of appointing the incumbent 
audit firm to provide NAS that derive from client specific investments. per se. are 
inextricably linked to lhe IR clement incentives. The benefits arc the prnduct of 
incumbency and joint production. Separation of duties trades off efficiencies for 
accountability. The means of breaking the stalemate - allowing the efficiencies to take 
effect, in the presence of incentives - lies with (ex post) governance mechanisms. which 
operate at the level of the JR elements attitude and opportunity (managerial opportunism). 
The incentive for the auditor to assume heightened independence risk in the exercise of 
his/her professional discretion in this study is, of course, wealth based. However, 
notwithstanding the source of the incentive, a significant formal mechanism exists within 
the broader corporate governance framework for resolving the underlying agency problem: 
auditor - investor and. manager - investor. The mechanism is the board of directors of a 
company in discharging their financial reporting function. Directors have the capacity to 
alter the opportunity for management and the auditor to act inappropriately in the exercise 
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of discretionary power that has implications for pay-offs to claimholders. From the 
perspective of the Mock et al. (2005) JR model and the appearance of independence, it is 
argued here that the board of directors has the capacity to negate the articulation between 
incentives and attitude (R 1 ); attitude and opportunity (R2): and incentives and opportunity 
(R3). The articulation, and. therefore, perception, accepts that discretionary decision­
making is subject to the self-serving bias, in the face of incentives. From the perspective of 
the threat to auditor independence from the continuity of fees that is of interest to this 
study, the board of directors has the capacity to negate the propagation from incentives to 
attitude (R 1a) and opportunity (R.1a) - as shown in Figure 9 on page 87 - by mitigating IR 
attitude and managerial opportunism, i.e., the propensity of the parties to act self­
interestedly. It is important to 110te at this point that the Mock et al. (2005, p. 3) JR model 
involves a "closed-form analytical formula". To suggest that the board of directors 
represents a means of mitigating both JR attitude and opportunity is t.o suggest also that 
assessing IR involves a network rather than a closed-form inferential problem. rlowever, 
Mock et al. (2005, p. 24) assert, on the basis of prior research. that their "model is a good, 
conservative approximation of the exact network model". 
Support for the proposition that the board of directors has the capacity to mitigate IR 
attitude and managerial opportunism is provided by the following set of regulatory 
circumstances: 
(i) Australian statutory regulation that vests directors of publicly listed 
corporations with the overriding responsibility for the intebrrity of 
financial reporting. 
(ii) Best-practice principles that arc dedicated to defining the duties and 
responsibilities of directors in that respect. The principles establish that 
discharging the responsibility involves monitoring the functions of 
management and the external (and internal) auditor, including 
communicating with the parties concerned. 
However, best-practice principles also identify key structural attributes as a buffer to 
director effectiveness. Further, the results of empirical research support the relationship 
between structural strength and effectiveness. 
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The effectiveness of the safeguarding role of the directors is, as mentioned earlier, 
operationalised in this study in tenns of its structural strength, which spills over to the audit 
committee. The governing role of directors generally, and as a safeguard of auditor 
independence in particular. including the significance of the strength of structural 
attributes, will now be considered in the process of developing the related hypotheses. 
4.2.2.1 Governing role of directors 
Corporate governance may be defined as "the system by which companies are directed and 
managed" (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003, p. 3 ). In its narrowest sense, 
governance m:iy be viewed as the "set of arrangements internal to the corporation that 
define the relationships between managers and shareholders" (World Bank, 1999, p. 6 ). In 
Australia, the internal arrangements are embedded in the Corporations Law and the terms 
of corporate documents, for example, the Corporate Charter. negotiated among the key 
players. At the centre of the arrangements are the directors who are the delegates of 
shareholders, and who have the "overriding responsibility to ensure the long-term viability 
of the firm and to provide oversight of management" (World Bank. 1999, p. 6). The 
responsibility for managing the core functions of the business is delegated by the board of 
directors to management, and the chief executive officer is accountable to the board in that 
respect. 
In the broadest sense of the tcnn, the internal perspective of corporate governance is 
strengthened by an external dimension consisting of external laws, rules and institutions 
that "provide a level. competitive playing field and discipline the behaviour of insiders, 
whether managers or shareholders" (World Bank, 1999, p. 6). The internal and external 
dimensions together provide the framework of corporate governance, depicted in Figure 
10. 
FIGURE 10: A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK: THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ARCHITECTURE 
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The construction of th� roles and relationships of directors and internal arid external 
auditors is the subject of best practice principles thnt fonn an integral part of the disciplin� 
of corporate governance. A major social stimulus for improvements in and the evolution of 
corporate governance best-practice principles lies with major corporate collapses. For 
example, the stock market crash of 1987 prompted major reviews of corporate governance 
both in Australia and overseas. The reviews resulted in the publication, over the ensuing I 0 
to IS years, of reports and guides that have played a major role in defining best-practice 
with respect to the duties and responsibilities of directors, managers, and auditors (internal 
and external). The publications include the following: 
ill UK, Cadbury Commission, Report 011 the Financial Aspects of C01porate 
Governance, 1992. 
ill US, National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway 
Commission) Report of the National Commissio11 on Fra11d11/ent 
Fi11a11cial Reporti11g, 1987. 
o US, General Motors. GM Board Guidelines 011 Sig11(/ica11t C01pora!e 
Governance Issues (the GM Guidelines). 1992. 
ill Australia, Bosch Committee (Bosch), C01porate Practices a11d Conduct, 
1995. 
o Australia, the Australian Investment Managers Association, Corporate 
Governance: A Guide for Investment Managers & A Statement of 
Recommended Practice (the AIMA Guidelines), 1995 (as amended). 
o Canada. The Toronto Stock Exchange, 711e Toronto Stock Exchange 
Company Manual, 1995 (as amended). 
The overriding consensus of these documents. and others. is that from a corporation's 
perspective, governance is concerned with "maximising value s11bject to meeting the 
corporation's financial and other legal and contractual obligations" (World Bank, 1999, p. 
4). Achieving that goal calls for a partnership between the directors and management, 
whose task, as the foregoing statement suggests, is twofold - enhancing perfonnance and 
accountability (Hilmer. 1993). However. the overriding internal responsibility for corporate 
governance vests with the directors, who exercise their function through giving direction 
and exercising judgement in setting the corporation's objectives, and "monitoring their 
implementation" (Bosch, 1995. p. 8). 
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The implementation of aspects of the best practice principles embodied in the foregoing 
documents has been expedited in recent times as a part of the current scrutiny of corporate 
governance worldwide. The scrutiny has been brought about by the financial reporting 
scandals surrounding entities such as Enron, Oracle, Tyco International, Microsoft and 
Worldcom, and locally HIH and Onetel. 
The ASX Corporate Governance Counci'. esrnblished in August 2002, provides the most 
recent de'.icription of the typical functions of Australian directors in the publication titled 
Principles q( Good C01porate Govemance and Best Practice Recommendations, released 
in March 2003. The publication is referred to hereafter as the ASX CG Recommendations, 
2003. The Ramsay (200 I) re\liew recommended that the task of defining good corporate 
governance be devolved to the ASX. The Comm01�wealth Government, as part of the 
CLERP 9 reform program, subsequently ratified the recommendation. A description of the 
directors' functions described in (he ASX CG Recommendations (2003) is provided in 
Figure 11. 
FIGURE 11: Typical duties of directors 
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Source: ASX C(1rpnrate Govcrn,1ncl' Coqncil, 2003, p. 16. 
The board as a safeguard of auditor independence 
The duty of the directors that is of immediate relevance to this study concerns item 8 
above. That is, their responsibility for approving and monitoring corporate financial 
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reporting obligations - specifically. the "ultimate responsibility of the board to ensure the 
integrity of the company's financial reporting" (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2003, p. 29). The Council asserts that "particularly for larger companies, an audit 
committee can be a more efficient mechanism than the full board for ... verifying and 
safeguarding the integrity of the company's financial reporting" (ASX Corporate 
Governance Coun..::il. 2003, p. 29). The experimental setting for this study includes an audit 
committee. 
The ASX Council also acknowledges the role of the Best Practice Guide - Audit 
Committees9 (200 I) (BPG - AC Guirie, 200 I) in providing a "detailed guide to the 
responsibilities of .. . audit committees" (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003, p. 
31 ). 
71,e BPG - AC Guide (200 I) represents one of a number of publications issued worldwide 
in the past five years that defines best practice with respect to the objectives and 
responsibilities of etlective ... •1dit committees. The remaining publications of significance 
include the following: 
• US, Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving 
the E.ffective11ess of C01porate Audit Commiltees ( 1999), Blue Ribbon 
Committee. 
• EU, Standard No 1: lndepe11de11ce Discussions with Audit Commitlees (1999) 
Independence Standards Board. 
Research that considers directors and internal and external auditors as belonging to a set of 
mechanisms for monitoring management, views the parties as either complememary or 
substitutes (e.g., Anderson, Francis & Stokes. 1993). The distinction between the two 
9 The Guide was published by the Auditing & Assurance Standards Board of the Australian Accounting 
Research Foundation. the (nstilutc of Internal Auditors. and the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, in August 200 I. 
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concepts is highlighted in the following quotation taken from Ahdel-khalik ( 1993, p. 298), 
used by him in the context of his analysis of the level of management demand for NAS: 
enhancing quality, or . . . meeting essential functions, is the issue of 
complementarity versus substitutability. 
Substitution assumes that the roles of the monitoring agents arc orthogonal, i.e., the choice 
of the quantity of one, is made independently of the other(s) (Anderson et al., 1993). 
However, it is argued here that notwithstanding directors overriding responsibility for 
ensuring the integrity of corporate financial statements, substitution is inconsistent with the 
relative positioning of directors in the regulatory corporate governance framework in 
Australia. That is, regulation reflects the monitoring role of directors (audit committee) as 
complementary. Support for this stance is contained in regulation that defines the roles and 
relationships of directors and internal and external auditors. 
The BPCi - AC Guide (200 I, p. 6 ), for example, states that the objective of the audit 
committee is to facilitate the "maintenance of the independence of the external auditor", 
i.e., no: to act as a substitute. The facilitating role is also expressly supported by PF I, the 
proposals contained in the R�msay Report (200 I) and the CLE RP 9 Report (2002). 
Further, the oyjectives of the audit committee, as defined by BPG -AC Guide (2001, p. 6) 
and contam{d in Figure 12, clearly establish that the role of a committee is not to act as a 
"quasi-auditor" (Hilmer, 1993, p. 57). The wording ot the duties centres on the key 
phrases "assisting", "improving". "facilitating". "strengthening" and "fostering" -
emphasising the advisory and overseeing role of the committee. 
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Fl Cl' RE I Z: Thl· ohjectin·� of the audit com mitt el' 
The main objectin•i. of an appropriatl'ly established and effrcli\'e audit committee 
would us11111ly include the followin�. 
• :\ss1s1111!! 1he hl,an.l or d1rectl1rs to discharge i1s n:spl>nsib11ity to exercise due care. 
d1hgl·11ce and sk1ll 111 rda1wn I() the cntuy·s: 
rcponmg of !inanr1al 111format1on lo users or financial repnrts: 
apphcat11111 or ai.:countmg pl1l11.:1es: 
tina1K1al management: 
1111erna I c,1ntn ,) s yslem: 
nsk management system: 
busmess pnhcu:s and prncllccs: 
protcc110n or the entity's assets: and 
wmphance w11h applicaole law. regulatmns. standards and best prnctice guidelines. 
• lmpninng the credih1l11y and 11b_1ectJ\·11y of the accountability process ( including financial 
n:pnnmg). especially where 1he role of the audit nmunillee and its membership by 
indep1:ndent nn·1-executi\'l: din:c111rs 1s disclosed tn shareholders and the public. 
• Pro\'1d111g a formal tixum fnr co111mumcm1on bctwcl·n tht· hoard of directors and senior 
financial managt·ment. 
• lmpnl\ ing the etliciem:y nr the hoard of direc1ors by delegating tasks 10 the commincc 
and thus allowmg more tune for issues to be discussed 111 sufficient depth. 
• lmpro\'ing the eftcctiwness or the mternal and external audit foncllons and bemg a forum 
for 1111prcwing n1m111unicat10ns between the board of directors and the internal and 
external auditors. 
o Facilitating the main1enance of 1he 111dependcncc of the external audi1or. 
• Providing a stmc1ured rcponing line for i'ltcrnal audit and facilitating the mai:-itcnancc of 
the objectivity of the internal auditor. 
• Improving the quality of internal and external r1:pon111g of financial and non-financial 
information. 
• lmprO\ ing the correlation between related financial and non-financial information and 
reports. 
• Strengthening the role and influence of non-execul1\'C directors. 
o Fostering an ethical culture throughout the entity. 
Source: /JPG ·· AC Guide. 2001. p. 6. 
The mitigating effect of the audit committee in the context of the Mock ct al. (2005) model 
is evident in the description of a committee's responsibilities provided in the BPG - AC 
Guide (200 I. p. 22-23 ). The responsibilities, which centre on the oversight of external 
reporting, internal control and risk managements, arc identified in Figure 13. The 
responsibilities clearly vest in the committee the capacity to alter the opportunity for self· 
seeking behaviour on the part of management and. in doing so. indirectly facilitating 
auditor int�grity: and the auditor. 
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The capacity of the audit committee (board) to mitigate managerial opportunism as an 
antecedent of IR opportunity is evident, fi.1r example, in the following responsibilities that 
define the external reporting function identified in Figure 13. 
c Consider the appropriatcnes� of the entity's accounting policies and 
rrinciples anJ ally changes, as well as the methods of applying them, 
ensuring that they arc in accordance with the stated financial reporting 
framework. To do this the commitke will need to request management to 
infonn the committee of: 
whether the methods chosen by management are c,insistent with 
Accounting Standards, Accounting f'oncc:pr:.; anJ lJrgent Issues Group 
(UIG) Consensus View�; 
any changes in significant accounting policies or their applications 
during the reporting period: 
the methods used to account for significant unusual transactions or 
transactions in emerging areas for which there may be no specific 
accounting standards, including management's reasomng in 
detenni:iing the appropriateness of those methods; 
and then request the internal and external auditors to infonn the committee 
of their views in relation to the above. 
o Assess significant estimates and judgements in financial reports by 
enquiring of management about the process used in making material 
estimates and judgements and then enquire of the internal and external 
auditors the basis for their conclusions on the reasonableness of 
management's estimates. 
o Assess infonnation from internal and external auditors that affects the 
quality of financial reports ( e.g.. actual and potential material audit 
adjustments, financial report disclosures. non-compliance with the laws 
and regulations, internal control issues). 
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FIGURE 13: Audit committee responsibilities 
The audit committee·s main responsibilities can be dividcd into the following areas {noting that 
some responsibilities and/or areas may not apply if some things. such as internal aud11 ti.mction. <lo 
not e:, ist ). 
Extc:mal Peporting 
o Consider the appropriateness of the entity's accounting policies and principles and any 
changes, as well as the methods of applying them. ensuring that they are in accordance with 
the stated financial reporting framework. To do this the committee will need to request 
management to inform the committee of: 
whether the methods chosen by management are consistent with Accounting Standards. 
Accounting Concepts and Urgent Issues Group (UIG) Consensus Views: 
any changes in significant accounting policies or their applications during the reporting 
period; 
the methods used to account for significant unusual transactions or transactions in 
emerging areas for which there may be no specific accounting standards. including 
management ·s reasoning in determining the appropriateness of those methods; 
and then request the internal and external auditors to inform the committee of their views in relation 
to the above. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
• 
0 
0 
0 
Assess significant estimates and judgements in financial reports by enquiring of 
management about the process used in making material estimates and judgements and then 
enquire of the internal and external auditors the basis for their conclusions on the 
reasonableness of management's estimates. 
Review management's processes for ensuring and monitoring compliance with laws. 
regulations and other requirements (including Australian Accounting Standards. the 
Corporations Act 200 I and the Australian Stock Exchange and. where applicable. those of 
other countries) relating to the external reporting by the entity of financial and non­
financial infonnation. 
Ensure that a comprehensive process is established by the entities management to capture 
issues for the purposes of continuous reporting to the Australian Stock Exchange. 
Assess infomrntion from internal and external auditors that affects the quality of financial 
reports (e.g. actual and potential material audit adjustments, financial report disclosures, 
non-compliance with the laws and regulations. internal control issues). 
I Ask the external auditor for an independent judgement about the appropriateness. not just 
the acceptability. of the accounting principles used and the clarity of the financial 
disclosure practices used or proposed to be used by the entity as put forward by 
management. 
Review documents and reports to regulators and make recommendations to the board on 
their approval or amendment. 
Assess the management of non-financial information in documents (both public and 
internal) to ensure the information does not conflict inappropriately wit the financial 
statements and other documents and assess internal control systems covering infonnation 
releases that hnve the potential to adversely rellect on the entity"s conduct. 
Review for completeness and accura·�y the reporting of the cntity·s main corporate 
governance practices as required under the Australian Stock Exchange listing rules. 
Recommend to the board whether the financial and non-financial assessments should be 
sii,.JJ1ed based on the committee·s assessment of them. 
Source: BPG-AC Guide. �00 I, . 22-23. 
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The role of the audit committee 111 that respcct is also mirrored in the following 
provision of the HPC - :IC Ciuidc (2001. p. 28). that defines the responsibility of the 
external auditor vis-ii-vis the audit committee: 
The external auditor's role and responsibilities in relation to the effective 
inter.iction with an audit committee include the following: 
lnfonning the committce l)f any significant unrcsolvcd and resolved 
issm:s revealed by the audit or areas of significant disagreement with 
management. the corrective action taken and the current status of the 
issues. These issues include errors. problems. weaknesses, 
disagreements with management. accounting treatments, estimates 
and judgements. 
Mitigating managerial opportunism ( IR opportunity) has direct implications for the 
signiticance l'f the threat to IR from wealth incentives. and. indirectly, IR attitude (the 
auditor's propensity to act inappropriately). 
The capacity for the committee lo mitigate auditor attitude. directly. is evident in the 
following auditor responsibility identified in the HPC AC Guide (200 I. p. 28). 
The external auditor's role and responsibilities in relation to the effective 
interaction with an audit committee include the following: 
lnfonning the committee on an ongoing basis of relationships and 
services (both within the entity and with other parties) that the 
committee needs to he made aware of so the committee can assess 
the auditor's indcpendenc<.:. 
Section 2. 7 3 of PF I also states that ··discussing i11depe11de11ce issues related to the 
provision of (NAS) with thos<.: charged with governance. such as the audit committee" 
may he "particularly relevant in reducing to an acceptable level threats created by the 
provision of (NAS) to ass111"m1cc clic111s". The mitigating effect would operate at the 
level of the Mock ct al. (2005) IR clement attitude. 
Thus. the audit committee (directors) represents a critical ex posl strategy for managing 
tht: tensions. actual or perceived. that arise in the interface between an audit film 
providing NAS and providing the audit. 
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4.2.2.3 Structural strength of board 
The ASX CG Rccomme11datio11s (2003) and the BP(; - AC Guide (2001) also identify 
key attributes that an audit committee ought to possess as a buffer to effectiveness. The 
attributes as they are identified in the ASX CG Recommendations (2003) are fourfold: a 
charter, independence, technical expertise, and active involvement. Guidance on the 
meaning of the concepts. drawn from an analysis of the respective publications, is 
provided in Table 11. The charter is concerned with fonnalising the committee's role 
and responsibilities. composition, structure, power, authority and membership 
requirements. Independence is measured in tenns of relationships: financial, business 
and employment. Technical expertise is concerned with financial litenicy. Active 
involvement is refened to in tenns of frequency of meetings. 
However, as stated in Chapter 3, DeZoort et al. (2002) offer an alternative, four-element 
taxonomy of the structural determinants of audit committee effectiveness (ACF.) to that 
identified above. The four clements and their dimensions are iterated below: 
Elements Dimensions 
• Composition - expertise, independence, integrity, objectivity: 
e Authority - responsibilities. influence (derived from full of board of 
Cl Resources 
e Diligence 
directors, federal law and exchange listing requirements); 
- adequate number of members: access to management, 
external auditors and internal auditors: and 
- incentive, motivation, perseverance. (DcZoort ct al. 2002. p. 42). 
The taxonomy embraces the issues identified in the ASX guidelines. The clement 
autlwrizr is consistent with the subject matter of the ASX charter; composition, 
independence and technical expertise. and dilige11ce. active involvement. 
However. the DcZoort ct al. (2002) taxonomy unlike the ASX description represents a 
systematic attempt to model the detcnninants of effectiveness and. therefore, better 
facilitates analysis. Thus, the DcZoort et al. (2002) taxonomy is used here as the basis 
for defining the structural strength of the board of directors. 
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TABLE 11: Concepts that define the structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of 
a corporation's financial reporting 
Charter The chm1er should clearly set out the audit committee's role and 
Independence 
responsibilities. composition. structure and membership 
requirements. 
The audit committee should he given the necessary power and 
resources to meet its charter. This will include rights of access to 
management and to auditors (e.xtemal and internal' without 
management preser;t and rights to seek explanations and additional 
infommtion. 
An independent director i� a non-executive director (i.e .. is not a 
member of management) and: 
1. is not a substantial shareholder of the company or an officer 
oC or otherwise associated directly with, a substantial 
shareholder of the company 
2. within the last three years has not been employed in an 
executive capacity by the company or another group member, 
or been a director after ceasing to hold any such employment 
3. within the last three years has not been a principal of a 
material professional adviser or a material consultant to the 
company or another group member, or an employee mater:ally 
associated with the service provided 
4. is not a material supplier or customer of the company or other 
group member. or an officer of or otherwise associated directly 
or indirectly with a material supplier or customer 
5. has not material contractual relationship with the company or 
another gr0up member other than as a director of the company 
6. has not served on the board for a period which could, or could 
reasonably be perceived to. materially interfere with the 
director·s ability to act in the best interests of the company 
7. is free from any interest and any business or other relationship 
which could. or could reasonably be perceived to, materially 
interfere with the director's ability to act in the best interest of 
the comp:my. 
Family ties and cross-directorship may be relevant in considering 
interests and relationships which may compromise independence. 
t----------------..-a_n_d_should be disclosed by directors to the boarci. 
Technical expertise 
Active involvement 
The audit committee should include members who are all 
financially literate (i.e .. able to read and understand financial 
statemen1s): at least one member who has financial expertise (i.e., 
1s a qualified accountant or other financial professional with 
expenence of financial and accounting matters): and some 
members who have an understanding of the industry in which the 
entity operates. 
The audit committee should meet often enough to undertake its role 
effectively. 
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DeZoort et al. (2002) deploy the taxonomy to model ACE as an input-process-output 
system as shown in Figure 14. 
FIGURE 14: Determinants of Audit Committee Effectiveness (ACE) 
output 
r 
process 
r 
input 
Composition 
(e.g .. Expertise. 
Independence) 
ACE 
iligence 
Authority 
(e.g .. Responsibilities. 
Influence) 
Resources 
(e.g .. Access to 
Management. 
External and Internal 
Auditors) 
L....-----------'------- ----'----- ------' 
Source: DcZoort ct al.. 2002. p. 43. 
The researchers also provide the following definition of ACE. 
An ejfective mu/if commilfee has quai!fied memhers ll'ith !he authority 
LmJ resourc.:s to protect stakeholder interes1s hy en.rnring rel iahle 
.financial reporting. internal controls. and risk management through its 
diligent oversight e.[!hrls ( DeZoort et al.. 2002. p. 41 ). 
The definition recognises the best-practice elements (composition. resources. authority 
and diligence) as a necessary condition or ACE. Empirical support for their position. 
and. therefore. the associated best-practice recommendations. is provided in the 
empirical audit committee literature. A summary of the literature is provided in Chapter 
3. The research questions addressed in the studies are diverse. as are the methods 
involved. However. a number of the studies that hold immediate implications for the 
theoretical development of the current research question are reviewed below. The 
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studies arc grouped and discussed on the basis 0f the following three relationships 
identified in Tables 6, 8 and 9 in Chapter 3: 
( i) strnctural strength of the audit committee and financial reporting 
reliability: 
(ii) structural strength of the audit committee and managerial 
discretionary decision-making; and 
(iii) structural strength of the audit committee/ACE and the structural 
strength of the board. 
Structural strength of the audit committee and jinancfo! reporting reliability 
Klein (2002a) found that audit committee independence was negatively associated with 
abnonnal accrnals, and reductions in audit committee independence were associated 
with large increases in abnonnal accruals. Abbott et al. (2000) found that companies 
that have audit committees comprised of independent directors that meet at least twice a 
year are less likely to be "sanctioned from fraudulent or misleading reporting". Beasley 
et al. (2000) found that fraud companies in technology. healthcare and financial services 
industries had a lower percentage of audit committees composed entirely of outside 
directors, held fewer committee meetings and has less internal audit support, than did 
non-fraud companies. McMullen et al. ( 1996) found that companies with financial 
reporting problems were Jess likely to have audit committees composed entirely of 
outside directors, CPAs as committee members and held less frequent meetings. 
Structural strength of the lllldit committee and managerial discretionary decisio11-
maki11g 
The threat to auditor independence from the provision of NAS in this study derives 
from wealth incentives, which provide a catalyst by which management may exact 
compliance in the context of audit-client negotiation. Here, as discussed earlier, the 
audit committee has the cap..1city to safeguard auditor independence through controlling 
the aberrant behaviour of management. as an antecedent of opportunity, at the same 
time, mitigating IR attitude. The tindings of studies conducted by Ng et al. (2003), 
DeZoort et al. (200 I) and Knapp ( 1985) provide evidence of a link between the 
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monitoring quality of the audit committee and its mitigating role in the presence of 
.. pressure·· from managerial oppc,rtunism. Ng ct al. (2003) found that audit committee 
independence and the availability of authoritative guidance on an accounting treatment 
interacted to jointly affoct auditors' propensity to concede to an auditee 's preferred 
position on the accounting treatment. DeZoort et al. (200 I) found that audit committee 
members with greater experience as independent directors and greater audit knowledge, 
are rr.0rc likely to support an auditor promoting "substance over form" in a client 
dispute, whereas executive directors are inore likely to support management. Knapp 
( 1985) found that audit committee members who were practicing managers were more 
likely to support auditors over management in a client dispute, than retired executives 
or committee members from a non-managerial background. 
Structural strength of the (llldit committee and the structural strength of the board 
However, the role and effectiveness uf the audit committee cannot be divorced from 
that of the board. The overriding responsibility for corporate governance vests with the 
full board of directors: "(t)he existence of an audit committee should not be seen as 
implying a fragmentation or diminution of the responsibilities of the board as a whole" 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003, p. 30). Further, the board defines the 
composition, operation and responsibilities of the committee. Consequently, the audit 
committee is nested in the structure of the board of directors in this study. The key 
defining relationship is the level of influence of the chief executive officer (CEO). 
The findings of studies conducted by Klein (2002b ), Cohen ct al. {2002), Beasley et al. 
(2001), Collier et al. (1999), Menon et al. (1994) and Kalbers et al. (1993) provide 
evidence of a link between the structural strength of the AC/ACE and the monitoring 
quality of the board. Klein (2002b) found audit committee independence was positively 
associated with board size and independence. Cohen et al. (2002) provide evidence that 
the effectiveness of the audit committee is subject to independence from the CEO. 
Beasley ct al. (200 I) found that voluntary increases in the breadth of outside audit 
committee members' collective financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and 
experience were positively related to board size, the proportion of outsiders on the 
board and the separation of board chair and CEO. Collier ct al. ( 1999) found that the 
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presence of a dominant CEO and the inclusion of insiders on the audit committee were 
negatively related to the level of audit committee activity. Menon et al. ( 1994) found 
that as the proportion of outside directors on the board increases, finns are more likely 
to exclude insiders from the audit committee. Kalbers ct al. (1993) found lhat audit 
committee power within an organisation came from a combination of written authority 
and the clear support of top management. 
The present study looks to add to the foregoing studies by examining the effect of the 
monitoring quality of the board of directors on stakeholder perception of auditor 
independence and willingness-to-appoint where the auditor has incentives and the 
opportunity to engage in high-risk behaviour. Under those circumstances the structural 
attributes assume the nature of assurance properties with respect to the board's 
effectiveness in discharging its responsib1iity for safeguarding ( ensuring) the integrity 
of financial reporting. 
The effectiveness 0f the audit committee vis-a-vis the board is reflected in the DeZoort 
et al. (2002) ACE authority element. Thus. the present study is as much concerned with 
examining the effect of the monitoring quality of the audit committee as the board of 
directors on stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence and willingness-to­
appoint. 
The foregoing discussion gives rise to the following three hypotheses, which are stated in 
the alternative form. 
H-1 Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence will be lowc · 
when the structural strength of the board of directors is weak 
than when it is strong. 
H5 Stakeholders will be less likely to choose the audit firm to provide 
the NAS when the structural strength of the hoard of directors is 
·weak than when it is strong. 
H6 Stakeholder strength of preference for the auditor will be lower 
when the structural strength of the board of directors is weak 
than when it is strong. 
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Hypotheses 4 to 6 predict a main effect on stakeholder perception of auditor 
independence and willingness-to-appoint. The basis for that proposition is, again, 
attributable to the belief that the structural strength of the board of directors acts as a 
signal of the board's effectiveness in discharging its responsibility for ensuring the 
integrity of the financial statements. A strong board of director:; has the capacity to 
negate the propagation from IR incentives to attitude and opportunity. i bus, one might 
also expect an interactive effect on stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence and 
willingness-to-appoint between recurring NAS and the weak form of the board of 
directors. The opportunity to test for the interactive effect 1s facilitated by the fact that 
the experimental desik'11 deployed in Study 2 involves a full-factorial, between-subjects 
design. 
The possible interactive effect is formalised by tr.e following set of hypotheses, which 
are expressed in the alternative fonn: 
H, Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence are more likely 
to be affected by the recurring NAS when the structural strength 
of the board of directors is weak than ,,·hen it is strong. 
HR Stakeholder choice of the audit firm is more likely to be affected by 
the recurring NAS when the structural strength of the board of 
directors is weak than when it is strong. 
H9 Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit firm is more likely 
to be affected by the recurring NAS when the structural strength 
of the board of directors is weak than when it is strong. 
Following on from the foregoing discussion, it is suggested that where accountability is 
perceived to be met, i.e., where the strength of the corporate governance is strong, 
stakeholders may choose the audit firm to provide the NAS. If so, this would suggest 
that the parties concerned considered that there were net benefits (efficiencies) to be 
obtained in appointing the audit firm. The key to identifying the nature of the benefits 
lies in the factors th&t differentiate the potential NAS providers and the implications of 
the factors for the capacity of the respective parties to add value. This brings us then, to 
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the issue of etlicicncics impacting on stakeholder willingness-to-appoint the incumbent 
auditor to provide NAS. 
4.3 EFFICIENCY RESEARCH QUESTION 
The nature and source of the benefits that may accrue from appointing the incumbent 
auditor to provide NAS is considered in detail in Chapter 5. The efficiencies derive 
from the superior capacity of a professional service provider to meet the needs of a 
client, relative to competitors. Superior capacity is, in turn, synonymous with 
competitive advantage ( e.g., Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist & Borgatti, 1998). 
Thus, the efficiencies involved are reciprocal. That is, they represent the capacity to add 
value for the residual claimants on both the demand (shareholders) and supply sides 
( professional partners) of the market. 
From a resource based perspective of competitive advantage, the capacity to deliver 
services better than rival firms derives from a set of distinctive organisational 
capabilities/resources (e.g., Jones et al., 1998; Teece et al., 1997). The resources also 
represent the criteria for choosing a professional service provider on the demand side of 
the market for NAS. The resources may be classified accord1ng to whether lhey are firm 
specific or client specific to the service provider. The dichotomisation of the resources 
is reflected in the economics of audit quality literature (e.g., De Angelo, !%la; 
Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988a & b). Simu,1ic (1984), for example, classifies 
knowledge spillovers as general and specific. Th,: fo1mer arc inherent in the service 
provider, i.e., non-transaction specific. The latter, on the other hand, are transaction 
( client) speci fie. 
Empirical research into the existence or otherwise of the cost-savings is embedded in J 
body of studies dedicated to examining the presence or otherwise of an association 
between the fees for N AS and audit fees ( e.g., Simunic, 1984; Beck ct al., 1988b; 
Palmrose, 1986 ). The weight of the evidence suggests a significant and positive relation 
between NAS and audit fees on the supply side of the market for the joint services. 
However, no evidence is provided of the cost savings accruing to audit clients given 
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that in all instances audit tees. as the dependent variablc. are found to be higher in the 
presence of the joint provision of the audit and NAS. 
The foregoing studies arc comparatively limited in number, which is attributed to the 
fact that the benefits and costs of the joint provision of the audit and NAS are 
reciprocal, and it is ditftcult to "model and test the . . . interactions" between the 
services (Dopuch & King. 1991, p. 61 ). However, anecdotal evidence of the existence 
of the economies also exists. From the supply side of the market for the joint services. 
such evidence includes the "prominence of management ..:onsulting services in the 
largest CPA finns" (Antic and Demski, 1991, p. 1 ). From the demand side of the 
market, it is the fact that the profession has played a leading role in the provision of 
NAS services (Hanlon, 1996; Dezalay, 1991 ). Support for this proposition is also 
provided in the following response, in June 2000, of the then President of the American 
Institute of CPAs, to the SEC proposal to place severe limitations on the NAS that US 
firms could offer to audit clients. 
clients want accounting fim1s to provide (NAS) because this achieves 
economic efficiencies which will be lost if clients are denied this choice 
(Melancon, 2000. p. 27). 
The present study will look to add to the foregoing empirical literature in two ways. 
Firstly, by identifying the benefits (efficiencies) that may accrue from appointing the 
incumbent auditor to provide NAS i.e., the demand side of the market for the joint 
services. Secondly, the investigation will not be confined to the benefits that may 
accrue from client speci fie resources, but extend to those that may accme from firm 
specific resources. Firm specific resources feature as part of th<' ex ante (initial) 
bidding competition for professional services. The decision of whether the incumbent 
audit finn should be chosen to provide NAS that underpins the experimental task in this 
study arises in the context of that market. Further. the potential NAS providers are 
heterogeneous with respect to criteria that hold implications for the parties' competitive 
advantage, i.e .. the superior capacity to add value. Thus, a unified approach to 
identifying, analytically, the nature and source of b�ncfits/efficiencies in the market for 
NAS is warranted. The approach facilitates examining the implications that the 
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fundamental factors that differentiate the potential NAS providers hold for the parties' 
capacity to add value, and that are expressed through firm and client specific assets. 
The foregoing discussion gives rise to the following research question. 
RQ What are the nature and .:;ources of the efficiencies that 
may accrue from appointing the incumbent audit firm 
to provide NAS'! 
The nature and source of the efficiencies are dealt with in the following Chapter 
(Chapter 5). 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF EFFICIENCIES 
IMPACTING WILLINGNESS TO APPOINT 
THE INCUMBENT AUDIT FIRM TO PROVIDE NAS 
5.0 CHAPTER CONTENT 
The purpose of this Chapter is twofold. Firstly, an analysis of the nature and source of 
economic efficiencies impicting the decision of whether to hire the incumbent audit finn 
to provide NAS is undertaken. Secondly, the implications of the efficiencies for the 
empirical component of the study are addressed. This Chapter is prepared in response to 
the research question concerning the nature and source of efficiencies impacting on 
stakeholder willingness-to-appoint the incumbent audit tim1 to provide NAS. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Abdel-khalik ( 1993, pp. 297 - 298) states that acquiring NAS is" (U)nlike audits ... a 
purely discretionary activity" that involves "a two-sequence decision: 
Whether to develop the service internally . . or to hire task-oriented consultants; 
and 
2 Whether the outside management consultant should be hired from the incumbent 
auditing finn". 
This thesis is concerned with examining factors that impact the latter stage of the two­
sequence decision in circumstances where the audit client has chosen to outsource the 
NAS and the incumbent audit finn is one of two final contenders to provide the NAS. The 
audit finn is a multi-discipline professional service provider. The alternative provider is 
represented as a single-discipline professional service provider - described, in the 
experimental materials, as a specialist provider. The use of the tem1 specialist provider in 
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that sense is separate from the notion of industry specialisation as defined in the audit 
quality literature (e.g. , Craswell. Francis & Taylor, 1995). 
The decision of whether to hire the incumbent audit firm, whilst complex, is assessed for 
the purposes of this thesis on two dimensions: accountability in the equity capital markets 
and efficiency in the market for joint audit-NAS. The framework for examining the issue 
of accountability, which centres on the regulatory conceptual approach to auditor 
independence, and the theory of IR ( e.g., Johnstone et al., 200 l; Mock et al., 2005) was 
dealt with in Chapters 2 and 4. The framework for examining the issue of the efficiencies 
that may accrue to the client from the audit-NAS strategy is the subject of this Chapter. 
From the perspective of the private enterprise corporation, each stage of the Abdel-khalik 
(1993) two-sequence decision can be assumed to be driven by the pursuit of economic 
(allocative) efficiency, i.e., profit maximisation. Simunic ( 1984, p. 682). for example, 
views consulting services as "factors of production purchased for the purpose of 
increasing the profits of the firm". Economic efficiency requires "either the maximum in 
value to be received from a given cost or the least cost for a given value received - in short 
. .. least-cost decisions" (Lindblom. 200 I. p. 129). Under those circumstances, a cost­
benefit framework would drive the decision choice. Thus, it is assumed here that with 
respect to phase two of the Abdel-khalik ( 1993) decision process, the contract to provide 
NAS would be awarded to the service provider who offers the projected least cost/largest 
net gain vis-a-vis competitive bidders, where accountability is met. The superior capacity 
of a professional service provider to meet the needs of a client in that respect, derives, 
from a resource based perspective of competitive advantage, from a set of distinctive 
organisational capabilities (e.g., Teece ct al., 1997). 
The resource based perspective of competitive advantage represents a theory of firm 
performance, which is addressed in the strategic management literature (e.g., Teece et al., 
1997; Barney, 1991 ). The approach views "firms ... (as) being profitable ... because they 
offer markedly lower costs, or offer markedly higher quality or performance" (Teece et al., 
t 997, 513 ). Further, it focuses on economic rents accruing to the owners of the scarce 
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resources, "rather than from tactics which deter entry and keep competitors ofT balance" 
(Teece et al., 1997, p. 513). 
Resource-based competitive advantage is reflected in the quasi-rent - economic bonding 
issue that is the subject of the economics of audit quality literature dealing with 
independence in appearance. The resources comprise technological advantages (e.g., Beck 
et al., 1988a) and knowledge spillovers (e.g., Simunic, 1984, Beck et al., 1988a & b). The 
resources are client speci fie. of an enduring nature, and give rise to a lack of parity in 
favour of the incumbent vis-a-vis competitors, ex posl. However, client specific assets are 
not a sufficient condition for competitive advantage in the initial market for NAS, which is 
of interest to this study. Competitive advantage in the initial market for professional 
services, and. therefore, NAS, begins with finn specific assets, i.e., ex ante advantage. 
Finn specific assets are the subject of the empirical literature dealing with the demand 
dctcnninants of quality professional services including the audit ( e.g., Williams, 1988; 
Beattie et al.. 1995; Craswell et al, 1995: Carcello ct al.. 1992; Eichenseher et al., 1983) 
and accounting services (e.g., Higgins & Ferguson, 1991 ): and best-practice literature 
(e.g., International Organization for Standardization (ISO)). The assets include expertise 
and reputation (e.g., Craswcll ct al., 1995). The literature is partially relied upon here to 
describe the nature of and provide empirical support for the role of firm specific assets as 
demand detenninants. However. the literature lacks a conceptual/structural framework. 
Therefore. it docs not provide the best opportunity to deal with the fundamental criteria 
that differentiate the potential NAS providers of interest to this study and that arc 
ultimately the basis of the relative strengths and weaknesses ot the -:ontenders. 
The fundamental criteria. attributable to the audit fim1. arc fourfold: 
(i) audit technology as a capability; 
(ii) incumbency vis-a-vis the client; 
(iii) a multi-disciplinary organisational structure; and 
(iv) fom1al pro fcssional status. 
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Fa<.:tors (i) to (iii) are, as stated earlier, the Achilles heel of the audit finn with respect to 
the independence of the audit. They are the source of the audit finn 's public interest role 
and, as such, the strength of the specialist finn. However, where accountability is met, all 
four factors represent possible sources of competitive advantage to the audit finn vis-a-vis 
the specialist. That is, the factors represent a basis and explanation for choosing the 
incumbent audit finn to provide NAS, where accountability is met. Examining willingness 
to appoint and therein the board of directors as an ex post safeguard of auditor 
independence anticipates such an outcome. 
The opportunity to capture the implications of the differentiating factors on the relative 
competitive advantage of the parties of interest to this study is provided in the resource 
based (RB) theory of competitive advantage (e.g., Jones et al., 1998; Teece et al., 1997). 
The RB literature includes a conceptual approach to identifying the dynamic capabilities 
that "undergird(s)" resource based competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997, p. 517). 
According to Teece et al., (1997, p. 513) "(c)ompetitive advantage lies 'upstream' of 
product markets". The conceptual approach allows a distinction to be drawn between 
resources, such as expertise, and the foundation of the resources. The distinction may be 
illustrated with respect to client specific assets. Client specific resources comprise 
technological advantages and knowledge spillovers. However, the foundation of the 
resources is incumbency and incumbency as a multi-discipline provider to the client, 
respectively. Incumbency and multi-disciplinarity fall within the ambit of what Teece ct 
al. ( 1997, p. 521) refer to as structural assets of a professional service provider. 
Structural assets accrue from the manner in which economic activity within a fim1 is 
organised/co-ordinated (Teece et al., 1997). Enduring client specific investm<'nl accruing 
from incumbency renders the client and service provider bi-lateral tn-lcrs (Williamson, 
1996). Thus, incumbency is concerned with the boundaries of ;i i,nn 's economic activity 
(Teece et al. 1997). Multi-disciplinarity. on the other hand. r.:prcsents a finn-based form of 
organising economic activity that is designed to faci1 itate innovation (Teece et al., 1997). 
Empi1ical support for the relationship between ,,tructural assets and firm pcrfonnance is 
provided by Garvin ( 1988, cited in Teece l'l al., 1997) and Clark and Fujimoto (1991. cited 
in Teece et al .. 1997). 
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Structural assets, in tum, represent a dimension of positions as one of three elements that 
Teece ct al. ( 1997) identify as fundamental to competitive advantage. The remaining two 
elements are processes and paths. Teece et al. ( 1997) do not attempt to model their theory 
diagrammatically. However, a synthesis of the researchers' conceptual approach is 
depicted in Figure 15. 
The model provides context and order to the ensuing discussion. The structure depicted in 
Figure 15 traces the conceptual origins of competitive advantage via a taxonomy and is 
therefore unilateral in direction. The origin of competitive advantage, moving from left to 
right, lies with conceptual assets, which can be traced to three conceptual elements and 
subsequently to firm spec{fic and clienl specific assets in the product market. The broad 
nature of the assets vis-a-vis the conceptual elements, is as follows: 
o Processes is defined by internal organisational systems associated with co­
ordination, integration, learning and adaptation. 
o Posilio11s refers to the specific asset base of an entity, which includes an 
organisation's technology, organisational structure and institutional 
environment. 
o Paths refors to the evolution of an entity with respect to its past investments 
and routines. 
The element positions, is of immediate interest to this study. The four variables that 
differentiate the potential providers of interest to this study fall within the domain of three 
classes of asset that define positions. The assets <.1re referred to by Teece et al. (1997, p. 
521-522) as technological, structural and institutional. 
Audit know-how falls within the domain of technological assets; incumbency and multi­
disciplinarity, as stated earlier, structural assets; and the formal professional status of the 
audit firm the i11stit111io11al e11viro11me11t. Thus, the four fundamental factors that 
differentiate the NAS providers hold implications for the superior capacity of the audit 
firm to add value vis-a-vis the specialist. The factor:, are, again, expressed, to varying 
degrees, through finn specific as well as client specifa: ;-esources (e.g., Jones et al., 1997). 
The broad nature of the latter relationship is denicted in ;:igure 16. 
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FIGURE 15: A model (taxonomy) of competitive advantage 
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FIGURE 16: The interface betw een the factors that differentiate the audit firm from the specialist and the determinants of 
competitive advantage 
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The relationship between finn and client specific resources as sources of competitive 
advantage in the product market and the distinguishing attributes of the audit firm as 
detenninants of competitive advantage at the conceptual level is identified in Table 12. 
The only asset type for which the factors do not hold implications is the finn-specific 
asset, reputation - for reasons explained later in the Chapter. The classification of the firm 
and client specific resources shown in Table 12 pre-empts the discussion in section 5.2. 
Suffice it to say at this point, that the basis for the classification of the client specific 
resources and their relationship to the differentiating factors has been drawn from the 
economics of audit quality literature (e.g., Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988a}. However, 
the dassification of firm-specific resources and their relationship to the differentiating 
factors shown in Table 12 is Jess certain -· highlighting the exploratory nature of the 
present research in that respect. The basis for arriving at the classification and 
relationships has been drawn from an analysis of the RB literature (e.g., Teece et al., 1998; 
Jones et al., 199'.7): empirical studies dealing with the demand dctcnninants of auditing 
services (e.g., William8, 1988; Beattie ct al., 1995; Craswell et al., 1995); and literature 
dealing with the economics of transactions costs (e.g., Williamson, 1996). The influence 
of the respective sets of literature in that respect is identified in the process of describing 
the nature of the finn-spccific assets in section 5.2. 
The RB theory also provides the opportunity to address the relationship between firm 
specific assets and economic ef
f
iciencies on the demand side of the market for 
professional services. The economic approach is at a descriptive level similar to that 
reflected in the economics of audit quality literature dealing with client specific assets. 
Thus, it facilitates adopting a unified approach to identifying the nature and source of 
efficiencies impacting the decision of whether to appoir,t the incumbent audit firm to 
provide NAS. 
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TABLE 12: -fhe relationship between the sources of competitive advantage in the 
product market and the distinguishing attributes of the audit firm as 
determinants of competitive advantage at the conceptual level 
SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE 
Distinguishing attributes of the audit firm 
ADVANTAGE 
in the product market 
Technological Structural Institutional 
I assets assets assets 
FIRM Asset type Multi- Formal 
SPECIFIC Audit Incumbency disciplinarity professional 
RESOURCES status 
Technological • Distincti,e Expertise ../ 
resources o lnfommtion benefits ,/ 
Contractual • Reputation . /;;; 
Assets 1 • Exclusivity ,/ ,/ 
CLIENT 
SPECIFIC 
RESOURCES 
Technological o Start-up costs ,/ 
ad\'antages o Client switching ,/ 
... 
costs '•, 
Knowledge o Economies of scope ,/ ,/ :·.,· � ·  ...:· " 
spillo\'ers o Scope of knowledge ,/ ,/ .. ·:,:,;\·, 
Finally, before concluding this section it is important to remember that the finn specific 
versus client speci tic asset issue also holds important implications for economic bonding 
between the audit firm and client vis-a-vis the audit-NAS strategy. Whilst an adjunct to the 
stated main purpose of this Chapter, the matter of economic bonding will also be discussed 
in the process of dealing with the respective categories of assets. 
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5.2 NATURE AND SOURCES OF EFFICIENCIES 
The finn versus client specific categories of resources provides the structure for the 
discussion in the remainder of this section, beginning with the fonner category of asset. 
The discussion centres on identifying the nature and sources of the efficiencies that may 
accrue from appointing the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS, and the relationship 
between those variables and the distinguishing attributes of the audit finn, which are 
driven by the experimental setting of the empirical component of the thesis. 
A description of the nature of the efficiencies that may accrue from appointing the 
incumbent audit finn to provide NAS and the sources of the efficiencies is provided in 
Table 13, which appears on pages 124 - 125. Table 13, as with Table 12, has been 
prepared as a guide to the ensuing discussion. 
5.2.l FIRM SPECIFIC RESOURCES 
Finn specific assets feature as part of the ex ante (initial) bidding competition for a NAS 
contract. They represent an investment in assets that are not client specific. Therefore, they 
can be transferred "without a net loss to some alternative use" (Simu11ic. 1984, p. 680) or 
users. Unlike client specific resources, the assets do not accrue from incumbency. Thus, no 
direct advantage accrues to the incumbent (audit finn) in that respect. Further, assuming a 
diversified client base. the value of the assets is not dependent on a continued relationship 
with the client. but a continued presence in the broader market. Under these 
circumstances, where the incumbent audit finn is chosen to provide the NAS, the 
"marginal benefits and costs of misrepresenting audit findings will be independent of the 
(NAS) situation" (Simunic. 1984, p. 680). That is, the NAS do not give rise to wealth 
incentives. Thus. fim1-specitic resources have important implications for any attempt to 
place a blanket prohibition on the provision of NAS by audit firms to audit clients. 
However. any non-financial threat emanating from, for example, the subject matter of the 
NAS (e.g., self-review. advocacy) and/or proximity to management (e.g .. familiarity) 
remams. 
The resources arc identified here as fourfold as follows: 
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(i) distinctive expertise; 
(ii) infonnation benefits; 
(iii) reputation; and 
(iv) exclusivity. 
The nature of the efficiencies that may accrue to the client from the resources differs. 
Distinctive expertise and information benefits represent technological assets. Thus, they 
are a source of productive efficiency to the client. Productive efficiency is concerned with 
the "ratio of valuable output to valuable input" (Lindblom, 2001, p. 124). Reputation and 
exclusivity, on the other hand, are a source of savings in transaction costs to the client and 
following the lead of Arrunada ( 1999) arc classified here as contractual assets. The 
technological - contractual classification is maintained for the purposes of the ensuing 
discussion of the four types of resources. 
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TABLE 13: Sources and nature of the efficiencies that may accrue from appointing the incumbent audit firm to provide 
NAS 
SOURCES OF THE EFFICIENCIES attaching to the supplier 
FIRM SPECIFIC 
ASSETS Asset type Asset description 
Technological resources l>lstinctivc Expcrtl,c 
Tc-.:hnicai knnwlL"dgl' and L'Xpc-r1cncl'. 
Complcml'ntary asscls. phih,sophy. 
!1c,ihility. creativity, listening skills. 
nbscn·atillnS skills and emp�thy. 
lnfonnation bt'flclits rcprc-scnt c'flhanccxl 
Information benefits cxpc"ftisc gainc-d from acting as a hroh-r of 
knowlLxlgc hetwc-cn otherwise dispar.ite 
disciplinc'S 
Rcputntion 
Substitute/signal for quality pro\'ldcs n 
cost-effoctivc means of controlling fort'.\ 
Contractual assets a11tc .advi..-rs� sckction. 
Collalc-ml for conlractual pcrfonnance that 
provides a cns1-cITc-.:1ive means of 
controlling for <'X p0<t opportunism. 
Eulu,Mty As for rl'purntion. 
Legend: 
Applicable ./ 
Not-applicable x. 
NATURE OF THE EFFICIENCIES TO THE CLIENT 
Producli\'c crlicicncy I Savings in trnn,nction cost, 
Vnluc of input : to ,·nluc of output rot lo 
X 
/ X 
X 
./ 
To thl' extent 1ha1 the status of the SL'n·icc providl'r 
is a signal of the quality ofa clic-r1t 0s'managcmcnt's 
infonnation system, to outside panics. cost savings 
,/' may accmc to thl' client in the fonn of reduced cost 
of capital. acquisition. production, distribution and 
sales. 
Continued ..... 
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TABLE 13 continued: Sources and nature of the efficiencies that may accrue from appointing the incumbent audit firm to 
provide NAS 
SOURCES OF THE EFFICIENCIES attaching to the supplied NATURE OF EFFICIENCIES TO THE CLIENT 
CLIENT SPECIFIC l'roducli\'I' cHicil'nC)' Sn,·ini:• in lran,nrlion costs 
ASSETS Asset type Asset description Vnluc of input : 10 \'nluc of oulpul ratio 
>--
I Technological S1nrl-up co<ts 
lnn.-s1111cn1 m gaming an understanding or 
!he clicnt·s operations and. possibly. ./ X 
advantages industry. 
Clicnl '" ilchini: coM< I r.msactions coses assnciat�"ti \'li'tth swnching 
supplic-rs. including tlwsc involwd m X ./ 
adapting npcr.uions to auditor change. 
Knowledge spillovers Economil'< of scope ( ·ost s.wing., that arise where the aud11 and ./ N,\S utilise 1he same sci or infonnation 
and'or profossional qualificatinns X 
Scope of knowlcdi:c 
Clicnt-,pc-cific cxpenisc tacit knnwkdge 
!hat the auditor gams from providing NAS 1,, 
the audit chenl. re-suiting in improved ./ X 
understanding nf the chcnl's bu,inc-ss. 
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5.2.1.1 Technological assets 
Technological assets are identified here as twofold: distinctive expertise and information 
benefits. 
Distinctive expertb,e 
Professional service providers are "hired for their expertise and skills enabling them to 
produce an outcome that clients either use or sell" (Jones et al., 1998, p. 397). Distinctive 
expertise is central to competitive advantage. Gaining entry to a competitive arena relies 
on a firm possessing distinctive expertise (Jones et al., 1998). The role of expertise as a 
demand determinant for audit services, for example, is provided by various studies (e.g., 
Beattie & Feamley, 1998a; Eichenseher et al., 1983). 
Expertise, per se. is defined in the audit literature as "task-specific superior performance" 
that is a function of technical knowledge, experience and innate ability (Bonner, Lewis & 
Marchant, 1990, p. 2). Technical knowledge refers to the codified knowledge that defines 
the boundaries of a discipline/profession (Jones et al., 1998). Experience, on the other 
hand, refers to tacit - non-codified knowledge - gained from workplace experience (Jones 
ct al.. 1998). Specialised industr; knowledge is also recognised as a component of 
expertise (Craswcll et al., 1995; Chapman, 1999). 
The foregoing conception of expertise emphasises technical knowledge. However. the RB 
and best-practice literatures suggest that the notion of expertise/superior performance 
extends to skills that facilitate the effective delivery of expertise (Chapman, 1999). The 
skills arc in that sense "complementary assets" (Teece et al., 1997). They are reflected, for 
example, in the following list of attributes that Chapman ( 1999), drawing on ISO guidance 
on the evaluation of auditors, identifies as key attribuk;:; of a quality consultant: 
philosophy, flexibility, creativity, listening and observation skills and empathy. The latter 
qualities arc vested in the inu1vidual and are recognised as the product of personality, 
experience and training (Chapman, 1999). 
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Ex1,-:rti :;e would represent a criterion for choosing the incumbent auditor to provide NAS 
in circumstances where the audit finn possesses superior operating capabilities in the NAS 
arena vis-a-vis competitors. Overall efficiency would come from using the best resources 
available to perfonn the task. Jones ct al. ( 1998, p. 40 I) maintain that a measure of 
distinctive expertise is a provider's "depth of experience in an area". Thus, an audit firm 
may be perceived to possess the superior capacity to add value vis-a-vis non-audit 
providers for those NAS that involve core audit technology (competencies). Kinney ( 1999, 
p. 75) suggests that two such competencies arc "expertise in measurement and competence 
in (the) application of standardized measurement rules" This also suggests that the type of 
N AS sought may impact the choice of professional service provider. 
However, as stated earlier. with respect to the incumbent audit firm, screening for non­
financial tlm.:ats emanating from the NAS would need to take place at this point. Notably, 
three of the non-exclusive list of nine prohibited NAS identified in PF I - preparing 
accounting records and financial statements, valuation services and internal audit services 
- fall within the domain of auditor competencies. 
Information be11efits 
lnfonnation benefits represent a sub-set of the capability referred to in the resource based 
literature as "structural holes" ( e.g., Jones ct al., 1998).10 The benefits represent the 
improved knowledge and skills gained from the opportunity to transfer knowledge 
between and practice disparate disciplines. The benefits represent an extemality and are 
analogous to scope of knowledge, as a by-product of joint production. However, they are 
of the nature of the "general" (finn specific) as opposed to "client specific" knowledge 
spillovers referred to by Simunic ( I 984, p. 681 ). Jones et al. ( 1998) identify the resource 
as accruing to professional service providers in the process of providing a single NAS 
across disparate markets, leading to enhanced creative problem solving for clients as the 
provider serves as a broker "between previously unconnected sources of technical 
knowledge" (Jones ct al., 1998. p. 403). 
1" 'The term "structural hole"' refers 10 the absence of a direct connection between a pair of actors that can 
be exploited by a third actor that is connected to the other two" (Jones et al.. 1998, p. 402). 
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Efficiencies from information benefits accrue to the client in the fonn of improved quality 
of service, i.e., enhanced value for money. Thus, the resource is of the nature of distinctive 
expertise, and, similarly, concerned with productive efficiency. However, information 
benefits may also accrue to a multi-disciplined professional service provider, as opposed 
to a single-discipline provider, through the transfer of knowledge intra-firm. The multi­
discipline organisational structure is driven by the opportunity to draw on a diverse set of 
specialist expertise in order to provide innovative quality services required to meet the 
complex demands of global corporate entities, efficiently (Arrunada, 1999). Multi­
disciplinarity is invoked in this study: {i) indirectly, by describing the incumbent audit 
firm as one of the Big 4; and (ii) directly by nominating the firm as an existing provider of 
taxation services to the client and as a possible contende1· for the NAS currently being 
sought. The Big 4 hold themselves out as "having firm-wide operations organized along 
industry lines, standardized national training, and standardized audit programs" (Ferguson, 
Francis & Stokes, 2003, p. 432-433). Ferguson et al. (2003 p. 432-433) go on to state that 
"(i)f (this) is descriptive of how accounting firms operate .. . strong positive network 
externalities" should ensue. Teece et al. ( 1997, p. 520) maintain that ''learning requires 
common codes of communication ar.d coordinated search procedures" and that the 
"knowledge generated by such activity resides in new patterns of activity". Multi­
discipline audit firms dedicate considerable resources to the development, centrally, of 
cutting-edge technology (Arrunada, 1999). Further, employee mobility and technology 
also facilitate learning through the transfer of knowledge finn-wide. 
Thus, with respect to the present study the multi-disciplinary organisational structure of 
the incumbent audit firm may serve as a signal of service quality. The unavailability of 
specialist services has, for example, been found to be a primary threshold criterion for 
excluding firms during the auditor selection stage ( e.g .. Beattie & Feamley, 1998b ), albeit 
in the pre-Enron era. 
In the event that information benefits result in cost-savings to a service provider, the client 
may also have the opportunity to share in the efficiencies through competitive pricing. 
128 
5.2.1.2 Contractual assets 
Whilst technological assets arc a source of productive efficiency to clients, contractual 
assets are a source of savings in transaction costs. Where there is a competitive market for 
a commodity, then price will be sufficient to guide consumer choice. A competitive 
market exists where the following circumstances prevail. A commodity is standardised, 
buyers arc fully infimned about the prices of the product offered by the competing 
suppliers. and each supplier is a price-taker as they do not have sufficient share of the 
market to control price ( Lindblom, 200 l ). Under those circumstances price, which 
incorporates a standard contract. provides market participants with sufficient information 
to ensure an equitable exchange. and the identity of the exchange partners may remain 
anonyrnm. �. 
However, not all of the foregoing conditions prevail in the market for corporate 
professional services. Professional consulting services are by their very nature intangible, 
and typically customised, complex tasks {Jones, ct al., 1998). That is, the commodities are 
not standardised and as a result buyers lack infonnation about the technology involved, 
which gives rise to information asymmetry between buyer and seller. As a result the buyer 
faces the problems of ex ante adverse selection and ex post opportunism (Bowen et al., 
1986), i.e., market uncertainty. Market uncertainty is a source of increased transaction 
costs to the client. 
Ex ante adverse selection derives from perfonnance ambiguity, which refers to the 
inability of a client to measure the perfonnancc of a service provider or accurately value a 
service. Performance ambiguity arises in circumstances where the client is at an 
infonnation disadvantage with respect to the inputs needed to produce a commodity and 
where the commodity in question is a service (intangible) as opposed to being a good 
(tangible). Increasing intangibility gives rise to credence qualities, i.e., search qualities that 
"a consumer may find impossible to evaluate, even after purchase and consumption" 
(Bowen ct al.. 1986, p. 431 ). These circumstances may give rise to increased "search and 
infonnation costs, bargaining and decision costs" (Hodgson, I 993, p. 82, citing Dahlman, 
1979). That is, the costs of "discovering and heeding true costs and revenues and agreeing 
upon the division of profits" (Klein. Crawford & Alchian. 1978, p. 300). 
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The se<.:lmd source of transaction costs, referred to as goal incongruence, does not centre 
on the difference between goods and services. but 1s common to commodities of a 
sr.:cialised nature. Goal incongruence gives rise to ex post opportunism, which 
Williamson ( 1996, p. 378) defines as "(s)clf-interest seeking with guile, to include 
calculated efforts to mislead, deceive, obfuscate, and otherwise confuse". Under these 
circumstances, clients face increased monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Market uncertainty and, therefore, increased transaction costs. are driven, as the foregoing 
discussion suggests, by the shift out of general purpose technology into special-purpose 
technology. Under these circumstances, the pursuit of economic efficiency goes beyond 
issues of productive efficiency, to include strategies for minimising transaction costs 
(Williamson. 1996). The key to minimising transaction costs lies with implicit contracting 
(Klein et al., 1978). 
Contracting may take one of two forms: explicit or implicit. Explicit contracting 
contemplates comprehensive contracting and legal enforcement of the rnntract by the 
government or other external institution. However, explicit contracting is generally 
considered to be a costly solution as it entails the "costs of specifying possible 
contingencies and the policing and litigation of detecting violations and enforcing the 
contract in the courts" (Klein et al., 1978, p. 303). Further, the process is, in any event, 
constrained by human bounded rationality - limited "knowledge, foresight, skill and time" 
(Simon, 1957, cited in Williamson, 1996, p. 36). For those reasons parties to an exchange 
typically rely on implicit contracting (Williamson. 1996). Implicit contracting is 
synonymous with incomplete contracting. and the presence of ex post safeguards designed 
to promote effective and efficient exchange. 
The safeguards of interest to this study are the market-based contractual assets vested in 
the service provider. which act as collateral for contractual performance. Contractual 
assets consist of dttnbutes of service providers that market participants rely on to draw 
inferences about the quality of a provider's commodity and likely future perfomrnnce. 
However. the theoretical conception of the attribute(s) differs according to whether 
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�cholars adopt an economic (e.g. Shapiro. 1983) or a social structural orientation (e.g., 
Podolny, 1994). A wider analysis of the literature suggests that in relation to the 
experimental setting for this thesis, the attributes concerned are twofold: reputation and 
exclusivity. Both. however, are associated with the notion of status. Status may be defined 
as a finn's "hierarchical rank within some social grouping . .. involv(ing) behavioural 
expectations that guide interactions" (Jones ct al., 1998, p. 40 I). 
Before considering the nature of the foregoing assets. it is important to note, in the context 
of the demand for professional services, that whilst technical expertise is the pre-requisite 
to gaining entry to a market. a client will not compete for a provider's services. under 
conditions of market uncertainty. unless the firrn has high status (Jones et al. 1998). 
Reputation 
The problem of adverse selection and opportunism represent impediments to economic 
exchange and as such provide an incentive for a fim1 to offer "markedly higher quality and 
performance" (Teece et al., 1997. p. 513) as a commodity at a price. The economic 
conception of that commodity is reputation ( e.g .. Shapiro, 1983 ). 
According to Shapiro { 1983, p. 660) a "seller who d10oses to enter the high quality 
seb1 nent must invest in his reputation via the production of quality merchandise. During 
this investment period such a seller must sell his product at less than cost: he cannot 
command those prices associated with high quality .. . until his reputation is established." 
This situation also "implies that. in equilibrium. high quality items must sell for a 
premium above their cost of production" (Shapiro, 1983, p. 660). The premium (quasi­
rent) represents the return to the initial investment. Thus, the value of the investment relies 
on a continued presence in the market and according to Klein et al. ( 1978, p. 306) -
dealing specifically with the issue of ex post opportunicm - is "highly specific to contract 
fulfilment by the finn". Thus, reputation assumes the quality of a brand name. 
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Reputation derives from past demonstrations of perfonnance in a given market, the 
benefits of which accrue in the future. Thercti.)rc. reputation would represent a basis for 
choosing an entity to provide NAS where it holds a superior reputation in a given market 
vis-a-vis competitors. The existence of reputation assets as a source of competitive 
advantage in the audit market is. as stated earlier. weL established (e.g., Teoh et al., 1993; 
Balvcrs ct al.. 1988: Palmrose. 1988: and Beatty. 1989). However, as the foregoing 
discussion indicates. reputat10n is market specific. Thus. reputation in the market for audit 
docs not necessarily transfer to the market for NAS. 
However. it is important to note in the context of the overall discussion in this section, that 
Arrunada ( 1999, p. 73) suggests that auditors' existing reputation - which is grounded in 
the notions of competence and independence (integrity and objectivity) - may place an 
audit linn at a "comparative advantage" over specialist competitors in the market for 
NAS, particularly in relation to new services, i.e .. circumstances where service providers 
have yet to establish a reputation. The comparative advantage would be cost-based, 
through brand-stretching from the audit to NAS market. The benefit to the client may 
accrue through competitive pricing and. again, directly, through savings in transaction 
costs. This issue docs not hold immediate implications for the present study, because of 
the research questions that underpin the thesis and, therefore, the experimental research 
design. 
Reputation effects "may and will in general flow both ways, from audit to non-audit 
services and vice-versa" ( Arrunada, 1999, p. 76 ). Thus, the value of the resource to the 
audit finn in the market for NAS and the audit, respectively, hinges on quality and 
contractual perfonnancc in the respective markets. Withdrawal of future business would 
have adverse implications ft)r the future income streams from all remaining sources of 
competitive advantage (De Angelo, 1981 a). Thus, wealth incentives associated with 
reputation represent the overriding market mechanism for safeguarding auditor 
independence (Kinney, 200 I). 
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The source of reputation. up-stream, is past performance in a given market, rather than the 
attributes that distinguish the audit firm from the specialist finn in this study - audit 
technology. incumbency, multi-disciplinarity and formal professional status. Thus, the 
asset does not hold immediate implications for the present study. 
Exclusivity 
The economic conception of reputation centres on past perfonnance in a given market, as 
a signal of future quality and contractual perfonnance. However, Podolny ( 1994), in line 
with RB theory. offers a conception of status that is grounded in the social structural 
position of an organisation vis-a-vis its exchange partners. Podolny ( 1994, p. 460) states 
that status derives "not only from past demonstrations of quality" but the standing of a 
potential professional service provider's exchange partners. Thus, exclusivity represents an 
extension of the notion of reputation as it is defined in the economic literature, rather than 
a substitute. 
Podolny (1994) posits that the higher the market uncertainty the more likely an 
organisation will trade with the following parties: 
(i) those with whom they have had transactions in the past; and 
(ii) those of similar status. 
Status is assessed with respect to prestige, economic or political power of a potential 
provider's exchange partners (Jones ct al.. 1998). 
Podolny ( 1994. p. 459) offers "satisficing search behaviour" as an explanation for 
transacting with those with whom one has had transactions in the past. He uses the notion 
of satisficing in the sense of choosing the set of potential exchange partners about whom 
one has the greatest knowledge, gained from previous exchanges, and choosing the best 
from that set. Further, he asserts that the higher the market uncertainty t:1e more likely it is 
that buyers will enter into exchanges with those of high status. The stat11s of the acquiring 
entity is. in tum, "contingent on the status of his or her afliliates'' (Podolny's, 1994, p. 
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460). Empirical support for social structural positioning (exclusivity) as a basis for trading 
partner selection is provided by Podolny ( 1994) in the investment banking industry; Baker 
(1984, cited in Jones et al.. 1998) in the securities market; and Faulkne1 (1987, cited in 
Jones ct al., 1998) in the film industry. 
The notion of exclusivity is also evident in the auditing literature. Parkash ct al. ( 1993) 
found that auditecs purchased higher levels of recurring NAS from the incumbent audit 
firm. notwithstanding the implications for wealth incentives, where the audit firm was an 
industry specialist or the largest overall provider of NAS. Parkash ct al. (I 993, p. 1 14) 
attribute the finding to a "quality signal" to the market "that allows an auditec to purchase 
higher levels of recurring (NAS) than would normally be expected". 
Exclusivity also appears to be at the heart of Kinney's (200 I) question of whether auditor 
reputation in the market for audit, may also add value to management in the market for 
NAS by signalling the "competence and objectivity" of its information systems/assurance 
services "to outside parties" (Kinney, 2001, p. 74) - leading to "lower(ing) the costs of 
capital, acquisition, production, distribution and sales" (Kinney, 2001, p. 276). 
Reputation in the market for a given NAS accepted, with respect to the present study, the 
incumbency of the audit firm holds implications for the satisficing criterion, and, in that 
respect, provides a possible basis of comparative advantage vis-a-vis a specialist provider. 
The notion of exclusivity. like reputation, is pitched at the level of the individual firm. 
However, reputation in the market for a given NAS accepted, the professional status of an 
audit fim1 may also act as a signal of quality and perfonnance in the NAS environment 
vis-a-vis competitors that lack such status. According to Reed ( 1999, p. 18) 
"professionalism is an attitude - a voluntary commitment to achieve excellence and serve 
the public interests". That position may be bolstered by institution-wide standards of 
performance that include a code of ethics (Arrunada, 1999). 
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Williamson ( 1996) dealing specifically with ex post opportunism, also acknowledges that 
such institutional-trust may have a role to play in securing a credible commitment to 
contractual pcrfonnance. The role of the institutional environment is implicit in the present 
study with respect to the incumbent audit finn, described simply as one of the Big 4. The 
specialist finn does not have that direct association. 
Notably, efficiency from contractual assets may not be limited to savings in transaction 
costs, but may accrue to the client in the form of increased revenue, where the perceived 
quality of inputs leads to increased client turnover and/or increased mark-up (Dietrich, 
1993). 
Thus, in concluding the discussion of firm specific assets, it is suggested that the nature of 
the efficiencies that may accrue to the client from firm specific assets are twofold: 
production efficiencies and savings in transactions costs. The sources of the production 
efficiencies arc distinctive expertise and information benefits. The source of the savings in 
transactions costs are reputation and exclusivity. The four factors that differentiate the 
audit firm from the specialist provider in the present study are a source of three of the four 
asset types, up stream, and, therefore, possible sources of competitive advantage. The 
relationship between the efficiP-ncies accruing to the client, the sources of the efficiencies 
in the product market and the distinguishing attributes of the audit firm as determinants of 
competitive advantage at the conceptual level is depicted in Table 14. Audit technology 
holds implications for distinctive expertise; incumbency and the professional envirorment, 
exclusivity; and multi-disciplinarity, information benefits. 
TABLE 14: Relationship between the efficiencies accruing to the client, the sources of the 
efficiencies in the product market and distinguishing attributes of the audit firm 
Firm specific assets 
Distinguishing attributes of the audit firm as determinants 
of competitive advantaee at the conce :>tual level 
Nature of 
Source of the 
efficiencies in 
efficiencies the product Audit Multi- Professional 
to client market technology Incumbency disciplinarity environment 
Production 0 Distinctive 
efficiencies Expertise ,/ 
• lnfommt1on 
benefits ,/ 
Savings in D Reputation 
transaction 
Exclusivity ,/ ,/ D costs 
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5.2.2 CLIENT-SPECIFIC RESOURCES 
Client specific resources represent ex post capabilities of an enduring nature that accrue 
from incumbency and/or incumbency as a multi-discipline provider. Incumbency and 
multi-disciplinarity are limited to the incumbent audit firm as a potential NAS provider in 
this study. Client specific resources are identified in the accounting literature in terms of 
technological advantages (e.g., De Angelo, 1981 a; Beck et al. 1988a) and client-specific 
knowledge spillovers (e.g .. Simunic, 1984), respectively. The assets are referred to as 
"winners advantages", as they give rise to a lack of competitive parity, in the first instance, 
at the contract renewal interval (Williamson, 1996 ); and possibly in the initial market for 
NAS sought by the client, post incumbency. Lack of parity, generally, derives from the 
opportunity to provide one or more of the following: (i) a lower price from the sunk costs 
associated with start-up costs and/or economies of scope from knowledge spillovers; (ii) 
higher service quality from scope of knowledge; and (iii) savings in switching costs. Items 
(i) and (ii) represent sources of production efficiency to the client, item (iii) savings in 
transaction costs. 
The ex-post category of competitive advantage is, as stated earlier. the basis of providing 
the incumbent audit finn with wealth incentives to assume heightened independence-risk. 
The value of the resources relies upon a future stream of quasi-rents from assets exclusive 
to the client, i.e., a continued relationship with the client. Thus, the resources represent a 
mechanism by which client management, acting in the d\.Hnain ofresidual opportunism (IR 
opportunity) may exact compliance from the audit finn with respect to the conduct of the 
audit. How quasi-rents arc shared, and. therefore, the relative level of economic bonding 
between the parties (auditor-client) and. similarly, the extent to which the client 
participates in the economies, depends on the level of competition including any low 
balling/discounting at the initial contract stage ( e.g., DcAngelo, 1981 b; Simunic, 1984). 
Efficiencies accruing to the client from client-specific assets held by the provider also 
involve productive efficiency and savings in transaction costs. However, the ensuing 
discussion of the resources that gives rise to the benefits is structured around the manner in 
which the resources are classified in the economics of audit quality literature -
technological advantages and knowledge spillovers - which reflects a service provider 
perspective. 
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5.2.2.1 Technological advantages 
Technological advantages arise in circumstances where competition exists, NAS are 
recurring, and the NAS involve start-up costs to the supplier of the services and switching 
costs to the client. Under those circumstances, start-up and switching costs are indicative 
of the presence of client-specific investment of a durable nature, i.e., specialised resources. 
The advantages derive from incumbency 
Start-up costs 
Start-up costs are incurred by a service provider in the process of gaining an understanding 
of the client's operations and, possibly, industry (Craswell, Price & Taylor, 1989). The 
investment in start-up costs represents a sunk cost (cost savings) to the incumbent and, 
therefore, a source of competitive advantage vis-a-vis competitors in Pcgc!iating the price 
for the services at the contract renewal stage. The investment may also be a source of 
competitive advantage in the initial market for NAS sought by the client post incumbency, 
to the extent that the costs are specific to the client rather than the NAS. The comparative 
advantage would be cost-based, through knowledge spillovers from one market to another 
e.g., audit to NAS or NAS to NAS. The opportunity for the client to participate in th!' 
benefits relies on competitive pricing. 
Switching costs 
Switching costs to the client include transaction costs of the nature of those referred to 
earlier in dealing with contractual assets, and the "internal costs of adapting operations to 
auditor change" (Abdel-khalik, 1993, p. 296). Incumbency is a source of contractual 
advantage to the incumbent in that respect. 
Beck et al. ( 1988a) demonstrate, analytically, that in the presence of recurring NAS, 
wealth incentives from technological advantages may be impacted by the presence or 
otherwise of client specific knowledge spillovers giving rise to economies of scope. The 
significance of the externalities for economic bonding depends upon the relative 
magnitude cf the audit versus NAS start-up and switching costs. 
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Beck et al. ( 1988a) also demonstrate, analytically, that enduring economies of scope, 
impacting normal audit costs, from non-recurring NAS increase auditor-client economic 
bonding. 
Competitors may employ low-balling in the mitial market for services in order to gain 
incumbency, and subsequently exercise limit pricing to undercut the bids of competitors at 
contract renewal intervals (Beck ct al., 1988a). The associated discount also represents a 
form of sunk cost, tre return to which relies on a continued relationship with the client. 
Thus, whilst, the initial winning bidder may or may not have had real ex ante 
technological or contractual advantage, the implications for economic bonding referred to 
above apply. 
5.2.2.2 Knowledge spillovers 
Knowledge spillovers represent benefits that accrue to the incumbent from 
"interdependencies or interactions between the production functions for ... two services" 
(Simunic, 1984, p. 680). Thus, the origin of the resources is incumbency as a multi­
discipline provider to the client. The benefits may take the form of economies of scope or 
scope of knowledge. Economies of scope involve cost savings. Scope of knowledge 
involves client-specific information benefits, which may or may not result in cost saving� 
to the provider. Knowledge spillovers are a source of production efficiency to both the 
service provider and client. 
Eco11omies of scope 
Economies of scope refer to cost savings that arise where, for example, the audit and NAS 
utilise the same set of information and/or professional qualifications. According to 
Simunic ( 1984, p. 681) the "cost of interdependency can be complex" for the following 
reasons: 
Specifically: (I) knowledge may flow fonn auditing to MAS, or MAS to auditing, or 
in both directions; (2) the fixed cost, variable cost, or both costs of the services can 
be affected; (3) the knowledge spillover may be client-specific or general (Simunic, 
1984, p. 681 ). 
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General knowledge spillovers represent linn-spcci tic resources and were dealt with earlier 
from the perspective of infonnation benefits. 
Scope of knowledge 
Scope of knowledge refers to client-specific expertise (tacit knowledge) that the auditor, 
for example, gains from providing NAS to the audit client, resulting in improved 
understanding of the client's business, which may enhance the quality of the audit. From 
the demand side of the market for the joint services, scope of knowledge represents 
"enhance(d) quality of information for investors" (Melancon, 2000, p. 26), which may 
translate to reduced cost of capital. Importantly, the benefits of scope of knowledge may 
also work in the direction of NAS and between NAS. 
Scope of knowledge may or may not lead to cost savings. The benefits of appointing the 
incumbent audit firm to provide NAS emanating from knowledge spillovers are associated 
with production efliciency. 
Thus. in concluding this section it is suggested that the nature of the effici ... 1cies accruing 
to the client form client specific assets are twofold: production efficiency and savings in 
transaction costs. The source of the efficiencies vis-a-vis the provider are technological 
advantages and knowledge spillovers. The sources of the efficiencies, up stream, are 
again, incumbency and incumbency as a multi-discipline provider to the client, 
respectively - two of the fi.)ur attributes that distinguish the audit firm from the specialist 
finn in this study. 
5.3 EFFICIENCIES AND THE EMPIRICAL COMPONENT OF THIS STUDY 
The following Table is an iteration of Table 12 (page 121) which provides a summary of 
the relationship between the source� of competitive advantage in the product market and 
distinguishing attributes of the audit Jinn as detenninants of competitive advantage at the 
conceptual level. 
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TABLE 12: The relationship between the sources of competitive advantage in the 
product market and the distinguishing attributes of the audit firm as 
determinants of competitive advantage at the conceptual level 
SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE 
Distinguishing attributes of the audit firm 
ADVANTAGE 
in the product market 
Technological ;'l(ructural Institutional 
assets assets assets 
FIRM Multi- Formal Asset type 
SPECIFIC Audit Incumbency disciplinarity professional 
RESOURCES status 
Technological • Distinctive Expenise ./ 
resources • lnfomrntion benefits ./ 
Contractual o Reputation 
Assets • Exclusivity ./ ./ 
CLIENT 
SPECIFIC 
RESOURCES 
Technological o Stan-up costs ./ 
advantages • Client switching ./ 
costs 
Knowledge • Economies of scope ./ ./ 
spillovers o Scope of knowledge ./ ./ 
With respect to the firm specific category of resources, the audit finn may be perceived to 
have the superior capacity to add value via distinctive expertise originating with audit 
technology. depending upon the nature of the NAS involved; and information benefits via 
the multi-disciplinary nature of the firm. Further, the incumbency and professional status 
of the firm. embedded in exclusivity, may be perceived as sources of savings in 
transaction costs to the client. The potential NAS providers are described in the scenarios 
as comparable with respect to their expertise and reputation in�NAS market, per se. 
However. with respect to the client-specific assets. not all of the asset types hold 
implications for the e1,, 1 1irical component of the thesis - studies I and 2 - due to the 
experimental setting. The superior capacity to add value via scope of knowledge is 
mitigated hy invoking separation of duties with respect to the provision of the NAS and 
audit services intra-finn. The use of Chinese walls breaks the nexus between incumbency 
and multi-disciplinarity as the antecedents of knowledge spillovers. Further, the price for 
the NAS vis-ii-vis the respective potential N AS providers is the same, negating any 
advantage from savings in start-up costs. Thcrefi.1rc. it is suggested, that any benefit to the 
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audit client from client specific assets 1s confined to costs savings associated with 
switching cosh. 
Thus. in concluding this Chapter, it is considered that the factors that differentiate the 
audit finn from the specialist fim1, taking into consideration the nature of the scenarios 
that will drive stakeholder choice, may be perceived to vest in the audit finn the superior 
capacity to add value with respect to the following resources: 
Firm specific resources: 
(i) distinctive expertise emanating from audit technology, subject to the nature 
of the NAS; 
(ii) i11formatio11 benefits emanating from multi-disciplinarity; and 
(iii) exclusivity emanating from incumbency and fonnal professional status. 
Client specific resources: 
(iv) clie111 switching costs, emanating from incumbency. 
The first of the empirical studies (Study I). described in the ensuing chapter, is, in part, 
undertaken with a view to obtaining preliminary evidence on the foregoing propositions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 1: 
PROTOCOL ANALYSIS 
6.0 CHAPTER CONTENT 
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a description of the first (Study l) of the two 
studies that c,.Jmprise the empirical component of the thesis. The study involves the use of 
V<''"'lal protC'col analysis to facilitate evaluating a set of dratt case studies. The case studies 
are design1·d to examine the issues of accountability and efficiency impacting stakeholder 
willingne .s-to-appoint the incumbent auditor identified in the prccedi11g Chapters. Study I 
also represents a precursor to the second empirical study (Study 2) which is discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
The remainder of the Chapter is organised in the following manner. The next section 
provides the introduction to Study l ,  which includes the purpose, research question, 
motivation, importance and contributions of the study. The introduction is followed by a 
review of prior empirical studies that have used verbal protocol analysis to evaluate written 
fonns of communication. Following this, the theoretical foundation for the study is 
provided along with suppo, ting empirical evidence. Next, the research method is described. 
The description includes details of the experimental design that underpins the case studies, 
the participants, task and data analy'iis. Subsequently, the results of the data analysis are 
presented. The Chapter concludes with a discussion of the key findings and implications. 
The limitations of the study are discussed in the final chapter of the thesis (Chapter 8). 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Protocol analysis is a qualitative method of inquiry used by researchers to trace human 
infomrntion (cognitive) processing ( Ericsson & Simon, 1993). The technique is typically 
used to investigate patterns and sequences in a continuous stream of problem solving 
behaviour directed at arriving at a decision choice (Kuusella et al.. 2000). The method 
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involves subjects verbalising the thoughts that enter their attention (thinking aloud) in the 
process of solving a problem/generating an answer to a 4uestion. The thoughts enter short 
tcm1 memory (STM) and arc referred to as "heeded infonnation" (Ericsson et al., 1993, p. 
133 ). Verbalisation can take place either during or, in the case of tasks of limited duration 
(0.5 to 10 seconds). immediately after the performance of the task (Ericsson et al., 1993, p. 
xvi). The two approaches are referred to by Ericsson ct al. ( 1993) as Type I and Type 2 
verbalisation. respectively: and give rise to concu1Tent and retrospective data, respectively. 
The verbalisation is recorded using either audio or video equipment. 
Empirical studies in various disciplines, including accounting and auditing, have 
successfully used protocol analysis to examine various aspects of cognitive processing 
including explanation use (e.g., Mao & Benbaset, 2000); knowledge acquisition (e.g., Van 
Someren, Barnard & Sandberg, 1994); decision making strategies (e.g, Biggs et al. 1983); 
expert perfonnancc (e.g., McCauley, King & Carr, 1998); information use (Frishkoff, 
Frishkoff & Bouwman, 1984); and reading comprehension (e.g., Graesser, Singer & 
T rabasso, 1994 ). 
Protocol analysis is also used in an applied capacity to, for example, assist in model 
fonnulation (e.g .. Sen & Vinze, 1997); improve the functionality of information systems 
design (e.g., Mantei et al. 1989); and improve the effectiveness of various forms of written 
communication (e.g., Benbunan-Fich. 2001; Willis, Royston & Bercini, 1991; Flower et 
al., 1983 ). This study is directed at identifying cognitive strategies employed by 
participants (e.g. .. Flower ct al., 1983) and cognitive problems experienced by participants 
in the process of comprehending a given fonn of written communication (e.g., Bcnbunan­
Fich, 200 I: Willis ct al.. 1991 ). The goal of the research is to incorporate a reader-based 
principle into evaluating and developing the effectiveness of written communication. 
The objective of the present study is to i,�corporate a reader-based principle into c, :iluating 
the effectiveness of a set of case studies (data instruments) in communicating to the reader 
(participant) the message intended by the author (researcher). The intended message 
concerns the issues of accountability and efficiency of interest to this thesis. impacting the 
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decision of whether to hire the incumbent audit firm as opposed to a specialist finn to 
provide NAS. The issues and decision choice are woven into a fonn of written narrative. 
The narrative centres on a fictional, listed Australian company (Baudin Ltd) that is in need 
of NAS that is to be outsourced: and the series of events leading up to the point where the 
choice pf service provider is to he made. 
The case studies are underpinned by a between-subject, experimental design which is 
described in detail in section 6.4. Each case study consists of between two and three pages 
of text. depending upon the nature of the variables involved. 
The case studies provide the basis of addressing the following questions associated with 
willingness-to-appoint the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS. 
I. Whom would you choose to provide the service? 
2. What is the strength of your pref erencc for the respective providers? 
Each case study is intended to provide the complete set of stimuli to the problem 
represented by the foregoing questions and on that basis represents a written text. Written 
texts are by definition "whole pieces of writing which hang together as complete products" 
( Feez & Joyce, I 998, p. I). However, the case studies rely on knowledge-based input from 
the participants to complete the fonnulation of the problem. The input is driven by the 
implicit dimension of the instruments associated. for example, with the cues used to 
manipulate the independent variables. The case studies and aspects of the experimental 
design that defines the instruments are, in that respect, premised on the constructionist 
approach to communication and reading comprehension. 
The constructionist approach holds that the effectiveness of communication is a function of 
the "three major components of a communication system: the author, the text and the 
reader" (Graesscr ct al.. 1994, p. 374). From a constructionist perspective written 
communication proceeds in the following manner: "(w)riters compose the content and 
wording of text in service of their communication goals. (and) readers attempt to recover 
the writer's goals" (Grnesscr ct al. 1994, p. 374). The text provides the interface. The 
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paradigm also holds that when a reader attempts to recover the writer's goals, he/she 
constructs a mental (situation) model of the meaning of the text. The situation model is the 
product of the text, the knowledge the reader brings to the text and the setting. 
Communication (comprehension) :mcceeds where there is hannony among the author's 
intended meaning, the explicit text and the reader's constructed meaning (Graesser et al., 
1994, p. 374). Conversely, communicati0n (comprehension) "breaks down to the extent 
that there is discord among the author's intended meaning, the explicit text, and the 
reader's constructed meaning" (Graesser ct al.. 1994, p. 374). 
Protocol analysis prnvidef the opportunity to evaluate the existing desigi of the case 
studies, which portray the researcher's representation of the issues of accou 1tability and 
efliciency 1111pacting the question of whether to appoint the incumbent audit ftrn1 to provide 
NAS, against the cognitive approach that informed participants would bring to the task. 
Study I is guided by the following research question: 
RQ Do the data instruments serve the researcher's communication goals? 
The overriding purpose of Study I is to identify any problems with the case studies that 
undennine the "successful transmission of information from author to reader" (Graesser ct 
al.. 1994. p. 374 ). Flower ct al. ( 1983, p. 43) maintain that protocol analysis "tends to 
capture just those places where readers encounter ditliculty and have to resort to conscious 
processing of the prose". 
The study is concerned with cognition. not obtaining feedback on structural or mechanical 
aspects of the documents. Structural or mechanical issues arc typically readily identified 
through a simple pre-test (Willis ct al., 1991 ). Further. given the purpose of the study. the 
analysis of the data will be directed at the substantive level of the protocols. That is, the 
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study is concerned with the product of comprehension rather than eliciting the co!:,rnitive 
process/activity involved. 
The motivation for Study I is essentially threefold. Firstly, notwithstanding the broad 
principles of cost - benefit analysis. the economics of audit quality literature and the theory 
of IR that have shaped the case studies 11• there is no definitive theory guiding the decision 
of whether to hire the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS. Examining the decision choice 
involves exploratory research and calls for the development of an original set of data 
instruments. The advantage of protocol analysis under those circumstances is that "(a)s the 
verbal protocols trace the decision-making process, they also explain it'' (Kuusela et al., 
2000. p. 388) - subject to the patticipants possessing the requisite knowledge. 
The participants m this study involve experienced corporate directors with extensive 
executive experience. That is, individuals experienced in the issues of accountability and 
eflicicncy impacting the decision choice, and for whom the issues hold considerable 
significance. Thus, the study provides the opportunity to obtain preliminary evidence on 
the broader research question that underpins the decision choice, i.e., the issues of 
accountability and efficiency impacting the decision of whether to hire the incumbent audit 
tinn to provide NAS. 
Secondly. the study represents an important phase in the development of the case studies 
that will be used in Study 2. Protocol analysis is recognised as the foremost method of 
identifying problems with an interface - in this instance, data instruments - that are 
attributable to cognition (e.g .. Flower ct al.. 1983: Mantei et al.. 1989). 
Thirdly. protocol analysis involves comparatively low start up costs and offers J high 
degree of "flexibility and efficiency" vis-a-vi·, 1t1<: t,";<litional empirical approach to data 
instrument design involving the use of c•ontrolkd cx·;;1crimcnts and hypothesis testing 
(Willis ct ,,I., 1991. p. 255). The prcscr1, stud, invol, es an "evaluative approach to 
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cognition" where the purpose of the research is to test and develop a particular set of data 
instruments rather than extract a reader-based principle that is applicable to all such 
instruments (Willis et al., 1991, p. 255). The evaluative method also allows for an iterative 
(test, retest) approach - an anathema to the controlled experimental approach (Willis et al., 
1991 ). 
The results of the study will play an important role in framing the scenario for the set of 
case studies to be used in the experimental study that -.:omprises Study 2. Thus, the 
importance of the study lies with the unique opportunity that protocol analysis provides to 
control for response error attributable to impediments to comprehension inherent in the 
data instruments vis-a-vis Study 2. Impediments to comprehension adversely impact a 
reader's meaning representation of text, and the "quality of the reader's representation has 
a large impact on determining the efficiency, elegance and precision of subsequent 
processing needed for problem solving" (Rabinowitz & Glaser, 1985, p. 85). The 
"efficiency, elegance and precision of ... processing", in tum, has implications for the 
validity and reliability of the experimental data obtained. 
The contributions of the study are twofold. Firstly. it contributes to the body of accounting 
and auditing research that uses protocol analysis to examine human information processing 
(e.g., Bedard ct al., 1992; Klcrscy et al., 1989; Bouwman, 1985; Frishkoff et al., 1984; 
Biggs ct al., 1983). Protocol analysis has not previously been used in that domain for the 
purpose of testing and developing data instruments. This study introduces to the literature 
the theoretical and empirical foundation for using the technique for that purpose. The 
theoretical and empirical material represents a blend of reading comprehension and 
protocol analysis research, supplemented by the theory of the narrative fonn of discourse. 
The study also demonstrates that the application of the method involves a systematic 
attempt to gain evidence on the research question. 
The second contribution of Study I is to the broader literature dealing with protocol 
analysis as a technique for developing written communication. The method has not, to my 
11 The theory of IR was 111 11s infancy at the time this particular study was undertaken - late 200 I. early 
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knowledge, previously been used to test and develop case studies as text, per se. The case 
studies fall within the ambit of the naiTative genre of discourse. Prior studies, on the other 
hand, deal with non-narrative (decontextualised) functional fonns of communications, i.e., 
survey questionnaires, government regulation and the interactive dialogue of commercial 
web sites. Study I, unlike the prior empirical studies, also exploits the theory and empirical 
research surrounding reading comprehension in the process of developing the theoretical 
foundation for the study. Finally, the study also has the capacity to provide evidence on the 
appropriateness of protocol analysis in evaluating case studies as narrative text. 
6.2 PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF WRITTEN COMMUNICATION 
The prior empirical research associated with the development of written communication is 
classified into three groups for the purposes of this study. The classification scheme is 
based on the fonn of communication involved. The first group of studies involves survey 
questionnaires. The questionnaires predominately relate to the health industry. The studies 
are directed at identifying "retrieval strategies" and "comprehension problems" 
encountered by participants (Midanik et al., 1999, p. 673). Midanik et al. ( 1999, p. 273) 
found that the participants employed "anchoring and "context" strategies in answering the 
survey questions involved. 
A comprehensive review of the studies in the survey domain is beyond the scope of this 
study. However, a review of a cross-section of the studies, along with the remaining two 
classes of study identified below, is provided in Table 15. 
The second class of study involves functional documents. There would appear to be only 
one study in this area, which was condu1.:tcd by Flower et al. ( 1983 ). Flower et al. ( 1983, p. 
41) define functional documents as those that individuals read "only in order to act". The 
i<)llowing types of text are provided as examples of functional documents: contracts, 
manuals, procedures and regulations. The experiment involved the use of an excerpt of 
government regulation as the representative sample of the text type. The study was directed 
2002. Publication in 1h,: academic press at 1ha1 lime was confined to the Johnstone ct al. (200 I) article. 
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at identifying strategics the participants used to comprehend functional documents. The 
goal of the research was to identify a reader-based principle that could be incorporated into 
the writing of such documents. The results of the study revealed that the dominant strategy 
used hy the participants was the scenario principle. The scenario principle "states that 
functional prose should he structured around a /111ma11 agent performing actions in a 
particular sit11atio11" (Flower ct al., 1983, p. 42). 
The third class of study involves the interactive dialogue of commercial web sites. 
Empirical research in the area would appear to be limited to the following two studies: 
Benbunan-Fich (2001) and Tilson, Dong, Martin & Kieke ( 1998). The Tilson et al. ( 1998) 
study was directed at identifying usability principles for evaluating the interactive dialogue 
of commercial weh sites in general. Benbunan-Fich (200 I) subsequently deployed the 15 
criteria identified by Tilson et al. ( 1998) to evaluate the useability of the dialogue of certain 
commercial web sites. Useability is concerned with the "extent to which the user and the 
system can "communicate" clearly and without misunderstanding through the interface" 
(Benbunan-Fich, 2001, p. 152). 
The present study looks to extend the foregoing literature, at the practical level, hy using 
protocol analysis to examine the useability of a set of draft case study questionnaires. The 
analysis of the protocols, as with the Benbunan-Fich (200 I) study and the bulk of the 
studies in the survey domain, is, again, directed at evaluating a particular set of case 
studies, rather than identifying a general rule that holds for all such instruments. The 
studies by Flower et al. ( 1983) and Tilson et al. ( 1998) on the other hand, were directed at 
generating general rules. 
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TABLE 15: Prior empirical research associated with the development of written communication 
Study Year Participants Domain Results 
Benbunan-Fich 2001 8 experienced Commercial The protocols provided evidence of usability problems with 
computer and web website. respect to three key web site evaluation parameters: content, 
users navigation and interactivity. The parameters were developed 
Product: free from a mapping of the 15 useability principles identified in 
electronic greeting the Tilson et al. study ( 1998). 
cards. 
Tilson et al. 1998 16 experienced Commercial web On the basis of the results, the researchers identified the 
computer and web sites - four in total. following 15 useability principles for commercial web sites: 
t:'.;ers simplicity of product menus; simplicity of the path to 
Products: clothing products; helpful categorisation of inventory; support for 
and computer personalizing or narrowing product lists; availability of 
equipment. product pictures; availability of product descriptions; 
I 
obvious order buttons/Jinks; a feature for facilitating 
comparison; optimal number of security messages; help in 
I understanding the ordering process; versatility of the ordering process; feedback on saving items; obviousness and 
accessibility of running total; ease of use for repeat buyers; 
and reversibility of actions. 
Midanik et al. 1999 39 heavier drinkers Survey instrument The protocols revealed that the participants employed two 
strategies in responding to the survey questions: anchoring 
and context. 
Continued ... 
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TABLE 15 continued: Prior empirical research associat"d with the development of written communication 
Study Year Participants Domain Results 
Jobe 1990 18 aged community Survey The researcher found that protocol analysis was usetul in 
dwellers questionnaire detecting cognitive problems with the survey questions and 
suggesting alternative wording which would promote the 
validity and reliability of the data. 
Willis ct al. 1991 
Questionnaire I Survey 
The researchers found that protocol analysis was useful in 
24 experienced detecting a range of questionnaire flaws relating to cognitive 
Subject: Assistive assistive device questionnaire processes, associated with both survey instruments. 
devices users. 
Questionnaire 2 19 subjects Survey 
Subject: Radon ( defining attributes questionnaire 
not provided) 
Midanik & Hines 1991 29 drinkers Survey The researchers found that respondents were more likely to 
questionnaire use anchoring and adjustment strategies and context 
strategies in arriving at their answers. 
Flower et al. 1983 3 subjects of Functional The findings support the use of what is termed the "scenario 
varying documents - principle" in the writing of such documents. 
backgrounds speci fie ally 
government 
re.1.,,ulation. 
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6.3 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY 
The theoretical foundation for the study is grounded in the constructionist cognitive 
perspective on reading comprehension, the methodology of protocol analysis and the 
narrative genre of discourse. The ensuing discussion begins by providing the background to 
the constructionist approach to communication. The background is followed by a 
discussion of the following issues: 
• a description of the constructionist CO!:,Jtlitive perspective on reading 
comprehension; 
• the benefits of protocol analysis as a method of inquiry into cognition; 
• the regurgitation problem associated with using the think aloud technique to 
examine text comprehension and its implications for the present study; and 
• the case studies as narrative text. 
6.3.1 Background 
The trend towards using protocol analysis in evaluating and developing the effectiveness of 
written communication is !:,'TOUnded in the shift in paradi!:,rrn in communications theory, 
from a sci en ti fie to a constructivist orientation, during the 1980s and 1990s. The scientific 
perspective viewed communic •. on as a unilateral process, where meaning and 
effectiveness vested with the writer. Under those circumstances, the formula for effective 
writing was essentially concerned with the "logic behind the structure of a text - from 
syntactic structures ... up to the top-level organisation of ideas" (Flower et al., 1983, p. 
42). The readability of text was assessed against formulae comprising linguistic variables, 
rather than variables that underpinned the reading process, per se (Huckin, 1983). 
Under the constructionist approach, on the other hand, whilst the formula for effective 
writing is still product-oriented, it includes a reader-based principk that acknowledges the 
comprehension ( cognitive) processes that readers bring to the task (Huckin, 1983). The 
method of inquiry for capturing the comprehension process as it is taking place is protocol 
analysis (Kucan & Beck, 1997). Thus, protocol analysis plays a critical role in informing 
the process of writing. The investigative -> facilitative role of protocol analysis in that 
respect reflects the essence of Study I. 
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Kucan ct al. ( 1997) outline the evolutionary development in the theoretical representation 
of reading towards the contemporary constructivist perspective - a process that started in 
the late 1970s. The period began with the representation of reading as a problem solving 
actiYity. Most problems investigated in problem-solving research arc "well-defined" 
(Kucan ct al.. 1997. p. 274). However. reading is identified as belonging to the "general 
class of"ill-dcfined" problems" (Kucan et al.. 1997. p. 274). 
An ill-defined problem, unlike a well-defined problem, is one the goal of which may not be 
certain at the outset and that may develop and undergo change during the process of 
addressing the given problem (Kucan ct al.. 1997). The representation of reading as 
problem solving brought "thinking aloud" �s a method of inquiry to the foreground of 
reading comprehension research. The pivotal role of verbal protocols in demonstrating the 
strategics that individuals bring to problem solving has its origins in the seminal work of 
Newell and Simon ( 1972. cited in Kucan ct al.. 1997). 
The focus of the researchers' attention m the reading-as-problem-solving era was lhe 
strategics readers used to engage with the text ( Kucan ct al.. 1997). The strategic reader 
was considered to filter his/her engagement with t�xt l'ia strategics. The strategies included 
"top-down" and "bottom-up" processing (Paran. 1997). However. significant developments 
in the theory of discourse comprehension ( e.g .. Kintch. 1988) and the results of empirical 
studies conducted in the problem solving era. using protocol analysis. contributed to 
refining the representation of reading from the comparatively narrow perspective of 
strategic problem solving to a "more holistic effort to construct meaning" (K •1can, 1997. p. 
285). The shitl in emphasis marked the ·1dvcnt of the contemporary constructionist era. 
6.3.2 Constructionist perspective on reading comprehension 
The constructionist paradigm embraces the notion of reading as problem solving. However, 
unlir,c the strategic problem solving perspective it "foregrounds the reader's direct 
engagement with text ideas" ( Kucan ct al., 1997, p. 284). The paradigm holds that when an 
individual attempts to comprehend text. he/she constructs a cognitive representation/mental 
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model of the meaning of the text. The representation is the product of the interaction of the 
following three dements. as shown in Figure 17: 
( i} the text: 
(ii) knowledge based inferences: and 
(iii) the .. pragmatic context .. of the text (Graesser et al.. 1994. p. 373). 
Figure 17: Comprehension model 
Comprehension 
as an intcractiw 
process 
KNOWLEDGE BASED INFERENCE 
Adapted from the Guide to Currirnlum 
!'la1111i11g in Reading. Wisconsin 
Department of Public Instruction. cited 
in Knuth and Jones. I 991. 
The texr represents the author·s expression of his/her intended message and provides the 
.. raw material from which a mental representation of the n,caning of that discourse is 
constructed .. (Kintch. 1988. p. 180). The reader"s existing knowledge base - schemata -
provides part of the context within which the text is interpreted ( Kintch. 1988). Schemata 
consist of structural patterns of generic and specific knowledge that arc stored in long-term 
memory ( LTM) as a result of past social and perceptual experiences ( Uraesser et al.. 1994 ). 
Knowlel��e hased inferences are .. constructed when background knowledge structures in 
LTM arc activated. and a subset of this infixmation is encoded in the meaning 
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representation of the text" (Graesser ct al.. 1994, p. 374 ). The elicitation of knowledge 
based inferences from L TM during comprehension is driven by the text i.e., "content 
words. combinations of content words, and interpreted text constituents" (Graesser ct al., 
1994. p. 3 74 ). Thus, a reader's mental representation of discourse combines "two sources 
of intimnation: the text itself and (his/her) knowledge-knowledge about language as well 
as knowledge about the world" ( Kintch, 1988, p. 180). The latter dimension of knowledge 
is of immediate interest to this study and includes domain specific knowledge. 
The remammg part of the context in which the interpretation of text takes place is the 
setting. i.e., the pragmatic context (Gracsscr et al.. 1994, p. 373).12 The pragmatic context 
takes into consideration all of the phenomena that impact on the comprehension process 
and that ultimately detenninc the quality of a reader's meaning representation of text. The 
phenomena include the following variables, which are of immediate interest to this study. 
who wrote the text, why it was written, who read the text and why it was 
read (Graesscr ct al., 1994, p. 373). 
The issue associated with who 11'/"0le ( who read) the texr takes into consideration the level 
of sophistication that the author's (reader's) knowledge of language and the world have on 
comprehension and. therefore. the effectiveness of communication. The effect of a reader's 
knowledge on comprehension is reflected, for example. in the results of studies dealing 
with expert versus novice performance (e.g .. Mao ct al.. 2000; Biggs ct al.. 1983). The 
superior problem solving perfrmnance of experts is attributed to the fact that they have 
"easy access to . . .  relevant knowledge" which "frees up attentional resources that can then 
be directed to other aspects of (a) task", leading to a '"more elaborate mental representation 
of a problem" ( Rabinowitz ct al., 1985. p. 91 ). 
The issues of 11"'11· a rexr was ll"ri{le11 and why ir \\"as read arc concerned with the 
communication goals of the author and the reader. respectively. The author's 
communication goals. for cxmnple. to persuade. infom1 or entertain - arc served by the text 
and dctcnninc the genre of discourse involved. The reader's goals arc typically, but not 
'' (iracsscr cl al. ( 1994) 1dc1111fy thc pragmallc contexl as a tlurd S(•urce of information to comprehension. 
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necessarily, mirrored in those nf the author. An exception would be. for example, where a 
text is read for the purpose of correcting for spelling errors, rather than comprehension. 
6.3.3 Benefits of protocol analysis in examining cognition 
Notwithstanding the shift in the representation of reading from strategic problem solving to 
one of constructive-integration, protocol analysis has maintained its role as the premier 
method of inquiry in reading comprehension research. The strength of the method lies in its 
unique capacity to capture mental processing as it happens, i.e., from direct memory 
( Ericsson et al.. 1993 ). Capturing comprehension in real time leads to more complete and 
reliable data vis-11-vis techniques that involve retrospective reporting on cognition, which is 
why protocol analysis is recognized as the foremost method of process tracing (e.g., 
Ericcson ct al.. 1993; Kuusela et al., 2000). 
The time delay involved in retrospc·.;tive reporting on information heeded during cognition 
undermines the completeness and t1e reliability of the data - Type 2 verbalisation aside. 
The lack of completeness and rl:liability is attributable to memory failure, limited 
accessibility to information stored in LTM, variability in individual memory perfonnance 
and behavioural biases (Kuuscla ct al., 2000). Further. retrospective reporting on cognition 
involves probing on the part of the researcher \'ia verbal and/or or written questions. The 
questions invite the following types of response biases: 
(i) accessing similar but not the actual schemata elicited during cognition; and 
(ii) the rationalisation ol choice behaviour rather than tracing the actual 
infonnation heeded ( Ericsson ct al., 1993 ). 
Further. where the research is exploratory, probing may he constrained hy the knowledge 
of the :-csearcher (Willis. 1999). 
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6.3.4 Protocol analysis and comprehension 
The cffcccivcness of the case studies that are the focus of this study is to be assessed on the 
basis of the extent to which there is compatibility between the following three factors: 
(i) the researcher's understanding of the problem, i.e., the issues of 
accountability and efficiency impacting the decision of whether to appoint 
the incumbent audit firm to provide NAS: 
(ii) the text: and 
(iii) the participants' representations of the problem. 
The success of the study in that respect rests with the quality (information content) of the 
participants' representations and the verbalisation of that information. The strategies used 
to promote verbalisation are described in Section 6.4, which deals with the research 
method. However, the issue of the information content of the protocol data will now be 
addressed. 
The results of studies that have examined text comprehension usmg protocol analysis 
indicate that "easy well-written text" leads to little more than a regurgitation of the text by 
the reader in the absence of strategics designed to slow down the reading process (Ericsson 
et al.. 1993, p. xxxvi). Ericsson et al. ( 1993) delimit what constitutes "easy well-written 
text" by defining ditlicult text. The latter is defined in tenns of "ditlicult material, poor 
writing and organization, and {an) unfamiliar writing style" (Ericsson et al., 1993, p. 
xxxvi). 
Ericsson ct al. ( 1993) ofter the following two-pronged explanation for the regurgitation 
problem. The explanation is premised on the understanding that the reader is one for whom 
reading is a highly automated skill. Firstly, the authors suggest that where the reader's 
mental representation of the message is consistent with that of the writer, the inference 
involved is readily accessed by the reader and comprehension proceeds r .. pidly and 
smoothly - without conscious effort � leading to a lack of "verbalization of additional 
inli.mnatior·," ( Ericsson ct al., 1993, xx xvi). Conversely, inconsistencies between 
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representations lead to conscious retrieval and thinking which slows down the reading 
process. 
However. Ericsson et al. ( 1993) also suggest that the genre of discourse has a role to play 
in the rcgurgitat;,>n problem. The genre of discourse refers to the fonn that communication 
takes. Tht: present study draws on the taxonomy provided by Jahn (2003) and depicted in 
Figure 18. as the basis lc.)r analysing genre. beginning with the narrative - non-narrative 
dichotomy. 
, • 
FIGURE 18: Genre model 
Genres 
. . . . . . . . . . ··�--�����-. · • 
ruuTative 
• · · · ---------------... 
•·m tten'pnnted performed �------- � 
novel short Ill1fl' al.1 v e 
story poem 
scnpt 
play- film- oper 11-
scnpt scnpt scnpt 
................. 
play film opera : 
non-nMrahve 
[ descn ption, argum en� 
lync 
poem 
Source: Jahn (2003) N2.2. I 
The genre of discourse alluded to by Ericsson e; al. ( 1993) \vas the non-narrative category. 
\vhich. as Figure 18 shows. includes description and argument (exposition). Ericsson ct al. 
( 1993) observed the regurgitation prohlem in a study in which the participants read essays. 
Essays involve exposition. The reader of such texts typically lacks "extensive background 
knowledge ahout the topics·· (Gracsser ct al.. 1994. p. 372). Under those circumstances. all 
other things hcing equal. the reader may adopt a passive approach to comprehension. That 
is. the reader may allow his/her construction of the meaning of the text to be guided by the 
writer. leading to a lack of conscious rt:tricval and thinking ( Ericsson et al.. 1993 ). 
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Thus. from the perspective of protocol analysis and cognitive process, the informativeness 
of verbal data lies in the active retrieval and thinking of knowledgeable readers. From the 
perspective of the constructionist approach to comprehension, that process takes place in 
the realm of the interface between the text and the reader's existing knowledge base. 
Further, from the constructionist perspective the quality of the product is a function of the 
pragmatic co111ext. How easy and well-written material is depends upon the knowledge 
base (including language skills) of the reader and writer respectively, i.e., who read and 
who HTote the text. The genre of discourse is inextricably linked to why a text was written, 
which spills over to why a text is read. 
The impact of the pragmatic context on the comprehension of data instruments is 
fundamental to the scientific approach to behavioural research generally and the issue of 
internal validity in particular (.e.g, Kcrlinger & Lee, 2000); and is at the heart of the 
motivation for this study. 
The success of the present study in tcn11S of the infonnation content of the protocol data 
lies with the research method. The knowledge that the author and the reader bring to the 
task, rests with the researcher and the choice of participant, respectively. The reader's goals 
will be detcnnined by the demands of the research task. Finally, the case studies have been 
written in the service of the researcher's goals. The goals arc twofold. Firstly, the case 
studies are the instruments for obtaining evidence on the issues of accountability and 
efficiency, of interest to this study, impacting the question of whether to hire the incumbent 
audit firm to provide NAS. Secondly, they have been written in the service of the validity 
of the evidence obtained. The case studies in serving those goals fall within the ambit of 
the narrative genre of discourse. In relation to Jahn's (2003) genre model, the case studies 
would provide a fifth am1 of the printed/written fonn of narrative. 
Gracsser ct al. ( 1994) hold that the constructionist search-after-meaning perspective on 
reading comprehension is best suited to the narrative style of text. Narrative text more than 
the non-narrative genre of discourse, speaks to the readers· existing perceptual and social 
experiences, i.e .. their existing knowledge base (Graesscr et al., 1994, p. 372). Shared 
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schema avoids the need for the writer to expound on the meaning of concepts, resulting in a 
deep implicit dimension to such text. The implicit dimension of text has the capacity to 
evoke a cognitive representation that is rich in inference, subject to the reader possessing 
the requisite knowledge base. 
Gracsscr ct al. ( 1994. p. 391) employing constructionist theory and protocol analysis, 
provide empirical support for the proposition that readers generate "rather rich situation 
models" during the comprehension of narrative text, again, subject to the reader possessing 
the requisite knowledge structures. The situation model is not, however, complete. That is, 
it does not produce a "lifelike rendition of the text . .. (i)nstead a ... subset of the situation 
is preserved" (Graesser et al. 1994, p. 391 ). 
6.3.5 The case studies as narrative text 
The basis for identifying the case studies under review as narrative text centres on two 
related criteria. Firstly. the definition of narrative, i.e., what makes a text narrative; and 
secondly, the levels of communication involved in a narrative - each of which will now be 
considered. 
The set 01 eight case studies used in the study arc provided in Appendix A. The research 
design that underpins the case studies is discussed in section 6.4.1. 
6.3.5.1. Definition of narrative 
Ryan (2003) defines a narrative in the following manner. Firstly, a "(n) arrative is . .. a 
mental image. or cog11itfre co11struct. which can be activated by various (l'pes of signs". 
The present researcher's cognitive construct of the story tlu defines the case studies is 
fictional and is, of course, activated through the written word. 
Secondly, Ryan (2003) goes onto characterise narrative in the following manner. 
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This image consists of a world (selling) populated by intelligent agents 
(characters). 71iese agents participate in actions and happenings (events. 
plof), which cause global changes in the narratii'e world. Narrative is thus a 
mental representation o(causa!zi· connected states and events which captures 
a segment in the his101:r of a world and o_(its members. 
The relationship between key defining characteristics of a narrative - a setting, characters, 
events and changes - and the case studies will now be addressed. 
Setti11g and characters 
The setting for the case studies involves the Australian corporate environment m the 
financial year 200 I to 2002. The characters are fivefold and as follows: 
(i) A corporation, Baudin Ltd. Baudin Ltd is characterised by, inter alia, its 
listing on the stock exchange, its size, year of establishment, industry, 
principal location, geographil:al and commodity markets and corporate 
governance �tructure. 
(ii) The board of directors of Baudin Ltd. The Board is characterised by it 
size, its independence, or otherwise, from management, and the 
monitoring quality of the audit committee. Independence is 
operationaliscd using the following cues: the ratio of executive to non­
executive direet0:-s; the source of authority fix the nomination of board 
members; and the absence or otherwise of relationships between the 
directors and the company. 
(iii) The incumbent audit fim1. The firm is described as a member of the Big 
5 1J , an industry specialist, and the external auditor to Baudin Ltd for five 
years. 
(iv) The NAS division of the incumbent audit firm. The division 1s 
l:haracterised on the basis of its separation from the audit division. its 
expertise and reputation, and the year of establishment. 
(v) The specialist NAS provider. The specialist is characterised on the basis 
of its expertise and reputation, and the year of establishment. 
The characters as business entities acquire their intelligence through management. The role 
of management is explicit in relation to Baudin Ltd. 
11 The study was commenced prior(() the ..:ollapse of Arthur Andersen. 
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Events a11d cha11ge 
The events that are the catalyst for change provide the story-line of a narrative. The story­
line is typically characterised by an orientation (who, when and where); a complication that 
is caused by the characters; and a resol11tio11 of the complication (Jahn, 2003). The 
orie11tatio11 (introduction) as it relates to the present set of case studies is encapsulated in 
the following excerpts from the documents. 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation, with an annual sales 
turnover of approximately $5 billion. The company, founded in 1978, is 
headquartered in Sydney, and it employs approximately 9,400 people 
worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved in the manufacture of chemical 
products for use in mining, agriculture, industry and the consumer sector. The 
products are sold both domestically and overseas. 
Baudin Ltd experienced a modest growth in profit before tax in the five years 
to the 30 June 200 I, notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the 
industry. Senior Management believes, given current social trends, that 
implementing and promoting socially responsible principles will be important 
in maintaining a competitive advantage, operationally and financially, in the 
industry in future. 
The complication and resolution of a narrative attach to the characters and are acted out 
through the events that arc the catalyst for change - all of which form part of the primary 
story-line. The primary story line (events and change) associated with the case studies, 
whilst minimalist, is encapsulated in the following description: 
Baudin Ltd's management opts to outsource NAS. Three professional NAS 
providers arc approached to submit proposals. The contenders are reduced 
from three to two, including the incumbent audit finn. 
The narrative complication arises out of the fact that the two final contenders differ in their 
capacity to add value, in tenns of accountability and efficiency - beginning with the audit 
finn 's incumbency as external auditor. However, in this instance, the resolution of the 
complication is the task of the participants, not the researcher (author). The resolution 
ultimately I ies with each participant ·s perception of the net benefits of hiring the audit finn 
versus the specialist finn. The net benefits are a function of perceived auditor independence 
and the perceived benefits of hiring the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS. 
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6.3.5.2 Levels of communication 
The levels of communication involved in a narrative also distinguish the genre and, in the 
present situation. as mt:ntioned earlier. hold the key to the depth of the readers· meaning 
n:presentation of a text. including inforence. 
Jahn (2003. N:2.3.1) maintains that a narrative must involve the "interplay of al least three 
communicative levels". which arc depicted in Figure 19. using Chinese boxes. 
FIGURE 19: Levels of narrative communication 
author - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -> reader 
ntuT Bi.or - - - - - - - - - - ->- acldresse e( S) 
chc1rncter - - - - � chfl!" acter 
level of action 
level cf.fictional mediation 
level of rvrf'ictional commwiication 
Source: Jahn (2003. N2.3. I). 
The model "distinguishes between the levels of action. fictional mediation. and 
nonfictional communication. and establishes useful points of reference for key terms like 
author. reader. narrator. and narrateeladdressee" (Jahn. 2003. N2.3. l ). 
All three levels arc present in the rnse studies under rcv1e\v. The nonfictional 
communication level is concerned with reality. The author of the case studies is the 
researcher. and the reader(s) the participant(sJ. Given that the author and reader do not 
communicate in the text itsclC their level of communication is referred to as "'extratextual'" 
(Jahn. 2003. N2.3. l ). However. the remaining two levels of communication are 
"''intratextual'"' (Jahn. 2003. N2.3. l ). The level <?(fictional mediation associated with the 
case studies involves a third-person narrator. as opposed to a first or second-person 
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narrator. The narratees are anonymous witnesses to the story line. Finally. at the level (?{ 
action. the communication is between Baudin Ltd represented by its senior management 
and the prospective NAS providers. 
However. notwithstanding the f ,�tional nature of the case studies under review. they are 
designed to represent reality. i.e .. speak to the participants· existing knowledge base as 
experienced directors and executives. The cues are drawn from reality - the regulation and 
analytical and empirical research that are the subject of the preceding chapters. Further. the 
scenarios depicted in the case studies are. as mentioned earlier. intended to provide the 
complete stimuli to the problem ot whether to hire the incumbent audit firm to provide 
NAS. However. not . .vithstanding the presence of comparatively strong textual cues. the 
issues of accountability and efliciency of interest to the thesis are implicit. The case studies 
hold. in that sense. an underlying (global) message. The implicit message gives rise to dual 
levels of communication at the intratextual level - an explicit and an implicit level. The 
explicit and implicit dimensions operate at the .fictional mediation level (narrator to 
narratee). The implicit dimension of the case studies gives rise to a fourth level of narrative 
communication. which is represented in Figure 20. by the shaded area. 
Figure 20: Level" of narr.ative communication (modified) 
author ---- ----------- --------- ----• reader 
narrator -------------+ addreasee(s) 
I character . - - - - i. character I level of action 
level of.fictional mediation 
level of nonfictional commum·cation 
LcgcndD Implicit dimension Sr111rn• Adaplt'</.from Jahn ( .'003) .\· 
The implicit nature of the data instruments. language aside. is driven by attributes of the 
experimental design that underpins the instruments. Firstly. the case studies are written in a 
manner that is designed to avoid demand cff ects emanating from the problem of saliency 
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associated with treatments (e.g. Pany et al., 1987). The treatments in this instance involve, 
of course, the following issues: 
• financial dependence emanating from recurring NAS; and 
• the monitoring strength of the board of directors. 
Saliency of treatments signals a researcher's intent and as a result may bias participants' 
responses. That is, the participant's behaviour may contemn to the researcher's hypotheses 
for reasons that are independent of the hypotheses the experiment was designed to test 
(Kanter, Kohlenberg & Loftus, 2002). Rendering the treatment cues implicit rather than 
explicit in nature provides a means of controlling for demand effects. 
The implicit dimension of the financial dependence treatment, relating to recurring NAS, is 
embodied ir. the following explicit text taken from the case studies dealing with the 
provision of non-financial key performance indicators: 
The successful contender will assist in the preparation of the (sustainable 
development) report for the first three years, with an option to renew at the 
end of that time at the discretion of Baud in Ltd. 
The implicit dimension of the monitoring strength of the board of directors (strong or 
weak) is embodied in the explicit text which appears in Table 16. The participants' 
perception of strength or weakness relies on inference associated with the following 
criteria: 
• the independence of the board from management, and 
• the strength of the composition, autho1ity, resources and diligence of the audit 
committee. 
Secondly, the implicit dimension of the text also extends to the antecedents of IR 
opporllmizr and the capacity of the contenders to add value (efficiencies). The scenarios 
that constitute the case studies are intended to convey the following underlying message as 
a whole: 
JR opportunity (the demand for an independent audit) is high. 
The threat to audit independence from self-interest (wealth incentives) 
emanating from the fees for recurring NAS is high (low). 
The structural strength of the board of directors is strong (weak). 
165 
The distinguishing attributes of the prospective providers (incumbent 
audit firm; specialist NAS provider) hold differing implications for their 
respective capacity to add value. 
Finally, in concluding this section, the underlying theme is embedded in rich co-context. 
Co-context is separate from the notion of the pragmatic context (context of situation) 
referred to earlier (Bloor, 2004). The co-context comprises the text surrounding those 
passages of the case studies that are intended to convey the underlying message, and 
includes the following: 
o The narrative orientatinn {the company description and need for NAS). 
• A description of the NAS 
o The basis for outsourcing the NAS. 
• The bm,1s for inviting submission from prnviders. 
• The rationale for choosing between the submissions. 
The purpose of the co-context is twofold. Firstly, it is also recognised as being important in 
overcoming the demand effects associated with saliency (e.g., Pany et al., 1987). 
Secondly, the co-context 1s intended to achieve the following with respect to the case 
studies: 
as narrative text, anchor the scope of each scenario in time and space; 
as data instruments, control for extraneous independent variables; and 
as data instruments, ensure that the overall task - whether to hire the incumbent 
audit firm to provide the NAS. or otherwise - is adequately specified. 
The meaning of the underlying message 1s in part dependent on the co-context and vice­
versa (Bloor, 2004). Thus, the present study is concerned with obtaining evidence on the 
effectiveness of the case studies as a whole. 
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6.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
A pilot study involving two separate protocol sess10ns. directors and case studies was 
undertaken prior to conducting the fonnal protocols. The purpose of the pre-trial was to 
gain preliminary feedback on the useability of the case studies, generally. and to test the 
understandibility of the protocol instruction. Significant changes were made to the case 
studies as a result of the data obtained. The participants and the data associated with the 
sessions arc not included in the ensuing discussion, which is based on the altered texts. 
6.4.1 Case information 
The case studies involve three types of NAS. The three NAS involve the following types of 
professional services: 
I. non-financial. sustainable development key perfornrnnce indicators (KPls); 
2. infonnation systems (IS) design and implementation; and 
3. market research. 
The provision of the NAS by the incumbent audit finn involves a separate division to the 
audit. invoking separation of duties as a safeguard of audit independence. How"ver, 
notwithstanding the safeguard. the NAS types may be perceived by stakeholders to give 
rise to the threat of self-review - arguably at three levels: high, moderate-low and low. The 
threat of self-review concerns the re-evaluation of the NAS (product and/or judgement) in 
reaching conclusions on the audit engagement ( PF I). The threat associated with the KP ls 
would result from the audit of the non-financial indicators by the incumbent external audit 
finn: and in the case of the IS service. the system would produce financial information 
subject to the external audit. The threat from the market research service would be 
negligible. Notably. the different types of NAS may ulso hold implications for the 
respective service pr,1viders' capacity to add value. 
The threat of self-review docs not feature in the accountability hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 4. and. therefore. Study 2. However. notwithstanding the tentative nature of the 
threat it is suhsequcntly identified as part of the underlying message involved in the case 
studies l<.ir the purpose of the data analysis. 
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The three NAS types. together with the accountability variables of immediate interest to 
this thesis and Study 2 [recurring NAS (high or low): monitoring strength of the board 
of directors (strong or weak)! gave rise to 12 case studies. The framework of the case 
studies including the numerical code used to identify each variable and. ultimately. case 
study. is depicted in Table 17. The shaded areas in the chart in the right-hand column of 
the table signify the sample of the eight case studies that fonn the basis of the data 
analysis. 
1 TABLE 17: The framework and coding of the draft case studies - Study I 
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>--------
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6..t.2 Participants 
Eleven protocol sessions were c.:onductL·d. Eight participants produced usable protocols. 
The recording quality of one of the remaining protocols was too poor to be transcribed: and 
the two remaining participants expcricrn:cd diftic.:ulty in verbalising c.:oncurrcntly. The 
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description of the participants is confined to the eight individuals who produced the usable 
protocols. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there were 12 ditlerent case studies, the eight useable 
protocols were suffa:ient to develop the final instruments for Study 2. The eight 
protocols involved the three different types of NAS as well as the each of the 
independent variables that were under consideration for use in Study 2. The 
modi ti cations arc discussed in Chapter 7. 
The participants were experienced, practicing company directors. The participants' average 
number of years of experience as directors was 12 years: the range 2 to 20 years. 
Participants were contacted by letter seeking their co-operation to participate in the study. 
A member of the researcher's family wrote the letter to business associates whom he knew 
first-hand to be experienced, practicing company directors. Each letter was personalised to 
the individual concerned. However. the section of the letter that described the task was 
standardised. A pro-fonna copy of the letter. without the identification of the parties 
involved. 1s provided in Appendix B. 
All remaining stages of the study were conducted by the researcher. 
The letter was foll,1\vcd by a telephone call to continn the individuals' willingness to 
participate and from there make an appointment to conduct the session. Each participant 
was studied in an indi,idual session. All of the sessions were conducted at the principal 
office of each of the participants. without distractions. 
The participants were given no inf<.mnation ahout what the process would entail prior to 
meeting. beyond that contained in the letter provided. 
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All mdividuals who were contacted participated. The participants were given a bottle of 
"tine" wine n.:fcrrcd to in the letter of solicitation. at the conclusion of each session. The 
wine repn.:senteJ a token of appreciation. not an incentive to participate. 
The participants were identified on the basis of the numerical coding of the case studies 
involved. and the numbers Pl to P8. The profile of the participants is provided in Table 18. 
The professional background of the participants, identified in the right hand column, 
represents their first discipline. All of the participants are in the workforce, with the 
exception of P3 who is retired. However, all occupy directorships. 
TABLE 18: Profile of the participants - Study 1 
Identification Directorships Years of Professional 
Experience as background 
No Case study Exec Non-exec a director 
Pl I. I. I ,/ ,/ 12 accounting 
P2 1.1.0 ,/ ,/ 15 engineering 
P3 1.01 n/a ,/ 18 management 
P4 2.1.0 ,/ n/a 4 en_gineering 
PS 2.0.0 ,/ n/a 2 accounting 
P6 3.1. I ,/ n/a 8 management 
P7 3.1.0 n/a ,/ 20 accounting 
PS 3.0.1 ,/ ,/ 14 marketing 
6.4.3 Task 
The task involved concurrent (Type I) verbalisation. 
A standard instruction script was used to introduce the task to the participants. The script 
describing the task and the think-aloud method is presented in Appendix C. 
Each participant was advised that the activity involved the following: 
reading a (\\'o to three page case slllc�v that centres on a company ·s 
decision to seek I he sen·ices <fa pr�fessional service provider and the 
even1s leading 11p 10 the point where the choice of service provider is to 
he made. 
'l11c case Sfll(Z\' is preceded by a single page which provides an 
i111rod11ctio11 to the overall task. 
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You H'il/ be asked to answer a set of four questions based on the 
i11/or111atio11 contained in the actual case study. The nature of the 
questions is ident(fied in the introductory page. 
In addition. we ask that you pe1.form the task through a technique 
re_fcrred to as "\·erbal protocol ana�vsis ". 7he technique involves 
capturing your thoughts as you consider the i11/ormatio11 provided in the 
case stucz\' in the process of arriving at your answers. 71ws. we ask that 
_rn11 speak aloud all of your thoughts as you work 011 the problem. 
My task will be to record your thoughts using a tape recorder. 
Your taped thoughts will be transcribed at a later date. The transcript 
11·il/ provide 11s with important feedback 011 the case studies. Again. we 
are interested i11 all of the thoughts that come to your mind as you work 
on the problem. 
The following supplementary instruction was also provided: 
It does 1101 mailer ((your sentences are not complete. since you will 1101 
be e.,p/aining to anyone else. Just acf as [l you are alo11e i11 the room 
speaking 10 yo11rse{/'1011dfy. 
The purpose of the instruction was to discourage the participants from explaining �l1cir 
actions, which would interfere with their natural comprehension process (Eric ;son et al. 
1993). 
Each session was tape-recorded. The observer made notes and prompted the subjects to 
keep talking, where necessary. 
The participants reading goals were also set by the following four questions which were 
idcnti tied in the introduction to the task and at the conclusion of the case study: 
(i) What factors do you consider arc important in choosing between alternative 
service providers in circumstances such as those facing Baudin Ltd. 
(ii) Whom would you chose to provide the service? 
(iii) What is the strength of your preference for the alterna�ivc providers? 
(iv) What factors account for your preference for one provider over the other? 
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The time spent on the reading task averaged 20 minutes. The total time involved m a 
session ranged from around 40 minutes to one hour. 
6.4.4 Data Analysis 
The eight protocols were transcribed. The individual transcripts were identified according 
to the numbering system allocated to the individual participant and the particular case study 
involved. The identification of the protocols vis-a-vis the independent variables is depicted 
in Table 19. 
Table 19: Identification of the transcripts vis-a-vis the independent variables 
Identification 
NAS type Strength of 
Continuity 
Board of 
No Case study no Fees 
Pt I. I. I KPI strong Non-recurring 
P2 1.1.0 KP! strong Recurring 
P3 l .0.1 KP! weak Non-recurring 
P4 2.1.0 IS strong Recurring 
PS 2.0.0 IS weak Recurring 
P6 3.1.1 Market research strong Non-recurring 
P7 3.1.0 Market research strcng Recurring 
pg 3.0.1 Market research Wi.;Jk Non-recurring 
The transcripts contained the exact verbalisations of the participants. 
The analysis of the protocols involved modelling (coding), scanmng and sconng 
techniques. The modelling and scanning of the protocol data will now be considered, 
followed by the scoring phase. 
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6.4.4.1 Modelling :rnd scanning 
Modelling proto�ols is not prescriptive. but should be driven by the research question 
( Ericsson et al.. 1993 ). The research question guiding this study asks whether the data 
instruments serve the researcher's communication goals. Evidence on the question was 
gained by assessing the compatibility between the participants· representations of the 
problem and the solution provided. The analysis was facilitated by compiling. a priori. two 
codes - a Task and a Transcript Code. Each protocol was modelled along the lines of a 
matrix. as shown in Figure 21. The raw data in each transcript was modelled. going down 
the page. according to the Task Code. Each modelled transcript was subsequently scanned 
and its contents classified. going across the page. according to the Transcript Code. The 
Transcript Code headed each page. 
FIGURE 21: Format for modelling protocols 
I 
Transcript Code 
Tusk Cudr 
j 
The nature of the two codes and the modelling process ·.vill now be considered in detail. 
The nature of the codes is illustrated by drawing on excerpts from the actual protocol data. 
notwithstanding the fact that the Codes were developed a priori. 
A copy of a modelled and scanned protocol ts provided 111 Appendix D. The details 
associated with the protocol are as follows: 
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Strength of 
Continuity of Participant Case Study NAS Board of 
No tvpe Directors NAS Fee 
P3 1.0.J KPls weak Non-recurring I 
Task Code 
The Task Code consists of a framework of the explicit text, which is depicted in Table 20. 
The framework was defined by paragraph number, title and broad content. The text content 
was subsequently coded according to the number of the paragraph and the order of the item 
involved, and titled the Content Code. 
Each transcript was initiallv modelled on the Task Code, commencing with the 
segmentation of the content by paragraph number and name. The speech within each 
paragraph was parsed by clause or sentence, which ever was applil:able, on a line-by-line 
basis. The resulting clauses (sentences) are subsequently referred to as "topic lines" 
(Bouwman, J 985. p. 68). The rationale for the choice of a clause/sentence as the unit of 
measurement was its "usefulness'' in improving the "accessibility and manageability of the 
protocol" (Bouwman, 1985. p. 68) with respect to the application of the Transcript Code. 
Examples of topic lines, which represent a sequence of lines from the sample protocol that 
appears in Appendix D, arc as follows: 
<Hmm> This is an illleresting hoard. 
Six executive members and 
71ie Chairman is the CEO also. 
This is a most 111ws1wl str11cture. 
Well it seems to me 
71wt we lw,·e a ve1:v dominant <z,h> CEO. 
Who <11/,> has a hoard that wo11/d have 110 d([Jiculty in being a tame board. 
Because the Chairman puts !hem 011. 
The segmented and parsed trnnscripts were then scanned and each topic line was numbered 
accordin� to the content code identified in Table 20. Forty four typed pages of transcript 
were generated ( an average of ti vc and one-ha If pages per subject). 
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TABLE 20: Task Code: framework of explicit text and content code 
Pnraurnph Content 
No Name Content code 
I Description of • Nature. size. location. industry and markets. I.I 
compnny • Sepamtion nf ownership and control. 1.2 
2 Board • Site. 2.1 
of directors • Rutio of exee:non-cxec . 2.2 
• Independence of chuir. 2.3 
0 Independence of nomination proc,:ss. 2.4 
• Emnloymcnt. financial. business tics . 2.5 
0 Sub-committc..'Cs 2.6 
' • Ovemll strength . 2.7 
J Audit Committee • Audit committc..-c. 3.1 
• Crnnnosition 3.2 
0 Authority. 3.3 
• RL"Soun:c..-s . 3.4 
• Diligence . 3.5 
• Overall strength . 3.6 
4 Executi\'e e:1.perience • Executive cxncricncc. 4.1 
& Remunerntion . Rcmuncr.ition: fixed, bonus. options . 4.2 
5 NAS need, purpose & • Modc..-st growth - past 5 years. 5.1 
type 0 Need: profits platc-.iucd, competitive market 5.2 
• Puf1losc: impro\'c tinancinl pcrfonnancc . 5.3 
• Dc.."Scription of N AS 5.4 
Linking statement 
6 Outsourcing & • Approach to providers. 6.1 
approach • Rationale for outsourcing: cxncnisc . 6.2 
7 Bnsis for submission 0 Basis ti.1r submissions: infonnation. 7.1 
& in\'iting 3 pro\'iders • Invitation: reputation for excellence . 7.2 
8 Criterion for choosing 0 Criterion: case of intcgrntio,,. 8.1 
between the proposals • Choice reduced to 2 cundidatc..'S . 8.2 
9 Description of Audit firm • Big 5: Tenn - 5 years: indu<try expert. 
9.1 
10 Separation of duties & Fee • NAS pc..-rfi.mncd by scparntc division. 10.1 
for NAS • Dc..-scrintion of division. 10.2 
0 NAS fee - S 125,000. 10.3 
11 Fees to audit firm for all • Total fee: 5% of annual revenue nfloc:1  uui.:;1 otlicc. I I. I 
sen-Ices • Total audit fee: $580.000 . 11.2 
• Tax and surer services provided . 11.3 
• Total ti:cs for NAS: $1.450,000 . 11.4 
12 Specinlist pro\'ider • Dcscrintion. 12.1 
• NAS ti.-c $120,000 . 12.2 
• 9% of annual revenue of lo,;al auJit otlicc . 12.3 
13 Compurubility • Of prupust1ls & upcmting capacity. 13.1 
Summarv comments 14.0 
Answers to questions QI -4 
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Transcript Code 
The content of each modelled protocol was subsequently scanned and each topic line 
grouped according to one of two broad categories of statements that made up the Transcript 
Code: meta-statements and co11te111 statements. The Code is depicted Table 21. The 
development of the Code was guided by the following criteria: 
(i) the purpose of the study; and 
(ii) studies conducted by Flower ct al. ( 1983) and Mao et al. (2000). 
The criteria allowed one to anticipate the type of statements that were likely to ensue. 
TABLE 21: Transcript Code of verbal stah:ments 
CONTENT Anomalies Perceived phenomena that impede 
STATEMENTS comprehension. 
C011firmmm:r swreme11rs Consistencies between the author's 
intended meaning. the text and the 
I 
reader's representation of the 
problem. 
S011ppleme111a1J· i11(omw1io11 lnfonnation that is indicative of a 
participant's prior understanding 
and judgment of the problem. 
other than anomalies and 
confim1atory statements. 
T1·a11slatio11s Restatements of the explicit text 
and any attempt to translate the 
text into another fonn. 
MET A-STATEMENTS Statements that do not pertain to the content N meaning of the 
case studies. 
Meta-statements, unlike content statements. embrace all statements that do not "directly 
pertain to the explicit text or global meaning of the text" (Flower et al., 1983). They 
include statements that related to the participants' cognitive processes, such as: 
well it seems to me; 
myjirst reaction here is; 
<Ah> I see; 
/ 'm suspicious; 
I would say it ·s <11'1>; 
let ·s move 011. 
and various other statements, including the following: 
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in my experience; 
it's interesting; 
I haven't sat 011 the boards o_(very many mining companies. 
Goodness me. 
The content statements were sub-classified by the researcher according to the following 
constructs: anomalies, co11/irmatory statements, supplementary i11formation and 
translations. The nature of each of the constructs will now be con"idered. 
A11omalies 
Anomalies refer to perceived phenomena associated with the stimuli that impede 
comprehension (Mao ct al., 2000). According to Mao et al. (2000. p. 159) "(e)mpirical 
studies have shown that the two most signifo:ant types of perceived anomalies are the 
absence of critical infonnation and the presence of contradictions". 
Examples of the two major types of anomaly follow. 
ABSENCE OF CRITICAL INFORMATION 
I don't real�\' hm·e enough understanding o(the criteria they are using to 
make the selection. 
Perceived contradictions may be within the body of the text (a lack of local coherence -· 
Graesser ct al., 1993) or between the participant's knowledge of the problem and the 
solution provided. 
CONTRADICTIONS 
Lack of local coherence 
71,e rem1111erntion str1•c111re.fiJr the senior executi\'es 
D0es11 't re.fleet the outcomes i11 relation to the ( KP Is) 
the srructw·e o(rhe employee compensation plan 
is dri\·e11 sole�,· 011.fi11a11cial outcomes. 
17X 
Participant's knowlrdge versus the solution 
Original sentence in text: 
The initial criterion for choosing between the proposals centred on the ease 
with which the perfonnance indicators could be integrated into management's 
·1.."lll'TC11l'plarm1\1g a·n<l c·ontroi' processes. 
Verbal Response: 
I'm not sure a bow 
the initial criteria 
And I tl1111k 
accuracy is more importa11t tha11 integration. 
It seems to be more co11venie11t than strategically sensible. 
Confirmatory stateme11ts 
The confinnatory category of statements, on the other hand, refers to those that reflect 
consistency between the author's intended meaning, the text and the reader's 
representation. Prior research suggests, as discussed earlier, that consistency may not elicit 
the inference involved (Ericsson ct al., 1093). However, again, the pragmatic context has a 
role to play in that respect. The case studies, as data instruments, contain various cues that 
are intended to represent red flags. For example, the bonus elements of senior 
management's remuneration package and the weak corporate government structure are 
intended to signal management's incentive and propensity to act self-interestedly, 
respectively. It was anticipated that where the cues were perceived as red flags 
(contradictions) by participants. they would lead to verbalisation and, if so, would represent 
confinnatory statements. 
The segment of protocol that appears at the bottom of page 175 represents an extract of the 
particular participant's response to the weak fom1 of corporate governance structure. The 
segment represents a confinnatory statement. The following segment of protocol, provided 
in response to the description nf the share option component of senior management's 
remuneration package, also represents a confinnatory statement 
Share options cire <uli> a,1 interesting \\'Cl\' to reward people. 
bw tlie hurdle is 011�\' M 5% �learnings per share growth 
and it's (the company) 011�\' Juul modest returns 
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so these guys might be drawing out their bonuses. 
Supp/ementory illformatio11 
The supplementary information category of statements refors to "supplementary context 
infonnation indicative of (participants') prior understanding and judl:,rrncnt of the problem" 
(Mao et al., 2000, p. 166) - excluding anomalies and confinnatory statements. The 
following segment of protocol represents supplementary infonnation. The information was 
provided by a participant following the individual's express disapproval of the criterion 
(inter;ration) identified in the case studies as the basis for choosing between the proposals 
received from the three service providers involved (sec the contradiction at the top of page 
179). 
Given that this is rhe.fi1:,;f rime the compcmy needs to do this 
It needs to accept that it has to get across 
A lear11i11g �( the issues 
And iclent(ficario11 c?f"the major issues 
Prioritisation £?(those whic:h it can have some impact or lewrage aho111. 
<Umm> Separation cf cause ancl eJl'ect, 
And then 1hi11k abolll the 11orio11 <?f'i11tegratio11. 
Tra11slatiom, 
Finally, translations incorporate restatements of the explicit text and any attempt to 
translate the text into another form ( Flower ct al. 1983 ). such as: 
so the company has got 9,400 people worldwide: 
and a $5 billion turnover. 
A summary of the L�_tructs that comprise the Transcript Code 1s provided tn the 
framework depicted in Figure 22. 
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FIGURE 22: Framework of the class of statements comprising the Transcript Code 
STATEMENTS 
Content statements Meta-statements 
I I 
Anomalies I Confirmatory Supplementary Tra 
I Information Information 
nslations 
I I 
Absence of Critical Contradictions 
Information 
I 
Participant Local 
Knowledge Coherence 
The anomalies. c01?firma1m:r slatements and supplementary i11/hrmatior are of particular 
interest to this study. They provide the kcy lo identifying thc participants· representations 
of the scenarios. and. thcrefore. assessing whether the case studies meet the researcher's 
communication goals. The material \viii also form the basis of thc reader based principle to 
be factored into the development or the case studies to be used in Study 2. 
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The n.:lationship between the modelled content of each transcript and the anomalies and 
confirmatory categories of cor.tent statements was registered by indicating whether the 
statements related to the underlying (global) message (G) or co-context (CC) dimensions of 
the original text. The cross-tabulation of the remaining classes of statement simply 
involved ticking ( ../ ). 
6AA.2 Scorino .,, 
There were severnl stages involved in the scoring phase of the analysis of the modelled and 
scanned protocols. Firstly, the number of topic lines per participant. and class of statements 
was obtained and totalled. The summary of the information is provided in Table 22. 
-
TABLE 22: Summary of topic lines/statements per participant and in total 
f.---
I 
Session Anomalies I 
N,1 I 00 I I 
Pl I 35 j 33 P2 13 I.:' 
1'3 12 II 
P4 9 y 
P5 l) 9 
1'6 I 0 /{) 
1'7 8 7 
1'8 9 y 
Tola! 10:'i I 00 
Content Statements 
Confirmutor) 
Statements 
No ! 0.0 i 
12 6 .,., I(} 
39 /Y 
10 5 
37 /8 
45 .:'O 
16 8 
29 I I./ 
21U , I 0/J ' 
Supplcmcntu� I 
Information I 
No I (l r " I 
46 }5 
2 I ' > 1-
7 ./ 
7 ./ 
33 18 
14 ,'i 
11 6 
42 .:3 �-- � 
181 i / {)() 
. . I Meta-
l rnn\lnt10n� I statements 
N,1 "o No �'o 
:'i5 -' I I 49 i 3.:' 
11 ' 15 Io ., 
� /8 / 18 I.:' 
21 I 8 4 3 
42 /6 13 8 .,., 
� 26 /7 
46 /8 14 y 
17 7 15 y 
260 I 00 154 I OU ------ --
I 
_J 
Total 
N() I 197 : 0,0 I ,, --
82 I y 
122 13 
51 6 
U4 /5 
117 13 
95 JO 
112 J} 
910 I OU 
Content Statements comprised 82% of the total number of statements. The collfrnt to meta­
statement ratio was 756: 154 statements i.e., 4.91: I. 
As Figure 23 shows. anomalies accounted fi.)r 14%, continnatory statements 28%. 
supplementary infonnation 24% and translations 34% of the content statements. 
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FIGURE 23: Percentage of categories of content statements 
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The anomalies and confirmatory statemems were used lo obtain a ball park measure of 
whether the case studies as a \\'hole met the researcher· s communication goals. 
notwithstanding the limitations inherent in the small sampk sizl'.. Firstly. the two scores 
for each of the eight protocols ( Tabk 22) were plotted using a scatter-plot. which is 
depicted in Figure 24. Taking into consideration the relationship of the plotted points to 
the line running. through them. six (75%) of the eight protocols confirm the researcher·s 
interpretation of the prob km in\·olved. 
FIGURE 24: scatter plot of confirmatory and anomalous statements 
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Secondly, the correlation between the score for the two types of statements for each 
protocol was obtained using simple li11l!ar regn.:ssi\)n. Table 23 shows the regression results 
for the analysis. Only the intercept is significant (.008). The adjusted R 2 was .005. 
TABLE 23: Re�ression coefficients 
Unstandardised Stamlardise< r--· r.,momH,· so,,;sc;
1 Coefficients Coefficients 
Model 
1------- I Std. Error B Beta l Si�. Tolerance \"IF 
I I (Constant) '' 6C' 8.649 3.892 .008 
i-
.D. J'."\_ ·---· I anomalies I -.565L .555 -.384 - l.O IX .348 1.000 1.000 I 
The remaining ar,alysis of the protocol data is confined to the anomalies and confirmatory 
categories of statements. each of which will now be dealt with separately, and in that order. 
Anomalies 
The protocols were scanned to identify the sections of the case studies that innilvcd 
perceived anomalies. based on the textual framework that comprises the Task Code. The 
number of protocols (incidents) associated with cm:h anomaly was also calculated. Fifteen 
sections of the text were involved. The sections and the related number of incidents are 
identified in Table 24. 
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TABLE 24: Task Code and number and location of anomalil·� ---- ---j Numbcrorl 
incidents 
!nrotocols) 
1------,---·----- --�-P_a_r_a_.g,.._r_a...._p_h _______ _ ---- -----1 
Contrnl 
Code No 
I 
2 
-
3 
s 
Name 
Description of 
company 
Board 
of directors 
-
Audit Committee 
Executive experience 
& Remuneration 
�AS need, purpose 
& 
type 
Con ten I 
• Nat ure. size. localion. industry and 
markets. 
1.1 
1---------- ----- -- -- ---- - 1-----+----- -
-
---
• Separation o f ownership and control. 
0 Size. 
• Ratio of exec:non-exec . ---,--
1.2 
2.1 
------11---- - --1 
) ) 
-- --------- -----____ _,_ __ _.... ___  • Independence of chair. 2.J 
• Independence of nomination process . 2.4 
• Emplovment, financial. business tics . 2 5 
• Sub-commiuees 2.h 
0 Overall strength. 2. 7 
0 Audit committee. J. I 
1 • Composition .'2 -
• Authoritv . -'--' 2 
0 Resources. .\4 2 --
• Diligence .<.5 -
• Overall strength . J (, 
,__• _ L_:x_e_c_u_l _-,_,e_c_·x_p_c_·r_ic_·n_c_e_. -- ----·- __ -, __ 4_._1 _ �-------1 
• Remuneration: fixed, bonus. options. 4.2 2 
,_• __ t,.,_1_o_d_e _st�g�·r_o_,\_'t_h �P_a_st_5�).'_e_a _rs_· - - -----+----5 __ 1_h ___ 1 __ ..... 
• 
• 
Description of NAS. 5.4 
Linking statement 
Need: profits plateaued. comect· _m _  a_r_k_c_t -f- s_.2 --+--- -- --­
Purpl1se: 1mpro\'e financial pcrfn�manL� --
+
!--5_._·' 
_  �
1
1 6 Outsourcin� & I o Approach to providers. h. \ 1----��---�---------- ----+------+- - - --
f-----+--
1
_
1p
_
p_r_
o
_
a
_
c
_
1_1 ____ --+_._ Rationale for t>utsourcrng: exper1ise. h.2 
7 
8 
Basis for submission o Basis for subnussions: 111forma11011. 7.1 --------------+------+--- -·--'" 
& invitin� 3 providers • Invitation: reputation for excellence. 7 2 
o Criterion: case of ;ntel!ration. X. I 7 Criterion for choosing 
bctwcen thc proposals 
1----- -------�----------+--- -
-t--- -----1 
o Choice reduced to 2 candidatl·s. X. 2 
t---------+---- --- ------1--- -- - ------ - ----·· --
->-------+---------. 
9 Description of • Bi g 5: Tenn 5 years: mdustry expe1 . <J.I 
Audit firm 1-----t--- -+---�>--- ·-----10 Separation of duties • NAS perfonned bv separate d1vis1on. _ __ 1_1 _1 _ ->----� 
I 
& Fee for NAS 1---:
- -D_e_s_c.ription of division. 
·--- -+
-
-:
-
:-: � - +----- 6____J1 NAS kc - S 125.000 . I f---t-------------'-- -- ---------- --·-�- -- -+------ ---1 Total fee: 5°,o of annual revenue ul' II Fees to audit firm for • 
all services -
• 
I 0 
0 
lo cal audit otlice. 11. l 3 • 1 
Ta.x and super sen·ices pro,·1dcd. __  I U I 
Total audit fi:e: $580.000. =t*l 1.2 I 
Total kes for NAS: S 1.450 .000. 11 A i 
I I 
12 Specialist provider o Descrip11on. _____ -
· -·
-
--<,--t 2-_-l -l 
k • NAS tee S 120.000. 
L-�_-2 ---_-_!_·,-_=] 
- --
o 9%, of annual revenue of local audit oflii.:e 12 .. • I I 
� ----
13 Comparability o Of proposals & operating capacitv. -·-- �-1._•-_I �-------< L • Three of the participants had difficulty m comprehending the overall paragraph. rather than any 
par1icular clcmcnl(s) of the parngraph. ___ - - - ·-- ·-
IXS 
The types 0f anomalies involved were threefold: 
(i) lack of infonnation: 
(ii) inconsistencies at the local level and between the participants· 
representations of the problem and that provided in the solution: and 
(iii) structural. 
The structural anomaly is not induded in the statistics associated with the protocols. per se. 
The problem was not identified by the participants. but by the researcher. both as observer 
and in the analysis of the protocols concerned. There was an obvious need to identify as 
early as possible in each case study that the provision of the NAS would be provided by a 
separate division of the audit firm. as opposed to the audit team. The information was 
provided later in the case studies and to an extent inhibited comprehension. 
The number of each type of anomaly was 8. 11 and I respecti\'dy. As figure 25 shows. 
lack of infomrntion accounted for 40%. inconsistencies 55% and the structural problem 5% 
of the total number of anomalies. A lack of local coher.::nce accounted for I�% of the 
inconsistencies involved. 
60.0° 0 
50.0° ·o 
f 40.0"o 
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FIGURE 25: Percentage of categories of anomalies 
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A cross-sessional summary of the nature of the anomalies. the section of the text 
framework to which they relate. the protocol{s) involved. and whether they involve the 
global message or co-context dimensions of the text is provided in Table 25. 
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�ABLE 25: Cross-scssional summary of anomalies 
· Paragraph I I I Dimension Type of 
Board of directors 
<�rn) 
Audit committee (AC): 
Sub-section Protocol of text 
O\'erall strength PR I Glohal 
Composition PR I Glohal 
Autll()rity 
:__i 
Glohal 
P2 Global 
Resources 1'2 Global 
1'2 I (ilobal 
I 
anomaly 
Summary of anomalies 
Lack of No reference to checks and balances vi-a-vis weak fonn or BoD. 
information 
LaL"k of No direL't reference to the qualifications of the non-executi\\� directors. 
information 
Lack of Tenns of reference considered a "bit skinny". 
information �����·t -� 
Lack of 
mformauon 
Lack of 
infonnation 
Lack of 
information 
I 
I 
No re tcrence to AC responsibility for monitoring non-financial reporting 
(KPI NAS invol\'edl. 
No n:ference to internal auditor access to the AC. and w1thout management 
invol\'ement. 
Need fr1r AC to meet with internal auditors to plan and review the audit 
programme. 
I nconsistcncy Executive experience 
I 
Rt:nHmcration I' l \ Co-context I n o sis e v I t:xecuuve rcmuncrat10n structure not l111kect to non-t111ancia1 nertonnance 
cal and remuneration 
I I 
I (lo 
coherence) 
Lac k ot�o identification of the specific type of ontions in\'ol\'ed. 
information ;--------+-I L�L 
Lac k of I Lack of quanutati\'c measure of what constitutes "mode�t"· pro tit growth. 
of NAS I i I i mlorn · muon 
Inconsi e-, ----r-
-
"1,8. Co-contc\t I consistency I Dissatisfaction with the title "customer sen·ices" consultants provided in 
relation to the marketing NAS. The tenn "market research" was considered 
more appropriate. 
P6 
___ _,_ __ ___ J 
reJeCted. 
- -- - -------­
Co-contcxti Inconsistency The notion that non-financial indicators lead to irnpro\'ed performa
�
1ce ' 
P7 Co-context \ lnwnsistency The follow-through (recurring) period for the marketing NAS ideally S 
years rather than the nominated 3 years. 
______ ] 
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r· 
i TABLE 25 continued: Cross-sessional summary of anomalies continued 
! I : Dimension j TYpe of . . �aragraph Sub-section Protocol . f · 1 Summan· of anonrnhes · · o text . anoma Y 
: ! ltkely to specialise m one of the three types ol K.Pl rather than possess 
1 i competenc ics in all three. 
I 
R,tionoldonhoi" orJ "''"'" prnvidm , PI 
] C �••'"" / lncoftsis<cncy Thcc,pcc<ation. wast ha I ,u,tain,bk d" clop,�,'."' pw, idcr.rn, mo" 
I i P6 ; Co-context ! Inconsistency The rationale for outsourcing - lack ()f imc-mal cxpc-rt1sc- - was rejectc-d as 
\ J 
unlikely gi\'ell the- size of the emity. 
J Criterion for choosi�g between the / Pl. P2. · Co-context I Inconsistency Rejection of integration as the rationalt· for .:hol,smg hetwecn the three 
! proposals P3. P4. ! proposals. 
l P5. P6. & 
l 
I l 
i PS i I 
/ Consultancy division of the firm i lnconsistenc y Inadequacy of the S 125.000 fee for the non-audit sen-ice sought. Pl. P3. C o-c0r.tc::x 1 
I P4. P:>. 
l ' 
Pi & PS ' 
! Fee5 to audit firm for all �ervices PI. P3. C 0-context I lncon,1stency Lack of clarity of description of fees to audit fim1. ' 
I p� i (local 
I ' coherence) 
j Specialist provider and fee PS (\-,-cf•ntc,t i lncons1stencv 
l 
J 
The fee for !he NAS as a proportion (9° ol of the a\'cragc annual revenue of 
the local office of the specialist fim1. pro\'cd a d1;;m1ction. 
I 
i 
i 
; Pl. p_;_ ( 0-C(>n!C'\l : Inconsistency lna.dcquacy 01' the S 120.000 fee for the non-audit ;;en·ice sought. 
l P4. P5. ; 
p-; & Pil. I 
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Conjirmatm:r stmen,cnts 
The continnatory statements, as stated earlier, were analysed according to whether they 
related to the co-contextual passages in the case studies or the passages dealing with the 
global message (implicit dimension of the text). As Table 26 indicates, confirmatory 
foedback on the co-context was confined to the rationale for the choice of NAS. 
TABLE 26: Protocol response� and the co-context of the case studies 
Para Element of the case stud,· Protocol responses 
Description of the company Elicited responses of a general nature 
that represented translations. -
5 The basis for seeking (need for NAS) There was express support for all three 
Kl'ls types of N AS as strategics for 
IS improving future financial 
Market research perfonnance. 
Description of N AS The subject of minor anomalies. 
l specifically. inconsistencies associated 
with the meaning of concepL� used. 
·-
The basis for ,lutsourcing the NAS. No verbalisation 
7 The basis for inviting submission from providers. No verbalisation. 
The rationale for choosing between the 
I 
The subject of major anomalies. 
�I -- submi:;sions. 
However, the volume of confimrntory statements associated with the implicit dimension of 
the text, which captures the issues at the heart of the thesis, \Vas substantial. Descriptive 
statistics dealing with the number of protocols and rate of confirnrntion associated with the 
implicit dimension, and whether the issues of accountability or efficiency were involved, 
are provided in Table 27. The subject matter of the confinnatory statements is reflected in 
the propositions implicit in the textual material involved. The relationship between 
accountability and JR i11cc11tin's, attit11dc and opport1111il_1· (Mock ct al., 2005); and 
efficiency and the sources of competitive advantage is also indicated. 
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TAHLE 27: C'onlirrnntor�· stntemcnts nml the implicit dimension of the cn,c studies 
! Accountnhilityi IR theory/sources of Implicit propositions No of cnscs conlirmution Pam Tcuual clement of the cn,c studies cfficienc�· compctiti\'c nd,mitngc m1dic, No of protocols % 
� 
,l"J}amlinn of 0"-1ll.�lup .and contnll acc:ountahi lity oppM111t1i(r 
Proxy for !ugh ai;cncy cosl,. lt::,ding to the 
X 2 25'% nL-..-<l rnr indL,1cndcnt monitoritH!. 
strong. structure 5 .j 80%, 
lJ.iard 1>f !>lrL'\:(O<S accountability opportu11i1y wt..-ak "tructure 3 3 100% ·-
strong stru�turc 5 4 80% 
_; Audit Co11111111tcc acCtlUntah1li[y apportunity -
\\.'t.>:nk �tructurc ·' 3 100% 
.j l�xL."cut1vc rcmum:ral1on 
Pc:rfl,nn,,nc:c hasc:d rc-mum:mtlon �1� an 
a�ntuntahll1ty appartu11ity inccnt1\'C to manipulak �1n1ing.'i.. s 3 38°/n 
s Nt\S type ilCCtlU1ltt1h1l1t\' int·••rllfrt•s llm:,11 ,,r self review lh>m KP ls ·' 3 100% 
'Jlircat ofscifn:,icw from IS 2 2 100% 
I11rl·at t,f sdf rc\'it:\\' from market rc..�can:h 3 I) ..... 
IO I C,,nsuhancy d1vis11"1 oflhe au<lir firm acwun1ah1 lily arriwd,• Chit1L'Se wall ,mplic<l safcguard of Al X 1 25�-Q 
Non·rc..-curring 4 
·---
l'ct-s l<>r NAS acwu111aoili1y i11et•ntfrt•J 
0 
llL'\:UfflnJ; 4 I) 
... 
II FL·\..� fnr audit and non-audtt ,erv1cc" acct�tmtah1lit: i11n•11ri,·t•s llucat to auditor rndcpcn<li:ncc from wcahh 
1nccnt1v\..� s J J8�o 
9 Dc..-scnptmn of current aud1tnr B,g 5 account.ah1hty a11i1111lt' 
Implicit ,:,fcguards of Al fr,,m rei;ulatory s 2 25�'o mcmhcr. industry cxpL"T1. � year environment 
IJ 
incumhcnt 
nncl L"111C1cncy ..1111/ir 1ech11<1/oKJ· Distinctive expcnisc !I I 13% 
the 
cl1ic1l"JH.'� 
Cfi'SC4' J11rnmht•11cy bclusivity 8 0 0 
ns a Client switching costs 8 0 [) 
whole 
Scope of knowlL-<lgc 8 3 38% 
ctlicicnc_v , If u/ti-di.,cip Ii 11a ri I)• lnfonnation ht"tlctils R I 13% 
efficiency Professitmal staru-' Fxclusivil} 8 0 0 
12 SpL'Ciali<t pr, •, ,dcr & foe Acrnunt.,oi litv & llUilUdc Quality signal of indcpcndt'!lCC g 3 3!i% 
efficiency I 
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The difference in the volume of verbalisation relating to the implicit dimension of the text 
as opposed to the co-context is not surprising, for three reasons. Firstly, on a word count, 
the passages of the case studies dealing with the implicit dimension of the material 
accounted for approximately 70% of the explicit text - a ratio of implicit-to-co-context in 
tenns of words of approximately 2.44: I. Secondly, the overall analysis of the data revealed 
that the cues associated with the issues of accountability and efficiencies represented the 
hot-spots in the comprehension process. 
Thirdly, c,)nsistent with prior research (e.g., Ericsson et al., 1993: Flower et al., 1983; Mao 
d al., 2000), contradictions whether they took the form of anomalies or confirmatory 
statements, triggered longer and more detailed responses than consistencies. This is 
exemplified in the contrasting nature of the following segments of protocol relating to the 
strong and weak forms of the board of directors. 
Strong form of Board of Directors (P4) 
A _fezir�r high weighting<�( non-exec ·s 
There appears to be 
A fair degree of independence of non-exec ·s. 
The <11111111> audit commiuee strucwre seems sound 
Overall seems like <uh. ah. tch. ah> afairzr competent company 
<ah> there don't seem !o be any <uh> 
any skeletons in the closet here. 
Weak form of Board of Directors (P8) 
The board . . .  probably has too many executive members 
The chief executive officer should not be the chairman o("thc board 
And probab�,- should not have sig11(/ica11t input into the 11omi11atio11 of members �( 
the board 
That structure would suggest to me 
1hat the company may ru11 the risk �(bei11g over�,· dominated by one individual. 
The 11011-executi,·e directors not ho/ding Australian pr�fessional accounting 
qua/ (ficat ions 
Is not an appropriate skill base.for this job 
Given the stated role �(the commillee 
A 11d I fear 
that the executive member might exert 1111d11e i1!flue11ce 011 them 
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Through superior expertise 
And more detailed experience H'ithi11 the company 
f 'm suspicious 
About the degree of i11vo/veme11t �(internal and external auditors. 
The ratio of the total number of words associated with the foregoing confirmatory protocol 
segments relating to the weak (P4) versus strong fon11 of corporate governance (P8) is 
approximately 2.47: I. The same ratio associated with the explicit text contained in the case 
studies, on the other hand, is approximately 0.58: I. 
The broad nature of the confinnatory statements is, as mentioned earlier, reflected in the 
propositions implicit in the textual material involved, as per Table 27. A closer analysis of 
the nature of the statements is provided in the ensuing discussion of the results. 
6.5 DISCUSSION OF RES UL TS 
The infonnation contained in the summary and srnnple segments of protocol provided in 
the data analysis, point to the success of the present study in diciting infom1ative data. The 
data set serves to fulfil the following related fonctions: 
o lnfonn the immediate research question concerning the effectiveness of 
the case studies in communicating the researcher's intended message. 
o Facilitate the development of the case studies to be used in Study 2. 
o lnfonn the broader question of the issues of accountability and 
efficiency impacting willingness-to-appoint. 
The percentage of participants (75%) agreeing with the researcher's overall interpretation 
of the scenarios framing the case studies point to the overall effectiveness of the 
instruments in communicating the researcher's intended message. 
Howeve,, notwithstanding the foregoing results, the overriding purpose of this study was to 
identify problems of a cognitive nature associated with the design of the case studies with a 
view to promoting the communication effectiveness of the case studies to be used in Study 
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2. The problems ass(•ciated with the following sections ::>f the case studies represented a 
significant impediment to comprehension: 
• The criterion for choosing between the proposals. 
• The size of the NAS fees. 
• The lack 0f clari;.y of the description of the fees accruing to the audit finn for the 
audit and NAS. 
The significance of the anomalies is evident on the basis of the following criteria: 
(i) the number of protocols involved - 7, 6 and 3 (of the 8) respectively; 
(ii) the implications of the anomalies for the effectiveness of the research design; 
and 
(iii) the substance of the participants' responses, as evidenced by the following 
excerpts from P2 and P3. 
Criterion for choosing between the proposals 
Original statement 
The initial criterion for choosing between the proposals centred on the ease with 
which the perfonnance indicators could be inte!:,>Tated into management's current 
planning and control processes. 
P2 Well that's OK 
{( the current management and co11trol prnr-esses 
Adequate(,, support the company ·s new aj1 .,·atio11s 
And they don't necessari(v. 
The NAS fee. 
P3 $/20(000) ... 
Goodness me. 
71iesefees are incredibt,· fow. 
The perceived anomaly associated with the criterion given as the rationale for choosing 
between the initial set of three submissions detracted from the overall specification of the 
case studies. However, the inadequacy of the fee for the NAS service, as the following 
segment of protocol from P4 demonstrates, had adverse consequences for wealth incentives 
i.e., the treatment associated with the threat of self-interest. The problem elicited a 
perception of the threat of wealth incentives from low-balling, rather than the continuity of 
fees. 
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P4 An ERPfor a $5 billion dollar company 
ls going to be a massive exercise 
$115,000 is a throw away 
Y 011 've gotta say 
Where's the big stilig coming.fiw11. 
The problem was compounded in relation to thre� of the partidpants who had difficulty 
interpreting the para!,r aph describing the fees foi the audit and non-audit services. 
The foregoing three anomalies, as maJor impediments to comprehension, will play an 
integral part i:i guiding the development of the case studies to be used in Study 2. The 
remaining 12 ar.omalies will also play an impo11ant part in that respect. However, the 
implications of the latter set were largely concerned with the underspecification of aspects 
of the case studies for which there was overall confirmation e.g., the strength of the 
corporate gO\ ernance structure and the description of the NAS. 
The confirmatory protocol data relating to the global message underpinning the case 
studies also serve to provide evidence of factors of accountability and efficiency impacting 
the decision of whether to appoint the incumbent audit firm to pnwide NAS. At the same 
time, the data set provides support for the findings of prior empirical research (eg., Parkash 
et al. 1993; DeZoort ct al. 2002) and bt:'st-practicc regulation (e.g, PF I; ASX, Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003) embodied in the specification of the task stimuli. 
The key issues of accountability impacting the participants' decision process are described 
below. The issues are structured according to key elements of the Mock et al. (2005) and 
Johnstone et al. ( 2001) IR models. The prior empirical research and/or best-practice 
regulation to which the data relate are identified in parentheses. A cross-sessional sample of 
confirmatory segments of protocol data pertaining to the issues, as listed, is provided in 
Table 28. 
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IR opportunitv 
The size and status of the finn as a listed corporation was identified as the basis of the 
demand for an independent audit c:.nd. therefore, the significance of the threat from the 
provision of NAS (e.g .. Parkash et al. 1993; PF I); and 
Performance based remuneration was also identified as an incentive to manipulate earnings 
vis-a-vis managerial opportunism in the exercise of discretionary decision-making. 
Safeguarding IR opportunity (managerial opportunism) and IR attitude 
Structural strength of the board o_(directors and independence 
The following independence factors were identified as important in evaluating the strength 
of the board of directors: 
o the ratio of non-executive to executive directors (e.g., Klien. 2002b; ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003); 
o the dominance of the CEO as board chairman and his/her influence over the 
detennination of the composition of the remainJer of the board membership (e.g., 
Cohen et al., 2002; Collier et al., J 999; ASX Corporate Governance Council. 2003 ); 
and 
• the qualifications of the non-executive directors. 
Str11ctural strength of the a11dit committee� 
The following ACE factors were identified as important in evaluating the audit committee 
• composition: expertise (Beasley et al., 200 I); and independence ( e.g., DeZoort et 
al., 2001; ,\SX, Corporate Governance Council. 2003); and 
• n:sources: access to external and internal auditors (e.g .. Kalbers et al.. 1993; ASX 
Corporate Governance Council. 2003); 
IR Incentives 
The following threats were identified: 
• the threat of self-review from NAS (specifically KPls and JS) (e.g., Geiger ct al., 
2002; Lowe et al. 1999); and 
• the threat of self-interest vis-a-vis the magnitude of non-audit to audit fees (e.g., 
McKinley et al., 1985; Pany ct al. 1988). 
IR Attitude 
Herc, the safeguarding role of Chinese walls (e.g .• Geiger et al., 2002; Lowe ct al. 1999) 
was addressed. 
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L\111.E 21\: Cro,.,-.sc,sionnl sample of conlirmator� statement, denlinl! "ith accountahility issues 
1H TIIEORY Textual clement of lmplicil proposition Example,, of conlirmntor�· sCJ!mcnts 
the case studic, -
Sepuration of Prnx.y li.1r lugh il!!C1l() cosb � lo me ,1z • .,. •. ·\ uot e·1w11gh 111dcpcmlc11cc• tl1t•n· 
Opportunil� 0\1 ncrship and llL'\.-d liir mdcpcnclc,ll H'c ·,·c 1r1/A111.c ·1hou1 d big nw1pw11 
control numttunnc .\'ot a 1,wuh ,·ump,!"' --·-
Pcrfonrnm�c h;1.-.�d So tht'I' m,ff ht' hW.\t·,I 
Executh'c fClllUOLT.lllllfl a� an ITlCClllJ\C to 
remuneration I ma111puhllc c;1111ing� IJ,a.\cd m tlh· protitahilir, a�pt'O 
I 
/11 order to g<'t big,_ct'1· H1/a,-,1·., 
i.\ the ,·orwbl,· 11'1:HC'1" ohJt'CIHT -
I .-1 /atrfr lu,d, n't•ightw� o(,w11·t·.u·c 's !-.trong ,tructurL' - Ullkpcndencc..· rl,cn· "Pf'''ort: 10 he Mitigation of A l�u, dt')!rt't.' o/ 11ul,·11t·11durct' ofmm-t'Xt.'C 0J 
m. attitude Board of Director, 71,t' chic( t·.,ccu1i,'(· ofliccr :rlw11ld 1wt ht· 1/11..• 
and we,,\.. struclur.: - mdcpL'lldc,icc d,a1rmm1 of the board 
m11nugcriul And prolwhfr not lral't' signUicunl input inlo tire 
opportunism L 
11om11wtl011 oJ memlwr.'i o/ tht· board 
Hwt .'i:tnwtun· u-011/d sug,_�t'J./ to me that the compa,n· 
m,11' nm the ri.d.: l�( bt'i1Jg on•r{,· clominulccl h.i 011c 
rndividual. 
I l11t· <11,um;· audit commiUct' .ttn1c111ri• St'C'ms .soutJd 
strung structur� m gc:nL-nll tH·t'rlllf 
.HTf1'5 like -...uh. ""· tel,. uh> " (i1ir/1· compt'teut 
compall_\· 
�-ah-· there d011 ·, .n·,·ms I<> be any ·:.uh� 
mu- '(kclcw,1.'i i,r lht· do.H't ht'rc: 
Audit Committee 
7 he itoll·t'.lt'Crtfiu· director.'\ ,wt lwlclt11g Australian 
We.,\.. ,1ructur.: c:i;.pi:r11�t: fl"fl{t.·SJIIJIW{ aC('OI0,/111].! qualilicatw,:J 
1.,. 1101 u,1 ar;·1ropnatc s '.ill bus,· j(,r this joh 
(i,-n•11 tire .Hated role o(rhc commirtt't' 
l - m,kpcndc1 cc Ard I /i:nr rlrat tl,c ,·x,·c11ti1.·c mt•mhcr m1J.!lrl c.\crt unduc ,n/lu,•ricc• 011 them I 1"11ro111•h .HlfU'rior c.,pi•rtt.'it' 
Ami more dt·tailed f'.\fJt'ricm ..·c H'ith1111lu· companr 
• rt.�nurct::-. I'm .\CHfUcimn 
,lhout thc dt•}.!rt'c•of 11nol1-t·m,·11t 0(1111cnwl am/ 
extcr,wlauc/uon 
The t'.\lc,u Jo u'l1ich tht• \•.:ork �,·c· art· .seeking 
f1lrt.!;.ll of self rcvlcv .. · from Kl'ls. 1:rom tht'�t' nuuulra11n-
lncenthcs NAS t)·pc }f If l.f ct11Tlt'd ow In· the e.,1t.•nwl a,,di! firm 
Ir co11/d ,mpmr 
O, he .,ec•n to zmpa,r 
Hit· i11dn1cndt'fl('t' o(tlre c.itt•nw/ audit ("'m. 
11,c t'-\J}t'rl di\'HWn i.t H"t'lcor.w to tender 
llm::11 or ,.:lf review from IS O,,li- m, tire hast_,;; that rlrtT arc· uuicr1t·nclcrrt 
// f/rc m•w St'l"\"iCt' i_\,r ·11hat gn·at 
111t'\ ·n· nor gwuw .HI\' mudr 
/Jeca11'ic 1h1•\· ·re· tire' n11c'_'i rlu..u /JU( the s,�1t·m i11. 
( ;om/nc.u 11ft' 
Fee� for non-audit nH'\t' aiullfo1" ou>:ht to go lnw tire accmoumrn· 
and audit ,cr,·ices I\ lag111tud� or 11<111•.IUdll · audtl 
St'('/IOlt 
O(r/nr;; comp,m\ 
1'hc· 11011�m,c/it kn 
An· t I arc f\,·o ami o Jw/(11mc.'i rh,: mulil frc 
It u t11terc.H111g that the currc,11 audit firm i.<" bidder 
Altitu<lc Con,ulrancy dh·ision Chm,;,;.: w;ill nnphcd Ill JIU'i 
of the audit lirm sar"""' "':�J )"011 would ),an· to c1ucuw11 how md,·111..•,u/n1t that iJ 
lrJ1Ctlrcr 1herc is a ( "lrmc.H' ,,·oll 
lh'th'c•cn 1 /11s part o/ Jhc htHlllt'.H 
Ami the audu part I. Accountahilit�· Speciali,t pro,·idcr & Ir ,s ab:'io(u1t•fr cit'llr 
& eflicicncv fee ()uality ,ignal 111' mdcpcndL'llCC >
'011 h'Oll/d gv f()l" //Jt' i11tft'pcm/c11l 
L__ 11,c .'ipccw/i.(t .n,."itarnablt• dc\•e/npmc,rt cons11ltann. 
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Thc issues nf efticicncy identiticd hy the participants in the process of making their 
decision arc listed hdow. It was suggested in thl: condusion to the previous chapter that 
audit technology. irn.:umbency. multi-disciplinarity and thc fomrnl professional status of the 
audit finn provided a basis for pcrL·civcd compctit1\e alhantage of the audit tim1 ovcr the 
specialist tim1. accountability acccptcd. Furthcr. it was suggcsted given the nature of the 
data instruments that any pcn:cn cd clfo.:icncic:s would bc limit .. ..,\ to the fol!:iv:ing areas. 
Firm specific resources: 
• clisti11cti\'(' expertise emanating from audit tcehnology. subject to the nature of 
the NAS: 
• i11/ormatio11 hcne/its emanating from multi-disciplinarity: and 
o exc/11si,·ity emanatint; frcm incumhency and fonnal professional status. 
Client specific resources: 
• client switching costs. emanating from incumbency. 
The summary of the confinnatory infi..1miation provided in Table 27 (pagc 193) rc.:lating to 
efficiency shows support for the foregoing proposition with respect to the fin�1 specific 
resources. dish1cti\·c expcnisc and i11/ormatio11 benefits. but not cxclush-izr or the client 
specific resource . . nl'itching costs. A cross-sessional summary of protocol segments 
pertaining to the perceived efficiencies is provided in Table 19. 
The data also show support for the benefits that would ensue from scope of knowledge in 
t'1e event that the auditor was appointed to pro\'ide the :\AS. The diem-specific resource. 
again, derives from incumbency as a multi-discipline scr\'icc provider to the client. It was 
suggested 111 the previous chapter that benefits from scope of knowledge would be 
mitigated as a result of employing separation of duties as a safeguard of auditor 
independence. Such a response may be attributable. fix example. to a lack of saliency 
associated with the s.afoguard. which will be taken into consideration in the de\·elopment of 
the data instruments to be used in Study 1. 
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TABLE 29: Cros�-sc"ional summary of confirma10r�· ,1a1cmcnh dcalini: "ilh cffiricnc� issuC\ 
compclili\·c for1or, lypc 
Elnmplc, of ronfirmntor�· SCj!mcnls Sources or ,\sscl 1ypc l)iffcrcntinlini: 
I 
l'i,\S 
l-'a"'d'--,,"'a"'n.:.:ld:.c1J!"''c ____ -+---------,'----------+-----+-�---------------------
FIRl\l Sf>ECIFIC lli,tinc1hc Aud111<:dm,110�} , :\lar�ct 
RESOlJ RCES c,pcrlisc !L'>card1 
CLIENT SPECIFIC 
HESOIIIKES 
h,form 
I ;:cncfih 
Scope or 
kno,..,ledJ!c 
Muhi-d1s.:1phna111� 
lncumh,."flc) and 
rr.,111,-J,.crpl mar rt:, 
6.6 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Kl'ls 
Market 
H.'"":.C;JfCh 
IS 
H1&· pro( and t'OIB Ifft' 
Fortht·auduur.-. 
· l m ·. and th,·l prohahfr l,ai(' a lwncr (eel 
/-'or tl1t· comb,,wrwn of lllt'.H' nu11-fina11cwl 1nd1eator.t to 
the Ji,ra,rnal uulwaton 
/Jut J '"l.'iJJt'cf tlwr u.Jwt ·.\ uuemlt'd here 
J.\ that all tl,n•t· co111ultw1r nm pnn·idc all thrt·t· "en.·1ct'.V 
)',-1, / 'd lw rnrpn<t·d 
lhi·rc ,nmld ht' nmJ11/11.1111J out rhert· ,dw could 
. .f/Jlwuj!I: tire wu/11 firm ,nmJd hll\l' accct.t It> th,� 
j rc'iot1n.:r� ro Jc/in•,- ull thn·,· 
lht· prni and con1 ar<· 
F(Jr 1h1• aud11on. 
( ompt11n Juwwl�·dg,·. 1r.du-11ry bwwledg,: 
Thr•, /..now t}u- f't'op/,· th<·1· htow tilt' h11111wu 
711c1 J..non· lwu· ,, <>/>t'r-a/e:s 
·- l 'mm · mu/ th,·,· pro/1<1bll' huw " h<•rt,•r (al (i,r th,· 
nwtbinotum o(tlu.·s,· 11on-fi1w11cwl uuiicawr:� to the 
fi11a1Jcial mdicalon 
I thm4 th,· mam 1,1c10,· 
uould ht· the ha/min· ht•rwcc11 
1ht· kn,ndcd_et' that lht· audit comp,11ll' ras of lhe 
nu11p,m,· \ opt'rc11101u 
un.J �dJCiht�r that ,nil '-!in.· tht'm a bt'/lt.'r 11uigh1 m/11 tht· 
,., .. wit.\ or rc(t'(lrch 
I )"ou cou/d Sllgj.!C.\! tht1t t/rt• audit {inn 
ft th•· ht'ltcr Oflt' /o du it 
llcn11He· 'io11wflmc.\ tiwir J.:,wwlcdj.!(' of tlrt.• company 
I 
l/cJp.., them comt• to u bt•ftt•r i·ww 
Rath,•r than ,w ouuidt· sp,•e1alist 
lf"/w doc'in 't hll\·c the .HJrlJC under.ttamimg 
<uh·· o(tltc· nmtpa111· 
Yeh ·. i,h :" 11,!UC."\.'i tht· in fur tht• firm 
i.'i �d,erc the audit firm luu hccn with nm (or 5 n'tlr.1 
Study I has theoretical and practical implications. The theoretical implications are fivefold. 
Firstly, the study identifies the theoretical frrnndation for and unique advantages of using 
protocol analysis as a means of evaluating the communication effectiveness of written 
narrative data instruments. Secondly, the results of the study confirm the findings of prior 
protocol studies that suggest that verbalisation is greatest where there are inconsistencies 
between the text and the reader's representation of the problem (e.g., Ericsson et al., 1993; 
Mao et al. 2000: Flower et al . 1983). Thirdly. such evidence together with the advantage of 
protocol analysis in capturing mental processing as it happens, provides support for the role 
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of protocol analysis in the developmental life-cycle of written data instruments (e.g. Mantci 
et al.. 1989). Fourthly. the study demonstrates that protocol analysis involves a systematic 
attempt to gather evidence on the research questilm. Fifthly. the results of the study provide 
preliminary qualitative evidence on issues of accountability and efficiency impacting the 
decision of whether to hire the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS. 
At the practical level. the results of the study indicate that protocol analysis is an 
appropriate method of inquiry in evaluating narrative case studies as data instruments. 
The limitations of the study, as mentioned earlier, arc addressed in the conclusion to the 
thesis (Chapter 8). 
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CHAPTER 7 
STUDY 2: 
AN EXPERll\1ENTAL STUDY OF THE THREAT OF SELF-INTEREST AND 
THE SAFEGllARDING ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS ON 
STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
AND \VILUNGNESS TO APPOINT THE INCUMBENT AUDIT FIRM 
7.0 CHAPTER CONTENT 
The purpose of this Chapter is to describe the experimental component of the thesis, i.e., 
Study 2. The experiment is designed to test the nine accountability hypotheses developed 
in Chapter 4. The study utilises a 2 x 2 experimental design. The two imlcpcndent variables 
arc: (I) a non-recurring (one-oft) or recurring NAS engagement: and (2) strong or weak 
corporate governance. Three dependent variables arc indudcd in the experimental design: 
(I) a dichotomous variable representing choice of NAS supplier (auditor or specialist finn): 
(2) strength of prctercnce for the incumbent auditor measured on a 7-point scak: and (3) 
perceptions of auditor independence measured on a 7-point scale. The hypotheses 
associated with the rdations between the sets of variables arc listed below. beginning with 
auditor independence: 
HI Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence will he lower 
when the NAS is recurring than when it is non-recurring. 
H;. Stakeholders will he less likel�· to choose the audit firm to proYide 
the NAS when the NAS is recurring than when it is non­
recurring. 
H., Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit firm will he 
lowtr when the N AS is recurring than when it is non-recurring. 
H-1 Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence n·ill he lower 
when the structural strength of the hoard of directors is weak 
than when it is strong. 
H5 Stak�holdcrs will he less likely to choose th<.' audit firm to provide 
the NAS when the structural strength of the hoard of directors is 
weak than when it is strong. 
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H6 Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit firm will be 
lower when the structural strength of the board of directors is 
weak than when it is strong. 
H1 Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence arc more likely 
to be affected by the recurring NAS when the structural strength 
of the board of directors is weak than when it is strong. 
H8 Stakeholder choice of the audit firm is more likely to be affected 
by the recurring NAS when the structural strength of the board 
of directors is weak than when it is strong. 
HIJ Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit firm is more 
likely to be affected by the recurring NAS when the structural 
strength of the board of directors is weak than when it is strong. 
The Chapter is organised in the following manner. The next section deals with the 
introduction to the study, which articulates the study with Study I. The remaining three 
sections of the Chapter deal solely with Study 2, specifically the research method, the 
results and the key findings and implications of the study. The limitations of the study are 
discussed in the fin:1 1 chapter of the thesis (Chapter 8). 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Study I represented a precursor to the experimental study. The purpose of Study I was to 
derive director insight into the issues of accountability and efficiency of interest to this 
thesis, which would act as a reader-based principle to be factored into the development of 
the experimental case studies. The results of Study I have been a si!:,Tflificant agent of 
change in that respect. However, the narrative nature and underlying theme of the 
experimental case studies is. of course, .::onsistent with that used in Study I. The theme is 
am:::hored by the research questions that arc at the heart of the thesis, and as with Study I, is 
intended to convey the following message: 
IR opportunity (the demand for an independent audit) is high. 
The threat to audit independence from self-interest (wealth incentives) 
emanating from recurring NAS is low (high). 
The strength of the board of directors is strong (weak). 
The distinguishing attributes of the prospective providers (incumbent audit 
finn; specialist NAS provider) hold differing implications for their 
respective capncity to add value. 
20[ 
The characters imbedded in the fixegoing description are preserved in the experimental 
case studies as is the overall corporate setting and the basis for the company's need for 
NAS. The changes to the text affected by the results of Study l are confined to 
strengthening the specification of the theme and the supporting co-context. However, 
before considering the general nature of the changes, it is important to note that Study 2, 
unlike the previous study, involves a single NAS, specifically, infonnation systems design 
and implementation. A single NAS was considered sufficient in the context of the demands 
of the overall thesis. 
The anomalies identified 111 Study l led to changes 111 the following areas of the case 
materials: 
(i) the logic and description associated with the events leading up to the 
auditor-versus-specialist decision choice; 
(ii) the strength of the manipulation of the threat of self-interest from 
recurring NAS; 
(iii) the description of the fees for existing services, including the audit; 
(iv) the strength of the wording associated with the separation of duties 
safeguard; and 
(v) the point at which the safeg•!ard is introduced to the reader. 
However, the specification of the current set of data instruments, including items (i), (iii) 
and (iv) above, has also been influenced by a second significant agent of change -
regulation. The changes to the r�gulation of the audit-NAS strategy in Australia, and 
elsewhere, described in Chapters 2 and 4 took place in the period that intervened between 
collecting the data for Study l and conducting Study 2. 
"';·he data for Study l was gathered in late 200 l and early 2002 - on the cusp of change in 
the regulation of auditor independence worldwide. The regulatory change was prompted 
by. inter a1w. the altered circumstances in the market for audit services described in 
Chapter 2. The speed of implementation and the evolution in the regulatory developments 
was subsequently driven by the events sunounding Enron and Arthur Andersen, and thf! 
ensuing spate of international financial scandals that were reported during 2002. The events 
precipitated the implementation of PF i by the Australian profession in March 2002. The 
role of PF I and, therefore. the profession in the regulation of the provision of NAS was 
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subsequently consolidated and complemented in Australia by the changes to corporations 
law which were impiemented in July 2004, and corporate governance best practice 
principles published by the ASX in March 2003. 
The data for Study 2 was collected in late 2004 and early 2005, i.e., after the 
implementation of the contemporary best practice - statutory approach to the regulation of 
the joint provision of the audit and NAS in Australia. The impact of the altered regulatory 
environment on the development of the present set of case studies was threefold. 
Firstly, the threat to auditor independence from self-interest (wealth incentives) in this 
study, as mentioned earlier, attaches to the provision of information systems desi!:,>n and 
implementation to the client. The service falls within the ambit of the list of NAS that PF I 
prohibits an auditor from providing to the audit client in the absence of certain safeguards, 
i.e., in the absence of accountability. The basis for the prohibition rests with the threat of 
self-review. The present set of case studies, unlike those used in Study I, expressly 
incorporates the regulatory safeguards. The inclusion of the safeguards has the flow-on 
effect of introducing an additional character to the case studies - an information technology 
manager. The specific nature of the threat and the safeguards are dealt with in section 7.2.1. 
The second major regulatory impact on the development of the experimental case studies 
emanated from the best practice - statutory regulatory framework that vests directors with 
the overriding responsibility for corporate policy with respect to the demand for the joint 
provision of the audit and NAS by publicly listed companies. The regulation, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, renders directors independence decision-makers and the decision process 
subject to the following basic tenet which highlights the cost-benefit nature of the decision 
choice: 
Independence decision-makers should conclude that the benefits of 
reduced independence risk from appl�·ing s�fcguards exceed their costs 
(ISB, 200 L section 31 ). 
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The cost-benefit issue is factored into the present set of case studies by nominating the 
company's policy with respect to hiring professional service providers. The policy reads as 
follows: 
Ba11din Lid's policy for choosing professional service provid.!rs ce11tres 011 a 
provider ·s superior capaci(v to add val11e. subject to meeting the 
cv1poratio11 's_fi11a11cial and other legal and contractual obligations. 
Director responsibility for accountability also prompted a further change to the case studies 
with respect to the events leading up to the decision choice. In Study I, the audit firm, 
along with two other potential NAS providers were approached by senior management to 
submit proposals for the provision of the NAS. However, the present regulatory 
environment, together with the company's policy for choosing professional service 
providers suggests that the issue of auditor independence ought to be considered prio� to 
making a direct approach to the incumbent. This issue is addressed in the case studies by 
the following passage, which introduces a second additional character to the narrative - a 
facility manager, who is vested with the responsibility of researching the market. 
771e company ·s facility manager was appointed to tl10ro11gh(v research 
potential providers. Kc:v search criteria included reputation for excellence i11 
the type o.f service sought and expertise i11 the industry in which Ba11di11 Lid 
operates. 
The search pnJL·css has identified two leading co11te11ders: 
• the IT co11s11/tancy division o.f the company ·s external audit.firm. and 
o a specialist IT co11s11/tam�v.firm. 
The third major regulatory impact on the development of the case studies concerns the 
specification of the cues associated with the strength of the treatment dealing with the 
board of directors. The wording of the cues were strengthened relative to Study I in line 
with best-practice developments that have taken place since that time, with particular 
reference to the strong form of the board of directors. Thus. the gap between the strong 
and weak forms of the hoard has possibly widened in the present study, relative to Study I. 
However, unlike Study I, the ratio of executive to non-executive directors in the present 
study is the same for both treatments (two to eight, respectively). Thus, the independence 
of the board from management in the present study rests with the dominance of the CEO -
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as Chainnan of the Board, and having sign(/icr•,tt input illto the nomi11atio11 of members to 
the Board - and the possible presence of business and or employment relationships 
between the company and the non-executive members. The change in composition was 
prompted by the interest in heightening the role of the CEO in defining the independence 
of the board. That interest was, in tum, prompted by claims made in the wash-out post­
Enron that the number of insiders on a board does not define board independence but the 
social dynamics of a board, and the CEO has a critical role to play in that respect (e.g., 
Sonnenfeld. 2002). 
Finally, heightened sensitivity to the joint prov1s1on of the audit and NAS within the 
market for audit services, outlined in Chapter 2, has also had a moderating effect on the 
case studies with respect to the nature and the size of the fee for taxation services currently 
provided by the incumbent audit firm to the audit client; and the audit fee. The descriptive 
detail is identified in section 7 .2.3.1. 
Before moving on to the research method employed in the present study, it is appropriate at 
this juncture to point out that, unlike Study I, the stakeholders involved in the present study 
are shareholders. The task is of course atypical for shareholders as shareholders, per se. 
However, placing the shareholders in the context of the decision choice goes some way 
towards creating the loss function that commentators such as Craswell ( 1999) lament is 
absent from survey-based user perception studies. Similarly, the decision context also goes 
some way towards casting the shareholder in the role of the "informed third party" referred 
to in the professional definition of independence in appearance, and, similarly, the statutory 
general standard of auditor independence, described in f:hapter 2. 
Participant commitment to the task is sought by the following passage which is included in 
the introduction to the case studies addressed to the individuals: 
We appreciate that individuals {_l'pica/ly make the foregoing t_vpes of 
decisions in their capacity as managers or directors. not shareholders. 
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However. the views of shareholders 011 the issues involved are importam. 
11111s. we ask that you complete the project from the perspective of a 
shareholder C?f Baudin Ltd. 
7.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
The description of the method associated with Study 2 addrcsse'i the following dimensions 
of the research: the task, the case scenario, the independent and dependent variables, the 
post-experimental questionnaire, demographic information, the participants and the 
manipulation check. The discussion of the demographic infonnation and the manipulation 
check is supported by the results of the data obtained from the experiment. 
7.2.1 Task 
The experimental task requires participants to review a three-page case study involving an 
Australian publicly listed company whose management has decided to seek the services of 
a professional consultant in undertaking the re-configuration of its existing computer 
software. The re-configuration involves integrating the company's accounting function 
with other major functions. A copy of the full set of case studies is provided in Appendix 
E. 
Each case study is preceded by an introductory page which describes the overall nature of 
the task to the participants. A copy of the introduction is provided in Appendix F. 
The research design that underpins the case studies involves a 2 x 2. between-subject, full 
factorial design. The four sets of information (case studies) are identical except for the 
manipulation of the independent variables. Each participant received only one of the four 
sets of infonnation. so it is unlikely that they would have been able to detennine the exact 
nature of the manipulations. 
After reviewing the case study materials. participants were asked to make the following 
decisions. in the order shown: 
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e indicate whom they would choose to provide the service; 
• rate the strength of their preference for the alternative providers; and 
• rate the likelihood that the external audit of the company's financial 
report would be unbiased. 
The latter judgement represents an addition to the present set of case studies vis-a-vis those 
used in Study I. 
·1 he participants are also asked to provide responses to a number of factors that comprise a 
post-experimental questionnaire. The details of the questionnaire are discussed in section 
7.2.5. 
7.2.2 Case Scenario 
The company was described as a manufacturer of chemical products for use m mining, 
agriculture, industry and the consumer sector, for sale domestically and overseas. The 
background infonnation included a description of the age, size, and ownership structure of 
the company. The fonn of remuneration of senior management was also provided, as was 
the rationale for seeking the NAS, as per the following excerpts from the case studies: 
Ba11di11 Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years 
experience with the organisation. The curre11t senior executive 
remuneration plan includes fixed and bonus components. The fixed 
component comprises a salary, superannuation contributions. and vehicle 
related benefits. The bo1111s components include an annual cash incentive 
bo1111s, payable on the achievemellf o( c01porate 1�ro.fi.·ability targets, and 
equi(v-based remuneration. 
Baudin Ltd experienced a modest growth in profit before tax in the five 
years to !he 30 J1111e 2004. notwithstarding the highly competitive 11ature of 
the industry. Senior management believes that sign(ficant efficiencies can be 
achieved in the f11ture through adapting the company's existing computer 
sofiware to integrate the company's accounting fimction with other major 
fi111ctions such as materials acquisition. production and human resources. 
71,e adaptation will sign(fica11t(,· reduce i11formatio11 processing and 
updating, leading to improved internal decision making. and, ultimately, 
improved.financial pe,formance. 
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The decision choice centres on whether the service provider should be hired from the 
incumbent audit finn, or the specialist IT consultancy firm. 
Information systems design and implementation is one of the list of nine prohibited NAS in 
the US. The provision of the service by t!ie auditor in Australia is allowed, however, 
subject to the provisions of PF I. The regulation provides that the threat from self-review 
"is likely to be too significant to allow the provision of such services to an audit client 
unless appropriate safeguards are put in place" ( PF I, 2. 98). The safeguards, identified in 
Figure 26, reflect an overwhelming concern for the threat from making management 
decisions. 
FIGURE 26: Safeguards designed to mitigate the threat to auditor independence I 
from making executive decisions associated with the provision of IT 
svstems services 
2.98 The self-review threat is likely to be too si!,'llilicant to allow the provision of such 
services to an a11dit clie11t unless appropriate safeguards are put in place ensuring 
that: 
(a) the a11dit clie111 acknowledges its responsibility for establishing and monitoring a 
system of internal controls, 
(b) the a11dit c:lient designates a competent employee, preferably within senior 
management. with the responsibility to make aH management decisions with respect 
to the design and implementation of the hardware or software system; 
le) the a11di1 client makes all management decisions with respect to the design and 
implementation process: 
(d) the a11di1 client evaluates the adequacy and results of the desi&rn and implementation 
of the system; and 
(e) the a11dir dienr is responsible for the operation of the system (hardware or software) 
and the data used or generated by the system. 
Source: PF I. 2 98 
The threat from pcrfonning management functions is negated in the present study by 
expressly building the sateguards into the research instruments, as evidenced by the 
following excerpt from the case studies: 
. . . the contract for the service will clear�r de.fine the overriding 
responsibility of Baudin ·s ma11ageme111 for establishing. maintaining. 
operating and evaluating the IT system. and the censultative role of the 
service ,?rovider. Baudin 's i1!formation technology manager will be 
appointed as the project manager. 
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However. PF I goes on to state that: 
(c)onsideration should also be given to whether such (NAS) should be 
provided only by personnel not involved in the audit engagement and with 
different reporting lines with the.firm (PF I, 2.99). 
To that end, separation of duties is also employed in the present study via the use of a 
Chinese wall between the provision of the N AS and the audit services. The results of prior 
experimental studies, suggest that separation of duties has a positive effect on user 
perception of auditor independence (Geiger et al., 2002: Lowe et al., 1999; and Swanger et 
al., 200 I). The safeguard is operationalised in the case studies via the following passage: 
The IT cons11/ta11cy and audit divisio11s are separate�\' sta_ffed and have 
separa/e reporti11g lines. headed by separate partners - reflecti11g the 
division of responsibili(l' for the respective services. Thus. the IT division 
wouf.l be solely respo11sible.for carrying out the project. 
Implementing separation of duties as a safeguard of self-review raises the question of the 
level at which the threat of self-interest (wealth incentives) lies, e.g., the lead auditor, 
responsible partner or audit finn. The foregoing description, taken at face value, would 
suggest that the threat lies at the audit firn1 level. However, the impact of the variable 
ultimately relics on the remuneration structure of the stakeholders involved (Arrunada, 
1999). Consideration was given to expressly controlling for the variable in the case studies 
at hand. However, doing so would have added to the demands of the task. Further, the lack 
of detail did not inhibit the decision-making process of the participants involved in Study 1, 
which included the separation of duties principle. Therefore, the decision was made to omit 
the detail. 
7.2.3 Independent variables 
The independent variables are recurring NAS and the strength of the board of directors, 
each of which was manipulated at two levels. 
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7.2.3.1 Recurring (non-recurring) NAS 
The threat of self-interest is manipulated from the perspe..:tivc of the continuity of fees for 
the NAS. The NAS variable states where the NAS is non-recurring that the provider of the 
IT service will be responsible for the both the design and implementation of the adaptation, 
for an estimated lump sum of $900,000. The relevdnt passages of the case studies read as 
follows: 
Havi11g.first developed n clear de.fin it ion of the problem. senior management 
chose to 0111source the wsk. The provider of the i11formatio11 technology (IT) 
service will be responsible for both the design and impleme11tatio11 of !he 
adaptation. 
Baudin ·s facility manager considers that the .firm ·s price for the (vpe of IT 
service sought would be arou11d $900.000. 
Where the NAS is recurring, it is stated that the successful contender will also be 
responsible for monitoring and upgrading, if necessary, the design and configuration of the 
software for a period of three years, with the option to renew at the end of that period at the 
discretion of company management. The estimated price for the subsequent stage is 
$150,000 per year. The relevant passages of the case studies are as follows: 
Having.first developed a clear d�fi11itio11 of the problem. senior ma11ageme11t 
chose to outso111 ce the task. The provider of the i11formation technology (IT) 
service will be responsible .for both the design a11d implementation of the 
adaptation. The success.fit! collle11der will also be responsible for mo11itori11g 
and upgrading. ({ necessary. the design and co11figuration of the soiware for 
a period o.{three years. with the option to renew at the end o_{that period at 
the discretion o_{Baudi11 Ltd. 
Baiuli11 's facility manager considers that the firm ·s price for the type of IT 
service sought would be around $900. 000 for the initial stage of the service 
and $150. 000 per year/or thl' s11bseq11e11t stage. 
However, it is also stated, as part of the co-context of the case studies that the audit finn 
current I y provides 011-going taxation services to the company . .for . . .  an an1111al fee o_f 
around $300,000. The fee, together with the a111111al fee .for the audit o_( . . .  around 
$2.200,00 represents J'1,, , r1f the average a1111ual revenue o( the local (Sydney) of ice of the 
cwdit .firm. Thus, the existing ratio of NAS to audit fees is low (O. l 4: I); as is the ratio of 
total client fees to total finn revenue (0.03: I). The audit finn 's proximity to management is 
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also minimised by stating that the taxation services involve some planning. but are 
predomi11a11t�r concerned with ensuring rcgulat01:l' compliance; and the (Big 4 audit) firm 
has audited Ba11di11 Ltd's .fi11a11cial statements for .four years vis-a-vis the regulatory five 
year rotation of the lead engagement (audit review) partner for listed entities (PF I. 2.63). 
7.2.3.2 Strength of board of directors 
The safeguarding role of the board is manipulated at two levels: strong and weak. Strength 
is manipulated in the first instance with respect to the independence of the board of 
directors, including the audit committee, from management (CEO); and, subsequently in 
relation to attributes of the audit committee, per se. The independence of the audit 
committee vis-a-vis management is embedded in the DeZoort et al. (2002) ACE element 
authority. The strength of the autlwrit y of the audit committee is also manipulated via the 
description of the committee's duties and responsibilities. The monitoring strength of the 
committee also extends to the remaining DeZoort et al. (2002) elements of competence, 
resources and di/ igence. 
The manipulation of the monitoring strength of the board of directors (strong:weak) is 
embodied in the explicit text which appears in Table 30. The descriptive passages are 
classified, in the lett-hand column, using the DcZoort et al. (2002) taxonomy: composition, 
authority (including the independence of the board from management), resources and 
diligence. 
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TABLE 30: Manipulation of the strength of the board of directors - Study 2 
Criteria 
Independence 
or the bourd 
(committee) 
from 
murrngemcnt 
C'on1position of 
1hc audit 
rummittcc 
Authority or the 
audit commillc,· 
Stron� treatment 
A h!n-mcmhcr Board of Director... comprised of two 
csc'Cutivc mcmhc-r,,, mcludmg the comp.iny', Chief 
Fxc-cutivc Otliccr, and eight nnn-c.,c'CUtivc member... 
gtwcn1� the: Cl�lllpany ·111c c·halnnan of the 13o;ud 1� a 
non-cXL"l'.Utl'\'t." Jirc...:101 \1.·1th cx:tcnsi\'c cxpcn..:ncc m 
the industry 
11,c Board " assisted m the J1sch;ir!_!e or ,is JutiL'S hy 
a numh'-�1 \lf suh-cmnm11tcc�. all of v.,hom au: 
\\'cak treatment -------i 
A tc11-mcmhc1 Board of Dirc-ctm,. cnmprisc-<l of two 
en-cut1vc member... mdudin!_! the company's Chief 
l:xc..:uti,·e Olliccr. and eight non-cxc'CUIIVC i:icmhc.-,. 
gJivt'lTI� th� i.:ompany 
li,c Ch,cf l'xwutivc Ollicer. who has cxlc-nsrvc 
expcnence m the industry. is rite Chairman of the Board 
lltc l 'ha1nnan h�L" signilicant inpul into lhl" nomination 
of member.. to rhc B,,ard. Hie Board is as�isted in the 
accnunt;1hle lo the Board. Ilic nominaunn of member.. discharge of 11s duties hy a numhc'f ,,f suh-commiuecs, all 
to the Board is rhe rc-sponsihility of a Nonunaliom of whom arc aecountahle 1,, the Board 
( ·\,mmiucc. \\thich 1s c,11nnnscd of three non-
cx1..-cuhvc dm .. �lors. 
B;mtlm Ltd h,L, ncv.:r employc-d the non-.:xix:utive 
momhers nr the Board, except in their position a_, 
D1rc-clnrs of the e<>mpany. Further. ncithc-r they nor 
any or their rc-spccuvc family mcmhc-rs arc related 10 
Baudin', management or have any financial dealing., 
(ff ntlu:r contractual ammgcmcnts with lhl" 
corporJllon. 
An Audil Conuninee. rc!_!ulated hy a fonnal wrillcn 
charter adopted and approved hy the Board. a_ssrsts the 
n�)ard m the ex1..'Cution of it\ accounting and auditing. 
rcsponsib1l111cs llte three-member Autlit Connniltec 
1!-. c.:ompn!-icd of non-�XL-cu11,·c Llircclor.,. all of whom 
arc linancially lileratc Two of lhc Comm1ttcc 
members. mc 1 · '.:,1g the Chair or the t ·onunittce. hole! 
st.."T11or Auslrnlian profc....;!-iinnal a-ccounung 
quahlicauons 
n,c role of the Audi! ( 'mnmillee is as follow, 
to advise on the l""Stahlishnwnt and maintenance 
of a t'rJlllC\\·ork of intcnlal �ontrnl and 
appruprlalt· ethical standards for thi: nianagcmcnt 
of 1hc company lliu,. it ;Lssists 1he Board 111 
fullilhng 1t, «-,spon.,1h1li1ies for lhc quality and 
rehah1hty ,,r tinancial mfonnatmn. mdudmg 
reporting in financial statements. 
tn monitor the 1nan�1gcrrn:nt of 1<..Jcnt1ficd n\J..\. 
td1,."ntify any OC\I,: risk� ;md rccrnnmcn<l acuon to 
he taken li,r their contn>I. 
tu hc mvulvL"<.t \\'lth the antcmal au<l1h)rs m 
plannmg the annual aud11 program. and 
n.·\·1cwmg 1he prog-rnm at \'ariom, mtervab 
lhrnughout the year. 
4 lo n:v1C\\ the Sr.:'Ofll' of tlu: cxtl·nml audit. and [o 
rc\·11.·"' lindmg.s and issues hrnug.ht to at� 
allc111n,n mdudmg thost· prov1dc-d by the external 
aud1h1r, 
5 hl pro\"1dc o\'cr�1ght and 1.:ommunu:at1on rcg.an.Jmg 
the prt,\'1�HH1 of non�audit �1..·rv1ce� hy lhl· 
e,tt:n1al aud1h)r. mi.:ludmg m;1Ucrs that m1gh1 
n.:a:,,orrnhly he lhoug.hl to hcar on mdL1ll."IH.k"tlcc. 
and 
(l h, rC\'ll'\I, thl• appoullmcnt and n:mu11cr.U 1nn of 
the e,1cn1al auditor 
An Audit Commillee. regulated hy a fonnal written 
charter adopted and appmv<-<l hy the Board. a;sisls lhc 
Bnard in 1hr c.\c..-cutinn of its accountmg and auditing 
rcsponsihiht1c-s The thr.-c-mcmhcr Audit Committee is 
cmnpn1,.c.:d of (\\"() mm-cxL"CUlivr d1rL-cll,r.:. and one 
cxt...-cut1vv dirL-ctnr. \,rho chajrs the C'nmmittcc..• l11t:­
c...·�L"CUtl\'C: JirL"Ctor hnlds a st:nu.,r Auscrnlian profCS!-.1t.mal 
accountmg qualitication Ilic linanc,;11 litcrJcy of the 
non-cx.t.."CUl1vc: directors is minlnial 
The role of thl' Audit ( 'rnnminec "' ,l, follows 
tu adv1st: llll the: t>stahlishmcnt and 
ma101cnancc of a fr.unev.·,lrJ... Llf internal 
control Thu,. It a""t' the lloa1d in 
fullilhng it, rc-,,pons1hli,tic, tiir thl' quality 
and rd,ahihty of fr1anc1al mfonna11on. 
rnclu<lmg. rt..71ortmg m inanc1al �tah:1m:nL,. 
lo Tl"VIL'"W is�UL'"S hrough' to 1L, alh:nlmn. and 
In rcv1t:w the ;ippomtmcnt and n:mum .. ·r..itmn 
of thL' cx.tenlal auditor 
�- -- ---t---------- -,-- ------,--------+------ - --- --------------
Rcsourc� nnd I he < 
·l11rnmtlc:t• h;i:-. the.> authllflty ltl invcst1gatl.' an� lhe ( ·ilUUn1llcl.' mccl$ oncL"" c,·cry tl1ur months [ he 
diliJ?cnre of the 111.attc� \v1thm It!',. tcnn, of rcforcm:c. the rt�ourcc:,, 11 mtcn1al and cxh:n1al audito� an: 1nvitcd to meetings. al 
audil rommillcc th:c...xh. lo do 'ill �1t1d ha!-- full �u:cc:r.'.\ to mfonnatmn the <l1�i.:rc.:lHHl nf the Committee tlic Committee n .. ·port� 
Ille ( 'onumttcl• mcch wllh the c,h.."fllal and 111tcmal 
auditors and �cn1or 1nanagcmcnt to review the half 
yc..lfly and annual financial statements and report!'!. 
and al !-.uch llChcr tune:-. a!'! 1:-,,, nt"Ccssary 10 com,1dcr 
spt.."l.'.'1fiL- ,��uc:, or maucr� that 1nay ansc from the 
111tcm;,I and c,temal audit pmec". Ilic cxtc'Tltal and 
mtcn,al authtor.-. have: d1n..�1 accc,� tn thl· ( 'ommitlC'l', 
1f nt"Cl"ssary. without manag.:mcnl mvolvcment ·inc: 
( ·mrnmlh:c n.:pnn, to thL· Board after c..nch ( ·lHnm1llrc 
nu:ctmg. 
to the Board ath:r t...:1ch { · ommtttcc mcc:ling. 
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7.2.4 Dependent variables 
There are in effect four dependent variables. The first variable is concerned with 
shareholder perception of auditor independence. The second variable concerns the choice 
of provider - audit tinn versus specialist fim1. The third and fourth variables involve the 
participants' strength of preference for the respective providers - the audit and specialist 
tinn. However. unlike the first three variables. the latter variable (strength of preference for 
the specialist fim1) is not the subject of the hypotheses. Thus, the variable is included in the 
ancillary analyses, rather than the analyses associated with the main experiment. 
7.2.4.1 Auditor independence 
The participants arc asked to rate the likelihood that the external audit of the company's 
financial report would be unbiased. taking into consideration the provision of the IT service 
by the audit tinn. using a seven point scale. The following descriptors anchor the scale: 
low. moderate and high. 
The auditor independence question follows the two questions associated with willingness 
to appoim in the case studies to avoid the problem of demand effects. Further, there is no 
reference to auditor independence in the text that comprises the introduction to the case 
studies and the case studies. per se. lc.H the same reason. 
7.2.4.2 \Villingncss-to-appoint the incumbent auditor to perform NAS 
Stakeholder pem.:ption of shareholder willingness-to-appoint the incumbent audit finn to 
perfi.mn NAS is examined hy utilising two dependent measures: the choice of NAS 
provider, and the strength of preference for the alternative providers. 
The questions associated with the respective judgements read as follows: 
Whom would you chose to provide the IT service'? 
( Indicate \\1ur answer hy ticking (./)ONE of the alternatives.) 
Audit f:nn Specialist !inn 
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2. Whal is the strength of your preference for thi..: alternative providers'? 
(Please circle a number for each provider.) 
I Audit firm: 3 4 5 6 7 
weak L.___----�---�-- moderate strong 
·-�· 
Specialist 
Finn: I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
weak moderate strong 
A copy of questions I and 2 is provided in Appendix G. 
A summary of the research design including the identification of the four !:,'Toups is 
provided in Table 31. The coding for the groups used in the statistical analysis of the 
empirical data appear� in parentheses. The respective codes consist of the group number 
and a truncated form of the name and level of the treatments involved. 
,E 31: Summary of research design - Studv 2 
(__ 
FEES (NAS) 
Board of J Non-recurring Recurring 
Directors , \ --....---------
Strong Group l I Group 2 ( J ,1roni:hod:11011-rec) ( 2�1roni:bod:rec) 
f-
Weak Group3� 
Group 4 
(J,..cakbod:non-rcc) ( 4,. cakhod:rec) 
1 
I 
It is hypothesisi..:d that participants' perceptions of auditor independence and stren!:,'1h of 
preference lt)r the audit fim1 will be lower and that the participants will be less likely to 
chC' .lse the audit fim1 when the NAS is recurring and the strength of the hoard of directors 
is weak. 
7.2.5 Post-experimental questionnaire 
The post-experimental questionnaire consists of two sets of questions. The first set of 
question asks the pm1icipants to rate their perception of seven attributes of the case study, 
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using a 7-point scale. The following descriptors anchor the scales: weak, moderate and 
strong. 
Two of the seven attributes concern the manipulation checks associated with the two 
treatments and arc described in section 7.2.8. 
Four of the remaining five factors comprise the following dimensions of the independent 
variable strength o_fboard o.f directors. 
• The degree of independence of the Board of Directors from management. 
o The degree of independence of the Audit Committee from management. 
• The adequacy of the duties and authority of the Audit Committee. 
o The financial expertise of the Audit Committee. 
The fifth factor concerns the net benefits of hiring the IT division of the audit finn to 
provide the IT service. The factors were rotated through the case studies to avoid the 
problem of order effects. 
A copy of the questions is provided in Appendix G. 
The second set of post-experimental questions asks the participants to indicate the extent to 
which seven factors influenced their choice of preferred NAS provider on a 7-point scale. 
The following descriptors anchor the scales: no influence, moderate influence and 
significant influence. The list of factors is as fi.)llows: 
• Attributes of Baudin Ltd: listed public company: diversification of the 
shareholder base; and absence of a dominant shareholding. 
o Safeguards of the independence of their preferred provider over the alternative 
provider. 
• Competition in the market for professional non-audit services. 
o Acccountability to shareholders. 
o Accountability to other stakeholders. 
215 
The factors were rotated through the case studies to avoid the problem of order t:ffects. 
The question concludes with an open-ended component, titled additional com111e11ts. A 
copy of the question is provided in Appendix G. 
7 .2.6 Demographic information 
The overall task concludes by asking the participants to provide demographic information 
concerning the following attributes: 
o Principal place (state/territory) of residence. 
o Thr. rnuntry m which his/her post-secondary studies (if applicable) were 
com1jleted. 
• �ature of shareholding (direct. indirect or both). 
o Extent of knowledge of the governance of corporations. 
o Post-secondary educational and/or trade or professional 
qualifications/training. 
The direct versus indirect shareholding classification 1s defined m the data sheet in the 
following manner: 
o A direct shareholding refers lo the situation where shares arc held directly 
in a company/companies. 
e An indirect shareholding, on the other hand. arises where shares are held 
via a managed fund or personal superannuation plan that invests wholly 
or partly in shares. 
A copy of the demographic data sheet is provided in Appendix 1-1. 
7.2. 7 Participants 
The participants wefl.' sc:lcctcd from a private Australiu-wide data base of shareholders. The 
data base consists of the clients and associates of the chief executive officer of a business 
involved in eXPcutive training. Research instruments were mailed to 115 shareholders, with 
random assignment to the four scenarios examined. The case materials were accompanied 
by a standardised covering letter that was written to meet the specifications of the Ethics 
Committee of the university ut which the researcher is enrolled as a student. 
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A total of 88 case studies were returned in the mail. Eighty three responses were useable. 
Four of the remaining five participants' responses were eliminated on the basis that the 
participants failed the manipulation of the strength of the board of directors. The four 
participants rated the overall standard of the weak bonrd of directors at 5 or above. i.e., as 
strong fonn. Such a result is inconsistent with the case material, best-practice criteria, the 
findings of audit committee effectiveness literature (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2002) and the 
results of Study I; and suggests that the participants may not have attended to the cues 
(Pany ct al., 1987). The fifth instrument was blank. The 83 usable responses represented a 
72% response rate. The 83 responses gave rise to a cell count across groups l to 4 of 21, 
22, 20 and 20, respectively. 
Table 32 summarises the statistics associated with the demographic characteristics of the 
respondents with respect to their level of education and governance knowledge. The 
respondents are highly educated, 87% have at least a bachelor's degree and 43% hold post­
graduate degrees. Forty eight percent of the participants rated their knowledge of corporate 
governance at 5 or higher. on a nine-point scale. The mean score for the knowledge 
variable was 4.83. 
TABLE 32: Demographic characteristics of participants bv group 
Group I Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Total 
Treatments 
Smml! hoard 11f ',tn•ng hoard of Weak ho.ird of WL-ak hoard of 
dirt."'CltffS lhn .. '1:lor-. dirl-Clllr.;. dir�-ctor, n/a 
Non-rLX fol' Re'\: fee· Non-rL'I..'. fee RL-c fee 
Cell size 21 I 22 20 20 83 
Degree 
None .=r s% I 18% 10% 20% 13.3% 
Undergraduate I 95% 82% 90% 80% 86.7% 
Post�r aduate 43% 50% 40% 40% 43.4% 
Governance knowledge 
Mean I 4.67 5.18 4.60 4.85 4.83 Standard deviation l.80 1.84 2.06 1.69 I.SJ 
The data in Table 33 summarises the chi-square tests of significant difference between the 
four groups on the basis of whether the individuals hold an undergraduate or post-graduate 
degree. respectively. The significance value at the undergraduate level is .430, the post­
graduate level .901. Thus, it can be concluded that the groups do not differ on the basis of 
tertiary education. However, as footnote (a) in Table 33 states, four cells have an expected 
count of less than 5. The cells concern the individuals who do not hold an undergraduate 
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degree. Thus the chi-square assumption concerning the minimum expected cell frequency 
has been violated. The assumption is not, however, violated at the post-graduate level (see 
footnote (b) in the table). 
[} ABLE 33: Chi-s
r
arc tests for level of education 
·-
Post�raduate de}.,>ree Undergraduate degree 
Asymp. Sig. Asymp. Sig. 
Value dt' (2:sidcd) Value df (2-sidcd) 
Pearson Chi-sguarc 2.758" 3 .430 .581{; 3 .901 
Likelihood Ratio 3.012 3 .390 .579 3 .901 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.229 I .268 .144 l .705 
No of Valid Cases 83 83 
a. 4 cells (50.0%) have an expected count less than 5. The b. 0 cells (.0%) have an expected count less 
minimum expected count is 2.65. than 5. The minimum expected count is less 
than 8.67. 
A one-way between-groups ANOV A reveals that there is no significance difference 
between the mean governance knowledge scores for the four groups [F(3, 79)=.422, 
p==.738]. Levene's test for homogeneity of variances between the four b>roups with respect 
to the governance knowledge variable shows a value greater than .05 (LS(3, 79)==.536, 
p=.659], thus supporting the assumption of equality of variance. 
Figure 27 shows the distribution of the participants by state (territory} of residence. Fifty 
four percent of the participants reside in Western Australia the remainder are distributed 
across the eastern states ( territories). The thn:e largest representations of the eastern states 
were Victoria at 14.5%: New South Wales, 13.3% and Queensland, 8.4% The only state 
(territory) not represented was Tasmania. 
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FIGURE 27: Distribution of participants by state (territory) of residence 
The majority of the participants - 59% - hold both direct and indirect shareholdings, 
whilst 26.5% hold direct shareholdings only. The remaining 14.5% of the participants 
hold indirect shareholdings only. 
7.2.8 Manipulation Checks 
Insignificant results may occur in between-subjects designs due to lack of statistically 
significant effects (Pany et al., 1987). Thus, participants were asked to rate their 
perception of the strength of the threat to audit independence from the fees for the IT 
service, and the overall standard of the company's governance framework, after they 
have completed the dependent measures. Seven-point rating scales are involved. The 
following descriptors anchor the scales: weak, moderate and strong. The results of the 
manipulation checks are as follows: 
7.2.8.1 Threat of self-interest 
The manipulation check associated with the threat to auditor independence from the 
continuity of fees (recurring or non-recurring NAS) was invoked by asking the 
participants to rate their perception of the following attribute of the case study: 
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The threat to audit 
independence from the 
fees for the IT service: 
weak 
2 3 4 
moderate 
5 6 7 
strong 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the self-interest threat for the 
non-recurring and recurring groups. The mean score for the non-recurring !:,JfOUp was 4.29 
( 1.270); and the recurring group 4.45 ( 1.273 ). There was no significant difference in scores 
between the groups - t(8 l )=-.572, p.=.569. 
Levenc's test of equality of error variance showed a significance value greater than .OS 
[F(8 l )=.017, p.=.898] thus supporting the assumption of equality of variances. 
7 .2.8.2 Strrngth of board of directors 
The manipulation check associated with the strength of the board of directors was invoked 
by asking the participants to rate their perception of the following attribute of the case 
study: 
The overall standard of 
the company's 
governance framework: 
weak 
2 3 4 
moderate 
5 6 7 
strong 
An independent-samples I-test was conducted to compare the means for the strong and 
weak fonns of the governance framework. The mean score for the strong form of the 
framework was 5.70 (.638); and the weak group 2.75 (.670). There was a significant 
difference in the scores between the groups: t(8 l )=20.540, p.=.000. 
Lcvene's test of equality of error variance showed a significance value greater than .05 
[F(81 )=.061, p.=.805] thus supporting the assumption of equality of variances. 
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The overall results of the manipulation checks indicate a significant effect on stakeholder 
judgement from the manipulation of the strength of the board of directors but not the 
recurcing NAS variable. The recurring NAS variable was, again, operationalised via the 
following description: 
71ie s,, .. cess(ul contender will also be responsible for monitoring and 
upgrading. i( 11ecessa1:1·. the design and co1ifiguratio11 of the software for a 
period of three years. with the option to renew at the end of that period at 
the discreii{III of Baud in Ltd. 
The S 150,000 per annum monitoring fee for three years, with the option to renew at the 
end of that period at the discretion of Baudin Ltd, may not have been perceived by the 
stakeholders as a sutlicient incentive to assume heightened IR, relative to the total revenue 
generated by the Sydney office. 
7.3 RESULTS OF THE MAIN EXPERIMENT 
Levene's test of equality of error variance was undertaken for each of the dependent 
measures. The significance level for each of the three variables, as Table 34 shows, is less 
than .05. rejecting the assumption of equality of variance. 
I TABLE 34: Levene's Test of Equalit\' of Error Variances - dependent variables 
Dependent variable F dfl df2 Sig. 
Auditor independence l 7.285 3 79 .000 
Choose auditor 41.050 3 79 .000 
�trength of �reference for auditor 3.277 3 79 .025 
A two-way A NOVA using both the recurring NAS and strength of the board of directors 
variables. was used for each dependent measure. A summary of the task stimulus, 
hypotheses, treatment means and ANOV A results for each of the dependent variables 
follows, beginning with auditor independence. 
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7.3.1 Auditor independence 
The task stimulus associated with auditor independence asked the participant to rate his/her 
perception of auditor independence using the following descriptor and scale. 
Thr likrlihuod !hat 1hr l'\tcrnnl audil 
o{ the company's lin:rncinl report 
\\uuld hr unhiasl·d. lnkinJ! into 
cunsidrrntion the pro\·isinn of the IT 
srn·irr hy the qudit firm: .I � 
modcrntc 
The hypotheses associated with auditor independence are as follows: 
Main effects 
6 
H I Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence will be lower when 
the N AS is recurring than when it is non-recurring. 
H.i Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence will be lower when 
the structural strength of the board of directors is weak than when it is 
strong. 
fllteractio11 
H7 Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence are more likely to be 
afll!cted by the recurring NAS when the structurai strength of the 
board of directors is weak than when it is strong. 
7 
high 
The descriptive statistics relating to participant perception of auditor independence are 
provided in Table 35. The m .. i score for Group I is 4.48 (I 60); Group 2, 4.73 (1.39); 
Group 3. 4.25 (.71): and Group 4. 3.25 (.85). 
TABLE 35: Descriptive statistics for auditor independence 
FEES (NA.-,) 
Board of 
Directors Non-recurring Recurring 
Group 1 Group 2 
Strong I 4.48 4.73 
1 ( 1.60) ( 1.39) Group 3 Group 4 Weak 4.25 3.25 
I (.72) ( .85) 
I =low independence 
7= high independence 
The mean scores. with the exception of Group 2 (M=4.73 ( 1.39)) relative to Group 
( M=4.48 ( 1.60)). are in the hypothesised direction i.e .. descending order. The Group 
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mean of 4.48 ( 1.60) is higher than the Group 3 mean of 4.25 (. 72), which is higher than the 
Group 4 mean of 3.25 (.85). 
Table 36 presents the ANOVA results for auditor independence based on the above means. 
The data indicates that participants' perceptions of auditor independence were significantly 
affected by the strength of the board of directors {F( I, 79)= I 0.315, p.=.00 I], whereas the 
recurrency of the NAS {F( 1,79)= 1.994] was only marginally significant at p=.081. The data 
in Table 36 also shows a significant interaction effect {F( I, 79)=5.564, p.=.O IO] between the 
treatments. Thus, the results support H.i and H 1 and marginally support H 1• 
TABLE 36: ANOV A for auditor independence 
Soun.::c 
Corrected model 
Intercept 
Strength BnD 
lh.-c foe 
StrcngBoD*rccti..-c 
Error 
Total 
Corrected Total 
I ypc Ill 
Su,n of 
25.8146h 
145.074 
15.029 
2.905 
8.107 
115.102 
1600.000 
140.916 
a. Computed usmg alphu = .05 
df Mean 
S<iu:irc 
3 8.605 
1 1445.074 
1 15.029 
I 2.905 
1 8.107 
79 1.457 
83 
82 
h. R Squared = .183 (Adjusted R Squared = .152) 
One tail tests 
I-
5.90(1 
991..826 
10.J 15 
1.994 
5.564 
Sig 
.000 
.000 
.001 
.081 
.010 
The interaction effect was examined by conducting post-hoc analysis. A one-way between 
groups ANOV A indicated a significant difference at the p<.0) level in auditor 
independence scores for the four groups {F (3. 79) = 5.906, p=.000]. Post-hoc multiple 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. shown in Table 37. indicate that the mean score for 
Group 4 (M=3.25 (.85)) is significantly dif
f
erent from Group I DY!.=4.48, ( 1.60)) and 
Group 2 (M=4.73, ( 1.39)). However. Group 3 (M=4.25, (.72)) does not differ significantly 
from the remaining three groups. 
·-
TABLE 37: Multiple comparison of group means for 
auditor independence 
!I.lean I 
IJ I llcr�"fll'C 
Cl) crnup tll grnul! n-11 I Sid. L'ITOI Sig 
I '.\trunghod .1wn-n .. •1:ll.'1..' -!�trongll\w J rL"'I. ICc • 25 I .3M! .452 
Jwmkho<l·nnn-rc-clc.: 22,, 377 4M, 
4wc:aU1< id :..·de.: 1.221i• .377 .004 
2,11<1ngl1<,d rL-cfc.: Jwc:,kl,od·nnn-rc-cfcc .477 .373 .. 289 
4wc,1kh<1d·1L-clcc I 477' 373 .. (1()() 
]wc.-;;11..hod nnn-rcdl.;'.: l -iwcakh,,d rL-cfoc I 000 .3X2 .02n .. • 11,c mcun d1tlcn:nce 1, Sl)!mhcant al 1hc .05 1cvcl. 
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The results of the post-hoc analysis indicate that the threat of self-interest as reflected in the 
recurring engagement has a significant impact on shareholders' perception of auditor 
independence \Vhen the board of directors is weak (p.=.004), but not when the board of 
directors is strong. The result may be attributed to the fact that the treatment group is in 
some way different from the remaining groups. However, the logical answer for the result 
lies with the IR model (Mock et al., 2005) and, therefore, the theoretical foundation for the 
hypothesis. The junction of the weak fonn of board of directors and recurring NAS is the 
point at which the following conditions prevail: 
• the threat from wealth incentives is highest; 
o the mitigating effect of the board on management's (JR opportunity) and the 
auditor's ( IR attitude) propensity to act inappropriately is weakest; and 
therefore, all other things being equal, from the perspective of independence in 
appearance 
o propagation from incentives to attitude (R ia) and incentive to opportunity (R3a) is 
more likely to occur. 
Attention will now tum to de!--:ribing the results associated with the issue of stakeholder 
willingness-to-appoint the incumbent auditor to perfonn the NAS. 
7 .3.2 Choice of N AS provider 
The task question associated with the choice of service provider is as follows: 
Whom would you chose to provide the IT service? 
Audit firm [J Specialist firm [l 
The hypotheses associated with the choice of service provider are as follows: 
Main effects 
H2 Stakeholders will be less likely to choose the audit finn to provide the 
NAS when the NAS is recurring than when it is non-recurring. 
H� Stakeholders will be less likely to choose the audit firm to provide the 
1\IAS when the structural strength of the board of directors is weak 
than when it is strong. 
224 
Interaction 
H11 Stakeholder choice of the audit finn is more likely to be affected by the 
recurring N AS when the structural strength of the board of directors is 
weak than when it is strong. 
Panels A and B of Table 38 report descriptive and frequency statistics associated with the 
choice of audit tinn. The number (percentage) of participants who chose the audit finn to 
provide the NAS in Group I was 9 (43%); Group 2, 5 (23%); Group 3, I (5%); and Group 
4, 0 (0%). The total "yes" count was I 5 ( 18.1 %). 
_!ABLE 38: Dcscri�tivc and frcgucncy statistics and choice of audit firm bv group 
Panel A: Descrie_tive statistics - mean a11d std deviation 
FEES FOR NAS 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS Non-recurring Recurring 
Group I Group 2 
Strong .43 23 
(.51) (AJ) --
Group 3 Group 4 
Weak .05 .00 
(.12) (.00) 
Panel B: Fl"eg_ue11,T statistic.'> - 11w11ber and e_ercentage 
i 
FEES FOR NAS 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS Non-rccurri Ill! Recurring 
,___:a.._ .. �-·-
I 
Group I Group 2 
Strong 9 5 r--- 43°10 23% 
Group 3 Group 4 
Weak I 0 
.:;o-- /0 0% 
-· 
Table 39 presents the ANOV A results for choice of auditor based on the above means. The 
data in the Table indicates that the choice of the auditor was significantly affected by the 
strength of the board of directors [F( I, 79)= 15.084, p.=.000]. The Sig. value for the 
recurrency of the NAS variable was .056 [F( I, 79)=2.595). The data in Table 39 also shows 
the absence of a significant interaction effect between the treatments [F( I. 79)=.94 I, 
p.=.168]. Thus, the results support H5 and H2, but not Hx. 
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TABLE 39: ANOV A for choice of 
lyp.: Ill 
Source; Sum of df 
Corn.-cted model 2.333,1 J 
l111erccpl 2.580 I 
Strength BoD 1.901 I 
R�-..: fee .327 l 
StrengthBnd*recfec .11'1 I 
Error 9 95t, 79 
Total l �.000 i-:3 
Corrci.:ted Toial 12.2l>9 82 
a.1omputcd using alpha � .05 
b.R Squared= .190(Adjustcd R Squared= .159) 
One-tail tests 
auditor I 
M<"ln Suua«· I Siu 
.77X (1.I iO .000 
2.580 20.475 .000 
1.901 15.084 .000 
.321 
I 
2.595 .056 
119 .941 .168 
.12'1 
J 
Given the categorical nature of the decision choice, the Chi-square test was also carried out 
in relation to both treatments. The results of the test lend support for those obtained using 
ANOVA to the extent that the Yates' Correction for Continuity value for the strength of 
the board of directors was si!:,111ificant [CC( I)= I 0.697, p.=.000]. The same statistic for the 
recurring NAS variable was marginally significant at p.=.116 [CC( I )=1.422]. 
7.3.3 Strength of preference for audit firm 
The question associated with the strength of preference for the auditor as the NAS provid�r 
is as follows: 
What is the strength of your preference for the alternative providers? 
Audit firm: 2 3 
weak 
4 
moderate 
5 6 7 
strong 
The hypotheses associated with the variable are as follows: 
Main effects 
H3 Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit firm will be lower when 
the NAS is recurring than when it is non-recurring. 
H6 Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit finn will be lower 
when the structural strength of the board of directors is weak than 
when it is strong. 
/nteractio11 
H9 Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit fim1 is more likely to 
be affected by the recurring NAS when the structural strength of the 
board of directors is weak than when it is strong. 
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The descriptive statistics relating to the participants' strength of preference for the auditor 
arc provided in Table 40. The mean score for Group I is 4.29 ( 1.68); Group 2, 3.86 ( 1.39); 
Group 3. 2.85 (0.93): and Group 4, 3.05 ( 1.00). 
TABLE 40: Descriptive statistics for strength of preference for 
audit firm tO__E!OYidc NAS 
FEES 1NAS} 
Board of 
Directors Non-recurring Recurring 
Strong 4.29 3.86 
( l .68) ( 1.39) 
Weak 2.85 3.05 
-· (.93) ( 1.00) 
l = weak preference for auditor 
I 7 = strong preference for auditor 
Table 41 presents the ANOVA results for the participants' strength of preference for the 
audit firm based on the above means. The data in Table 41 indicates that participants' 
strength of preference was significantly affected by the strength of the board of directors 
[F( I, 79)=15.639. p.=.000] but not the recum.:ncy of the NAS f�( I, 79)=. I 52, p.=.348]. 
Further, the data shows the ..ibsence of a significant intera..:tion effect between the 
treatments [F( I. 79)= 1.196, p.=.138]. l nus. the results "llP!Jt'rt H6 but not I-l 3 and H9. 
TABLE 41: AN OVA for strength of preference for 
auditor to orovide NAS 
·type Ill 
Soun.:c Sum pf 
Corrected mndd 28.2<J8a 
lntcrcepl 1022 :;n 
Strength BnD 2h.205 
Rec fee . 255 
StrengB0D•re1.: foe 2.004 
Errnr 132.377 
Total I 195.000 
Corrected Total I Ml.675 
a. Computed using alpha " .05 
df Mean S4uarc 
3 9 .. tJJ 
I I ll22.J27 
1 26.205 
\ .255 
I 2.004 
7<) l.6 76 
X3 
x1 ' -
h. R Squared=. I 71, (Adjusted R Squared� .145) 
On.: tail test 
I 
5 n2<' 
hll· Jl,u 
I'· oJ9 
152 
.196 
Sig 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.348 
138 
Table 42 provides a summary of the relation between the hypotheses and the Sig. values 
arising from the various statistical tests involved in the main experiment, and whether 
the results support the hypotheses at p.=.05 or otherwise. 
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Table 42: Summ:tr\' of the relation between the hypotheses and significance tests - main experiment 
Sil!, \'alucs 
HYPOTHESES Support at n.=.05 _ 
Yes No ,---------- --------------- -------'--
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
Mt1i11 effect.� 
II I S1akeholder pcrcep1ions of auditor independence will be lower 
when lhe NAS is recurring 1han when it is non-recurring. 
H� Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence will be lower 
when the s1ruc1ural strength of the board of directors 1s weak 
than when ii is strong. 
lnteractim, 
H7 Stakeholder perceptions of audilor independence .ire more 
likely to be affected by the recurring NAS when the structural 
slrength of 1he board of directors is weak than when it is 
strong. 
.081 
.00 I 
.OIO 
--------------------------------+------+· ------1 
CHOICE OF AUDIT FIRM 
Main t'ffects 
II! Stakeholders will he less likely to choose the audit fim, 10 
provide the NAS when the NAS is recurring than when it is 
non-recurring. 
II� Stakeholders will be less like\:, to choose the audi1 firm lo 
provide NAS when the structural strength of the board of 
directors 1s weak than when it is strong. 
/111erucrio11 
HK Stakeholder choice of the audit fim1 is more likely to be affected 
by the recurring NAS when the structural strength of the board 
of directors is weak than when it is strong. 
STRENGTH OF PREFERENCE FOR AUDIT FIRM 
Muin effects 
11.l Stakeholder strength of preference for the audi1 firm will be 
lower when the NAS 1s recurr111g than when it ,� 11011-
rccurr111g. 
llh S1akehn\der strength of preference for the audit firm wtll be 
lower when the strnctural strength of the board ot' directors 1s 
weak than when it is strong. 
.056 
.000 
.168 
.348 
.000 
/11teractim1 
liq Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit !inn is more �J likely to be affected by the recurring NAS when the �--�---s-tru-ct_u_r,-1l _ s_·t-rc-·n_g-tl-1 _o_r_ih_e-bo_ ar_d_o_f _d_ir_e_c_to_r _s _i _s _\_\·e-·a_k_· _il _ia_n_�- �---�- .138 _ when it is strong. 
7.4 POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
Additional statistical analyses were undertaken using the data obtained from the two sets of 
questions in the post-experimental questionnaire. 
7.4. l The first set of post-experimental questions 
The first set of questions. as stated earlier, asked the participants to rate their perception of 
the strength or the seven attributes of the case studies listed below. The coding of the 
variables for the puq)ose of the statistical analyses appears in parentheses. 
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(i) The degree of independence of the board of directors from management 
(ind of BoD) 
(ii) The degree of independence of the audit committee from management 
(ind of AC). 
(iii) The adequacy of the duties and authority of the audit committee 
(duties & auth of AC). 
( iv) The financial expertise of the audit committee 
( fin exp of -\C). 
(\·) The standard of the company's twerall governance framework 
(std of CGF). 
(vi) The threat to auditor independence from the fees for the IT service 
( sci f:-interest). 
(vii) The net benefits of appointing the incumbent audit firm to provide NAS 
(net benefits). 
Items (i) to (iv) are determinants of item (v). and. therefore. provide the opportunity to 
examine the relation between the four variables, as independent variables, and the 
perceived standard of the company's overall corporate governance framework as the 
dependent variable. Items (v) to (vii) arc used in the reanalysis of the hypotheses. 
7 .4.1.1 Factors affecting overall assessment of corporate governance 
The research question of interest associated with the perceived strength of the standard of 
the company's corporate governance framework is as follows: 
How well do the four variables explain the perceived standard of the 
company· c corporate governance framework·? 
The basis for the question lies with the audit committee effectiveness ACE literature, not 
least of all the DcZoort ct al. (2002) taxonomy and Australian best-practice. 
The regression equation is as follows: 
Std of CGF = a ..,. b 1(ind of BoD) - b"(ind of AC) - b3(duties and auth of 
AC)+ b4(fin exp of AC). 
Standard multiple regression is used to explore the research question. The technique is 
generally recognised to be sensitive to the assumptions that underlie the statistical test in 
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relation to attributes of the data used (Taba..:hnick & Fidell. 1996 ). The cr.iical assumptions 
concern sample size. collinearity and singularity. and normality. Tabachn1ck et al. ( 1996. 
p. 132) provide the following fonnula for calculating sample size requirements: N .> 50 + 
8111 (where III cc number of independent variables). The issue at stake is generalisability. 
The value of m in this instance is 4. suggesting a re4uircd sample size of not le:;s than 82. 
The present sample size is 83. With respect to the matter of the nornrnlity of the data. the 
nonnal probability plot of the regression standardised residual statistics associated with 
participan, perception of the dependent variable lies in a reasonably straight diagonal line 
from the bottom left hand side of the diagram to the top right hand side. This suggests that 
there arc no major d1..·viations from nonnality. However. collinearity may hold implications 
for the analysis of the results. 
The Pearson wrrelation co-efficient values for the variables arc listed in Table 43. Each of 
the independent variables shows a strong positive correlation with the dependent variable. 
The magnitude of the correlation coefficients is as fi_11lows: fin exper of AC , .920; duties 
and auth of AC. .884; ind of AC. .880; and ind of BoD .. 851. However. notwithstanding 
that favour.iblc outcome. the data also show comparatively strong correlations between the 
independent \'ariablcs. which raises the possihility of collinearity. The values range from 
.81 J (duties and auth of AC and ind of BoD) to .886 (ind of AC and fin expertise of AC). 
Tabachnick ct al. ( 1996, p. 86) suggest that one should .. think carefully before including 
two variables with a bivariate correlation ot: say .. 7 or more in the same analysis". The 
collinearity issue is revisited in the process of discussing the regression results. 
I TABLE 43: Correlations for standard of corporate governance framework and 
indeecndent variables 
Dutic,-& 
S1d ind uf author tin exp of 
CGF BoD ind of AC AC AC 
Pearson Std CGF 
I 
1.000 
Correlation Ind of BoD .851 • 1.000 
Ind of AC .880• .861 * 1.000 
Duties and auth of AC I .884* 811 * .825* 1.000 Fm ex£ of AC .920* I .819* .886* .867* l.000 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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The issue of collinearity acknowledged. the descriptive statistics relating to mean scores for 
the dependent and independent variables. according to the structural strength of the board 
of directors and in total arc identified in Table 44. The mean scores for the strong form of 
the overall standard of the company's governance framework is 5.70 (.64); the weak form, 
2. 75 (.6 7;. The magnitude of the mean scores fi.)r the independent variables for the strong 
fonn of the board of directors range from 5.21 (.68) fix the independence of the board, to 
5.65 (.75) fix the financial expertise of the audit committee. The magnitude of the mean 
scores for the weak form of the board of directors range from 2.30 (. 72) for financial 
expertise of the audit committee, to 3.15 (. 70) for independence of the board. 
TABLE 44: Descriptive statistics for standard of corporate governance and independent 
variables 
Strength of the board of 
directors 
Variable type Variable name Strong Weak Total 
Dependent Standard of governance framework 5.70 2.75 4.28 
(.64) (.67) ( 1.62) 
Independent Independence of board 5.21 3.15 4.22 
(.68) (. 70) ( I. 24) 
Independence of audit committee 
I 
5.49 2.70 4.14 
(.70) (.61) ( 1.55) 
Duties and authority of audit committee 5.42 3.13 4.31 
(.79) (.76) ( 1.39) 
Financial expertise of audit committee 5.65 2.30 3.95 
(.75) (. 72) ( I. 98) 
Table 45 shows the regression results. The standard1sed beta values are, as the findings of 
prior ACE empirical studies would suggest (e.g .. DeZoort et al., 2002), all positive. The 
Sig. values suggest that the financial expertise of the audit committee (p.=.000); the duties 
and authority of the audit committee (p.=.001) a!1d the independence of the board of 
directors (p.=.010) contributed significantly to explaining the dependent variable in their 
own right, at or below .05 probability. The independence of the audit committee 
2pproachcs significance at p.=.076. 
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1 TABLE 4- S 
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Ind of AC 
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B Std. Error Bein I 
.OJO .NX 121 
.11-l .102 
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.07(, .159 h.2.W 
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a. Dt.11<-·ru.knt \",:,.ri..1hk. ,1andard of corp<•r..11c _!!(>H."T11an<.-..: rr..ttl"k."'"ri 
One-tail h.-sh 
Returning to the collinearity problem referred to earlier. the tolerance collinearity statistics 
for the independent variables are moderately low (.156 to .226). Tabachnick et al. (1996) 
maintain that tolerance statistics approaching zero suggest the possibility of collinearity. 
7.4. 1.2 Reanalysis of the hypotheses using alternative measures of the 
independent variables 
This section of the additional analyses includes the reanalysis of the hypotheses, usmg 
alternative measures of the self-interest threat and strength of the board of directors and, 
where relevant, the net benefits of hinng the IT division of the audit firm to provide the 
NAS. The dichotomous manipulations of the self-interest threat (recurring or non-recurring 
NAS engagement) and stren!,rth of the board of directors (strong or weak) will be perceived 
differently by the various participants. The previous tests of the hypotheses treated these 
effects as homogeneous across the participants. within the different treatments groups. 
Here, the hypotheses are reanalysed using the participants· perceptions about the self­
interest threat and the strength of the board of directors measured on a 7-point scale rather 
than the dichotomous treatment of the manipulations. The data (scales) arc a spin-off of the 
manipulation checks. The statistical tests involve the use of linear reb'Tession in relation to 
the continuous dependent variables, perceived auditor independence and strength of 
preference for the audit finn; and logistic regression for the <lichotomous dependent 
variable. choice of audit firm. The dependent variable, strength of preference for the 
specialist firm. for which there are no hypotheses. is also examined. using linear 
regress 1011. 
Panels A. B and C of Tahle 46 report the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation 
coefficients relating to the independent variahlcs. and the correlation coetlicients bctwet:n 
the independent and dependent variables associated the linear regression tests. With respect 
to the independent variables. the largest correlation is between std of CGF and the 
interaction variable (.688). The magnitude of the bivariate correlation coefficients of the 
remaining various independent variables is low ( .018 to -.464 ), suggesting that collinearity 
is unlikely to he a problem in interpreting the results of the linear re&Jfession tests. 
However. the collinearity issue is revisited in the process of discussing the regression 
results. 
With respect to the relations between the independent and dependent variables the largest 
correlations art: bt:tween self-interest and strength of preference for the audit firm (-.588); 
and net benefits and strength of preference for the at:dit tirm (.545). The magnitude of the 
remaining correlation coetlicicnts is low (.00 I to .489). 
TABLE 46: Dc�criptivl' statistics and coefficients between variables 
Pa11el A. Descrif)tin• statistics. lndevcmlcnt i ·arillhles 
Self-interest 
Self-interest Std ofCGF x Std ofCGF Net benefits 
Mean 4.37 4.28 17.99 3.54 
(std dev} ( 1.27) ( 1.62) (7.93) ( 1.41) 
Pline/ 8. Pearson Correlatio11 Coe{ficie111s. lnclepe11d<'11l I 'ariahles 
Self-interest 
Sc I f-intcrest Std ofCGF x Std ofCGF Net benefits 
Self-interest 1.000 
Std ofCGF -.355 1.000 
Self-interest 
x Std 01 CGF .412 .668 l.000 
Net benl'fits -.464 420 .018 1.000 
I 
Panel (' Pew:rn11 Correlation Cvc(ficic111s. i11dcf)e11drn1 and DcJJrndcnt Variables 
Dependent variables 
Auditor Strength of Strength of 
independence Preference for Preference for 
Audit firm specialist 
Self-interest -.�86 -.588 .475 
Std ofCGF .343 .489 ·.345 
Self-interest x 
Std ofCGF .142 .001 .085 
Net benefits n,a .545 -.359 
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Auditor independence hypothe.ws 
The auditor independence hypotheses are retested using the following regression equation: 
Aud Ind = a + b 1 (sdf-interest) + b� (std of CGF) + b_, (self-interest) x 
(std of CGF). 
Table 47 shows the regression results. The sign (critical value) of the coefficient for sdf­
intcrest is negative (-.560) i.e., perceived auditor independence declined as the threat of 
self:.interest rose. The coefficient is also significant at p.=.036. The sign of the correlation 
coefficient of std of CGF is negative (-.190) and non-significant (p.=.306). The si1:,111 of the 
correlation coefficient of the interaction variable is positive (.500) and is marginally 
significant at p.=.098. Thus, the results support H1 but not H.i and H1. 
TABLE 47: Sum man of the coefficients of the independent variables • 
Unstandardised Standardised Collinearit, Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
!\lmlel B Std. Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Error 
(Con,;1anl) 5.1/02 1.57'1 .l741, .000 -- � 
Scll"-1n1crcst -.580 .117 -.5/iO -UDO .!l.lh .IU H.872 - - - -- -- -
Std otTtil· -.154 .J04 -. I')() -.SOK .. ,oh 075 IJ .. lOK ,- -· 
Sclf-1111crcs1,Std ofCGF .08J .Oh4 .500 1.300 .09X .071 14.01.2 
a. DL-pcndcnl Variahlc: auditor imlcpcndcm:c 
Onc-1ail IL-Sis. 
Notwithstanding the earlier suggestion of the lack of a collinearity problem, the tolerance 
collinearity statistics for the independent variables arc relatively low (.071 to .113). 
The marginally significant result (.098) associated with the interaction variable was 
examined further, by separatint> out the equations for the strong and weak fonns of the 
strength of the board of directors variable. The regression results for the strong and weak 
fonns of the variable arc reported in Tables 48 and 49. respectively. The coefficients for std 
of CGF arc positive and non-significant in both instances. The signs of the correlation 
coefficients for scl1:.interest arc negative in both instances. That is, perceived auditor 
independence declined as the perceived sci 1:.interest threat increased. The magnitude of the 
coeflicicnt is greater where the strength of the bomd of directors is weak (-.297) than when 
234 
it 1s strong (-.163): and, similarly, significant (p.=.040) as opposed to insignificant 
(p=.157). The result !ends support for l-l7. 
TABLE 48: Summary of the coefficients of the independent variables where the strength of the 
board of directors is strong• 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Model B �td. 
I 
Error 
(Con�tanl) 5. lX5 2JlN 
Sclf-intert..-st ·.175 .172 
Std ofCGF .(J23 .372 
a. Dependent Variahle: auditor independence 
One-tail tests. 
Standardised Collincaritv Statistics 
Coefficients 
Beta I Sig. Tolerance VIF 
2.170 .036 
-.163 -1.020 .157 .948 1.054 ····-·-· 
.010 .061 .476 .948 1.054 
TABLE 49: Summary of the coefficients of the independent variables where the strength of the 
board of directors is weak• 
Unstandardised Standardised Collinearitv Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
!\lode! B Std. Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Error ,____ 
I I (C'onst.1111) 4.544 1.081) 4.137 .000 
c---
I Sclf-intcrL"St -.297 i · l.803 -.265 .147 .040 .871 1.149 
I Std of C'GF .167 .228 .120 .732 .234 .871 1.149 ---
a. Ucpemtent Variahlc: auditor independence 
One-tail tt..-sts. 
Willing11ess-to-appoi11t the iucumhellt audit firm hypotheses 
The willingness-to-appui11t the incumbent audit firm hypotheses involve the choice of NAS 
provider and strength of preference for the audit firm. The retesting of the hypotheses 
includes the participants' perceptions of the net benefits of appointing the incumbent audit 
firm to provide NAS. 
Earlier in the thesis it was suggested that the net benefits of hiring the incumbent audit firm 
are a function of perceived auditor independence (accountability) and the perceived 
benefits of hiring the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS (efficiency). Further, it was 
anticipated that there may be a positive correlation between the choice of audit firm and 
perceived net benefits. The relation was examined using Spearman 's Rank Order 
Correlation test. The test shows a strong, positive correlation between the two variables 
[r.= . .570, (n=83, p.=.000)], i.e., the choice of audit firm is associated with higher levels of 
perceived net benefits of appointing the incumbent audit fim1 to provide NAS. 
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Choice of NAS provider 
The ehoi,·c of NAS provider hypotheses arc n.:testcd us111g logistic rcgrcssi<•n. The 
rcgres-;ion equation is as follows: 
Choice of NAS provide, =a+ b1 (self-interest)+ b2 (std of CGF) + b; (sdf­
interest x std ofCGF) + b.: {net benefits). 
Choice of NAS provider equals 1 if the auditor is chosen '.d provide the NAS, 0 if the 
specialist is chosen. 
correlation coefficients between the constant and the independent variables. with the 
exception of net benefits (-.377) are very high (-.915 to .966). The magnitude of the 
bivariate correlation coefficients of the independent variables, again, with the exception of 
net b�"fldits. are also high (.839) to very high (._()82). Menard (1995. p. 66) maintains that 
E 50: C<��;.-clnt�ns for �hoicc of NAS pr
-
ovidcr ---
------
-­
------- ---, cnns1u111 -i- Sdf---1-·· S1J uf -·-1- Sdl'·i:llcrc�t ) fin c.xp of . 
. • mtcr,:,.t _ C'GF Std of C'GF I AC' 
! Step Com,'!3111 l .000 i I 
I S.::-lf-,,,.1-.-es:1 - . 9 l 5 . l. O()(J 
S.d ofCGF -%/J �39 lJY.,c(, 
S,df-� 1. :ffii of CGF 
Set i=:..:fit5 -. ..!/ I 
-,�� 
043 
l ljr.)'j 
-.4-0l ; I fJOO; 
Menard's ( 1995) assertions .. vith respect to the implications of collinearity for Sig. values 
about the relation between the hypotheses and the results. The remaining discussion of the 
results is confined to the combined effects of the variables in the model. 
TABLE 51: Summan· of the variables - choice of NAS provider 
Step I 
I• Sclf'.-interc.:st 
Std ofCGF 
Self-interest x std of CGF 
Net benefits 
Consiant 
One-tail tests. 
B 
-.199 
4.352 
-1.023 
2.923 
-17.277 - -
S.E. 
4.572 
3.777 
l.064 
1.248 
16.575 
a. Variahlc(s) cn1crcd on slcp I: scltin1r. s1dcgf. MCGsclti. ncthcnauf. 
Wald 
.002 
1.328 
.924 
5.481 
1.086 
di Sig Exp(B) 
I .488 .820 
I .124 77.629 
I .168 .359 
I .010 18.588 
I .297 .000 
The classification data shown in Table 52 show that the model predicted the choice of the 
audit tinn with 86.7% accuracy; the choice of the specialist firm with 98.5 % accuracy; 
giving rise to an overall response prediction rate of 96.4%. 
@BLE 52: Classification Table choice of audit firm• 
Observed 
Step I Choose auditor no 
yes 
Overall percentage -
a. The cut value is .5000 
Predicted 
Choose auditor Percentage 
no yes Correct 
67 I 98.5 
2 13 86.7 
96.4 
The omnibus tests of coefficients (Step, Block and Model) were significant at .000 [Chi­
square. 65.426 (4)]. The Cox and Snell R Square statistic was .545; the Nagelkerke R 
Square .. 892 (-2 Log likelihood. 13.007). 
Strength of preference for the audit firm to provide NAS hypotheses 
Tht.· strength of preference for the audit fii, n hypotheses arc retested using the following 
regression l!quation: 
Strength of prekrern.:e for audit fim1 c=c a + b 1 (self-interest) + b2 (std of 
C'GF) + b, (self-interest) x (std of CGF) + b4 (net 
benefits). 
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I 
The regression results are provided in Table 53. Net benefits (p.=.004) is the only 
independent variable that contributed significantly to the change in the dependent variable 
in its own right. at or below .05 probability. The standard of the corporate governance 
framework approaches significance at p.=. l 04. Thus. the results do not support H;,, Hs or 
Hx. 
TABLE 53: Summan· of the coefficients of the independent variables• 
Unstandardised Stnndardised 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Betu 
I 
Error 
( Constant J 2.957 1.350 
Se\l�inh.:rL-st -.296 .267 -.268 
Std ofCGF .333 .262 .384 
Sdf-intcrcstx ';tdCGF -.027 .054 -.151 
Net benefits .261 .0% .262 
. 
b. Dq,endent Variable: strength ofprctercncc tor the audit tmn 
One-tail tests. 
I Sig. 
2.190 .032 
-1.110 .136 
1.271 .104 
• .493 .312 
2. 705 .:104 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
.113 8.877 
.072 13.957 
.070 14.251 
.698 1.432 
Notwithstanding the earlier reference to the lack of a collinearity problem, the tolerance 
collinearity statistics for the independent variables. other than net benefits, are, to varying 
degrees. approaching O (Tabachnick et al., 1996). 
The overall collinearity problem aside, Table 54 provides a summary of the relation 
between the hypotheses and the Sig. values of the regression results, and whether the 
results support the hypotheses at p.=.05 or otherwise. The relation between perceived net 
benefits and the Sig. values is also included, where relevant. 
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Table 54: Sununarv of the relation between the lwpotheses and significance tests - reanalvses 
I AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
,\1ai11 <'i/ecf.� 
HYPOTHESES 
\ 11 1 · Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence will be lower 
when the NAS is recurring than when it is non-recurring. 
H� Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence will be lower 
when the structurnl strength of the beard of directors is weak than 
when it ts strong. 
lllt,:rucrim, 
II, Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence arc more likely 
to be affrcted by the rernrring NAS when the structural strength 
of the board of directors 1s weah. than when it is strung. 
,__ ______________ ·- --
CHOICE OF Al!DIT FIRM 
Mui11 effects 
H2 Stakeholders will be less likely to choose the audit fim1 to provide 
the NAS when the NAS is recurring than when it is non-recuning. 
H� Stakeholders will be less likely 10 choose the audit !inn to provide 
the NAS when the structural strength ,if the board of directors is 
weak than when 11 is strong. 
/11tauctic111 
HM Stakeholder choice of the audit !inn is more likely to be affected 
by the recurring NAS when the s1ructurnl :arength of the board of 
direciors is weak than when it is strong. 
N ct benefits 
Sig. values 
Support at p.=.05 
Yes No 
.036 
.306 
.098 
.488 
.124 
.168 
.010 ----------------------+-- - ---·-
STRENGTH OF PREFERENCE FOR AUDIT FIRM 
Main ej]ects 
11., Stakeholdt.' strength of preference for the audit fim1 will be lower 
when the NA::, is recurring than when it is non-recurring. 
116 Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit !inn will be lower 
when the structurnl strength of the board of directors is weak than 
when it is strong. 
I 11taucti011 
119 Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit finn 1s more likely 
to be affected by the recurring NAS when the structurnl strength 
of the board of directors ,s weak than when it is strong. 
.136 
.104 
.312 
I 
L __ i\i_._ct_b_cn_c_fi_1t_s _______ __________________ �--·0_0_4_�----� 
Strength of preference for the specialist firm to provide NAS 
The dependent variable involving the participants' strength of preference for the specialist 
fim1 to provide NAS is tested using both linear regression and a two-way A NOVA. 
Linear regression 
The rebr ession equation is as follows: 
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Strength of preference for specialist firm = a+ b 1 (self-interest)+ b2 (std of 
CGF) + b3 (self-interest) x (std of CGF) + b4 (net 
benefits). 
Table 55 shows the regression results for the analysis. The negative signs ( critical values) 
of the coctricients of std of CGF (-.833) and net benefits (-.093) suggest that the 
participants' strength of preference for the specialist firm declined as the perceived 
standard of the overall corporate governance and net benefit of appointing the incumbent 
audit finn rose. However, the Sig. values show that std of CGF (p.=.O I 0) and the 
interaction variable (p.=.026) are the only variables that contributed significantly to 
explaining the dependent variable in their own right at or below .05 probability. The Sig. 
value for the threat of self-interest is p.=.292; net benefits, p.=.205. 
TABLE 55: Summary of the coefficients of the independent variables" 
Unstandurdiscd S111nd11rdised Collincuritv Statistics 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta I Sig. Tolerunce \'IF 
I (Constant) h.749 1.1m: 6.090 .000 
Self-interest threat -.121 .219 -.155 -.551 .292 .ID 8.877 
Standard of CGF -.508 .215 -.833 -2.3(i5 .010 .072 13.957 
StdCGGxSelf-interest .OXR .044 .707 1.986 026 .070 14.251 
Net benefits -.065 .079 -.09.1 -.X:!8 .205 .69� 1.432 
a. Dependeni Variaole: strength of prdcrem:c lor sp,:c1alist firm 
One-tail tests 
Thi.: significant result (.026) associated with the interaction variable was examined further, 
by separating out the equations for the strong anti weak fonns of the strength of the board 
of directors variable. The regression results for the strong and weak fonns of the variable 
are reported in Tables 56 and 57, respectively. The sign of the coetlicient f<.1r std of CGF is 
negative in both instances. H<.m ever. the magnitude of the coenicients is greater when the 
strength of the board of directors is weak (-.319) than when it is strong (-.112). and, 
similarly. significant (.056) as opposed lo insignificant (.428). The sign of the coefficient 
for threat of self-interest is positive in both instances. The magnitude of the coeCcient is 
greater ( .427) when the strength of the board of directors is strong, than when it is weak 
( .162 ); and. similarly. -;ignificant (p.=.007) as opposed to insignificant (p.=.344 ). 
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TABLE 56: Summary of the coefficients of the independent variables where the strength of the 
board of directors is strong• 
Unstundurdiscd Stundurdised 
Coefficients Coefficients 
l\loclcl 8 I Std. Bctu 
I 
Error 
(Cnnstanl) 5.276 1.5.tO 
Sclf-inten:st .J.l 1 .117 .427 
StJ ofCGI -. IXX .2J..\ -.112 
nethcncf -.01/..\ .104 -.13 7 
a. DcpcnJcnt Vanahk· strcngth nl prdcrc1icl· lt1r spei:1alist t1n11 
Twn-tail tCS[S. 
I I Collincarit,· Statistics 
t Si g. Tolerance VIF 
J.425 001 
2.8JO 007 .795 1.258 
-.802 428 .927 1.079 
-.910 .794 1.259 
/ TABLE 57: Summary of the coe fficients of the independent variables where the strength of the 
Model 
I 
board of direr•ors is weak" 
(Constalll) 
Sclt�imcrcst 
Std ofCGF 
m:tbenc! 
stundurdisecl I Un 
C 
I .. :. 
'ocfficients 
171 
,j I � ==r� s I 
Std. 
Error 
I.! J 1/ 
. I J<, 
.201 
.13<, 
Stunclurcliscd 
Coefficients 
Beta 
.162 
-.319 
-.068 
a. Dependent Van.,hlc: strcn,:1h of preference for specialist !inn 
Two-tail ICS[S. 
Two-way ANOV.4 
Collinearity Statistics 
I t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
5.626 .000 
.959 .34..\ .789 1.268 
-1.971 .056 .865 1.156 
-.42..\ .674 .872 1.1.;7 
A two-way ANOV A using the recurring NAS and the strength of the board of directors 
variables was used to examine the participants' strength of preference for the specialist 
finn. Levcnc's test of equality of error variance fr1r the v.1riable resulted in a Sig. value of 
.054 [ F(J. 79)=2.563 J, supporting the assumption of equality of variance. 
The descriptive statistics relating to pat1icipants' strength of preference for the specialist 
finn, by group. are provided in Table 58. The mean scores for Group I is 4.86 ( 1.06); 
Group 2, 5.45 ( 1.0 l ): Group 3. 5.55 ( 1.05 ): and Group 4, 5. 75 (.55) - an ascending order. 
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TAB LI•: 58: Descriptive statistics for strength of preference for 
specialist firm to provide NAS 
FEES (NAS) 
Board of 
Directors Non-recurring Recurring 
�
lrnng I 4.86 5.45 
( 1.06) ( 1.0 I l 
Weak 5.55 5.75 
{ 1.05) (.55) 
I = weak preference for specialist 
7 = stroll!.! preference for specialist 
Table 59 presents the ANOY A results for auditor independence based on the above means. 
The data indicates that participants' strength of preference for the specialist finn was 
significantly affected by the strength of the board of directors [F( I, 79)=5.651, p.=.020). 
whilst the recurrency of the NAS [F( I, 79)=3.679, p.=.059] approached significance. The 
data also show the lack of a significant interaction effect [F.( I, 79)=.914, p.=.342]. 
TABLE 59: ANOV A for strength of preference for the 
specialist firm to provide NAS 
I Yl'l' Ill 
Suun:c Sum of 
C orrccted model 9.154" 
Intercept 2419.104 
Strength BoD 5.059 
Rec fee 3.293 
Strength BoD*recfcc .818 
Error 70.726 
Tut,1  2498.000 
Corrected Total 78.880 
a.Computed using alpha = .05 
df �l,,::an I I S,g 
Sguarc I 
·' :;os I I 3.408 .022 
I 241� I�: 270:.108 .O�O 
1 3.293 3.679 I .059 
I .ii IS .914 I . .<42 
l �"" I ,,,, ,1-11 
79 �·1 LJ ii3 iP -- ----
h.R S4uared = 115 {AdjustL'tl R S4uan:d • .OXI l 
Two-tail tests 
Attention now turns to describing the results associated with the second set of post­
experimental questions. 
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7.4.2 The second set of post-experimental questions 
The statistical analysis for the study concludes by examining data associated with the 
second set of post-experimental questions. The participants were asked to rate the extent to 
which seven factors influenced their choice of preferred provider using a 7-point scale. The 
scales are anchored by the following descriptors: no influence, moderate influence and 
significant influence. 
The seven factors arc as follows: 
(i) The diversification of the Baudin Ltd's shareholder base. 
(ii) The absence of a dominant shareholding. 
(iii) The status of Baudin Ltd as a listed public company; 
(iv) Acccountability to shareholders. 
(v) Accountability to other stakeholders. 
(vi) Safeguards of the independence of the participants' preferred provider over 
the alternative provider. 
(vii) Competition in the market for professional non-audit services. 
The overall question concludes with an open-ended question. simply titled addirional 
comments. 
The quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the question provide the structure f,x the 
ensuing analysis, and ar<' headed ancillary data and open-ended q11csrio11, respectively. 
Anci/Jary data 
The total descriptive statistics as-;ociated with the seven variables is provided in Table 60. 
The mean scores range from safeguards of indepcndcm:c at 5.47 ( 1.00) to the !inn 
characteristics, diversified shareholder hasc at 3.20 ( 1.65) and absence of a dominant 
shareholding (3.20). Table 61 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables by 
treatment (groups). 
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TABLE 60: Descriptive statistics for second set of questions in post-
experimental auestionnaire 
Std 
N Min Max Mean dev 
Din:rsified shareholder ba�e 83 I 7 3.20 1.65 
Absence or donunant shareholding 83 I 7 3.20 1.72 
Lis1..:d co. 83 I 7 3.95 1.84 
Accountabilitv to shareholders 83 I 7 5.30 1.41 
Accountabilitv to other stakeholders 83 I 7 4.24 1.72 
Safeguards of independence 83 2 7 5.47 1.00 
Competition in the market for NAS 83 I 7 3.86 1.65 
Valid N (listwise) 83 
The first and second of the foregoing variables (diversified shareholder base and absence 
of a dominant shareholder) represent organisational attributes of the firm. The two 
variables played an integral part in operationalising the separation of ownership and 
control and, thereby, the scope for discretionary decision-making and managerial 
opportunism as detenninants of IR opportunity. The status of the company as a listed 
entity (the third variable) served to heighten thl.! public interest role of the entity. All three 
variables were intended to invoke heightened demand for an independent audit. The 
heightened demand, as stated earlier in the thesis, also holds implications for the 
significance of lR incentives. 
I was interested to sec how the participants would rate the variables. For the foregoing 
n:asons it was anticipated that the means scores for the variables may have been rated 
above the moderate level of 4 on the 7-point scale. However, the mean score for the 
diversified shan:holder base is 3.20 ( 1.65): absence of a dominant shareholding, 3.20 
( 1. 72): and the listed status of the fim1. 3.95 ( l.84). 
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TABLE 61: Drscriptive statistics for second set of Questions bv treatments 
I I Diversified Absence of ' Accountabilit)· Accountability to j Safeguards of Competition \ 
��-· 
Shareholder dominant Listed Co to shareholders other auditor in the market 
base shareholder· stakeholders independence for NAS 
FEES for Non Non Non Non Non Non Non 
NAS rec rec rec rec rec Rec rec rec rec Rec rec Rec rec Rec 
Board 
Of 
Directors I I -· 
i 
Strong 
2.76 
1 
3.55 3. 14 3.09 3.76 3.73 5.14 5.27 4.14 4.55 5.24 5.55 3.24 4.14 
( 1.58) . ( 1.99) ( 1.65) ( 1.92) ( I. 79) (2.07) ( 1.59) ( 1.58) (2.0 I) ( 1.65) ( 1.41) (0.86) ( I. 79) ( 1.52) 
I 
Weak 
3.40 3.10 3.30 3.30 4.10 4.25 5.35 5.45 4.05 4.20 5.50 5.60 4.15 3.90 
( I. 54) ( I .41) ( I .49) ( 1.87) ( 1.89) ( 1.65) ( 1.35 (1.15) (I. 73) ( 1.54) (0.76) I (0.88) ( 1.39) ( 1.83) 
I I I 
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An explanation fi.)r the moderate results may lie with the fact that the factors are not the 
sole detenninants (evidence) of the antecedents of lR opportunity. For example, with 
respect to managerial opportunism, there is the issue of the bonus component of senior 
management's remuneration package. Secondly, heightened accountability with respect to 
the provision of the external audit is not limited to corporate status (PF I). The size and 
nature of the business also have a role to play in that respect ( PF I, 1.120). Mock el al. 
(2005) also identify the nature of the business as a dctenninant of the scope for 
discretionary decision-making ( IR oppo11unity). Finally, the mean scores for the three 
variahl<.:s associated with accountability as an alternative measure of the demand for an 
independent audit (IR opportunity) arc relatively high. The mean score for safeguards of 
independence is 5.47 ( 1.00): accountability to shareholders, 5.30 ( 1.41 ): and accountability 
to other stakeholders, 4.24 (I. 72 ). 
The inclusion of the seventh and final factor - competition in the market for NAS- was 
prompted by a result obtained in Study I. There, a participant, whose case instrument 
involved the strong fonn of board of directors and non-recurring NAS, chose the specialist 
fim1 to provide NAS on the grounds of promoting competition in the market for the NAS. 
Such competition adds an additional dimension to the notion of efficiency to that adopted 
in this thesis. Thus, the opportunity was taken to obtain a measure of the influence that the 
variable might have on the participants' choice of NAS provider, although, obviously, as 
only one of several variables. The descriptive statistics shown in Table 60 indicate that the 
mean score for the variable is moderately low at 3.86 ( 1.65). 
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Ope11-e11detl question 
The questionnaire cnncludcd with an open-ended component. titled additional co111111e11ts. 
Nine ( 11 %) of the 83 participants provided additional comments. The participants fall 
within the domain of groups I to 3. None of the individuals concerned chose the audit firm 
to pro,ide the NAS. 
A summary of the comments is provided in Table 62. The group (variables) involved arc 
also idcnti tied. Each transcript shows the exact written scripts of the participants. 
The comments from participants 2. 3. 5 and 6 clearly acknowledge the cost-benefit nature 
of the decision choice. Participant 5 demonstrates significant insight into the issues 
involved. including the dilemma surrounding the audit-NAS strategy. His/her comments 
also hold the hint of a possible expectation gap between management and shareholders 
with respect to the audit-NAS strategy. The conservative position adopted by the 
participant as a shareholder. is repeated in the comments of Participant 4. 
Participants 7 and 8 confirm the weak nature of the board of directors reflected in the case 
studies that provided the stimuli for their responses. Participant 7 also highlights an 
important dimension of the audit-NAS debate from the demand side of the market for 
NAS. generally. That is. the need for management to avoid the problem of abrogating its 
core responsibilities in the process of outsourcing (Vartanian. 2002). This issue has its 
analogy in the threat to auditor independence from self-review as it relates to making 
executive decisions. which was expressly controlled for in the case studies. The comments 
of the participant. in that respect. suggest a lack of communication between author and 
reader. Lack of communication would also appear to be at the heart of the comments made 
by Participant 9. 
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TABLE 62: Summary of participant responses to the open-ended question by group 
GROUP Participant Comments 
Group I I It is my hdief that the external auditor would not now undertake such an 
,cronj!hod:non-rce 
assignmcnc due 11, the issue of independence. 
Group 2 2 I. Whilsc exisling audit arrangements would give the e.,isting auditors 
advantage of dccailcd knowledge of Baud in ·s financial side, such 
,rrouJ!hod:rcc knowledge could well compromise their objl.-ctivicy. 
Rcco1n1ncnda1ions re staff reductions could he influenced hy 
rcla1i11nsh ips over 4 years helweell auditors & co. otlicers for 
inslance. 
:!. The IT spL-cial isl co on the 111her hand, could reasonably be eXpt.'Cled 
lo lake a more objecllvc approach. nol limilcd by existing 
relationships. Their lask would he more complicated by the amount 
of pn.:parnlion !hey would need in forniliarizing themselves wilh the 
co. operations CIC. much of which would he. presumably. well known 
to existing ,mdu co. 
In halan.:c. I believe the special isl IT !inn would he lhe heller choice. 
3 I. ·nic role of the Audit commillc.-c docs not expressly include any 
reference hl scru1iny of major stra1cgk contnicts. The contract in 
qucslion might he considered to be such - nol bl.-cause of its value hul 
hL-.:ause of 1he rcla1ionship with the Auditors. 
:!. TI1c perceived risk is 1101 so much Ill the IT ct>nlrnct as lo Baudin's 
capacity 10 release itself from the auditor during the lenn of 1hc IT 
conlr.ict. 
3. ·n1e judgc111cn11prclcrencc indicated here is hased on the particular 
scnsitiviry of rhe rdarionship wirh and role ol� the auditor. In regards 
nther less sensitive services broader relationships with service 
pro\'iders might be encouraged not so where the auditors urc 
involved. 
4 As a shareholder. whilst I understand that the company has an excellent 
corporate govcn1ancc structure in place. the mere possibility of 
compromised audit independ.:ncc would lead me to prefer that the IT 
Spccialisrs arc appointed. 
No maller how good the corporate govcrnam:c structure is the perception 
of independence hrcaches should he avoided. 
s As a sharclwldcr I would always choose the option which ollcrcd mgl the 
least opportunily lo ever become too ·cosy with an external ovider. 
External service provision is sueh a double-edged sword: the hctl<.'T mgt 
gets on wi1h the provider the 11lllfC ctlcctive and frictionless the 
relationship hut the less mgt hccome inclined 10 tighten the screws like 
they sometimes should. I would note however that if I were in the sh(K'S 
of mgt I would probably he indined, all things being equal. to go for rhc 
audir tirm because it provitks me with grearcr leverage in the relationship 
and a broader array of prl.-ssure points that can he used lo make sure the 
company gels good service and rhat prohlcms/issucs arc addrl.'SSCd with 
un:encv. 
6 Whilst h<1th . · m" on paper arc equally capable it is more important to 
maintain 1hc perceive,! indcp.:ndcncc of the audit rlwn it is for the service 
provider to ha,c prior kn<1wledgc!expcricncc of Baudin's 
linam:ialsibusi ncss. 
Group .l 7 Whilst the govcmancc is very weak. there needs to he a contracl !hat 
wcakhod:nnn-rcc clearly dctim:s the providers service and !hat keeps accountahili1y ti.1r IT 
s�rvu.::cs with Baudin Lid otherwise lhe) arc abdicating rhcir 
r<.-sponsihilirics which will cause the outsourCl.'S (sic) objl."Ctive to succeed 
over Baudi,, Lid',. 
8 "udi1 Commit. c-c composition inmlcqualc 
7 should nor have mgt. on cttce 
Board composition OK hut CEO as Chainnan is inadl."qUatc 
9 As a shareholder since I <>79. I am very disappo1111cd in the modest growth 
in profit hcforc lax during 1he pasr .5 yc.irs. with consequent poor returns 
for shareholders. 
II is lime for restructuring within Baudin Ltd. 
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Finally, Participant I. in effect. questions the basis for conducting a study such as this in 
the present climate. The response is understandable. However, as suggested in Chapters I, 
2 and 4. the Australian best practice - statute approach to the regulation of the provision of 
NAS invites more questions, of an empirical nature, than it provides answers. The 
regulation facilitates a balance being struck between accountability and efficiency. The 
balance docs not lie with prohibition, but a network of safeguards whose 'acceptability' is 
a matter for empirical examination. 
7.5 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The overall results of the main experiment indicate that the structural strength of the board 
of directors significantly impacted shareholder perception of auditor independence, choice 
of audit finn to provid1: the NAS and strength of preference for the audit firm to provide 
the NAS. Shareholders had a more positive perception of auditor independence, were 
more likely to chose the audit firm to provide NAS, and their strength of preference for the 
audit finn to provide NAS was higher when the strength of the board of directors was 
strong than when it was weak. 
The results also show that stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence and 
willingness-to-appoint the incumbent audit firm to provide, with respect to the choice of 
NAS provider, were adversely affected by the threat to auditor independence from the 
continuity of fees for NAS. However, the results were only marginally significant with 
respect to perceived autiitor independence. Further, the results show that shareholder 
perceptions of auditor independence were more likely to be affected by recurring NAS 
where the strength of the board of directors is weak than when it is strong 
The results collectively indicate that the shareholders had decidedly negative reactions 
when the strength of the board of directors was weak, and, to a lesser extent, when the 
NAS was recurring. 
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The only significant results obtained as part of the reanalysis of the hypotheses using data 
obtained in the post-experimental questionnaire, were the impact of the recurring NAS 
variable on stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence; and the net benefits variable 
on the choice of audit finn and the strength of the preference for the audit firm. 
The results of the post-experimental questionnaire indicate that the independence of the 
board of directors and the audit committee from management, the duties and authority of 
the audit committee and the financial expertise of the audit committee affected the 
perceived standard of the company's governance framework. The results also show that, 
with the exception of the independence of the audit committee, the variables made 
significant unique contributions to explaining the perceived standard of the overall 
governance framework. Similarly, the four variables were collectively a significant 
explanation for the perceived overall strength of the company's governance framework. 
7.6 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The results obtained from the main experiment provide important insight into the effects of 
the safeguarding role of the board of directors (audit committee) and the continuity of fees 
for NAS on independence in appearance. Contemporary Australian best-practice, 
embodied in the ASX CG Recommendations (2003) and the BPG - AC Guide (200 I), 
identify key structural attributes that the board of directors (audit committee) should 
possess as a buffer to effectiveness. From the perspective of the audit committee literature, 
the attributes centre on the following elements: composition, authority, resources and 
diligence. The results inc!icate that the attributes (clements) collectively act as a signal of 
board (audit committee) effectiveness vis-a-vis the inte&>rity of the audit, and therefore hold 
implications for independence in appearance. Further, the relevant post-experimental 
results, taken as a whole, support the role of the four ACE elements as determinants of the 
strength of the board of directors. 
The results associated with the threat of self-interest also suggest that the shareholders 
perceived heightened threat to auditor independence from recurring NAS, which spilled 
over to willingness-to-appoint with respect to the choice of NAS provider. Thus, from the 
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pcrspccti\'c of indcpcmlcm.:c in appearance. the results lend support to the empirical 
analytical arguments (e.g .. Simunic. 1984: Beck ct al.. 1988a) and findings k.g .. Beck et 
al.. 1988h: Park ash ct al.. 1993) associated with the threat to auditor independence from 
dicnt-spccitic investment. Similarly. thc results pro\'ide support for the profession's 
analogy of the threat from recurring NAS. i.e .. the financial threat to auditor independence 
from .. conlcm ahout the possibility of losing the engagement'' (PF I. 1.22 (d)}. 
Finally. the overall results also lend support for the strength of the Mock et al. (2005) 
model of the problem of inferring independence risk (perceived auditor independence). 
The model anchors the hypotheses and the experimental stimuli (evidence) used in the 
study. 
The present Chapter concludes the substance of the thesis. The summary of and conclu�ion 
to th<.: thesis is provided in the following chapter (8). 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine issues of accountability and efficiency impactif}g 
the decision of whether to hire the incumbent audit finn to provide Non Audit Services 
[NAS]. The thesis falls within the ambit of the debate surrounding the joint provision of 
the external audit and NAS, which is ultimately concerned with the question of what 
constitutes an acceptable safeguard of auditor independence. Antagonists of the joint 
provision of the services call for the separation of the services at the professional level - an 
ex ante perspective. Protagonists, on the other hand, maintain that the costs of such an 
outcome may outweigh the benefits in the light of ex post safeguards of auditor 
independerce, including market based incentives. The theoretical bases for the opposing 
positions lie with separation of duties as the foundation of the professions and the 
economics of audit quality. respectively. 
Concern over the impact of the scope of services on auditor independence was expressed in 
the US as early as 1957 and remained on the agenda of the regulators in the decades that 
followed. The debate gained considerable momentum. worldwide, during the 1990s. 
Evidence of the growing economic significance of NAS. relative to the audit, and the 
change in nature of the NAS offered, including the market for the joint services, combined 
to signal a shift in the boundaries of the auditing profession and. with it a perceived shift in 
ethos from serving the public interest to serving management 
The altered circumstances precipitated trnljor reviews of the regulation of auditor 
independence. globally. 111 the later ha] r of the 1990s. The process culminated in the release 
of significant developmental publications in the area at the tum of the new millennium. 
The publications sought to modernise the regulation of professional independence. 
including auditor independence. to re11ect the altered professional environment that had 
evolved in response to deregulation and the advent of the global economy. 
The publications included the release in 2001 of a re-exposure draft on professional 
independence hy the peak international professional body. IFAC. The lFAC publication 
was fonnally adopted by the Australian profession in March 2002 - forming part of its 
joint code of conduct (PF 1 ). The implementation of PF I lead the way in the reformation 
of the regulation of auditor independence in Australia, followed by significant legislative 
change and corporate governance best-practice developments impacting directors' 
financial reporting responsibilities. The contemporary best practice - statute regulatory 
regime as it relates to the joint provision of the audit and NAS provided the setting for this 
thesis. 
The prohibition of the provision of certain services to audit clients aside, on the supply side 
of the market. the best practice - statute approach to the joint provision of the audit and 
NAS is anchored by the following general standard: 
... a !inn may provide services beyond the assurance engagement provided 
any threats to i11depc11de11ce have been reduced to an acceptable level ( PF I, 
2.71 ). 
The proviso in the general standard is referred to in the thesis in tenns of accountability. 
The responsibility for ensuring that accountability is met vests with the NAS provider 
(audit fim1} and is principles based. However, PF I plays a significant role in providing 
guidance in defining the parameters of accountability. 
The Australian legislature has chosen to leave the overriding responsibility for the 
regulation of the joint provision of the audit and NAS on the supply side of the market with 
the profession and has strengthened the profession's position via key changes to the 
Corporations Act (200 I). The changes arc essentially fivefold. Firstly, the Act includes an 
inaugural general standard of auditor independence. The standard is grounded in the notion 
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of the auditor not occupying a position of conflict of interest. in fact or appearance. 
Secondly. and to that end. PF 1 forms part of the auditor independence requirements of the 
Corporations Act (200 I). Thirdly. the auditor has an obligation to declare, annually, to the 
board of directors. in writing. that he/she has met the independence requirements of the Act 
and applicable codes of conduct. Fourthly, on the demand side of the market, there is 
increased market transparency through the need for the audit client to annually disclose in 
the annual report the fees paid to the external audit finn for audit and non-audit services. 
Fifthly, directors are held directly accountable to stakeholders in the presence of the joint 
provision of audit and NAS i·ia the need to provide statements in the annual report that the 
provision of NAS by the auditor is compatible with the general standard of independence 
and their reasons fi.)r being satisfied in that respect. The latter provision clearly vests the 
overriding responsibility for the joint provision of the audit and NAS, on the demand side 
of the market. witb directors. The responsibility represents a natural extension of their 
wider overriding statutory responsibility for the integrity of the financial statement and, 
therein, the external audit. 
Directors could place a blankl;!t prohibition on the provision of NAS to the client by the 
external audit firm. i.e .. invoke separation of duties at the level of the client. Howevc,. it 
was argued here that directors arc constrained from adopting such a policy by the need w 
ensure that the costs of reduced independence risk do not exceed the benefits vis-a-vis the 
wider best-practice prin1.:iple that holds that directors arc responsible for maximising 
ef
f
iciency subject to mcding accountability. 
The key to balancing perfom1ance and accountability in the area of the joint provision of 
the audit and NAS lies with ex post safeguards of auditor independence. i.e., governance 
mechanisms. What has been of interest to this study. is the fact that the board of directors 
is in its own right a governance (ex post) mechanism for safeguarding auditor 
independence. Directors in discharging their responsibility fix the integrity of the audit, as 
defined by corporate governance best practice. have the capacity to negate the threat to 
auditcir inJependence from the provision of NAS by controlling li..)r the propensity of 
management ( JR opportunity) and the auditor ( IR attitude) to act without integrity. 
254 
Corporate governance best practice also suggests that board (audit committee) 
cffectiven::ss in that respect relics on the presence of key structural attributes. This thesis 
was motivated by the upportunity to examine the signalling quality of the structural 
attributes as a measure of board effectiveness in fulfilling its safeguarding role, in 
circumsta:1ccs where the thrc:at to auditor independence emanated from recurring NAS. as 
the best approximation of the presence of client-specific investment. The variables are key 
determinants of auditor independence within the Aus11alian regulatory framework, and had 
not previously been examined from a user-based perspective, i.e., independence in 
appearance. This set of circumstances combined to give rise to the following empirical 
research question. 
RQl Docs financial threat to auditor independenc(; from recurring NAS 
and the structural strength of the board of directors affect 
stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence? 
The ex post nature of the safeguarding role of the directors provides the opportunity for an 
entity (stakeholders) to chose the audit fim1 to provide NAS, where the firm is perceived to 
have the superior capacity to ado value for shareholders. The superior capacity to add 
value begins with the client specific assets that arc the basis of wealth incentives to the 
audit tinn, i.e .. at the conceptual level. incumbency, and incumbency as a multi-discipline 
supplier of services to the audit client. Thus, this research was not limited to examining the 
relationship between the foregoing IR variables and perceived auditor independence. The 
research, as an important extension of prior research, included the issue of stakeholder 
willingness to appoint the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS - giving rise to the 
following empirical research question. 
RQ2 Docs financial threat to auditor independence from recurring NAS 
and the structural strength of the board of directors aff cct 
stakeholder willingness to appoint the incumbent audit firm to 
provide NAS'! 
The experimental setting for the present study placed the decision surrounding the choice 
of NA.� provider in the initial market for NAS. where the superior capacity to add value 
docs nnt begin with client specific assets. hut firm specific assets. The experimental setting 
also scr\'ed to attribute to the audit lin11. by virtue of the specialist nature of the competing 
255 
NAS provider. audit technology and fonnal professional status. which represent potential 
sources of compL·titi, c advantage in the initial market for NAS. 
All four of the distinguishing attributes of the audit finn - incumbency. multi­
disciplinarity. audit technology anr fonnal professional status - as possible sources of 
competitive advantage lie upstream of the end product market. The implications of 
incumbency and multi-di-; ... iplinarity in the client specific product market is well defined in 
the economics of audit quality literature from the supply side of the market, but Jess so 
from a demand perspective. Further. the relationship between audit technology and fonnal 
professional status and the finn specific product market is not addressed in the prior 
auditing literature dealing with the demand detenninants of professional services. The 
latter body of literature lacks a conceptual framework and is. therefore, fixated in the 
product market. The present study sought to close that hiatus and in doing so brought the 
demand determinant literature into the realm of the audit-NAS debate. The process was 
facilitated by adopting the resource-based (RB) theory of competitive advantage proY1ded 
in the strategic management literature, supported by literature dealing with the economic<; 
of transaction costs. The RB and transaction costs theories are compatible with the 
economics of audit quality literature dealing with the client specific assets. Thus, they 
facilitated adopting an integrated approach to examir .ng the benefits that may accrue from 
appointing the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS. The analysis was undertaken in the 
process of answering the fo)lc,wing descriptive research question. 
RQ3 \Vhat arc the nature and sources of the efficiencies that may 
accrue from appointing the incumbent audit firm to provide 
NAS? 
The foregoing question was addressed at both a general theoretical level and with specific 
reference to the present study. The major contribution of the research lies at the general 
theoretical level, spccitically. the integrated framework of the nature and sources of the 
efficiencies that may accrue from appointing the incumbent audit tinn, developed m 
Chapter 5 through the exploitation of the associated literatures. The framework 1s 
underpinned by the following series of related propositions: 
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( i) the nature of the efficiencies that may accrue from appointing the incumbent 
audit finn to provide NAS arc twofold, productive e_flicielll)' (the ratio of 
valuable input to valuable output) and savings in transaction costs; 
(ii) the sources of the efficiencies may he conceptualised at two levels - down­
stream at the product market in the fonn of finn specific and client specific 
assets vested in the provider; and up-stream of the product market at a 
conceptual level; 
at the product market level 
(iii) finn specific assets consist of tech110/ogical and contract11al assets; 
(a) technological resources consist of two asset types, distinctive expertise 
and information benefits; 
(b) contractual assets consist of two asset types, reputation and exclusivity; 
(iv) client specific assets consist of technological advantage and knowledge 
spi I lovers; and 
at the conceptual level 
( v) finn and client spcci fie assets derive, up stream, from three conceptual 
clements - processes, positions and paths - which are, in turn, defined by 
\ arious antecedents. 
The conceptual clement of immediate interest 10 this study was positions. The 
distinguishing attributes of the audit tim1. vis-a-vis the competing specialist NAS provider, 
arc antecedents of the clement. The antecedent -. conceptual clement _. product market 
relationship. taking into consideration the experimental setting. lead to the conclusion that 
the audit fim1 may be perceived to have the superior capacity to add value with respect to 
the fr11lowing asset types: 
Firm specific resources: 
(i) dis1i11ctfrc cxperlisc emanating from audit technology. subject to the nature 
of the NAS: 
(ii) infcm11atio11 hc11c/its emanating from multi-disciplinarity; and 
(iii) cxclu.\fri�,· emanating from incumhency and fonnal professional status. 
Client specific resources: 
(iv) client s11·i1clzi11g costs. emanating from incumbency. 
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Qualitati, e evidence on the latter set of propositions was obtained as an outcome of Study 
I. the first nf the two studies that comprised the empirical component of the thesis. 
STUDY 1 
Study I involved the use of verbal protocol analysis as a critical stage in the design of the 
data instruments used in the experimental component of the thesis, Study 2. 
Notwithstanding the broad principles of cost - benefit analysis, the economics of audit 
quality literature, the ACE literature and the theory of JR, which shaped the case studies, 
there is no definitive theory guiding the decision of whether to appoint the incumbent audit 
firm to provide NAS. Examining the decision choice involved exploratory research and 
culled for the design of an original set of data instruments. The advantage of protocol 
analysis under those circumstances is that as "'the ... protocols trace the decision-making 
process, they also explain it" (Kuusela et al., 2000, p. 388) - subject to the participants 
possessing the requisite knowledge. 
The protocol study was guided by the following research question: 
RQ4 Do the data instruments serve the researcher's communication 
goals'? 
The answer to the foregoing question lay in the match between the researcher's 
rep, esentation of the research problem expressed in the written case scenarios and the 
readers' representations of the problem expressed in their verbal protocols. The 
participants were experiem:ed corporate directors. The research problem concerned 
choosing between the incumbent audit firm and a specialist fim1 to provide NAS in 
circumstances where the fc.1llowing set of implicit conditions were to prevail: 
The demand for an independent audit was high (IR opportunity). 
The tlm::at to audit independence from self-interest emanating from the fees 
tc.1r recurring NAS was high (low) (IR incentives). 
The structural strength of the board of directors was strong (weak) (IR 
mitigation). 
The prospective providers were heterogeneous with respect to their capacity 
to add vnluc. 
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The results of the study suggest that the respective representations were for the most part 
consistent. The protocol data provided direct confinnatory evidence of the effectiveness of 
the cues associated with operationalising the foregoing dimensions of the implicit message, 
with the exception of IR incentives. The following accountability variables were addressed 
by directors in the process of undertaking the task: 
IR opportu11ity 
(i) the size and status of the client as a listed corporation, as the basis of the 
demand for an independent audit: 
(ii) performance based remuneration, as a source of managerial opportunism; 
Structural strength of the board of directors 
(iii) the ratio of non-executive to executive directors; 
(iv) the dominance of the CEO as board chainnan and his/her influence on the 
composition of the remainder of the board; 
(v) the qua! itications of the non-executive directors; 
Structural strength of the audit committee 
(vi) composition: expertise and independence; and 
(vii) resources: access to external and internal auditors. 
The following efficiency variables were also addressed by directors in the process of 
arriving at their decision. The finn specific assets, distinctive expertise and information 
hem/its, which are associated up-stream with the audit tinn attributes, audit technology 
and multi-disciplinarity, respectively; and the client-specific asset, scope of knowledge. 
However, the latter result is, arguably, anomalous rather than confinnatory due to the fact 
that the case studies involved the pro\'ision of the audit and NAS by separate divisions of 
the tinn i.e., the ex ante safeguard, separation of duties. 
Anomalies associated with the following issues significantly undennined the reader's 
comprehension and. therefore. the writer's communication goals: 
• the rationale fr1r choosing between the NAS proposals: 
o the description of the Ices accruing to the audit fim1 for the audit and NAS; and 
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• the siZL' llf the NAS fee. which evoked a perception of low hailing rather than 
the intended threat from the continuity of fees. 
The anomalies provided an important agent of change in the further development of the 
case studies vis-it-vis Study 2. 
Following on from the foregoing results, the principal limitation of Study I lies with the 
fact that the study was directed at evaluating a particular set of case studies, rather than 
identifying a general rule that holds for all such instruments, i.e., the results of the study 
lack generalisability. The contributions of the study to the broader literature, however, are 
twofold. Firstly. the exploitation of the reading comprehension and protocol literatures that 
provided the theoretical foundation for the study, introduces to the auditing literature the 
value of protocol analysis in the developmental life cycle of written data instruments. 
Secondly, thr results of the study demonstrate that protocol analysis is an appropriate 
method of inquiry in evaluating narrative case studies. 
The results of Study I, together with the issues surrounding the audit-NAS debate (Chapter 
2): prior empiril.al research (Chapter 3 ): the contemporary best practice - statute regulatory 
framework (Chapters 2 and 4); IR theory (Chapters 2 and 4): and the efficiencies that may 
ensue from appointing the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS (Chapter 5), provided the 
background to the experimental research undertaken in Study 2. 
STUDY 2 
Study 2 was designed to gain evidence on the two empirical research questions identified 
earlier in the Chapter. 
Research question I addressed the effect of the threat from recumng NAS and the 
structural strength of the board of directors on stakeholder (shareholder) perceptions of 
auditor independence. Shareholder pcrcept1uns of auditor independence were measured 
260 
using a 7-point rating scale ( I represented low auditl)r independence; 4, moderate; and 7, 
high auditor independence). 
Research question 2 addressed the effect of recurring NAS and the structural strength of 
the board of directors on stakeholder (shareholder) willingness to appoint the incumbent 
audit firm to provide NAS. The notion of willingness-to-appoint was opcrationalised by 
asking the participants to indicate the following: 
(i) whom they would choose to provide the NAS; and 
(ii) their strength of preference for the respective providers. 
The participants' choice of NAS provider was measured using a dichotomous (audit 
firm versus specialist finn) scale. The participants' strength of preference for the 
respective providers was measured using 7-point rating scales ( I represented weak 
strength of preference; 4, moderate; and 7, strong strength of preference). 
The two treatments were manipulated at two levels giving rise to a 2 x 2 (between subjects) 
design. The levels of financial threat from recurring NAS (self-intere�t .vere low and high. 
The low level of threat was operationalised via the provision of a single professional 
service. The high level of threat involved a consecutive, three-year follow-up period to the 
provision of the initial main service. which attracted an annual fee, and included the option 
to renew at the end of that period, exercisable at the discretion of the client's management. 
The structural strength of the board of directors variable was manipulated using a strong 
and weak fonn of the rekvant attributes. 
A summary of each research question and the hypotheses, measures of the participants' 
responses (statistics), statistical tests and main findings associated with each of the 
questions. is provided in Tables 63 and 64. beginning with research question I. 
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A discussion of the sets of main findings associated with each question follows the relevant 
Tables. However, the discussion of the implications of the results is postponed until the 
review of the findings is complete i.e., the discussion follows Table 64. 
TABLE 63: RQl and the hyeotheses, statistics, statistical tests and main findings 
RQI: Docs financial threat to auditor independence from recurring NAS and the structural strength of 
the board of directors affect stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence? 
H1&.i: Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence will be lower when the NAS is recurring than 
when it is non-recurring (the structural strength of the board of directors is weak than when it is 
strong). 
H1: Stakeholder perceptions of auditor independence are more likely to be affected by the recurring 
NAS when the structural strength of the board of directors is weak than when it is strong. 
Auditor Group I Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
independence Strong board of D Strong board of D Weak hoard ofD Weak board ofD 
non-recurrent fee recurrent fee non-recurrent fee recurrent fee 
Mean response 4.48 4.73 4.25 3.25 
(std dev) ( 1.60) ( 1.39) (.72) (.85) 
Statistical test: Two-way ANOV A . 
J\tain findings: 
The mean scores. with the exception of Group 2 relative to group 2. are in the hypothesised direction. 
Milin effects: 
The recurring NAS treatment was marginally significant with respect to its impact on participant 
perceptions of auditor independence [F (I. 79)= 1.994, p.�.081 J. !lid 
The. strength of the board of directors treatment. on the other hand. ,ignificantly impacted participant 
perceptions of auditor independence [ F( I. 79)= I 0.315. p.�.oo I]. 1114] 
lnteractio11 tffect: 
The results of the ANOV A also showed a significant interaction effect between the treatments 
[F( I .79)�5.564. p.= .0 I OJ. The results of the post-hoc analysis (Tu keys l·ISD tesl) of the interaction effect. 
indicate that the threat of self-interest significantly impacted participan1 perceptions of auditor independence 
when th:: N AS fee was recurring and the slrength of the br .rd of directors was weak (p. � .004 ). (111] 
The main effects associated with RQ I indicate that participant perceptions of auditor 
independence were adversely affected when the following conditions prevailed: 
o the NAS was recuning i.e., the threat of self-interest was high; and 
o the structural strength of the board of directors was weak. 
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Further, the results show that participant pcri,;cptiorrn of 11uditor independence were more 
likely to he 111Tected by recurring NAS where the Htrcnglh or the honrd of' clircctorn war; 
weak than when it wus strong. 
Altc111io11 1H1w turn� to Table M. P1111t:I A of Table (1·1 dcnls with the dependent vnriahle. 
choice of audit lirm: and panel B. strength or prcforcncc for !ht 1111dit linn. 
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TABLE 64: R 2 and the hv otheses, statistics, statistical test.,; and main findin s 
RQ2: Does financial threat to auditor independence from recurring NAS and the struLtural strength of 
the board of directors affect stakeholder \\ 11lingness to appoint the incumbent audit finn to 
rovide NAS'! 
Panel A: Choice o audit ,rm variahl,: 
----------,--------,--------:----:----,---:---::-----:---1 
111 & 5: Stakeholders will be !es� hkely to choose the audit !inn to provide the NAS when the NAS is 
recumng than \\ hen I! is non-rccumng { the structural strength of the board of directors is weak 
than when 11 ts strong). 
Stakeholder choice of the audit finn is more likely to be affected by the recurring NAS when the 
structural strength of the board of directors is weak than when it is strong. 
Choice of audit firm 
Mean response 
(std dcv) 
Response frequency - no· s 
(%) 
Group I Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Strong board of D Strong board of D Weak board of D Weak board of D 
non-recurrent fee recurrent fee non-recurrent fee 
.43 .23 .OS 
(.5 I) (.43) (.22) 
9 
(43%) I 
5 
(23%) 
I 
(5%) 
recurrent fee 
.00 
(.00) 
0 
(0%) 
Statistical tests: Two-way ANOV A. Chi-quare based on the above frequencies. 
Main findings: 
The mean scores ( frequencies) arc in the hypothesised direction. 
,\Jain effects: 
The ANOV A results indicate that the recurring NAS variable significantly impacted participants' choice of 
the audit firm to provide the NAS [F( l.79)=2.595. p=.056) IHzl: as did the strength of the board of directors 
variable [F( I. 79)= I� 084. p.=.000) IHsl-
The results of the Chi-Square test lend support for those obtained using ANOV A to the extent that the 
Yates· Correction for Continuity value for the strength of the board of directors variable was significant 
[CC( I)= 10.697. p.=-000]. The same statistic for the recurring NAS variable was marginally significant at 
p.=.116[CC( l)=l .422J.1Hsl 
Interaction effect: 
There was no significant interaction effect between the treaunents [F( I. 79)=.941, p.=.168]. 
Panel B: Strenf!th of preference for audit firm variable 
H., & b: Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit firm will be lower when the NAS is recurring 
than when it is non-recurring ( the structural strength of the board of directors is weak than when 
it is strong). 
H,f Stakeholder strength of preference for the audit firm is more likely to be affected by the recurring 
NAS when the structural strength of the board of directors is weak than \vhen it is strong. 
l 
Strength of preference 
for the audit firm 
Mean response 
(std dev) 
! Group I i Group 2 i Group 3 Group 4 
Strong board ofD Strongboard ofD 1 W<..-ak board ofD Weakboard ofD 
non-recurrent fee 
4.29 
( 1.68) 
recurrent fee 
3.86 
( 1.39) 
non-recurrent fee 
2.85 
(.93) 
recurrent fee 
3.05 
( 1.00) 
Statistical test: Two-way ANOV A. 
I Main findings: 
The mean scores. with the exception of group 4 relative to group 3. are in the hypothesised direction. 
,\Jain effects: 
The ANO\ A results md1cate that the participanL-. strength of preference for the audit firm to provide the 
NAS was significantly impacted by the strength of the board of directors variable [F( I, 79)= I 5.639. p.=.000]. I 
l-!!%ever. the result for the recurring NAS variable was not significant [F( I, 79)=.152, p.=.348J.:JH3) 
lllteraction effect: 
There was no si •nificant interaction effect between the treatments [F( I. 79)"' 1.196, .=.138 . IH9l 
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The foregoing willingness-lo-appoint results indicate that the participants were less 
likely to choose the audit tim1. and their strength of preference for the audit fim1 was 
adversely affected when the NAS was recurring and the strength of the board of 
dire1.:tors was weak. 
The signi ti cant mam effects asso1.:iated with participant perceptions of auditor 
independence and willingness to appoint the incumbent audit fim1 to provide NAS 
variables. lend support for the various frameworks that provided the theoretical 
foundation of the hypotheses. The frameworks include with respect to the recurring 
NAS rnriahle. the economics of audit quality (analytical and empirical) and the 
Australian professional best practice literatures: and vJith respect to the structural 
strength of the board of directors. the audit committee effectiveness (ACE) literature, 
empirical and hcst-practice. The results of the regression analysis, undertaken as part of 
the post-experimental questionnaire. of the relation between perceived strength of 
corporate governance and the structural attributes thJ·board of directors deployed in the 
study. also provided support for the ACE literature. 
The results also lend support for the Mock ct al. (2005) model of the problem of 
interring independence risk. which underpins the overall framework of the study. The 
most signi ti cant result in that respect lies with the interaction effect, which shows that 
the pcn.:eption of auditor independence was more likely to he affected by recurring NAS 
where the structural strength of the board of directors was weak than when it was 
strong. r-rom the perspective of the model. that is the point at which :-1:-opagation from 
IR incentives to IR attitude and IR opportunity (specifically. managerial opportunism) is 
more likely to occur. 
The focus of Study 2 was on issues of accountability. However, early 111 the thesis it was 
suggested that the net henclits of hiring the incumhent audit tim1 arc a function of 
pen.:cin:d auditor independence (accountability) and the perceived benefits of hiring the 
111cumbent audit tinn to prm·idc NAS (efticiem.:y). Thus. it was anticipated that there 
may he a positi,·e correlation between the choi1.:c of audit tinn and perceived net 
benefits. The relation was examined using Speannan 's Rank Order Correlation test. The 
results of the test showed a strong. positive correlation between the variables [r.=.570. 
(tF83, r -=.000) i.e .. the choice of audit firn1 was associated with higher levels of 
perceived net benefits. 
Finally. the major limitation of Study 2. as with Study I. concerns the generalisability of 
the results. The sample of shareholders may not be representative of the Australian 
shareholder population. The sample is comparatively small (83 observations) and fifty 
four percent of the participants reside in Western Austrnlia. 
Opportunities for further research 
Opportunities for further research arising from the thesis lie in the areas of efficiency 
and accountability. Australian regulators have not placed a blanket prohibition on the 
provision of NAS by external audit firms to the extent that efficiency may prevail where 
accountability is met. From the perspective of the market players, including directors, 
given the current sensitivity to the market. such an outcome might only proceed in the 
knowledge of what constitutes an acceptable safeguard of auditor independence in the 
eyes of investors. The contemporary regulatory regime has spawned a plethora of 
safeguards of auditor independence about whose acceptability to the equity market little 
is known. Citing JUst a few of the many examples identified in PF I, the safeguards 
include the following: 
(i) from the perspective of the audit finn, disciplinary mechanisms to 
promote compliance with policies an� procedures, and i:1volving another 
tinn to rc-perfonn the non-assurance engagement; 
(ii) from the perspective of the audit client. policies and procedures that 
emphasise the assurance clien: 's commitment to fair financial 
reporting. and internal procedures that ensure objective choices in 
commissioning non-assurance engagements: and 
(iii) from the broader regulatory environment, the external review of an 
audit tinn 's quality control systems. 
Howc\'l.:r. the question of the acceptahility of any safeguard of auditor independence, in 
the face of signitkant threat arising from the provision of NAS, only becomes relevant 
where the audit tinn in all other respe.:ts represents the least cost/largest net gain to the 
client \'is-ii-vis rival providers. Thus. it is suggcstc 1 •.hat future user-based studies of the 
a1.:ceptability of safeguards of auditor independence ought to take place in the context of 
the eflkiency - acwuntability (IR) dilcmma. particularly in relation to shareholders, as 
residual claimants. This might include taking a more overt/salient approach to audit firm 
eflicicncy than that reflected in the experimental setting for the present study. For 
example, a monetary value might be placed on the net gain (accountability aside) that 
would ensue from appointing the i11cumbent auditor to provide NAS relative to the 
competitor(s). 
The acceptability of safeguards ought also to be tested from the perspective of the 
\'arious frmns of threat. i.e .. self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and 
intimidation. It would be interesting in the light of the results of this study to test the 
signalling quality of the structural strength of the board of directors where the threat 
emanating from NAS involved self-review. Self-review represents a more subtle threat 
to auditor inderendence than wealth incentives. and does not rely for its effect on the 
exercise of managerial opportunism. The threat places in question a board's capacity to 
more directly control IR attitude. 
Further, \vith respect to the role .Jf the board of directors as a safeguard of auditor 
independence. there is considerable debate as to whether structural attributes or the 
social dynamics of a board are the key to effectiveness. The structural attributes versus 
social dynamics issue. represents an interesting area for research, internationally. From 
the perspective of the present study. the issue leads to the question of the acceptability 
(signalling quality) of the separate sets ;if attributes to the equity market as safeguards 
of auditor independern.:e. 
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Conclusion 
The overall importance of this study lies in the fact that it has the capacity to extend our 
understanding of issues that arc central to the debate surrounding the joint provision of 
the audit and NAS: 
(i) the threat to perceived auditor independence from client specific investment, 
approximated by recurring NAS: 
(ii) the assurance properties of the structural strength of the board of directors as 
a signal of board effectiveness in the discharge of its responsibility for the 
integrity of the external audit; and 
( iii) the issue of the efficiencies that may ensue from appointing the incumbent 
audit firm to provide NAS. 
Theory tells us that item (i) is at the heart of the threat to auditor independence from 
self-interest as it relates to the provision of NAS. The Australian government has also 
identified financial incentives as the overriding threat to auditor independence from the 
provision of NAS to audit clients. With respect to item (ii), the board of the directors 
(audit committee) is at the pinnacle of the network of safeguards of auditor 
independence within the Australian regulatory best practice - statute framework that has 
been established to preserve auditor indepe11dence. The empirical results of the research 
suggest that items (i) and (ii) impact the perception of auditor independence, a 
necessary condition of auditor independence and, similarly. stakeholder willingness to 
appoint the incumbent audit finn to provide NAS. 
Further. with respect item (iii) the debate sunounding the joint provision of the audit 
and NAS is ultimately concerned with the costs and benefits associated with safeguards 
of auditor independence i.e .. the benefits of reduced independence risk versus the costs 
of any economic efficiencies foregone. The issue of the costs of safeguards is a basic 
tenet to be considered by independence decision makers, notwithstanding the status of 
the decision maker e.g., regulatory authority and directors. The current study sought to 
advance our theoretical understanding of the indirect costs of reduced independence risk 
(safeguards) as they relate to the etliciencies that may ensue from appointing the 
2n8 
incumbent audit finn to provide NAS. Preliminary qualitative evidence on the matter 
was also obtained as part of Study I. 
Thus. taking into consideration the significance of the issues addressed in this study to 
the debate surrounding the joint provision of the audit and NAS, and the evidence 
obtained. it is concluded that the research has a valuable contributi011 to make to the 
academic literature. and to those parties who have a vested interest in the debate e.g., 
the auditing profession. other regulators, audit firms and audit clients. 
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APPENDIX A: Protocol analysis Case study I/Protocol 1. Code: 1.1.1 
Professional Service Providers Study 
Dear Participant: 
Thank you !<.1f participating in this study. The purpose of the study is to gain an 
understanding of factors that directors consider impot1ant when a corporation is faced 
with the task of choosing hetwccn alternative providers of professional si..:rvices. 
You will be provided with a description of a corporation, Baudin Ltd. which has recently 
adopted the principle of sustainable development, with respect to employee health and 
safety and the natural environment. The corporation has called fix proposals to assist in 
the development and implementation of key health. sati.:ty and environme11tal 
performance indicators. and in the pn.:paration of the im1uhrural annual sustainable 
development report to external stakeholder.,;, as part of the overall initiative. The final 
stage in the selection process has been reached, where the choice is to be made between 
the remaining two comcnders: the current external audit tim1 and a sp1xialist pmvider. 
You will be asked to answer the following four questions on the hasis of the case 
description: 
I. What factors do you consider arc important in choosing between altcm.:1tivc 
service pn)\"iders in circtm1stances 'iUCh as those faring Baud in Ltd'? 
2. Whom would you choose to pmvidc the service'! 
3. What is the stICngth of your preference fort hc alternative pro\'idcrs'! 
4. Wlrnt facto� account for your preference for one provider o,·er the otl1Li·'.' 
In addition, we ask that you perfonn the task through a technique referred to as "verbal 
protocol analysis". The technique involves capturing your thoughts as you consider the 
infomiation provided in the case study in the process of arriving at your answers. Thus. 
we ask that you speak aloud all of your thoughts as you Wtlrk on the problem. We will 
tape record your responses to e11-;ure that we have an accurate record of your thoughts. 
We arc interested in your judgement based on your standing as a director. Please note 
that there is no correct or incoiTcct answer. You can he assurL'(I that your identity will 
remain anonymous. Individual responses \\ ill not be knm\11 to anyone other than the 
members of the research team. Thc aggregate results of all pai1ieipants in the study only 
will be reported. 
Thank you once again for participating in this study. 
Colleen Hayes. Edi1h Cowan llni\crsity 
Professor Gary Monroe. Edith (\,wan Um crsity 
Professor Theodore Mod,. University or Southern Caliltm1ia 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation. with an annual sales turnover of 
approximately S5 hillil,n. The company. founded in 1978. is headquartered in Sydney. 
and it employs approximately 9.400 people worldwidl.!. Baudin is primarily involved in 
the manufacture of chemical products for use in mining. ag1iculture. industry and the 
consumer sector. The products an: sold both domt.:stically and overseas. The company, 
which is publicly traded. has a diversified shareholder hasc and no group of shareholders 
holds any significant influence. 
The entity is govem�d by a ten-member Board of Directors. comprised of three executive 
members. including the company's Chief Executive Otfo.:er. and seven non-executive 
members. The Chainnan of the Board i!; a non-executive director. The Board is assisted 
in the discharge of its duties by a number of sub-committees. all of whom are 
accountable to the Board. Thi.! nomination of members to the Board. is the responsibility 
of a Nominations Committee. which is comprised of three non-executive directors. 
The non-executive members of the Board. with the exception of their positions as 
Directors of the company. have never been employed by Baud in Ltd. and neither they nor 
any of their respective family members. have any financial dealings or other contmctual 
arrangements with the corporation. 
The Board is assisted in the execution llf its accounting and auditing responsibilities. by 
an Audit Committee. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of non-executive 
directors. Two of the Committee members hold senior Australian professional accounting 
qualitit:ations. The role of the Committee is as foliows: 
I. to advise on th!.! establishment and maintemmce of a framework of internal 
control and appropriate ethical standards ti)r the management of the company. 
Thus. it assist-; the Board in ti.Jltilling its responsibilities for the quality and 
reliahility of financial infonnation. including reporting in financial statements; 
'> to monitor the management of identified risks. idcntify any new risks and 
recommend action to he taken for their control: 
3. to review the scope of the external audit. and to review findings and issues 
brought to its attention; and 
4. to reviev,' the appointment and remuneration of the 1.:xtemal auditors. 
The Audit Committee meets with the external and internal auditots and sernor 
management to review the half yearly and annual financial statl.!ments and reports. and al 
such other times as ma:. he necessary to consider specific issues or matters which may 
arise from the internal and external audit process. The external auditors have direct 
access to the Committee. if nccessa'.)', without management involvl.!ment. The 
Committee reports to the Board afler each Committee meeting. 
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Baudin Ltd's senior executive management ha� an average of ten years experience with 
the organisation. The current senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed and 
variable components. The fixed component comprises a salary. supcmnnuation 
contributions. and vehicle related benefits. The va1iable component comprises an annual 
cash incentive bonus. payable on the achievement of corporntc profitability targets. The 
remuneration package also includes an executive share option plan. The options arc 
exercisable upon achievement of earnings per share (EPS) growth at 5'Yo per annum. The 
first trnnche of options is exercisable on 31 December 2002. 
Baudin Ltd expcricnccd a modest growth in profit before tax in the five years to the 30 
June 2001, notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
Management believes, given cu1Tent social trends. that implementing and promoting 
socially responsible principles \viii be important in maintaining a competitive advantage. 
operntionally and tin�ncially. in the industry in future. Thus. the company has made a 
public commitment to integrate sustainable development ptinciples into its business 
policies, with specific reference to employee health and safety, and the natural 
enviromm.'I1t. The company's public commitment to the policy will be underpinned by 
publishing a sustainable development report. as part of its annual reporting obligations to 
shareholders. The company's cuncnt external auditor will audit the report. 
Senior Management. acting with the approval of the Board of Dire<.:tors. has. to date, 
undertaken the following steps to implement the strntcgy. 
Three sustainable development consultants, including the company's current external 
audit finn. were approached to prepare submissio11� to Baudin Ltd identifying (i) 
proposLxl key perfonnance indicators of employee health and safety and the natural 
environment. which will limn part of its sustainable development fr,1111ework: and (ii) a 
proposal for assisting management in the implementation of the perfl)m1ance indicators 
and in the preparation of the inaugural annual sustainable development report to external 
stakeholders. The perfr.)m1ance indicators will form the foundation of the annual 
sustainable development report. 
Submissions were sought from three different sources in order to gain an appreciation of 
the nature and quality of the service ,1vailabk in the marketplace and. at the same time. 
fomrnlate the needs of the <.ompany. The service providei:; were selected on the basis of 
their reputation fr1r excellence in tl1e pnwision of all facets of the service sought. 
The initial criterion frx choosing between the proposals. centred on the case with which 
the perfonnancc indicators wuld be integrated into management's cun-ent planning and 
control processes. On that basis. the final choice of scn:ice providers has been reduced to 
two candidates: the current external audit firm and a specialist sustainable development 
consultancy finn. 
Baudin Ltd's current auditor is a member of the Big 5 audit tinns. and has audited Baud in 
Ltd's financial statements for five years. The auditor is an expert in the industry in which 
the company operates. 
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The sustainable development consultancy di\'ision of the audit tim1 has been solely 
responsible fr1r the submission. and will be solely responsible for carrying out the project 
in the cv1.:nt that its proposal is accepted. The division was established in 1997 and its 
staf
f 
is hoth reputable and expert in the field. and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd 
operates. The audit firm's price for providing the {Wcmll service is S 125.000. 
The total fees paid by Baudin Ltd to the audit tinn. for all services, will represent 5% of 
the average annual revenue of the local audit otlice, in the event that the current 
submission is successful. The total annual audit fee will be $580,000. The audit fim, 
also provides on-going taxation and superannuation consultancy services to the company. 
The fees for all non-audit services wi II be $1.450.000. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading specialist sustainable development 
consultam.·y fim,s in Australia. The finn has been solely responsible for the submission.. 
and will be solely n:sponsible for carrying out the project in the event that its proposal is 
accepted. The finn w;1s established in 1997, and its staff is both reputable and expert in 
the field. and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. The finn's price for providing 
the overall service is S 120,000. The figure will represent 9% of the average annual 
revenue of the local otli-:c, in the event that thc submission is successful. 
Whilst the two subm.ssions differ significantly on certain detail. management considers 
that they arc equally meritorious with respect to the standard and suitability of what is 
proposed. Further. it considers that the operating capacity of hnth contenders is 
appropriate for the task. 
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Professional Service Providers Study 
Dear Participant: 
Thank you for participating in this stu<ly. The purpose of the study is to gain an 
understanding of factors that directors consider important when a corporation is faced 
with the task of choosing octween altemative providers of professional services. 
You will be provided with a desc1ipt1on of a corporation, Baudin Ltd, which has recently 
adopted the principle of sustainable development. with respect to employee health and 
safety and the natural environment The corporation has called for proposals to assist in 
the development and implementation of key health, safety and environmental 
performance indicators, and in the preparation of the inauh>ural annual sustainable 
development report to external stakeholders, as part of the overall initiative. The final 
stage in the selection process has been reached, when: the choice is to be made between 
the remaining two contenders: the current external audit finn and a specialist provider. 
You will be asked to answer the following four questions on the basis of the case 
description: 
I. What factors do you consider arc important in choosing between alternative 
service providers in circumstances such as those facing Baud in Ltd'? 
2. Whom would you choose to provide the service'? 
3. What is the strength of your preference fr)r the alternative providers? 
4. What factors account for your preference for one provider over the other? 
In addition, we ask that you perfom1 the task through a technique referred to as "verbal 
protocol analysis". The technique involves capturing your thoughts as you consider the 
infonnation provided in the case study in the process of arriving at your answers. Thus, 
we ask that you speak aloud all of your thoughts as you work on the problem. We will 
tape record your responses to ensure that we have an accurate record of your thoughts. 
We are interested in your judgement based on your standing as a director. Please note 
that there is no cotTect or incoITect answer. You can be assured that your identity will 
remain anonymous. Individual responses will not be known to anyone other than the 
members of the research team. The aggregate results of all participants in the study only 
will be reported. 
Thank you once again for pa1·ticipating in this study. 
Colh:en Hayes. E�hth Cowan lJni\'ersity 
Professor Gary Monroe. Edith Cowan Universi1y 
Professor Theodore l\fock. University of Southern California 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation. with an annual sales turnover of 
approximately S5 bill1lm. The company. founded in 1978, is headquartered in Sydney, 
and it emr!oys approximately 9,400 people worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved in 
the manufacture of chemi...:al products for use in mining, agriculture, industry and the 
consumer sector. The products are sold both domestically and overseas. The company, 
which is publicly traded. has a diversified shareholder base and no group of shareholders 
holds any significant influence. 
The entity is governed by a ten-member Board of Directors, comprised of three executive 
members, including the company's Chief Executive Officer. and seven non-executive 
members. The Chairman of the Board is a non-executive director. The Board is assisted 
in the discharge of its duties by a number of sub-committees, all of whom are 
accountable to the Board. The nomination of member., to the Board is the responsibility 
of a Nominations Committee, which is comprised of three non-executive directors. 
The non-executive members of the Board. with the exception of their positions as 
Directors of the company. have never been employed by Baud in Ltd, and neither they nor 
any of their respective family members, have any financial dealings or other contractual 
anangcments with the corporation. 
The Board is assisted in the execution of its accounting and auditing responsibilities, by 
an Audit Committee. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of non-executive 
directors. Two of the Committee members hold senior Austrnlian professional accounting 
qualification·,. The role of the Committee is as follows: 
I. to advise on the establishment and maintenance of a framework of internal 
control and approp1iate ethical standards tcx the management of the company. 
Thus. it assists the Board in fulfilling its responsibilities for the quality and 
reliability of financial infom1ation, including reporting in financial statements; 
2. to monitor the management of identified risks, identify any new risks and 
recommend action to be taken for their control: 
3. to review the scope of the external audit. and to review findings and issues 
brought to its attention: and 
4. to reviev,1 the appointment and remuneration of the external auditors. 
The Audit Committee meets with the external and internal auditors and semor 
management to review the half yearly and annual financial statements and reports, and at 
such other times as may be necessary to consider speci fie issues or matters which may 
arise from the internal and external audit process. The extemal auditors have direct 
access to the Committee. if necessaty, without management involvement. The 
Committee reports to the Board after each Committee meeting. 
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Baudin Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years experience with 
the organisation. The current senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed and 
variable components. The fixed component comprises a salary, supcrnnnuation 
contributions, and vehicle related benefits. The vmiable component comprises an annual 
c,L<;h incentive bonus, payable on the achievement of crnvorate profitability targets. The 
remuneration package also includes an executive share option plan. The options are 
exercisable upon achievement of earnings per share (EPS) gnm1h at 5% per annum. The 
first trnnche of options is exercisable on 31 December 2002. 
Baudin Ltd experienced a modest gro\\1h in profit before tax in the five years to the 30 
June 2001, notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
Management believes, given current social trends, that implementing and promoting 
socially responsible principles will be important in maintaining a competitive advantage, 
operationally and financially, in the industry in future. Thus, the company has made a 
public commitment to intebr ate sustainable development principles into its business 
policies, with specific reference to employee health and safety, and the natural 
environment. The company's public commitment to the policy will be underpinned by 
publishing a sustainable development report, as part of its annual reporting obligations to 
shareholders. The company's current external auditor will audit the report. 
Senior Management. acting with the approval of the Board of Directors, has, to date, 
undertake11 the following steps to implement the strategy. 
Three sustainable development consultants, including the company's current external 
audit fim1, were approached to prepare submissions to Baudin Ltd identifying (i) 
proposed key perfomrnnce indicators of employee health and safety and the natural 
environment. which will fonn part of its sustainable development framework; and (ii) a 
proposal for assisting management in the implementation of the perfonnance indicators 
and in the preparation of the annual sustainable development report to external 
stakeholders. The perfor111ancc indicators will fonn the foundation of the annual 
sustainable development report. The successful contender will assist in the preparation of 
the rep01t for the first three years, with an option to renew at the end of that time at the 
discretion of Baudin Ltd. 
Submissions were sought from three different sources in order to gain an appreciation of 
the nature and quality of the service available in the marketplace and, at the same time, 
fonnulate the needs of the company. The service providers were selected on the basis of 
their reputation for excellence in the provision of all facets of the service sought. 
The initial criterion fi-1r choosing betv,:een the proposals, centred on the case with which 
the performance indicators could he inte!:,r ated into management's current planning and 
control processes. On that basis. the final choice of service providers has been reduced to 
two candidates: the current external audit fo111 and a specialist sustainable development 
consultancy fim1. 
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Baudin Ltd's current auditor is a member of the Big 5 audit foms, and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for five years. The auditor is an expert in the industry in which 
the company operates. 
The sustainable development consultancy division of the audit firm has been solely 
responsible for the submission, and will be solely responsible for carrying out the project 
in the event that its proposal is accepted The ciivision was established in 1997 and its 
stc:iff is both reputable and expert in the field, and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd 
operates. The audit film's price for providing the overall service is $125,000. 
The total fees paid by Baudin Ltd to the audit firm, for all services, will represent 5% of 
the average annual revenue of the local audit otlice, in the event that the current 
submission is successful. The tot,ll annual audit fee will be $580,000. The audit firm 
also provides on-going taxation and superannuation consultancy services to the company. 
The fees for all non-audit services will be $1,450,000. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading specialist sustainable development 
consultancy firms in Australia. The firm has been solely responsible for the submission, 
and will be solely responsible for carrying out the project in the event that its proposal is 
accepted. The fom was established in 1997, and its staff is both reputable and expert in 
the field, and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. The firm's price for providing 
the overall service is S 120,000. The figure will represent 9% of the average annual 
revenue of the local ot1ice, in the event that the submission is successful. 
Whilst the two submissions differ significantly on certain detail, management considers 
that they are equally meritorious with respect to the standard and suitability of what is 
proposed. Further, it consider.:; that the operating capacity of both contenders is 
appropriate for the task. 
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Profes sional Service Providers Study 
Dear Participant: 
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the study is to gain an 
understanding of factors that directors consider important when a corporation is faced 
with the task of choosing between alternative providers of professional services. 
You will be provided with a description of a corporation, Baud in Ltd, which has recently 
adopted the principle of sustainable development, with respect to employee health and 
safety and the natural environment. The corporation has called for proposals to assist in 
the development and implementation of key health, safety and environmental 
perfo1mance indicators, and in the preparation of the inau!:,iural annual sustainable 
development report to external stakeholders, as part of the overall initiative. The final 
stage in the selection process has been reached, where the choice is to be made between 
the remaining two contenders: the cWTent external audit firm and a specialist provider. 
You will be asked to answer the following four questions on the basis of the case 
description: 
I. What factors do you consider are important in choosing between alternative 
service providers in circumstance<; such as those facing Baud in Ltd? 
2. Whom would you choose to provide the se1Yice? 
3. What is the strength of your preference for the alternative providers? 
4. What factors account for your preference for one provider over the other? 
In addition, we ask that you perfo1m the task through a technique referred to as "verbal 
protocol analysis". The technique involves capturing your thoughts as you consider the 
information provided in the case study in the process of aniving at your answers. Thus, 
we ask that you speak aloud all of your thoughts as you work on the problem. We will 
tape record your responses to ensure that we have an accurate record of your thoughts. 
We arc interested in your judgement based on your standing as a director. Please note 
that there is no correct or incorrect answer. You can be assured that your identity will 
remain anonymous. Individual responses will not he kncwn to anyone other than the 
members of the research team. The aggregate results of all participants in the study only 
will be reported. 
Thank you once again for participating in this s tudy. 
Colleen Hayes. Edith Cowan L'niversity 
Professor Gary Monroe. Edith Cowan University 
Professor Theodore Mock. Uni,ersity of Southern California 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation, with an annual sales turnover of 
approximately $5 billion. The company, founded in 1978, is headquartered in Sydney, 
and it employs approximately 9,400 people worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved in 
the manufacture of chemical products for use in mining, ag1iculture, industry and the 
consumer sector. The products are sold both domestically and overseas. The company, 
which is publicly tmded, has a diversi tied shareholder base and no group of shareholders 
holds any significant influence. 
The entity is governed by a ten-member Board of Directors, comprised of six executive 
members, including the company's Chief Executive Officer, and four non-executive 
members. The Chief Executive Officer is the Chairman of the Board. The Chairman has 
significant input into the nomination of members to the Board. The Board is assisted in 
the dischar6,e of its duties by a number of sub-committees, all of whom are accountable 
to the Boa!d. 
The Board is assisted in the execution of its accounting and auditing responsibilities. by 
an Audit Committee. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of two non­
executive directors and one executive director, who chairs the Committee. The executive 
director, unlike the non-executive directors, holds an Australian professional accounting 
qualificatiort The role of the Committee is to advise on the establishment and 
maintenance of a framework of internal control; and, in that way, it assists the Board in 
fulfilling its responsibilities for the quality and reliability of financial infom,ation, 
including reporting in financial statements. The Committee meets once every four 
months. The internal and external auditors are invited to meetings at the discretion of the 
Committee. The Committee reports to the Bomd after each Committee meeting 
Baudin Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years experience with 
the organisation. The cu1Tent senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed and 
variable components. The fixed component comprises a salary, superannuation 
contributions, and vehicle related benefits. The variable component comprises an annual 
ca<;h incentive bonus, payable on the achievement of corpomtc profitability targets. The 
remuneration package also includes an executive share option plan. The options are 
exercisable upon achievement of earnings per share (EPS) gro\\1h at 5% per annum. The 
first tranche of options is exercisable on 31 December 2002. 
Baudin Ltd expe1ienced a modest growth in profit before tax in the five years to the 30 
June 2001, notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
Management believes, given cun-ent social trends, that implementing and promoting 
socially responsible principles will be impo1tant in maintaining a competitive advantage, 
operationally and financially, in the industry in future. Thus, the company has made a 
public commitment to integrate sustainable development principles into its business 
policies, with specific reference to er11ployee health and safety, and the natural 
environment. The company's public commitment to the policy will be underpinned by 
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publishing a sustainable development report, as part of its annual reporting obligations to 
shareholders. The company's current external auditor will audit the report. 
Senior Management, acting with the approval of the Board of Directors, has, to date, 
undertaken the following steps to implement :he strategy. 
Three sustainable development consultants, including the company's current external 
audit finn, were approached to prepare submissions to Baudin Ltd identifying (i) 
proposed key perto1mance indicators of e111ployec health and safety and the natural 
environment, which viii fonn part of its sustainable development framework; and (ii) a 
proposal for assisting management in the implementation of the perfonnance indicators 
and in the preparation of the inaugural annual sustainable developmenfreport to external 
stakeholders. The perfonnance indicators will fonn the foundation of the annual 
sustainable development report. 
Submissions were sought from three different sources in order to gain an appreciation of 
the nature a,nd quality of the service available in the marketplace and, at the same time, 
fonnulate the needs of the company. The service providers were selected on the basis of 
their reputation for excellence in the provision of all facets of the service sought. 
The initial criterion for choosing between the proposals, centred on the ease with which 
the perfom1ance indicators could be inte1:,1Tated into management's current plmming and 
control processes. On that basis, the final choice of service providers has been reduced to 
two candidates: the current external audit finn and a specialist sustainable development 
consultancy firm. 
Baudin Ltd's current auditor is a member of the Big 5 audit firms, and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for five years. The auditor is an expert in the industry in which 
the company operates. 
The sustainable development consultancy division 0f the audit firm has been solely 
responsible for the submission, and will be solely responsible for carrying out the project 
in the event that its proposal is accepted The division was established in 1997 and its 
staff is both reputable and expert in the field, and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd 
operates. The audit film's price for providing the overall service is S 125,000. 
The total fees paid by Baudin Ltd to the audit tinn, for all services, will represent 5% of 
the average annual revenue of the local audit otlice, in the event that the current 
submission is successful. The total annual audit fee will be $580,000. The audit firm 
also provides on-going taxation and superannuation consultancy ser1ices to the company. 
The foes for all non-audit services will be $1,450,000. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading specialist sustainable development 
consultancy finns in Australia. The finn has been solely responsible for the submission, 
and will be solely responsible for carrying out the project in the event that its proposal is 
accepted. The firm was established in 1997, and its staff is both reputable and expert in 
the field, and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. The firm's price for providing 
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the overall service is S120,000. The figure will represent 9% of the average annual 
revenue of the local office, in the event that the submission is successful. 
Whilst the two submissions differ significantly on certain detail. management considers 
that they arc equally mc1itrnious with respect to the standard and suitability of what is 
proposed. Further. it considers that the operating capacity of both contenders is 
appropriate for the task. 
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Profossi onal Service Providers Study 
Dear Participant: 
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the study is to gam an 
understanding of factors that directors consider important when a corporation is faced 
with the task of choosing between alternative providers of professional services. 
You will be provided with a descri!)tion of a corporation. Baudin Ltd. which has recently 
decided to alter the configuratio:1 of its existing computer software. to integrate its 
accounting function with other major functions such as materials acquisition. production 
and human resources. The corporation has called for proposals to undertake the re­
engineering process. as part of the overall initiative. The final stage in the selection 
process has been reached. where the choice is to be made between the remaining two 
contenders: the cun-ent external audit fim1 and a specialist provider. 
You will be asked to answer the following four questions on the basis of the case 
description: 
I. What factors do you consider are important in choosing between alternative 
service providers in circumstances such as those facing Baudin Ltd? 
2. Whom would you choose to provide the service? 
3. What is the strength of your preference for the alternative providers? 
4. What factors account for your pref erencc for one provider over the other? 
In addition. we ask that you perfoffn the task through a technique refcn-ed to as "verbal 
protocol analysis". The technique involves capturing your thoughts as you consider the 
infomrntion pmvided in the case study in the process of arriving at your answers. Thus, 
we ask that you speak aloud all of your thoughts as you work on the problem. We will 
tape record your responses to ensure that we have an accurate record of your thoughts. 
We are interested in your judgement based on your standing as a director. Please note 
that there is no correct or incorrect answer. You can be assured that your identity will 
remain anonymous. Individual responses will not he known to anyone other than the 
members of the research team. The aggregate results of all participants in the study only 
will be r�ported. 
Thank you once again for participating in this study. 
Colleen Hayes. Edith Cowan University 
Professor Gary Monroe. Edith Cowan University 
Professor Theodore Mock. University of Southern California 
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CASE STUD\' 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation. with an annual sales turnover of 
approximately SS hillion. The company. founded in 1978. is headquai1ercd in Sydney. 
and it employs approximately 9.400 people worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved in 
the manufacture or chemical prodw.:ts for use in mining. agriculture. industry and the 
consumer sector. The products arc sold hoth domestically and overseas. The company. 
which is puhlicly traded. has a diversilicd slrnreholdcr hasc and no group of shareholders 
holds any significant influence. 
The entity is governed by a ten-memhc. Board of Directors. comprised or three executive 
members. including the company's Chier Executive Officer. and seven non-c:<ccutive 
members. The Chainnan of the Board is a non-executive director. The Board is assisted 
in the discharge of its duties by a numher of sub-committe1.:s. all of whom arc 
accountable to the Board. The nomination or members to the Bt)ard is the responsibility 
of a Nominations Commillcl!. which is comprised of three non-executive directors. 
The non-executive members of the Board. with the exception of their positions as 
Directors of the company. have never been employed by Baudin Ltd. and neither they nor 
any of their respective family members. have any financial dealings or other contractual 
arrangements with the corporation. 
The Board is assisted in the execution or its accounting and auditing responsibilities. by 
an Audit Committee. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of non-executive 
directors. Two of the Committee members hold senior Australian professional accounting 
qualifications. The role of the Committee is as follows: 
I. to advise on the establishment and maintenance or a framework of internal 
control and appropriate ethical standards for the management of the company. 
Thus. It assists �he Board in fulfilling its responsibilities for the quality and 
reliability of financial inforrnation. including reporting in financial statements: 
2. to monitor the management of identified risks. identify any new risks and 
recommend action to be taken for their control: 
3. to review the scope of the external audit. and to review findings and issues 
brought to its attention: and 
4. to review the appointment and remuneration of the external auditors. 
The Audit Committee meets with the external and internal auditors and semor 
management to review the half yearly and annual financial statements and reports. and at 
such other times as may be necessary to consider specific issues or matters which may 
arise from the internal and external audit process. The external auditors have direct 
access to the Committee, if necessary. without management involvement. The 
Committee reports to the Board after each Committee meeting. 
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Baudin Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years cxpctience with 
the organisation. The cutTcnt senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed and 
variable components. The fixed component comprises a salary. superannuation 
contributions, and vehicle related benefits. The variable component comprises an annual 
cash inccnti\'C bonus. payable on the achievement of corporate profitability targets. The 
remuneration p,1ckugc also includes an executive share option plan. The options are 
exercisable upon achievement of earnings per share (EPS) growth at 51Yo per annum. The 
first tranche of options is exercisable on 31 December 2002. 
Baudin Ltd experienced a modest growth in prntit before tax in the five years to the 30 
June 200 l, notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
Management believes that signifi1.:ant eflicicncies can be achieved in the future through 
adapting the company's existing computer software to integrate the company's 
accounting function with other major functions such as materials acquisition, production 
and human resources. The adaptation will si!:,111ificantly reduce information processing 
costs and speed up info1mation processing and updating. leading to improved internal 
decision making, and, ultimately, improved financial perfonnance. 
Senior Management. acting with the approval of the Board or Directors. has. to date. 
undertaken the following steps to implement the strategy. 
Given the lack of internal expertise in the area. three infom1ation systems consultants. 
including the company's current external audit finn. were approached to submit 
proposals to Baudin Ltd to undertake the necessary re-configuration of its software. The 
successful contender will also be responsible for maintaining. and. in consultation with 
Baudin Ltd. upgrading if necessary. the configuration or the company's software for a 
period of three years. with the option to renew at the end or th,11 period at the discretion 
of Baudin Ltd. 
Submissions were sought from three different sources in order to gain an appreciation of 
the nature and quality of the service available in the marketplace and. at the same time, 
formulate the needs of the company. The service providers were selected on the basis of 
their reputation for excellence in the provision of all facets of the service sought. 
The initial criterion for choosing between the submissions was the case with which the 
proposed changes could be integrated into management's planning and control processes. 
On that basis. the final choice of service providers has been n.:duced to two candidates: 
the current external audit !inn and a specialist infonnation systems consultancy fim1. 
Baudin Ltd's cuncnt auditor i� a member of the Big 5 audit tinns. and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for live years. The auditor is an expert in the industry in which 
the company operates. 
The infom1ation systems consultancy division of the audit finn has been solely 
responsible for the submission. and will be solely responsible for canying out the project 
in the event that its proposal is accepted. The division was established in 1997 and its 
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staff is both reputable and expert in the field. and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd 
operates. The audit firm's price for providing the overall service is $125,000. 
The total lees paid by Baudin Ltd to the audit li1111. for all services. will represem 5% of 
the average annual revenue of the local audit of
f
ice. in the event that the current 
submission is successful. The annual audit fee is $580.000. The audit firm also provides 
on-going taxation and superannuation consultancy services to the company. The fees for 
all non-audit services will be $1.450.000. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading infonnation systems consultancy firms in 
Australia. The film has been solely responsible for the submission. and will be solely 
responsible for cmTying out the project in the event that its proposal is accepted. The 
firm was established in 1997. and its staff is both reputable and expe11 in the field, and in 
the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. The !inn's price for providing the overall 
service is $120.000. The figure will represent 9% of the average annual revenue of the 
local ollice. in the event that the submission is successful. 
Whilst the two submissions differ significantly on certain detail. management considers 
that they are equally meritorious with respect to the standard and suitability of what is 
proposed. Further. it considers that the operating capacity of both contenders is 
appropriate for the task. 
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Professional Service Providers Study 
Dear Participant: 
Thank you liJr participating in this study. The purpose of th1.: study is to gam an 
understanding of factors that directors considcr important when a corporation is faced 
with the task of choosing hetween altcmativc providers of professional services. 
You will h•.: provided with a description of a corporation. Baudin Ltd. which has recently 
decided to alter the conligurntion of its existing computer software. to integrate its 
accounting function with other major functions such as materials acquisition. production 
and human rcsoun.:cs. The crnvoration has called for proposals to undertake the re­
engineering process. as part pf the overall initiative. The final stage in the selection 
process has been reached. where the choice is hl he madr.: betwr.:r.:n the remaining two 
contenders: the current external audit !inn and a specialist provider. 
You will he asked lo answer the following four qur.:stions on the basis of the case 
description: 
I. What factors do you considcr arc important in choosing between alternative 
service providers in circumstances such as those facing Baudin Ltd"! 
? Whom would you choose to provide the service'? 
3. What is the strength of your preference for the altemativi: providers? 
4. What factors al'.count for your preference for one providcr over the other? 
In addition. we ask that ynu perform the task through a tcchniqur.: rel�rrcd to as "verbal 
protocol analysis". The technique involves capturing your thoughts as you consider the 
infrm11ation provided in the casr.: study in the process of arriving at your answers. Thus. 
we ask that you speak aloud all of your thoughts as you work on the problem. We will 
tape record your responses to ensure that we have an accurate record nf your thoughts. 
We arc interested in your judgem1.:nt based on your standing as a director. Please note 
that there is no ClHTcct or incorrect answer. You can he assured that your identity will 
remain anonymous. Individual responses will not be known to anyone other than the 
members of the research team. The ,,ggrcgatc results of all pa11icipants in the study only 
will be rcpm1cd. 
Thank you once again for participating in this study. 
Colleen Haye,;. Edith C1m an ll111wr-.11:, 
Professor Ga�' Monroe. l:dith Cowan l 1111\·er-11� 
Professor Thcodnrc Mock. l Jrnn:rs11y of Southern California 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation. with an annual sales turnover of 
approximatdy $5 billion. The company. founded in I 978. is headquartered in Sydney, 
and it employs approximately 9.400 people worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved in 
the manufacture of chemical products for use in mining. agriculture. industry and the 
consumer sector. The products are sold both domestically and overseas. The company. 
which is publicly traded, has a diversified shareholder base and no group of shareholders 
holds any significant influence. 
The entity is governed by a ten-member Board of Directors. comprised of six executive 
members. including the company's Chief Executive Officer. and four non-executive 
members. The Chier Executive Officer is the Chainnan or the Board. The Chairman has 
significant input into the nomination of members to the Board. The Board is assisted in 
the discharge of its duties by a number or sub-committees. all of whom are accountable 
to the Board. 
The Board is assisted in the execution of its accounting and auditing responsibilities, by 
an Audit Committee. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised or two non­
executive directors and one executive director, who chairs the Commi'tee. The executive 
director. unlike the non-executive directors, holds an Australian professional accounting 
qualification. The role of the Committee is to advise on the establishment and 
maintenance of a framework of internal control: and. in that way. it assists the Board in 
fulfilling its responsibilities for the quality and reliability of financial information. 
including reporting in financial statements. The Committee meets once every four 
months. The internal and external auditors arc invited to meetings at the discretion of the 
Committee. The Committee reports to the Board alter each Committee meeting. 
Baudin Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years experience with 
the organisation. The cun-ent senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed and 
variable components. The fixed component comprises a salary. superannuation 
contributions. and vehicle related benefits. The variable component comprises an annual 
cash incentive bonus. payable on the achievement of corporate profitability targets. The 
remuneration package also includes an executive share option plan. The options are 
exercisable upon achievement of earnings per share ( EPS) growth at 5% per annum. The 
first tranche of options is exercisable on 31 December 2002. 
Baudin Ltd expe1ienced a modest growth in profit before tax in the five years to the 30 
June 200 I. notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
Management believes that significant efliciencics can be achieved in the future through 
adapting the company's existing computer software to integrn.te the company's 
accounting function with other major functions such as materials acquisition. production 
and human resources. The adaptation will significantly reduce information proce�sing 
costs and speed up infonnation processing and updating. leading to improved internal 
decision making. and. ultimately. improved financial performance. 
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Senior Management, acting with the approval of the Board of Directors, has. to date. 
undertaken the following steps to implement the strategy. 
Given the lack of internal expertise in the area. three information systems consultants. 
including the company's current external audit finn, were approached to submit 
proposals to Baudin Ltd to undertake the necessary re-configuration of its software. The 
successful contender will also be responsible for maintaining. and. in consultation with 
Baudin Ltd. upgrading if necessary, the configuration of the company's software for a 
period of three years. with the option to renew at the end of that period at the discretion 
of Baudin Ltd. 
Submissions were sought from three different sources in order to gain an appreciation of 
the nature and quality of the service available in the marketplace and, at the same time, 
fmmulate the needs of the company. The service providers were selected on the basis of 
their reputation for excellence in the provision of all facets of the service sought. 
The initial criterion for choosing between the submissions was the case with which the 
proposed changes could be integrated into management's planning and control processes. 
On that basis. the final choice of service providers has been reduced to two candidates: 
the current external audit firm and a specialist infomiation systems consultancy finn. 
Baudin Ltd's current auditor is a member of the Big 5 audit firms. and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for five years. The auditor is an expert in the industry in which 
the company operates. 
The infom1ation systems consultancy division of the audit finn has been solely 
responsible for the submission. and will be solely responsible for carrying out the project 
in the event that its propo:;al is accepted. The division was established in I 997 and its 
staf
f 
is both reputable and expert in the field. and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd 
operates. The audit linn's p,icc for providing the overall service is $125,000. 
The total fees paid by Baudin Ltd to the audit firm. for all services. will represent 5% of 
the average annual revenue of the local audit office, in the event that the current 
submission is successful. The annual audit fee is $580.000. The audit finn also provides 
on-going taxation and superannuation consultancy services to the company. The fees for 
all non-audit services will be SI ,450,000. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading information systems consultancy I inns in 
Australia. The finn has been solely responsible for the sul:--iiission. and will be solely 
responsible for carrying out the project in the event that its proposal is accepted. The 
tinn was established in 1997. and its staff is both reputable and expert in the field. and in 
the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. The firm's price for providing the overall 
service is $120.000. The figure will represent 9% of the average annual revenue of the 
local ofTice. in the event that the submission is successful. 
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Whilst the two submissions differ significantly on certain detail. management considers 
that they arc equally meiitorious with respect to the standard and suitability of what is 
proposed. Fu1ther. it considers that the operating capacity of both contenders is 
appropriate for the task. 
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Profes sional Service Providers Study 
Dear Participant: 
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the study is to gain an 
understanding of factors that directors consider important when a corporation is faced 
with the task of choosing between alternative providers of professional services 
You will be provided with a description of a corporation. Baudin Ltd, which has recently 
decided to integrate non-financial measures with traditional financial measures in internal 
decision making. The company has called for proposals, from external providers, to 
measure and analys� its customers' attitudes to the company and its products, as part of 
the overall initiative. The final stage in the selection process has been reached, where the 
choice is to be made between the remaining two contenders: the current external audit 
firm and a specialist provider. 
You will be asked to answer the following four questions on the basis of the case 
description: 
I. What factors do you consider are important in choosing between alternative 
service providers in circumstances such as those facing Baudin Ltd? 
2. Whom would you choose to provide the service? 
3. What is the strength of your preference for the alternative provider:>':' 
4. What factors account for your preference tor one provider over the other? 
In addition, we ask that you perform the task through a technique referred to as "verbal 
protocol analysis". The technique involves capturing your thoughts as you consider the 
information provided in the case study ir. the process of arriving at your answers. Thus, 
we ask that you speak aloud all of your thoughts as you work on the problem. We will 
tape record your responses to ensure that we have an accurate record of your thoughts. 
We are interested in your judgement based on your standing as a director. Please note 
that there is no correct or incorrect answer. You can be assured that your identity will 
remain anonymous. Individual responses will not be known to anyone other than the 
members of the research team. The aggregate results of all participants in the study only 
will be reported. 
Thank you once again for participating in this s tudy. 
Colleen Hayes. Edith Cowan University 
Professor Gary Monroe. Edith Cowan University 
Professor Theodore Mock. University of Southern California 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation, with an annual sales turnover of 
approximately $5 billion. The company, founded in 1978, is headquartered in Sydney, 
and it employs approximately 9,400 people worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved in 
the manufacture of chemical products for use in mining, agriculture. industry and the 
consumer sector. The products are sold both domestically and overseas. The company, 
which is publicly traded, has a diversified shareholder base and no group of shareholders 
holds any significant 111fluence. 
The entity is governed by a ten-member Board of Directors. comprised of three executive 
members, including the company's Chief Executive Officer, and seven non-executive 
members. The Chairman of the Board is a non-executive director. The Board is assisted 
in the discharge of its duties by a number of sub-committees, all of whom are 
accountable to the Board. The nomination of members to the Board. is the responsibility 
of a Nominations Committee, which is comprised of three non-executive directors. 
The non-executive members of the Board, with the exception of their positions as 
Directors of the company, have never been employed by Baud in Ltd, and neither they nor 
any of their respective family members, have any financial dealings or other contractual 
arrange=nents with the corporation. 
The Board is assisted in the execution of its accounting and auditing responsibilities, by 
an Audit Committee. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of non-executive 
directors. Two of the Committee members hold senior Australian professional accounting 
qualifications. The role of the Committee is as follows: 
I. to advise on the establishment and maintenance of a framework of internal 
control and appropriate ethical standards for the management of the company. 
Thus. it assists the Board in fulfillin·g its responsibilities for the quality and 
reliability of financial information. including reporting in financial statements; 
2. to monitor the management of identified risks. identify any new risks and 
recommend action to be taken for their control: 
3. to review the scope of the external audit, and to review findings and issues 
brought to its attention: and 
4. to review the appointment and remuneration of the external auditors. 
The Audit Committee meets with the external and internal auditors and semor 
management to review the half yearly and annual financial statements and reports, and at 
such other times as may be necessary to consider specific issues or matters which may 
arise from the internal and external audit process. The external auditors have direct 
access to the Committee. if necessary, without management involvement. The 
Committee reports to the Board alter each Committee meeting. 
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Baudi:i Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years experience with 
the organisation. The current senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed and 
variable components. The fixed component comprises a salary, superannuation 
contributions. and vehide related benefits. The vaiiable component comprises an annual 
ca,;h incentive bonus. payable on the achievement of corporate profitability targets. The 
remuneration package also includes an executive share option plan. The options are 
exercisable upon achievement of earnings per share (EPS) growth at 5% per annum. The 
first tranche of options is exercisable on 31 December 2002. 
Baudin Ltd experienced a modest growth in profit before tax in the five years to the 30 
June 200 I. notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
Management believes that integrating non-financial performance indicators with 
traditional financial perform,mce measures, in internal decision making, can lead to 
improved financial perfonnance. Thus, the decision was made to obtain information on 
the company's customers' attitudes to the company and its products. as part of the overall 
initiative. 
Senior Management. acting with the approval of the Board of Directors, has, to date, 
undertaken the following steps to implement the strategy. 
Given the lack of internal expertise with respect to measuring and analysing customer 
satisfaction. three customer services consultants, including the company's current 
external audit fitm. were approached to submit proposals to Baudin Ltd for measuring 
and analysing the company's customer base, worldwide. with respect to customer attitude 
towards the company and satisfaction with its products. 
Submissions were sought from three different sources in order to gain an appreciation of 
the nature and quality of the service available in the marketplace and, at the same time, 
formulate the needs of the company. The service providers wen: selected on the basis of 
their reputation for excellence in the provision of all facets of the service sought. 
The initial criterion for choosing between the proposals. centred on the ease with which 
the performance indicators could be integrated into management's current planning and 
control processes. On that basis. the final choice of service providers has been reduced to 
two candidates: the current external audit firm and a specialist sustainable development 
consultancy firm. 
Baudin Ltd's current auditor is a member of the Big 5 audit !inns. and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for five years. The auditor is an expert in the industry in which 
the company operates. 
The customer services consultancy division of the audit firm has been solely responsible 
for the submission. and will be solely responsible for carrying out the project in the event 
that its proposal is accepted. The division was established in 1997 and its staff is both 
reputable and expert in the field. and in the mdustry in which Baudin Ltd operates. The 
audit firm's price for providing the overall service is $125,000. 
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The total fees paid hy Baudin Ltd to the audit film, for all services. will represent 5% of 
the average annual revenue of the local audit office, in the event that the current 
submission is successful. The annual audit fee is $580,000. The audit finn also provides 
on-going taxation and superannuation consultancy services to the company. The fees for 
all non-audit services will be $1 .450,000. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading specialist customer services consultancy 
finns in Australia. The finn has been solely responsible for the submission. and will be 
solely responsible for carrying out the project in the event that its proposal is accepted. 
The finn was established in 1997, and its staff is both reputable and expe,t in the field. 
and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. The finn's price for providing the 
overall service is S 120.000. The figure will represent 9% of the average annual revenue 
of the local office, in the event that the submission is successful. 
Whilst the two submissions differ significantly on certain detail, management considers 
that they are equally meritorious with respect to the standard and suitability of what is 
proposed. Further. it considers that the operating capacity of both contenders is 
appropriate for the task. 
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Professional Service Providers Study 
Dear Participant: 
Thank you for participating in this study. The pmpose of the study is to gam an 
understanding of factors that directors consider important when a corporation is faced 
with the task of choosing between alternative providers of professional services. 
You will be provided with a description of a corporation, Baudin Ltd, which has recently 
decided to integrate non-financial measures with traditional financial measures in internal 
decision making. The company has called for proposals, from external providers, to 
measure and analyse its customers' attitudes to the company and its products, as part of 
the overall initiative. The final stage in the selection process has been reached, where the 
choice is to be made between the remaining two contenders: the current external audit 
finn and a specialist provider. 
You will be asked to answer the following four questions on the basis of the case 
description: 
I. What factors do you consider are important in choosing between alternative 
service providers in circumstances such as those facing Baudin Ltd? 
2. Whom would you choose to provide the service? 
3. What is the strength of your preference for the alternative providers'? 
4. What factors account for your preference for one provider over the other'? 
In addition. we ask that you perfonn the task through a technique referred to as "verbal 
protocol analysis". The techiquc involves capturing your thoughts as you consider the 
infonnation provided in the ;ase study in the process of arriving at your answers. Thus, 
we ask that you speak aloud all llf your thoughts as you work on the problem. We will 
tape record your responses t<i ensure that we have an accurate record of your thoughts. 
We are interested in your Judgement based on your standing as a director. Please note 
that there is no correct or incorrect answer. You can be assured that your identity will 
remain anonymous. Individual responses will not be known to anyone other than the 
members of the research team. The aggregate results of all participants in the study only 
will be reported. 
Thank you once again for participating in this s tudy. 
Colleen Hayes. Edith Cowan University 
Professor Gary Monroe, Edith Cowan University 
Professor Theodore Mock. University of Southern California 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation. with an annual sales turnover of 
approximately $5 billion. The company. founded in 1978, is headquartered in Sydney, 
and it employs approximately 9.400 people worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved in 
the manufacture uf chemical products for use in mining, agriculture. industry and the 
consumer sector. The products are sold both domestically and uverseas. The company, 
which is publicly traded, has a diversified shareholder base and no group of shareholders 
holds any significant influence. 
Th\! entity is governed by a ten-member Board of Directors, comprised of three executive 
members. including the company's Chief E'Cccutive Officer, and seven non-executive 
members. The Chairn1an of the Board i5 1 non-executivl;'. director. The Board is assisted 
in the discharge of its duties by a number of sub-committees, all of whom are 
accountable to the Board. The nomination of members to the Board, is the responsibility 
of a Nominations Committee, whi<..� is comprised of three non-executive directors. 
The non-executive members of the Board, with the exception of their positions as 
Directors of the company. have never been employed by Baudin Ltd, and neither they nor 
any of their respective family members, have any financial dealings or other contractual 
anangements with the corporation. 
The Board is assisted in the execution of its accounting and auditing responsibilities, by 
an Audit Committee. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of non-executive 
directors. Two of the Committee members hold senior Australian proressional accounting 
qualifications. The role of the Committee is as follows: 
I. to advise on the establishment and maintenance of a framework of internal 
control and appropriate ethical standards for the management of the company. 
Thus. it assists the Board in fulfilling its responsibilities for the quality and 
reliability of financial inforn1ation. including reporting in financial statements; 
2. to monitor the management of identified risks. identify any new risks and 
recommend action to be taken for their control; 
3. to review the scope of the external audit. and to review findings and issues 
brought_to its attention; and 
4. to review the appointment and remuneration of the external auditors. 
The Audit Committee meets with the external and internal auditors and senior 
management to review the half yearly and annual financial statements and reports, and at 
such other times as may be necessary to consider specific issues or matters which may 
arise from the internal and external audit process. The external auditors have direct 
access to the Committee. if necessal)'. without management involvement. The 
Committee reports to the Board afler each Committee meeting. 
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Baudin Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years �xperience with 
the organisation. The current senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed and 
variable components. The fixed component comprises a salary, superannuation 
contributions. and vehicle related benefits. The variable component comprises an annual 
cash incentive bonus. payable on the achievement of corporate profitability targets. The 
remuneration package also includes an executive share option plan. The options are 
exercisable upon achievert1ent of ea[llings per share (EPS) growth at 5% per annum. The 
first tranche of options is exercisable llll 31 December 2002. 
Baudin Ltd expefienced a modest grov th in profit before tax in the five years to the 30 
June 200 I. notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
Management believes that intet,.rrating non-financial performance indicators with 
traditional financial perfonnance measures. in internal decision making. can lead to 
improved financial pe1formance. Thus, the decision was made to obtain information on 
the company's customers' attitudes to the company and its products. as part of the overall 
initiative. 
Senior Management. acting with the approval of the Board of Directors. has, to date, 
undertaken the following steps to implement the strategy. 
Given the lack of internal expertise with respect to measuring and analysing customer 
satisfaction, three customer services consultants. including the company's current 
external audit firm, were approached to submit proposals to Baudin Ltd for measuring 
and analysing the company's customer base, worldwide. with respect to their attitude 
towards the company and satisfoc�:on with its products. Tlie successful contender will 
also be responsible fo1 the on-going nature of the undertaking for a period of three years. 
with the option to renew at the end of the period at the discretion of Baud in Ltd. 
Submissions were sought from three different sources i!l order to gain an appreciation of 
the nature and quality of the service available in the marketplace and. at the same time, 
fom1ulate the needs of the company. The service providers were selected on the basis of 
their reputation for excellence in the provision of all facets of the service sought. 
The initial criterion for choosing between the proposals. centred on the ease with which 
the perfonnance indicators could be integrated into management's current planning and 
control processes. On that basis. the final choice of service providers has been reduced to 
two candidates: the current external audit !inn and a specialist sustainable development 
consultancy firm. 
Baudin Ltd's current auditor is a member of the Big 5 audit firms, and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for five years. The auditor is an expert in the industry in v-:hich 
the company operates. 
The customer services consultancy division of the audit li11 1 has been solely responsible 
for the submission. and will be solely responsible for carrying out the project in the event 
that its proposal is accepted. The division was established in 1997 and its staff is both 
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reputable and expert in the field. and in the industry in which Bau<lin Ltd operates. The 
audit Jinn's price for providing the overall service is $125.000. 
·rhe total fees paid by Baudin Ltd to the audit film. for all services. will represent 5% of 
the average annual revenue of the local audit office. in the event that the current 
submission is successful. The total annual audit fee will be $580,000. The audit firm 
also provides on-going taxation and superannuation consultancy services to the company. 
The fees for all non-audit services will be $1.450.000. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading specialist customer services consultancy 
firms in Australia. The firm has been solely responsible for the submission, and will be 
solely responsible for carrying out the project in the event that its proposal is accepted. 
The firm was established in 1997. and its staf
f 
is both reputable and expert in the field, 
and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. The firm's price for providing the 
overall servic1.: is $120,000. The figure will represent 9% of the average annual revenue 
of the local office, in the event that the submission is successful. 
Whilst the t\\O submissions differ significantly on ce11ain detail. management considers 
that they are equally meritorious with respect to the standard and suitability of what is 
proposed. Further. it considers that the operating capacity of both contenders is 
appropriate for the task. 
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Professional Service Providers Study 
Dear Pmticipant: 
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the study is to gain an 
understanding of factors that directors consider important when a corporation is faced 
\vith the task of choosing between alternative providers of professional services. 
You will be provided with a description of a corporation. Baudin Ltd, which has recently 
decided to integrate non-financial measures with traditional financial measures in internal 
decision making. The company has called for proposals. from external providers, to 
measure and analyse its customers' attitudes to the company and its products, as part of 
the overall initiative. The final stage in the selection process has been reached, where the 
choice is to be made between the remaining two contenders: the current external audit 
firm and a specialist provider. 
You will he asked to answer the following fi)ur questions on the basis of the case 
description: 
I. What factors do you consider are important in choosing between alternative 
service providers in circumstances such as those facing Baudin Ltd? 
2. Whom would you choose to provide the service? 
3. What is the strength or your preference for the alternative providers? 
4. What factors account for your preference for one provider over the other? 
In addition, we ask that you perform the task through a technique refc1Ted to as "verbal 
protocol analysis". The technique involves capturing your thoughts as you consider the 
information provided in the case study in the process of arriving at your answers. Thus, 
we ask that you speak aloud all of your thoughts as you work on the problem. We will 
tape record your responses to ensure that we have an accurate record of your thoughts. 
We are interested in your judgement based on your standing as a director. Please note 
that there is no correct or incorrect answer. You can be assured that your identity will 
remain anonymous. Individual responses \Viii not be known to anyone other than the 
members of the research team. The aggregate results of all participants in the study only 
will be reported. 
Thank you once again for participating in this study. 
Colleen Hayes. Edith Cowan University 
Professor Gary Monroe. Edith Cowan University 
Professor Theodore Mock, University of Southern California 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation, with an annual sales turnover of 
approximately $5 billion. The company. founded in 1978. is headquartered in Sydney. 
and it employs approximately 9.400 people worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved in 
the manufacture of chemical products for use in mining. agriculture, industry and the 
consumer sector. The products arc sold both domestically and overseas. The company, 
which is publicly traded. has a diversified shareholder base and no group of shareholders 
holds any significant influence. 
The entity is governed by a ten-member Board of Directors, comprised of six executive 
members, including the company's Chief Executive Officer, and four non-executive 
members. The Chief Executive Officer is the Chai1111an of the Board. The Chai1111an has 
significant input into the nomination of members to the Board. The Board is assisted in 
the discharge of its duties by a number of sub-committees, all of whom are accountable 
to the Board. 
The Board is assisted in the execution of its accounting and auditing responsibilities. by 
an Audit Committee. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of two non­
executive directors and one executive director. who chairs the Committee. The executive 
director. unlike the non-executive directors. holds an Australian professional accounting 
qu.:Iilication. The role of the Committee is to advise on the establishment and 
maintenance of a framework of internal control: and, in that way. it assists the Board in 
fulfilling its n.:sponsibilities for the quality and reliability of financial info1111ation. 
including repm1ing in linancial statements. The Committee meets once every four 
months. The internal and external auditors arc invited to meetings at the discretion of the 
Committee. The Committee reports to the Board alter each Committee meeting 
Baudin Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years experience with 
the organisation. The current senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed and 
va,iahle components. The fixed component comprises a salary. superannuation 
contrihutions. and vehicle related hencfits. The variable component comp1ises an annual 
cash incentive bonus. payable on the achievement of corporate profitability targets. The 
remuneration package also includes an executive share option plan. The options are 
exercisable upon achievement of earnings per share (EPS) growth at 5% per annum. The 
first tranche of l,ptions is exercisable on 31 December 2002. 
Baudin Ltd expcricrn:ed a modest grO\vth in profit before tax in the five years to the 30 
June 200 I. notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industr-:,. Senior 
Management believes that integrating non-financial pcrfonnance indicators with 
traditional financial perfonnance measures. in internal decision making. can lead to 
improved financial perfonnance. Thus. the derision \vas made to obtain infomrntion on 
its customers' attitudes to the company an1' its products. as pa11 of the overall initiative. 
Senior Management. acting with thi.: approval of the Board of Directors, has. to date. 
undertaken the following steps to implement the strategy. 
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Given the lack of internal expertise with respect to measuring and analysing customer 
satisfaction. three customer services consultants. including the company's current 
external audit !inn. were approached to submit proposals to Baudin Ltd for measuring 
and analysing the company's customer base. worldwide. with respect to customer attitude 
towards the company and satisfaction with its products. 
Submissions were sought from three different sources in order to gain an appreciation of 
the nature and quality of the service available in the marketplace and, at the same time. 
fonnulatc the needs of the company. The service providers were selected on the basis of 
their reputation for excellence in the provision of all facets of the service sought. 
The initial c1ite1ion for choosing between the proposals. centred on the ease with which 
the perfom1ance indicators could be integrated into management's current planning and 
control processes. On that basis. the final choice of service providers has been reduced to 
two candidates: the current external audit fim1 and a specialist sustainable development 
consultancy firm. 
Baudin Ltd's cu1Tent auditor is a member of the Big 5 audit finns, and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for five years. The auditor is an expert in the industry in which 
the company operates. 
The customer services consultancy division of the audit finn has been solely responsible 
for the submission. and will be solely responsible for cmTying out the project in the event 
that its proposal is accepted. The division was established in 1997 and its staff is both 
reputable and expert in the field, and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. The 
audit fim1's price for providing the overall service is S 125,000. 
The total fees paid by Baudin Ltd to the audit !inn, for all services, will represent 5% of 
the average annual revenue of the local audit office, in the event that the current 
submission is successful. The total annual audit fee will be $580,000. The audit finn 
also provides on-going taxation and superannuation consultancy services to the company. 
The lees for all non-audit services will be $1.450,000. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading specialist customer services consultancy 
!inns in Australia. The linn has been solely rcsponsiblt: for the submission. and will be 
solely responsible for can-ying out the project in the event that its proposal is accepted. 
The firm was established in 1997. and its staff is both reputable and expert in the field. 
and in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. The finn's price for providing the 
overall service is $120.000. The figure will represent 9°,{ 01' the average annual revenue 
of the local office. in the event that the submission i� \uccessful. 
Whilst the two submissions differ significar.uy on certain detail, management considers 
that they are equally meritorious with 1\.:spect lo the standard and suitability of what is 
proposed. Further, it considers that the operating capacity of both contenders is 
appropriate for the task. 
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October 30, 200 I 
Dear 
It is good to be in tough with you again. I hope to catch up with you in Perth after 
New Year when I am likely to be in Australia on a business trip for . In the 
meantime I would be really gratetul for a small favour in November. 
My younger sister, Colleen, lecturing in accounting at Edith Cowan University, is 
on the verge of completing her Ph.D. Her thesis research is on an important aspect of 
corporate governance. Colleen is exploring decision-making practices of company 
directors. In particular she is pursuing insights on issues pertaining to auditor 
independence. In my jud�TJ11ent her work is relevant, topical and timely. She is focussing 
on decision-making by directors and the challenges companies face with the 
independence of their auditors. 
If you could spare Colleen a twenty-minute appointment in November, it would be 
terrific. She would like to seek your response to a practical corporate case study, hear 
thoughts on your decision process and gather a few indications of your views on the 
sensitive matter of auditor independence. 
Your confidential insights will enable Colleen to sharpen her case study and survey 
instrument before she polls more than 150 company directors across Australia early in 
2002. 
Colleen will phone your office and seek an appoint1:,�nt iri the ,,eeks ahead. Thank 
you for your consideration. She has a bottle of fine wine to give you as a small token of 
our appreciation. 
A II the best. 
Best wishes 
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APPENDIX C 
STUDY 1: Protocol Analysis 
Standard script describing the task 
The activity involves reading a two (three) page case study that centres on a 
company's decision to seek the services of a professional service provider and the 
events leading up to the point where the choice of service provider is to be made. 
The case study is preceded by a single page which provides an introduction to the 
overall task. 
You will be asked to answer a set of four questions based on the information 
contained in the actual case study. The nature of the questions is identified in the 
introductory page. 
In addition, we ask that you pcrfom1 the task through a technique referred to as 
"verbal protocol analysis". The technique involves capturing your thoughts as you 
consider the information provided in the case study in the process of arriving at 
your answers. Thus, we ask that you speak aloud all of your thoughts as you work 
on the problem. 
My task will be to record your thoughts using a tape recorder. 
Your taped thoughts will be transcribed at a later date. The transcript will provide 
us with important feedback on the case studies. Again, we arc interested in all of 
the thoughts that come to your mind as you work on the problem. 
It does not matter if your sentences are not complete, since you will not be 
explaining to anyone else. Just act as if you arc alone in the room speaking to 
yourself loudly. 
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Coded PROTOCOL 
Subject P3. 1.0. l [KP!. Weak. Non-rec fee) 
Protocol Structure Task TRANSCRIPT CODE 
line # Con ten Content Statements i\lcta-St 
Code Parsed Sc1tment t Ano ma l's Confirm'y Supplem'y Transl'n 
Code 
Para I Comoanv descriotion 
So the company has got 9,400 people worldwide 1.1 ,/ 
2 And a $5 billion turnover 1.1 ,/ 
3 Petro-chemical products used in mining and agriculture 1.1 ,/ 
4 And consumer. consumer protection 1.1 ,/ 
Para 2 Board of Directors 
5 <Hmm> this is an interestin_g board 2.6 G 
6 Six executive members and 2.2 ,/ 
7 The Chainnan is the CEO also. 2.3 ,/ 
8 This is a most unusual structure. 2.6 G 
9 The Chainnan has significant input into the nomination of members 2.4 
of the board ,/ 
IO Well it seems to me 2.7 ,/ 
11 That we have a very dominant <uh> CEO 2.7 G 
12 Who <uh> has a board that would have no difficulty in being a tame 
board 2.7 G 
13 Because the Chainnan · s puts them on 2.7 G --
14 And <uh> there's sub-committees. 2.6 ,/ 
Para 3 Audit Committee 
15 There's an audit committee 3.1 ,/ 
16 That's important 3.1 cc 
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Line No Parsed segment Anomnlics Confirm'y Supplem'y Transl'n Me!a-St -
17 And the committee 's two non-executive directors 3.2 ./ 
18 And one executive director 3.2 ./ 
19 Who chairs the committee 3.2 ./ 
20 One would expect 3.2 ./ 
21 The executive members to have some accounting qualification 3.2 cc 
22 Or in that area. 3.2 cc 
23 <Uh> and it only meets once every four months. 3.5 cc 
24 <Hmm> the internal and external auditors are invited to the meetings. 3.4 ./ 
25 At the discretion of ... 3.4 ./ 
26 Yeh. l 'vc got some problems here. 3.6 G 
27 I don't like the look ot� 3.6 ./ 
28 the look of, this <uh> committee 3.6 G 
29 I think it's <uh> it's <uh> it is ... 3.6 ./ 
30 , It is certainly being kept at anns kngth 3.6 G 
31 By the executive 3.6 G 
32 So <uh> ych, well 3.6 ./ 
Para 4 Executive experience and remuneration 
33 I wonder if there arc any figures here 4.2 ./ 
34 That denote what kind of 02tions we've got 4.2 G 
35 It doesn't look like there arc. 4.2 G 
36 Share options arc <uh> an interesting way to reward people 4.2 ./ 
37 It's a wa� to reward eeoele, 4.2 ./ 
38 But the hurdle is only at 5% of earnings per share growth. 4.2 G 
Para 5 NAS need, purpose & tvpe 
39 And it's only had modest 5.1 ./ 
40 So its only had results 5.1 ./ 
41 And< uh> it doesn't say what modest is 5.1 cc 
42 compared to the 5% 4.2 G 
316 
APPENDIX D: Protocol Analysis. Example of coded transcript. P3. Code 1.0.1 
Code Parsed segment Anomalies Confirm'y Supplcm'y Transl'n Mcta-S 
43 So these guys might be drawin_g out there bonuses 4.2 G 
44 And things 4.2 G 
45 Without having to really do very much 4.2 G 
46 Yes, they're looking at that natural environment and stuff 5.4 cc 
47 Because 5.4 ./ 
48 they're in chemicals and 5.4 cc 
49 <uh> ag1iculture anti industry 5.4 cc 
so They're paying a fairly hi_gh degree of attention to the 5.4 cc 
51 To the environmental situation 5.4 cc 
52 Yeh, mining and agriculture 5.4 ./ 
53 The� certain!� need <uh> a high level interest in that health, safetl 5.4 cc 
54 Right. publishing a sustainable 5.4 ./ 
55 Its annual reporting obligations 5.4 ./ 
56 Lets have a look at the reporting date 5.4 ./ 
57 So the board 5.4 ./ 
58 if they're goin_g to have a sustainable development report 5.4 ./ 
59 And that's going to include environmental measurements 5.4 ./ 
60 annual reporting of its 5.4 ./ 
61 If I was on the board I'd look for that on the agenda 5.4 cc 
62 So management with the board LS ./ 
63 Has. to date, undertaken LS ./ 
Para 6 Intro to consultants 
64 Three sustainable development consultants 6.1 ./ 
65 Current ... 6.1 ./ 
66 What kind of <uh> background are they getting these reports from 6.1 cc 
Para 7 Rationale for choice of the three ser·vice providers 
67 Reputation for excellence in the provision of all facets of the service 7.2 ./ -
68 they might have put in there who they were, who they were, and <uh> 7.2 cc 
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Line No Parsed segment Anomnl's Confirm'y Supplem'y Transl Meta-S 
69 And as a director I could sort of <uh> cast a view 7.2 cc ·-
70 Over <uh> just what ... 7.2 cc ·-
Para 8 Criterion for choosing between the proposals (3 -> 2) 
71 Three down to two 8.2 ,/ 
72 Oh! That's interesting 8.2 ,/ 
73 They're going to get the firm to audit it 8.2 ,/ 
Para 9 Description of current auditor 
No comment 
Para 10 Consultancv division of the audit firm 
74 And then give them the responsibility to carry it out 10.1 cc 
75 And if it doesn't work they can blame somebody else 10.1 G 
76 Oh! An onerous task l 0.1 ,/ 
77 I'm a bit worried about this <uh> situation 10.1 G 
78 About this <uh> situation. 10. l G 
79 With the audit finn IO.I G 
80 Not only going to be given . .  10.2 cc 
81 And SI 25,000 and 10.3 cc 
-· 
82 It's <uh> a S5 r1_1illion, SS billion turnover company 11.1 cc 
83 To carry out this sustainable development situation 11.1 cc 
Para 11 Fees for audit and non-audit services 
84 <Uh> fees for non-audit services 11.3 ,/ 
85 Goodness me. the accountants 11.4 G 
86 These auditors ought to go into the accountancy section 11.4 G 
87 Of this company 11.4 G 
88 The non-audit fees 11.3 ,/ 
89 are t. .. t. .. are. two and a half times the audit fee ./ 
90 Most unusual 11.3 ./ 
91 It seems to me as though 11.3 ./ 
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92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
llO 
111 
-
APPENDIX D: Protocol Analysb. Example of coded transcript. P3. Code 1.0.1 
Parsed seement 
The auditors getting a bit close to the action here 
Para 12 Specialist provider and fee 
This other finn is 
Must providing ... 
$120 ! 
Goodness me 
These fees arc incredibly low 
So, I'm, I'm 
-- --- " 
This is 9% of the revenue of the local office of this organisation 
Right 
Para 13 Comparability of providers 
No comment 
Para 14 Summan' comments 
I <uh> would be a bit worried about being a non-executive on this 
company. 
<Huh> More than a bit nervous. 
I think 
when you've got clear majority of executives directors 
Who seem to control all of the kc)'. functions 
And then we've got the auditors providing an enonnous amount of 
non-audit services 
Into th .. situation 
And <uh> then they're talking about spending <uh> only $125,000 
odd 
For creating a plan 
which seems to be a very ... 
Would be, would be an important part of how the company's going to 
reap these key goals 
Anomnl's Confirm'y Supplcm'y Transl'n Meta-St 
11.J I GG 
12.1 ./ 
12.1 ./ 
12.2 cc 
12.2 cc 
12.2 cc 
12.2 ./ 
12.2 ./ 
12.2 ./ 
----
14.0 GG 
14.0 GG 
14.0 ./ 
14.0 GG 
14.0 GG 
14.0 GG 
14.0 ./ 
14.0 
cc 
14.0 cc 
14.0 ./ 
14.0 
cc 
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Line No Parsed se�ment Anomnl's Confirm'�· Supplem':\' Transl'n Meta-St 
112 In its <uh> business poli..::ies ,/ 
113 And employee health, safety and the nat ... natural environment 14.0 ,/ ·-
114 When we're producing chemicals 14.0 ,/ 
115 For mining ... agriculture and 14.0 ,/ 
116 The areas that that runs into 14.0 cc 
117 So <uh> and then particularly 14.0 ,/ 
118 An inter .. international situation 14.0 cc 
119 With <uh> international laws that have to be comelied with 14.0 cc 
120 I'd like to see 14.0 ,/ 
121 All this needs to go back to the drawing board 14.0 ./ 
122 I think. 14.0 ./ 
12 39 8 45 18 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation, with an annual sales turnover of 
approximately $5 billion. The company, founded in 1978, is headquartered in Sydney, 
and it employs approximately 9,400 people worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved 
in the manufacture of chemical products for use in mining, agriculture. industry and 
the consumer sector. The products are sold both domestically and overseas. The 
company, which is publicly traded, has a diversified shareholder base and no 1:,>roup of 
shareholders holds any significant influence. 
A ten-member Board of Directors, comprised of two executive members, including 
the company's Chief Executive Officer, and eight non-executive members, governs 
the company. The Chairman of the Board is a non-executive director with extensive 
experience in the industry. 
The Board is assisted in the discharge of its duties by a number of sub-committees, all 
of whom are accountable to the Board. The nomination of members to the Board is 
the responsibility of a Nominations Committee, which is comprised of three non­
executive directors. 
Baudin Ltd has never employed the non-executive members of the Board, except in 
their position as Directors of the company. Further, neither they nor any of their 
respective family members are related to Baudin's management or have any financial 
dealings or other contractual arrangements with the corporation. 
Each of the directors is a minority shareholder in the company. 
An Audit Committee, regulated by a fonnal written charter adopted and approved by 
the Board, assists the Board in the execution of its accounting and auditing 
responsibilities. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of non-executive 
directors all of whom arc financially literate. Two of the Committee members, 
including the Chair of the Committee, hold senior Australian professional accounting 
qualifications. 
The role of the Audit Committee is as follows: 
I. to advise on the establishment and maintenance of a framework of internal 
contwl and appropriate ethical standards fi.)r the management of the 
company. Thus, it assists the Board in fulfilling its responsibilities for the 
quality and reliability of financial infonnation, including reporting in 
financial statements; 
2. to monitor the management of identified risks, identify any new risks and 
recommend action to he taken for their control; 
3. to be involved with the internal auditors in planning the annual audit 
program. and reviewing the program at various intervals throughout the year; 
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4. to review the scope of the external audit, and to review findings and issues 
brought to its attention including those provided by the external auditor; 
5. to provide oversight and communication regarding the provision of non-audit 
services by the external auditor, including matters that might reasonably be 
thought to bear on independence; and 
6. to review the appointment and remuneration of the external auditor. 
The Committee has the authority to investigate any matters within its terms of 
reference, the resources it needs to do so and has full access to information. 
The Committee meets with the external and internal auditors and senior management 
to review the half yearly and annual financial statements and reports, and at such other 
times as is necessary to consider specific issues or matters that may arise from the 
internal and external audit process. The external and internal auditors have direct 
access to the Committee. if necessary, without management involvement. The 
Committee reports to the Board after each Committee meeting. 
Baudin Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years experience 
with the organisation. The current senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed 
and bonus components. The fixed component comprises a salary, superannuation 
contributions, and vehicle related benefits. The bonus components include an annual 
cash incentive bonus, payable on the achievement of corporate profitability targets, 
and equity-based remuneration. 
Baudin Ltd experienced a modest growth in profit before tax in the five years to the 
30 June 2004. notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
management believes that significant efficiencies can be achieved in the future 
through adapting the company's existing computer software to integrate th� 
company's accounting function with other major functions such as materials 
acquisition, production and human resources. The adaptation will significantly reduce 
information processing and updating, leading to improved internal decision making, 
and, ultimately, improved financial performance. 
The following steps have, to date, been undertaken to implement the strategy. 
Having first developed a clear definition of the problem, senior management chose to 
outsource the task. The provider of the information technology (IT) service will be 
responsible for both the design and implementation of the adaptation. 
However. the contract for the service will clearly define the overriding responsibility 
of Baud in 's management for establishing. maintaining, operating and evaluating the 
IT system, and the consultative role 0f tht: service provider. Baud in 's information 
technology manager will be appointed as the project manager. 
The co1,:ract for the service will also specify the minimum qualifications and 
experience of the staff who will undertake the project. and that the provider must have 
adequate insurance coverage in the event that problems arise ir .;arrying out the work. 
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The company's facility manager was appointed to thoroughly research potential 
providers. Key search criteria included reputation for excellence in the type of service 
sought and expertise in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. 
The search process has identified two leading contenders: 
• the IT consultancy division of the company's external audit firm, and 
o a specialist IT consultancy finn. 
Baudin Ltd's policy for choosing professional service providers centres on a 
provider's superior capacity to add value, subject to meeting the corporation's 
financial and other legal and contractual obligations. 
Baudin Ltd's current auditor is one of the Big 4 audit firms, and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for four years. 
The annual fee for the audit of the financial report is currently around $2,200,000. 
The audit finn also provides on-going taxation services to the company, fur which it 
receives an annual fee of around $300,000. The total figure of $2,500,000 represents 
3% of the average annual revenue of the local (Sydney) office of the audit firm. The 
taxation services involve some planning, but arc predominantly concerned with 
ensuring regulatory compliance. 
The IT consultancy and audit divisions arc separately staffed and have separate 
reporting lines, headed by separate partners - reflecting the division of responsibility 
for the respective services. Thus, the IT division would be solely responsible for 
carrying out the project. 
The IT division was established in 1997 in response to the growing international 
market for corporate information technology consultancy services. Baud in 's facility 
manager considers that the tinn 's price for the type of IT service sought would be 
around $900.000. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading, reputable. international, specialist IT 
consultancy firms. which have also emerged. in recent years, in response to the 
growth in demand i<.)r corporate infrmnation technology consultancy services. The 
firm. which was established in 1997. would be solely responsible for carrying out the 
project. Again, it is expected that the firm's price for providing the service would be 
around $900,000. The figure would represent 4% of the average annual revenue of the 
local (Sydney) office of the IT finn. The finn has not provided Baudin Ltd with 
consultancy services in the past. 
All relationships between the prospective service providers and Baudin Ltd are 
confined to those described above. 
The two IT service providers arc considered to be comparable with respect to the 
calibre of the staff who will undertake the work, including their technical expertise 
and experience in IT services of the type required. Further, it is considered that the 
operating capacity of both contenders is appropriate for the task. 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation, with an annual sales turnover cf 
approximately $5 billion. The company, founded in 1978, is headquartered in Sydney, 
and it employs approximately 9,400 people worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved 
in the manufacture of chemical products for use in mining, agriculture, industry and 
the consumer sector. The products are sold both domestically and overseas. The 
company, which is public!'.} traded. has a diversified shareholder base and no group of 
shareholders holds any significant influence. 
A ten-member Board of Directors, comprised of two executive members, including 
the company's Chief Executive Officer, and eight non-executive members, governs 
the company. The Chairman of the Board is a non-executive director with extensive 
experience in the industry. 
The Board is assisted in the discharge of its duties by a number of sub-committees, all 
of whom are accountable to the Board. The nomination of members to the Board is 
the responsibility of a Nominations Committee, which is comprised of three non­
executive directors. 
Baudin Ltd has never employed the non-executive members of the Board, except in 
their position as Directors of the company. Further, neither they nor any of their 
respective family members arc related to Baudin's management or have any financial 
dealings or other contractual arrangements with the corporation. 
Each of the directors is a minority shareholder in the company. 
An Audit Committee, regulated by a fonnal written charter adopted and approved by 
the Board, assists the Board in the execution of its accounting and auditing 
responsibilities. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of non-executive 
directors all of whom are financially literate. Two of the Committee members, 
including the Chair of the Committee, hold senior Australian profcs�ional accounting 
qualifications. 
The role of the Audit Committee is as follows: 
I. to advise on the establishment and maintenance of a framework of internal 
control and appropriate ethical standards for the manag1?ment of the 
company. Thus, it assists the Board in fulfilling its responsibilities for the 
quality and reliability of financial infonnation, including reporting in 
financial statements; 
2. to monitor the management of identified risks, identify any new risks and 
recommend action to be taken for their control; 
3. to be involved with the internal auditors in planning the annual audit 
program. and reviewing the program at various intervals throughout the year; 
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4. to review the scope of the external audit, and to review findings and issues 
brought to its attention including those provided by the external auditor; 
5. to provide oversight and communication regarding the provision of non-audit 
services by the external auditor, including matters that might reasonably be 
thought to bear on independence; and 
6. to review the appointment and remuneration of the external auditor. 
The Committee has the authority to investigate any matters within its terms of 
reference, the resources it needs to do so and has full access to infonnation. 
The Committee meets with the external and internal auditors and senior management 
to review the half yearly and annual financial statements and reports, and at such 
other times as is necessary to consider specific issues or matters that may arise from 
the internal and external audit process. The external and internal auditors have direct 
access to the Committee, if necessary, without management involvement. The 
Committee reports to the Board after each Committee meeting. 
Baudin Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years experience 
with the organisation. The current senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed 
and bonus components. The fixed component comprises a salary, superannuation 
contributions, and vehicle related benefits. The bonus components include an annual 
cash incentive bonus, payable on the achievement of corporate profitability targets, 
and equity-based remuneration. 
Baudin Ltd experienced a modest growth in profit before tax in the five years to the 
30 June 2004, notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
management believes that significant efficiencies can be achieved in the future 
through adapting the company's existing computer software to integrate the 
wmpany's accounting function with oti1er major functions such as materials 
acquisition, production and human resources. The adaptation will significantly reduce 
infonnation processing and updating, leading to improved internal decision making, 
and, ultin,:i.tely, improved financial perfonnance. 
The following steps have, to date, been undertaken to implement the strategy. 
Having first developed a clear definition of the problem, senior management chose to 
l)Utsource the task. The provider of the infonnation technology (IT) service will be 
responsible for both the design and implementation of the adaptation. The successful 
contender will also be responsible for monitoring and upgrading, if necessary, the 
design and configuration of the software for a period of three years, with the option to 
renew at the end of that period at the discretion of Baud in Ltd. 
However, the contract for the service will clearly define the overriding responsibility 
of Baud in 's management for establishing, maintaining, operating and evaluating the 
IT system, and the consultative role of the service provider. Baudin's information 
technology manager will be appointed as the project manager. 
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The contract for the service will also specify the minimum qualifications and 
experience of the staff who will undertake the project, and that the provider must have 
adequate insurance coverage in the event that problems arise in carrying out the work. 
The company's facility manager was appointed to thoroughly research potential 
providers. Key search criteria included reputation for excellence in the type of service 
sought and expertise in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. 
The search process has identified two leading contenders: 
o the IT consultancy division of the company's external audit finn, and 
• a specialist IT consultancy finn. 
Baud in Ltd's policy for choosing professional service providers centres on a 
provider's superior capacity to add value, subject to meeting the corporation's 
financial and other legal and contractual obligations. 
Baudin Ltd's current auditor is one of the Big 4 audit finns, and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for four years. 
The annual fee for the audit of the financial report is currently around $2,200,000. 
The audit fim1 also provides on-going taxation services to the company, for which it 
receives an annual fee of around $300,000. The total figure of $2,500,000 represents 
3% of the average annual revenue of the local (Sydney) office of the audit fim1. The 
taxation services involve some planning, but are predominantly concerned with 
ensuring regulatory compliance. 
The IT consultancy and audit divisions are separately staffed and have separate 
reporting lines, headed by separate partners - reflecting the division of responsibility 
for the respective services. Thus, the IT division would be solely responsible for 
carrying out the project. 
The IT division was established in 1997 in response to the growing international 
market for corporate infonnation technology consultancy services. Baud in 's facility 
manager considers that the finn 's price for the type of IT service sought would be 
around $900,000 for the initial s!age of the service and $150,000 per year for the 
subsequent stage. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading, reputable, international, specialist IT 
consultancy finns, which have also emerged, in recent years, in response to the 
growth in demand for corporate infonnation technology consultancy services. The 
firm, which was established in J 997, would be solely responsible for carrying out the 
project. Again, it is expected that the firm's price for providing the service would be 
around $900,000 for the initial stage of the service and S 150,000 per year for the 
subsequent stage. The $900,000 figure would represent 4% of the average annual 
revenue of the local (Sydney) office of the IT finn. The finn has not provided Baud in 
Ltd with consultancy services in the past. 
All relationships between the prospective service providers and Baudin Ltd arc 
confined to those described above. 
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The two IT service providers arc considered to be comparable with respect to the 
calibre of the staff who will undertake the work, including their technical expertise 
and experience in IT services of the type required. Further, it is considered that the 
operating capacity of both contenders is appropriate for the task. 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation, with an annual sales turnover of 
approximately $5 billion. The company, founded in 1978, is headquartered in Sydney, 
and it employs approximately 9.400 people worldwide. Bau<lin is primarily involved 
in the manufacture of chemical products for use in mining, agriculture. industry and 
the consumer sector. The products arc sold both domestically and overseas. The 
company. which is publicly traded. has a diversified shareholder base and no group of 
shareholders holds any significant influence. 
A ten-member Board of Directors, comprised of two executive members, including 
the company's Chief Executive Officer. and eight non-executive members, governs 
the company. 
The Chief Executive Officer. who has extensive experience in the industry, is the 
Chainnan of the Board. The Chairman has significant input into the nomination of 
members to the Board. The Board is assisted in the discharge of its duties by a 
number of sub-committees. all of whom are accountable to the Board. 
Each of the directors is a minority shareholder in the company. 
An Audit Committee, regulated by a fonnal written charter adopted and approved by 
the Board. assists the Board in the execution of its accounting and auditing 
responsibilities. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of two non­
executive directors and one executive director, who chairs the Committee. The 
executive director holds a senior Australian professional accounting qualification. The 
financial literacy of the non-executive directors is minimal. 
The role of the Committee is as follows: 
I. to advise on the establishment and maintenance of a framework of internal 
control. Thus, it assists the Board in fulfilling its responsibilities for the 
quality and reliability of financial information, including reporting in 
financial statements; 
2. to review issues brought to its attention; and 
3. to re\ iew the appointment and remuneration of the external auditor. 
The Committee meets once every four months. The internal and external auditors arc 
invited to meetings at the discretion of the Committee. The Committee reports to the 
Board after each Committee meeting. 
Bauain Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years experience 
with the organisation. The current senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed 
and bonus components. The fixed component comprises a salary, superannuation 
contributions, and vehicle related benefits. The bonus components include an annual 
cash incentive bonus, payable on the achievement of corporate profitability targets, 
and equity-based remuneration. 
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Baudin Ltd experienced a modest growth in profit before tax in the five years to the 
30 June 2004, notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
management believes that significant efficiencies can be achieved in the future 
through adapting the company's existing computer software to integrate the 
company's accounting function with other major functions such as materials 
acquisition, production and human resources. The adaptation will significantly reduce 
information processing and updating, leading to improved internal decision making, 
and, ultimately, improved financial performance. 
The following steps have, to date, been undertaken to implement the strategy. 
Having first developed a clear definition of the problem, senior management chose to 
outsource the task. The provider of the information technology (IT) service will be 
responsible for both the design and implementation of the adaptation. 
However, the contract for the service will clearly define the overriding responsibility 
of Baudin's management for establishing, maintaining, operating and evaluating the 
IT system, and the consultative role of the service provider. Baudin 's information 
technology manager will be appointed as the project manager. 
The contract for the service will also specify the minimum qualifications and 
experience of the staff who will undertake the project, and that the provider must have 
adequate insurance coverage in the event that problems arise in carrying out the work. 
The company's facility manager was appointed to thoroughly research potential 
providers. Key search criteria included reputation for excellence in the type of service 
sought and expertise in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. 
The search process has identified two leading contenders: 
o the IT consultancy division of the company's external audit firm, and 
o a specialist IT consultancy firm. 
Baud in Ltd's policy for choosing professional service providers centres on a 
provider's superior capacity to add value, subject to meeting the corporation's 
financial and other legal and contractual obligations. 
Baudin Ltd's current auditor is one of the Big 4 audit firms, and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for four years. 
The annual fee for the audit of the financial report is currently around $2,200,000. The 
audit firm also provides on-going taxation services to the company, for which it 
receives an annual fee of around $300,000. The total figure of $2,500,000 represents 
3% of the average annual revenue of the local (Sydney) office of the audit firm. The 
taxation services involve some planning, but are predominantly concerned with 
ensuring regulatory compliance. 
The IT consultancy and audit divisions are separately staffed and have separate 
reporting lines, headed by separate partners - reflecting the division of responsihility 
fcx the respective services. Thus, the IT division would be solely responsible for 
carrying out the project. 
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The IT division was established in 1997 in response to the growing international 
market for corporate infonnation technology consultancy services. Baud in 's facility 
manager considers that the finn 's price for the type of IT service sought would be 
around $900,000. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading, reputable. international. specialist IT 
consultancy finns, which have also emerged, in recent years, in response to the 
growth in demand fc.lr corporate information technology consultancy services. The 
finn. which was established in 1997. would be solely responsible for carrying out the 
project. Again, it is expected that the finn 's price for providing the service would be 
around $900,000. The figure would represent 4% of the average annual revenue of the 
local (Sydney) office of the IT finn. The finn has not provided Baudin Ltd with 
consultancy services in the past. 
All relationships between the prospective service providers and Baudin Ltd are 
confined to those described above. 
The two IT service providers are considered to be comparable with respect to the 
calibre of the staff who will undertake the work, including their tcchnkal expertise 
and experience in IT services of the type required. Further, it is consider,'!d that the 
operating capacity of both contenders is appropriate for the task. 
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CASE STUDY 
Baudin Ltd is a large Australian owned organisation. with l1'1 annual sales turnover of 
approximately $5 billion. The company, founded in 1978, is headquartered in Sydney, 
and it employs approximately 9,400 people worldwide. Baudin is primarily involved 
in the manufacture of chemical products for use in mining, agriculture, industry and 
the consumer sector. The products are sold both domestically and overseas. The 
co, .. pany. which is publicly traded, has a diversified shareholder base and no group of 
shareholders holds any significant influence. 
A ten-member Board of Directors, comprised of two executive members, including 
the company's Chief Executive Officer, and eight non-executive members, governs 
the company. 
The Chief Executive Officer. who has extensive experience in the industry, is the 
Chairman of the Board. The Chairman has si!::,rnificant input into the nomination of 
members to the Board. The Board is assisted in the discharge of its duties by a 
number of sub-committees, all of whom are accountable to the Board. 
Each of the directors is a minority shareholder in the company. 
An Audit Committee, regulated by a fonnal written charter adopted and approved by 
the Board, assists the Board in the execution of its accounting and auditing 
responsibilities. The three-member Audit Committee is comprised of two non­
executive directors and one executive director. who chairs the Committee. The 
executive director holds a senior Australian professional accountiilg qualification. The 
financial literacy of the non-executive directors is minimal. 
The role of the Committee is as follows: 
I. to advise on the establishment and maintenance of a framework of internal 
control. Thus, it assists the Board in fulfilling its responsibilities for the 
quality and reliability of financial information, including reporting in 
financial statements; 
2. to review issues brought to its attention; and 
3. to review the appointment and remuneration of the external auditor. 
The Committee meets once every four months. The internal and external auditors arc 
invited to meetings at the discretion of the Committee. The Committee reports to the 
Board after each Committee meeting. 
Baudin Ltd's senior executive management has an average of ten years experience 
with the organisation. The current senior executive remuneration plan includes fixed 
and bonus components. The fixed component comprises a salary. superannuation 
contributions. and vehicle related benefits. The bonus components include an annual 
cash incentive bonus. payable on the achievement of corporate profitability targets. 
and equity-based remuneration. 
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Baudin Ltd experienced a modest growth in profit before tax in the five years to the 
30 June 2004. notwithstanding the highly competitive nature of the industry. Senior 
management believes that significant etlicicncies can be achieved in the future 
through adapting the company's existing computer software to integrate the 
company's accounting function with other major functions such as materials 
acquisition. production and human resources. The adaptation will !-ihrnificantly reduce 
inti.mnation processing and updating, leading to improved internal decision making, 
and. ultimately. improved financial perfonnance. 
The ti.1llowing steps have. to date. been undertaken to implement the strategy. 
Having first developed a clear definition of the problem, senior management chose to 
outsource the task. The provider of the infonnation technology (IT) service will be 
responsible for both the design and implementation of the adaptation. The successful 
contender will also be responsible for monitoring and upgrading, if necessary, the 
design and configuration of the software for a period of three years, with the option to 
renew at the end of that period at the discretion of B • .iudin Ltd. 
However. the contract for the service will clearly define the overriding responsibility 
of Baudin's management for establishing. maintaining, operating and evaluating the 
IT system. and the consultative role of the service provider. Baudin 's infonnation 
technology manager will be appointed as the project manager. 
The contract for the service will also specify the minimum qualifications and 
experience of the staff who will undertake the project. and that the provider must have 
adequate insurance coverage in the event that problems arise in carrying out the work. 
The company's facility manager was appointed to thoroughly research potential 
providers. Key search criteria included reputation for excellence in the type of service 
sought and expertise in the industry in which Baudin Ltd operates. 
The search process has identified two leading contenders: 
o the IT consultancy division of the company's external audit finn, and 
o a specialist IT consultancy finn. 
Baudin Ltd's policy for choosing professional service providers centres l, , a 
provider's superior capacity to add value, subject to meeting the corporation's 
financial and other legal and contractual obligations. 
Baudin Ltd's current auditor is one of the Big 4 audit finns, and has audited Baudin 
Ltd's financial statements for four years. 
The annual fee for the audit of the financial report is currently around $2,200,000. 
The audit finn also provides on-going taxation services to the company, for which it 
receives an annual fee of around $300,000. The total figure of $2,500,000 represents 
3% of the average annual revenue of the local (Sydney) office of the audit firm. The 
taxation :-.ervices involve some planning. but are predominantly concerned with 
ensuring regulatory compliance. 
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The IT consultancy and audit divisions are separately staffed and have separate 
reporting lines, headed by separate partners - reflecting the division of responsibility 
for the respective services. Thus, the IT division would be solely responsible for 
carrying out the project. 
The IT division was established in 1997 in response to the growing international 
market for corporate infonnation technology consultancy services. Baudin 's facility 
manager considers that the finn 's price for the type of IT service sought would be 
around $900,000 for the initial stage of the service and $150,000 per year for the 
subsequent stage. 
The remaining contender is one of four leading, reputable, international, specialist IT 
consultancy tinns, which have also emerged, in recent years, in response to the 
growth in demand for corporate information technology consultancy services. The 
firm, which was established in 1997, would be solely responsible for carrying out the 
project. Again, it is expected that the finn 's price for providing the service would be 
around $900,000 for the initial stage of the service and $150,000 per year for the 
subsequent stage. The $900,000 figure would represent 4% of the average annual 
revenue of the local (Sydney) office of the IT firm. The firm has not provided Baudin 
Ltd with consultancy services in the past. 
All relationships between the prospective service providers and Baudin Ltd are 
confined to those described above. 
The two IT service providers arc considered to be co:nparable with respect to the 
calibre of the staff who will undertake the work, including their technical expertise 
and e., f1erience in IT services of the type required. Further, it is considered that the 
operating capacity of both contenders is appropriate for the task. 
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Professional Service Providers Study 
Dear Participant: 
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the study is to gain an 
understanding of factors that shareholders consider important when a corporation is 
faced with the task of choosing between alternative providers of professional services. 
You will be provided with a two and one-ha If page description of a corporation, 
Baudin Ltd, which recently decided to alter the configuration of its existing computer 
software, to integrate its accounting function with other major functions such as 
materials acquisition, production and human resources. 
The task is to be out-sourced and a thorough research of potential providers has 
identified two leading contenders: the information technology (IT) division of the 
external audit finn and a specialist IT provider. 
Baudin hires professional service providers on the basis of their superior capacity to 
add value, subject to meeting the corporation's financial and other legal and 
contractual obligations. 
The case study does not reflect the circumstances of an actual company. However, 
every effort has been made to make the study as realistic as possible. 
You will be asked to answer the following two questions on the basis of the case 
description: 
I. Whom would you choose to provide the IT service? 
2. What is the strength of your preference for the alternative providers? 
We appreciate that individuah; typically make the foregoing types of decisions in their 
capacity as managers or directors, not shareholders. However, the views of 
shareholders on the issues involved are important. Thus, we ask that you complete the 
project from the perspective of a shareholder of Baudin Ltd. 
In addition, two further questions ask you to rate certain factors associated with the 
case study. We are interested in your responses to this study, and there is no corred 
or incorrect answer. 
Answering the four questions involves either ticking (,/) a box, or circling (0) a 
number. The project will take around 15 minutes to complete. 
You can be assured that your identity will remain anonymous. Individual responses 
will not be known to anyone other than the members of the research team. Only the 
aggregate results of all participants in the study will be reported. 
Thank you once again for participating in this study. 
Colleen Hayes. Edith Cowan University 
Professor Gary Monroe. Australian National University 
Professor Theodore Mock, University of Southern California 
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QUESTIONS 
Given the foregoing case description and your standing as a company shareholder, 
please answer the following questions. 
I. Whom would you chose to provide the IT service'? 
( Indicate your answer by ticking ( ./) ONE of the alternatives.) 
Audit finn Specialist firm 
' What is the strength of your preference for the alternative providers? 
(Please circle a number for each provider.) 
Audit finn: 
Specialist 
Firm: 
weak 
weak 
2 3 
2 3 
4 
moderate 
4 
moderate 
5 
5 
6 
6 
7 
strong 
7 
strong 
PLEASE TURN TO TIIE FOLLOWING PAC.E TO COMPLETE QUESTION 3. 
HOWEVER, DO NOT DO SO BEFORE COMPLETING QUESTIONS 1 and 2. 
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3. Please rate your perception of the following attributes of the case study. 
(Please circle a number for each attribute.) 
The likelihood that the 
l'Xternal audit of the 
company's financial report 
would be unbiased, taking 
into consideration the 
provision of the IT service by 
the audit firm: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
low moderate high 
The degree of independence 
of the Board of Directors 
from managcment: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
weak moderate strong 
The degree of independence 
of the Audit Committee from 
managcmen t: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
weak moderate strong 
The adequacy of the du tics 
and authority of the Audit 
Committce: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
weak moderate strong 
The financial expertise of the 
Audit Committee: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
weak moderate strong 
Thc threat to audit 
indepcndence from the fees 
for the IT scrvicc: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
weak moderate strong 
Thl' ovcrall standard of the 
company's governancL· 
framework: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
weak moderate strong 
Thl' nl't benl'fits of hiring the 
IT rlivision of thl' audit firm 
to providl' thc IT service: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
weak moderate strong 
Pl.EASE TURN TO TIIE FOi.LOWiNG PAGE TO C0!\1PLETE QUESTION 4. 
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4. Please indicate the extent to which the following factors influenced your 
choice of preferred provider of the IT service. 
(Please circle a number for each factor.) 
The following attributes of Baudin 
Ltd: 
• Listed public company: 1 J 4 5 
N,, J\lodcrntc 
inllucncc mllucncc 
• The diversification of the 
shareholder base: 1 3 4 5 
No �1o<k�uc 
tnllUL'llCL' mtlucncc· 
• Absence of a dominant 
shareholding: 1 3 4 5 
No J\to<lcrn1c 
influence mllucnct..· 
Safeguards of the independence of 
your preferred pro,·ider over the 
alternative provider: 2 J 4 5 
Nil J\hxkralc 
influence mllucm:c 
Competition in the market for 
professional non-audit services: 1 3 4 5 
No J\to<lc-rJh: 
mllucnce inllucncc 
Accountability to shareholders: 2 ·' 4 5 
Nn J\lo,kratc 
lllilUL11CC mlluc:m:L: 
Accountability to other 
stakeholders: 2 J 4 5 
No Modcrnlc 
mllucnce mtluc:nct.· 
Additional comments: 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING (FINAL) PAGE 
<, 
(l 
6 
6 
(l 
<, 
6 
7 
Signilicanl 
inllucncc 
7 
S1gmtkan1 
milUL'llCC 
7 
Sign ificant 
inflUL'llCe 
7 
S1gnilicant 
mfluc'tlcc 
7 
"\1gmlican1 
1111luc:1h..:l' 
7 
S1g.nllii.:unt 
mflm.·nce 
7 
Significant 
inllUL'llCC 
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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMAT!ON 
I. The state (territory) of your principal place of residence. 
ACT. I NSW NT I QLD. SA TAS VIC WA' 
2. The country where you completed your post-secondary studies (if applicable). 
u d n ergra d t C I d" T AFE) ua e me u mg . 
Continental Other 
Australia Europe UK us (please specify): 
(please specify): 
·-
Post raduatc 
Australia 
111.tinental C 
E 
(p 
n··ope 
lease specify}: 
UK 
3. The nature of your shareholding. 
J Direct* =undirect** 
Other 
us (please specify): 
1 Direct & Indirect 
* Shares are held directly in a company/companies. 
** Shares are held via a managed fund or personal superannuation plan 
that invests wholly or partly in shares. 
4. How extensive is your knowledge of the governance of corporations? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No 
Knowledge 
Expert 
Knowledge 
5. Post-secondary educational andtor trade or professional qualifications/training 
(please specify): 
PLEASE RETURN THE DOCUMENT IN THE PRE-PAID, SELF-ADDRESSED 
ENVELOPE PROVIDim 
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